

India & China Contrasting Approaches to Terrorism

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The scourge of terrorism has emerged as an international problem, severely impacting global politics. Long gone are the days when security could be viewed in traditional state-centric terms. Global networks of terror, operating through media encompassing communication tools which were intended to further the forces of globalisation, are the ugly reality of the 21st century. Asia, as a region has not been left untouched. According to the Global Terrorism Index, 2017, India ranks 8th on the list of countries most affected by terrorism, while Pakistan ranks 5th. The countries listed have scores assigned to them with 10 indicating greatly affected by terrorism while 0 indicates not affected by terrorism. Pakistan scored 8.4, while India stood at 7.534.¹

Terrorism is not a challenge faced by India or Pakistan alone. It is, in fact, one of the most significant challenges that

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1 Global Terrorism Index, “Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism”, Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017, <http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf>.

states in the international system face. China, which has clearly emerged as an integral part of the international system owing to its diplomatic and economic manoeuvres, has its own share of woes emanating from sub-nationalist movements among minority groups, which at times have sought the forceful overthrow of the state, despite massive clamp downs.

An early example was the 1990 uprising in Baren, where 200 Uyghur militants armed with ‘advanced weaponry’, according to Chinese sources, attacked Chinese paramilitary forces. According to reports, Afghan trained Islamists set up loudspeakers in the township, urging the local Uyghur population to rise up against Chinese oppression and to establish an independent Uyghur state. The uprising was crushed by Chinese government forces.² There are two contesting views here regarding the nature of the Baren incidents. The first is that of the Chinese authorities, who perceive the incident as an uprising and assert that it was initiated by 200 Uyghur militants, armed with ‘advanced weaponry’, who attacked Chinese paramilitary forces. It is also held by authorities that Afghani militia forces were involved and Islamists set up loudspeakers urging the local Uyghur populace to rise up against oppression and to work towards the establishment of an independent Uyghur Islamic state, all the while praising *jihād*.³

The Uyghur position is that Zeydin Yusup, the leader of the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP) led an unarmed protest

2 MAJ Shawn M. Patrick, “The Uyghur Movement: China’s Insurgency in Xinjiang”, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2010, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a523195.pdf>.

3 Guo, Rongxing, *China’s Spatial (Dis)integration: Political Economy of the Interethnic Unrest in Xinjiang*, Chados Publishing, London, 2015, p. 38.

with around 200 men.⁴ They marched up to the local government office and demanded an end to the mass immigration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang. Alternatly, some sources assert that the protests were the result of forced abortions imposed on Uyghur women by the Chinese government.⁵ Others argue that the protests were the result of local Uyghurs not being allowed to build a mosque. Despite the variance in the attributed cause, the incident was brutally crushed.

Chinese authorities believe that, since 1990, there have been “six stages of terrorism” in Xinjiang and also that, over this period, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)’s capabilities – its tactics, target selection, geographic reach, and international connections – have evolved and grown, as has the danger it poses in the country. Gohel, however, claims that the 2013 Tiananmen Square attack served as the initiation of the “seventh stage” of Uyghur-linked terrorism.⁶

TABLE 1: SEVEN STAGES OF TERRORISM IN CHINA

Stage	Description
Stage 1	Creating an Atmosphere of Terror – On April 5, 1990, violent protests erupted in Baren, a township in Aktu County.
Stage 2	Explosive Attacks – February 28, 1991, an explosion at a bus station in Kuqa County, Aksu Prefecture, killing one person.

4 Remi Castets, “The Uyghurs in Xinjiang: The Malaise Grows”, *China Perspectives*, 2013, <https://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/648#tocto1n6>.

5 Guo, Rongxing, *China’s Spatial (Dis)integration: Political Economy of the Interethnic Unrest in Xinjiang*, Chados Publishing, London, 2015, p. 38.

6 Sajjan M. Gohel, “The ‘Seventh Stage’ Of Terrorism in China”, *Combating Terrorism Center at West Point*, Volume 7, Issue 11, Nov/Dec 2014, <https://ctc.usma.edu/the-seventh-stage-of-terrorism-in-china/>.

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Stage 3	Assassinations – August 24, 1993, two men stabbed and injured Abliz Damolla, an executive committee member of the CPPCC Yecheng County Committee in the Kashi Prefecture and imam of the Great Mosque.
Stage 4	Attacks on Police and Government Institutions – August 27, 1996.
Stage 5	Organising Disturbances and Riots – From February 5 to 8, 1997, rioters calling for a caliphate attacked people and destroyed stores and burned and damaged cars and buses in Yining, Ili Kazakh Prefecture. Seven people were killed, more than 200 were injured.
Stage 6	Poison Attacks – From January 30 to February 18, 1998, Uighur terrorists conducted 23 poisoning cases in Kashgar resulting in one fatality, and four others suffering ill-effects.
Stage 7	A man drove a jeep packed with explosives and carrying his wife and mother into a crowd in Tiananmen Square on October 28, 2013. This resulted in the death of two civilians along with the driver, and two other passengers. Following the attack, Abdullah Mansour, the leader of the Pakistan-based and Uighur-led TIP released a propaganda video praising the plotters and warned of future attacks.

Source: Gohel’s personal interview with an official from the Ministry of Public Security, March 28, 2011.⁷

Clearly, China has been at the receiving end of what it terms as terrorism for a relatively long time span; which means it has an understanding of how non state actors challenge a state’s security.

However, as seen in the case of India’s attempts to list Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) ‘chief’ Maulana Masood Azhar as a designated terrorist by the United Nations (UN), China has repeatedly blocked such moves, with the latest incident in November, 2017, when China obstructed a bid by the US,

⁷ Ibid.

France and the UK to list Azhar as a global terrorist by the UN.⁸

This clearly demonstrates a divergence in the understanding of the issue of terrorism vis-à-vis the two countries. A better understanding of what the convergences and divergences in India's and China's approaches to terrorism are, could possibly facilitate better cooperation. The problem of extremism in Xinjiang is China's primary concern, while the Indian perspective focuses on Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the Maoist insurgency and the multiple insurgencies of the Northeast.

Among the first divergences between the Indian and Chinese approach to terrorism is with respect to Pakistan. On June 28, 2017 a day after India and the US asked Pakistan to rein in cross border terror, China put up a defence of Pakistan, stating that Islamabad has been at the frontlines of the fight against terrorism.⁹ Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang told reporters in Beijing, "China thinks that the international cooperation against terrorism should be enhanced and stepped up. The international community should give full recognition and affirmation to Pakistan's efforts in this regard."¹⁰ In contrast to the Chinese sheltering of state sponsored terrorism from Pakistan was the US approach. Ahead of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi – President Donald Trump meeting in 2017,

8 Elizabeth Roche, "China again blocks bid in UN to list Masood Azhar as a global terrorist", *Live Mint*, November 2, 2017, <https://www.livemint.com/Politics/ABEmOW05luaAgJjaVcrfql/China-says-no-consensus-over-listing-Masood-Azhar-as-global.html>.

9 PTI, "China defends Pakistan, says it's fighting terror", *The Economic Times*, June 28, 2017, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/china-defends-pakistan-says-its-fighting-terror/articleshow/59352142.cms>.

10 "China Backs Pakistan, Says It Is At Frontlines Of Anti-Terror Fight", *NDTV*, June 28, 2017, <http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/china-backs-pakistan-says-it-is-at-frontlines-of-anti-terror-fight-1718008>.

the US State Department declared Syed Salahuddin, ‘chief’ of the Kashmiri terrorist group Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), as a “global terrorist”.¹¹

While it may seem that China is unsympathetic to the cross-border terrorism that India faces because it has not borne the brunt of a comparable terror, the fact is that cross border terrorism has also been a source of concern for China. On 30 August 2016, the Chinese Embassy on the outskirts of the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek was attacked by a suicide bomber who drove a Mitsubishi Delica van packed with explosives into its security gates. The attack injured two Kyrgyz security guards and three Embassy staff. Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Jenish Razakov confirmed that the attack was the handiwork of terrorists. Various Chinese observers asserted that the attack was the work of Uyghur extremists. Li Wei, an anti-terrorism expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, claimed that the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) most likely carried out the attack.¹² Through 2017, however, the Chinese state media reported that the number of violent attacks by “terrorist cells” in China has dropped due to increased security measures; but also cited experts claiming that the level of attempted violence remains high. China says it faces a serious threat from violent extremism, particularly in its western region of Xinjiang, where hundreds of people have been killed in recent years in unrest mostly between Muslim ethnic Uyghurs and majority Han Chinese. However, there

11 Prabhash K. Dutta, “Hizbul Mujahideen chief Syed Salahuddin: Global terrorist for US but a free bird in Pakistan”, *India Today*, July 1, 2017, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/hizbul-mujahideen-salahuddin-global-terrorist-america-pakistan-kashmir/1/991886.html>.

12 Michael Clarke, “China’s Terrorist Problem Goes Global”, *The Diplomat*, September 7, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/chinas-terrorist-problem-goes-global/>.

is no official record of the number of casualties, and a wide divergence in other estimates. For example, according to state media, the explosions and their aftermath in Xinjiang in 2014 resulted in 50 people dead and 50 injured.¹³ On the other hand, according to Radio Free Asia, a dozen people were killed and 100 were injured in the bomb blasts. The report also stated that the injured included 12 police officers.¹⁴ Such discrepancies in data are a constant over the years with regard to incidents in Xinjiang.

According to officials, there is a campaign by separatists in Xinjiang, who want to set up an independent state called East Turkestan. However, rights groups doubt the existence of a coherent militant group in the region and argue that Uyghur anger at repressive Chinese policies is more to blame for the unrest.¹⁵ Several Uyghurs are, however, believed to have joined hands with Indonesian terrorist groups linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In 2016, Reuters reported that Saud Usman Nasution, the head of Jakarta's National Counter Terrorism Agency, stated that Indonesia was cooperating with China to investigate an ethnic Uyghur suspected of plotting a suicide bombing.¹⁶ Uran Botobekov, a Kyrgyz diplomat,

13 Elizabeth Barber, "Chinese State Media Now Put Death Toll From Xinjiang Violence at 50", *The Guardian*, September 26, 2014, <http://time.com/3432189/china-xinjiang-50-killed-luntai-county-uyghur/>.

14 Radio Free Asia, "At Least a Dozen Killed, 100 Wounded in Bugur Riots in Xinjiang", September 25, 2014, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/violence-09252014005018.html>.

15 Michael Martina, "China Says Number of 'Terror Attacks' Is Down, but Threat Remains High", *US News*, March 21, 2017, <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-03-21/china-says-number-of-terror-attacks-is-down-but-threat-remains-high>.

16 Shannon Tiezzi, "Official: Indonesia Working With China to Investigate Uyghur Terrorist Suspect", *The Diplomat*, January 7, 2016, <http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/official-indonesia-working-with-china-to-investigate-uyghur-terrorist-suspect/>.

asserted that the position of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) against the Chinese authorities has become even more radical. If previously the party's strategic objective was to conduct a terrorist struggle against China's power structures and to separate Xinjiang from Beijing, today it has adopted a more global objective. TIP fighters call on the world's Muslims to join the jihad against Western countries in internet videos. Perhaps most worryingly for China, TIP believes that Muslims may fight locally, using various means, instead of going to Syria and Iraq to conduct a "holy war" against the "infidel" Western regimes.¹⁷ In March 2017, ISIS released a half-hour video in which they pledged to "shed blood like rivers" in attacks against Chinese targets. This was the first direct threat that ISIS levelled against China.¹⁸

While there may be disputes over the quantum and nature of terrorist activity in or against China, it is clear that China does face a terrorist threat, as does India. Nevertheless, Indian responses to terrorism in China have been very different from what China has done with reference to terrorist activities in India. An example was the diplomatic row between India and China in 2016, over the grant of an Indian visa to Dolkun Isa – the leader of the World Uyghur Conference. When Isa was granted the permit to visit India, China protested that he was a "terrorist" on the Interpol's Red Corner list, and it was the obligation of all countries to "bring him to justice".¹⁹ India

17 Ibid.

18 Robbie Gramer, "The Islamic State Pledged to Attack China Next. Here's Why", *Foreign Policy*, March 1, 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/01/the-islamic-state-pledged-to-attack-china-next-heres-why/>.

19 "Uighur leader that India allowed a terrorist on Interpol's list: China", *The Hindu*, April 22, 2016, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/uyghur-leader-a-terrorist-on-interpols-list-china-to-india/article8508767.ece>.

immediately cancelled Isa's visa. Isa claimed that no reason was given to him by Indian authorities for the cancellation of his visa.²⁰

There is thus a great divergence in the approaches adopted by the two countries to address concerns of terrorism within each other's territories. In this context, it is pertinent to look at the measures the two have adopted within their territories to address the challenge of terrorism.

THE CHINESE APPROACH

The major terror threats experienced by China, in the official narrative, originate from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the northwest of the country. Since roughly three decades, the region has been rocked by social unrest involving the indigenous populations. Xinjiang principal population is Uyghur, and is increasingly matched by Han Chinese – the ethnic majority of the People's Republic of China (PRC); Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Mongols, and Hui constitute lesser minorities. Among the local groups opposing Beijing's authority some more radical factions have emerged.

Xinjiang today is one of the five minority autonomous regions of China, occupying one-sixth of China's landmass, bordering eight countries, and is the location of an ethno-nationalist conflict of the Uyghurs who constitute 45.84 per cent of the region's population.²¹

20 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, "India cancels visa for Uyghur dissident Dolkun Isa", *The Economic Times*, April 25, 2016, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-cancels-visa-for-uyghur-dissident-dolkun-isa/articleshow/51986138.cms>.

21 Stanley Toops, "Spatial Results of the 2010 Census in Xinjiang", *Asia Dialogue*, March 7, 2016, <http://theasiadialogue.com/2016/03/07/spatial-results-of-the-2010-census-in-xinjiang/>.

Xinjiang presents a complicated minority issue for its links with the wider issues of Islamic identity in Central and West Asia. This Islamic factor, along with ethnic consciousness, has been fused together to produce an ethno-religious conflict. The situation has been further exacerbated in the post-9/11 phase, where the war against international terrorism has impacted the region, and effectively allowed the Chinese government to blur the distinction between separatism and terrorism. Xinjiang represents a case of contest between an ethnic minority and majority Han Chinese nationalism, a contest that is perceived by Beijing as a distinct security threat to the Chinese state.

The current terrorist threat is caused by scattered local unconnected groups rather than a single well organised network with a clear chain of command. There are several sporadic groups resorting to violence in Xinjiang. The violent outbreaks in Xinjiang occur intermittently, and the groups that claim responsibility frequently splinter, merge and collapse. Some of these terrorist groups, which operated or are operating in Xinjiang, were listed in China's official statement on East Turkestan terrorists, published in January 2002. The list includes several groups allegedly responsible for violence, including the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkistan Liberation Organisation (ETLO), the Islamic Reformist Party 'Shock Brigade', the East Turkestan Islamic Party, the East Turkestan Opposition Party, the East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah, the Uyghur Liberation Organization, the Islamic Holy Warriors and the East Turkestan International Committee.²² Yet the approach of the Chinese government has been to constantly blame ETIM alone as being behind most terrorist attacks and uprisings.

22 Information Office of the P.R.C. State Council, "East Turkestan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Their Offences", Beijing, January 1, 2002.

ETIM, however, seems to have been replaced by the Turkistan Islamic Party TIP, or partly absorbed into the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). In fact, in 2008, TIP claimed twin terror attacks in Shanghai and Kunming as well as the attack at the Urumqi Railway Station in April 2014. The vast majority of the attacks, though, remain unclaimed by any organisation, suggesting that the terrorist threat lacks a unified chain of command and that various acts of terrorism are carried out by separate groups, which may have similar goals but generally do not function as a cohesive unit or organisation.

The geographical expanse of Chinese terrorism is visible outside Chinese borders in Central Asia and in the Hindu Kush region as well. Historically, militant Uyghurs fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. After September 11, 2001, the Chinese government charged that Uyghur groups had links with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Earlier, in 1998, local authorities announced that they had smashed twenty “terrorist bases” in southern Xinjiang. Among those arrested were some men allegedly coming back from Afghanistan and Pakistan.²³

In May, 2014 the IMU urged all Taliban groups to target Chinese interests in the region, especially embassies, companies, and Chinese nationals.²⁴ The separatists hide mainly in the troubled North Waziristan region, where they are treated by the Pakistani Taliban hosts as guests of honour, according to Pakistani intelligence sources.²⁵

23 Human Rights Watch, “China: Human Rights Concerns in Xinjiang”, October 2001, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/asia/china-bck1017.pdf>.

24 Tahir Ali, “Taliban Group Threatens to Attack Chinese Interests”, *The Nation*, November 17, 2014, <http://nation.com.pk/national/17-Nov-2014/taliban-group-threatens-to-attack-chinese-interests>.

25 Saud Mehsud and Maria Golovkina, “From his Pakistan Hideout Uyghur Leader Vows Revenge on China”, *Reuters*, March 14, 2014, <http://in.reuters.com/article/pakistan-uyghurs-idINDEEA2D08U20140314>.

After the terrorist attacks in Beijing and Kunming, surveillance and troop deployments have increased both inside and outside Xinjiang. In May 2014, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Secretary, Zhang Chunxian called for a “people’s war on terror” (反恐维稳的人民战争) (Fankong weiwen de renmin zhanzheng). Shortly after, the then Minister of Public Security, Guo Shengkun announced a so-called “strike hard” campaign (严打) (yanda) to crack down on “terrorist elements.” Xi Jinping declared that in order to stabilise Xinjiang, the state’s surveillance nets needed to “spread from the earth to the sky”.²⁶

Official English language newspaper, *China Daily* stated that violent attacks involving or orchestrated by terrorist cells dropped in 2016, citing data from the Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. However, no figures were provided. Nevertheless, Li Wei, an anti-terrorism expert at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, told the *China Daily*, “People should realize that more attacks have been foiled at the planning stage. We haven’t seen a significant drop in the number of attempted attacks”²⁷.

As reported in March, 2017, in its effort to combat separatist Uyghur groups, China is apparently seeking to establish military bases in the part of Pakistan that borders Xinjiang.²⁸ China has pressed Islamabad to crack down on Pakistan-based Uyghur terrorist groups. It was due to pressure

26 Johannes Buckow, Marc Julienne, and Moritz Rudolf, “How the Chinese Government Fights Terrorism”, *The Diplomat*, June 1, 2015, <https://thediplomat.com/2015/06/how-the-chinese-government-fights-terrorism/>.

27 Michael Martina, “China says number of ‘terror attacks’ is down, but threat remains high”, *Reuters*, March 21, 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-security-idUSKBN16S0C5>.

28 Joshua Kuchera, “China Seeking Counter-Uighur Military Bases In Pakistan?”, *Eurasia*, October 25, 2011, <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64379>.

from Beijing that Pakistan banned ETIM, IMU and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU); extradited ETIM leaders to China and carried out military operations to dismantle ETIM's bases in Pakistan. In fact, the operation launched by Pakistan's military in North Waziristan in June 2014, which reportedly focused on ETIM and IMU, was at Beijing's behest.

THREE EVILS

The Three Evils or *Sangu Shili* (三股勢力) refers to the forces of separatism, extremism and terrorism. In June 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that the fight against the three evil forces – “terrorism, separatism and extremism” is a long and arduous task. President Xi made the speech at the latest Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Astana.²⁹ The concept of the three evils is closely linked to China's western provinces, which are resource rich regions, and building a harmonious socialist society as was envisaged at the fourth plenary session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2004, and that requires a stable Western boundary. The three evil forces are projected as the biggest obstacles hindering the construction of a harmonious society in the western border areas.³⁰

What the phrase actually means is a push for cooperation and to rally China's western neighbours against nascent

29 Zhao Lei, “Xi vows to fight ‘three evil forces’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism”, *The Telegraph*, June 19, 2017, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world/china-watch/politics/xi-fights-three-evil-forces-terrorism-separatism-extremism/>.

30 Longpin Ma, 2013. “西部边疆稳定视角下打击“三股势力”法治化研究” *Xibu bianjiang wending shijiao xia daji sangu shili fazhi hua yanjiu* [A Study on the Legality of Combating the “Three Forces” from the Perspective of Western Border Stability], Doctoral Thesis, Lanzhou University, 2013, <http://cdmd.cnki.com.cn/Article/CDMD-10730-1013239296.htm>.

independence movements such as those in Xinjiang and Tibet. In 2006, a *China Daily* report on exercises between the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) members was to demonstrate the determination and capabilities of the SCO member countries to combat the Three Evil Forces.³¹ Additionally, the then Chinese Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang reminded the Pakistani government of its commitment to fight these evils.³² Stila Nicholas Puerava notes that China's identification of the three evil forces, splittism (separatism), terrorism and extremism, are code-words for Xinjiang's troubles.³³ Meng Li, on the other hand, blames Tibet entirely for the three evils, which, he asserts, are the problems causing socio-political instability in Tibet, where separatist forces led by the Dalai Lama resort to fanaticism and religious extremism, using violent and terrorist activities to achieve their political ends.³⁴ Broadly, secessionism in either Tibet or in Xinjiang – both of which are resource rich Western provinces – easily fit the Chinese description of the three evils.

In other words, while China has been trying to internally address the three evils, it also has been seeking international cooperation from neighbouring countries. In fact SCO, which came into existence as the Shanghai Five, began with meetings

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- 31 “SCO Cooperation to Combat ‘Three Evil Forces’”, *Xinhua News Agency*, September 22, 2006, <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2006/Sep/181910.htm>.
- 32 Sam Dupont, “China’s War on the Three Evils”, *Foreign Policy*, July 25, 2007, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2007/07/25/chinas-war-on-the-three-evil-forces/>.
- 33 Stila-Nicholas Puerava, “China’s Separatist Provinces: Xinjiang and Tibet Part of China?”, *The Public Administration and Social Policies Review*, Volume 6, Number 12, 2014, p.62.
- 34 Li Meng, “‘三股势力’与西藏社会政治稳定’ Sangushili yu Xizang shehui zhengchi wending [The Three Evil Forces and the Social Political Stability of Tibet], *Journal of the Party School of Shengli*, Volume 4, p.4, <https://wenku.baidu.com/view/1d8f3d32cfc789eb172dc8ad.html?re=view>.

on improving frontier security. Following the resolution of all boundary disputes between Beijing and the post Soviet Republics, by the turn of the new century SCO's focus shifted to combating 'the three evils' in Eurasia.³⁵

CHINESE GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARDS UYGHURS

Xinjiang was incorporated into the People's Republic of China in 1949, which is known as the "peaceful liberation of Xinjiang" (新疆和平解放) (Xinjiang heping jiefang). In 1949, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) marched into the Hexi corridor in Gansu Province and proceeded towards Xinjiang. At that time, Xinjiang was ruled by a coalition government which was comprised of the Chinese nationalists (Kuomintang) and representatives from the former Second East Turkistan Republic.³⁶

Graham Adams notes that, since the "peaceful liberation of Xinjiang", the PLA has endeavoured to present itself as a benevolent protector of ethnic minorities. Local propaganda in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region features members of the military, linked arm-in-arm with colourfully dressed minorities, all of whom are unified as one family, one nation. However, beneath the official veneer of ethnic solidarity, local Central Asian ethnic groups tend to remain extremely distrustful of the military and Public Security Bureau.³⁷

35 Mahmoud Vaezi, "Goals and interests of China and Russia in SCO", *Center for Strategic Assessments and Forecasts*, October 11, 2011, <http://csef.ru/en/politica-i-geopolitica/416/czeli-i-interesy-kitaya-i-rossii-v-shos-2093>.

36 James Z. Gao, "The Call of the Oases: The Peaceful Liberation of Xinjiang", in Jeremy Brown, Paul Pickowicz eds., *Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People's Republic of China*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2014, pp. 184-189.

37 Graham Adams, "The Xinjiang Perspective: In Photos", *The Diplomat*, April 7, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/04/by-graham-adams/>.

What has also been a constant is the encouragement by the Chinese Government to the Han population to settle in Xinjiang. The resettlement policy, together with huge investments in infrastructure, was, of course, to the detriment of the Uyghurs, who represent today barely 45 per cent of the population in the province³⁸ compared to over 80 per cent in 1941.³⁹

The repression of Muslims in Xinjiang takes myriad forms. 2017 alone, for example, Muslim names for babies were banned in the Province. The authorities banned the names with religious connotations such as Saddam or Medina, on the pretext that they could “exaggerate religious fervour”. Children with banned names will not be able to obtain a “*hukou*,” or household registration, essential for accessing public school and other social services.⁴⁰ On April 1, 2017, the authorities in Xinjiang imposed new rules that prohibit the wearing of what they call “abnormal” beards or veils in public spaces. Punishments have also been imposed for refusing to watch state TV or radio programs.⁴¹ Brutal stories of detention, torture and Uyghur women forced to endure late-term abortions to comply with the now lifted one child policy, from which Uyghurs were supposedly exempted, are galore. Oral and written testimonies speak of the Han Chinese who flood the cities of Xinjiang and are rarely respectful of Uyghur’s beliefs and customs, and who also exclude Uyghur’s from well-paid jobs.

38 “China clamps down on Xinjiang’s Muslims over Ramadan”, *The Observers*, January 7, 2015, <http://observers.france24.com/en/20150701-china-muslims-uyghur-ramadan-freedom-religion>.

39 Ildikó Bellér-Hann, *Community Matters in Xinjiang, 1880-1949: Towards a Historical Anthropology of the Uyghur*. BRILL, 2008, p. 64.

40 Lin Xin, “China Bans ‘Extreme’ Islamic Baby Names Among Xinjiang’s Uyghurs”, *Radio Free Asia*, April 20, 2017, <http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/names-04202017093324.html>.

41 Sophie Richardson, “China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang”, *Human Rights Watch*, April 24, 2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/24/china-bans-many-muslim-baby-names-xinjiang>.

Authorities in Xinjiang's major cities of Urumqi, Hotan, Kashi and Aksu, have also held a series of "anti-terrorism pledge meetings" at which huge numbers of paramilitary police are mobilised in public squares. In a ceremonial show of force these rallies publicly commit themselves to "maintain stability". In May 2017, more than 10,000 soldiers took part in one such rally in Xinjiang's capital Urumqi.⁴²

After the 'incident' in 2009, in which Police crackdown resulted in killing of 100 people and which led to ethnic riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang has become the main focus for repression by Chinese authorities. Yiming Li notes that annual security spending in the region has doubled since then, if not more. In August 2016, Chen Quanguo replaced Zhang Chunxian as the top leader of Xinjiang. Chen was previously in Tibet, where he was responsible for "stability maintenance", and had a reputation for being a hardliner. In Xinjiang, he is replicating his Tibet 'model', and the array of repressive measures such as banning Muslim names, a ban on fasting, etc., stand out as examples. The most appalling step has been the imprisonment of Uyghurs in concentration camps. In August 2018, Gay McDougall, a member of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, stated that there have been reports that Beijing had turned the Uyghur autonomous region into something of a massive internment camp.⁴³

TERRORISM IN INDIA

Terrorism in India ranges from ethno-nationalist terrorism to left wing terrorism to religious terrorism and narco-terrorism.

42 Yiming Li, "China: Regime Steps Up Repression in Xinjiang", *The Socialist Alternative*, May 10, 2017, <https://www.socialistalternative.org/2017/05/10/china-regime-steps-repression-xinjiang/>.

43 "China Uighurs: One million held in political camps, UN told", *BBC News*, August 10, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-45147972>.

A report released by the U.S. State Department in July 2016 noted that more than half the terror attacks in the country in that year took place in four states – Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Chhattisgarh, Manipur and Jharkhand. As compared to China, where the so called terrorist threat emanates only from the Western regions, terrorism in India plagues more than one region, with a wider geographical spread. Further, the underlying causes of violence are vastly different in India's case. While demands for separate states and/or identity based movements are seen in India as well, economic deprivation, land ownership rights and multiple lines of ethnic differences separate the Indian case from that of China.

INDIAN GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO TERRORISM

Since independence in 1947, India has been embroiled in a number of low intensity conflicts. As far as a standard approach to rooting out terrorism is concerned, India lacks one. In fact, according to Major General Sheru Thapliyal of the Center for Land Warfare Studies, "India lacks a coherent strategic response to terrorism; and most of our responses are kneejerk."⁴⁴ However, the lack of a standard response is often due to the fact that the causes and nature of terror-related activities in various parts of India are different. The approach that has been used by security agencies, consequently, differs across the geographical expanse of the country. It is necessary, therefore, to adopt a case by case approach to understand India's counter insurgency responses in its various geographical landscapes.

44 Eben Kaplan and Jayshree Bajoria, "Counter terrorism in India", *Council on Foreign Relations*, November 27, 2008, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/counterterrorism-india>.

INDIAN POLICIES IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

The State of J&K was granted autonomous status by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Gopalswami Ayyangar, Minister in the first Union Cabinet of independent India, who was the principal drafter of Article 370, stated that, for a variety of reasons, Kashmir, unlike the other princely states was not ripe for integration into the Indian state. India had been at war with Pakistan over J&K, and there had been a ceasefire. Yet, the conditions were still unusual and abnormal and part of the State's territory was still in the hands of "rebels and enemies".⁴⁵ As stated by Amitabh Mattoo observes that there was hope that J&K would one day integrate like other States of the Union; which is why there is the use of the term "temporary provisions" in the title of Article 370. This, however, could happen only when there was real peace and only when the people of the State acquiesced to such an arrangement.⁴⁶


The State of J&K is the only State in India to have a separate Constitution as well as a State flag of its own. However, the flag cannot be hoisted alone and has to be hoisted at all times along with the Union flag of India. The Directive Principles of State Policy and the Fundamental Duties of the Indian Constitution are not applicable to J&K. Additionally, the right to property which has been reduced to a legal right from being a fundamental right in the rest of India, is still a fundamental right in J&K.

45 Reeta Trembalay and Mohita Bhatia, "Kashmir's Contentious Politics: The More Things Change, the More They Remain the Same", in Paul Wallace ed., *India's 2014 Elections: A Modi-led BJP Sweep*, Sage Publications: New Delhi, 2015, p.232.

46 Amitabh Mattoo, "Understanding Article 370", *The Hindu*, November 18, 2016, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Understanding-Article-370/article11640894.ece>.

The terrorist threat or the Kashmiri insurgency is largely a conflict between various Kashmiri separatist formations, on the one hand, and the Government of India, on the other. Over recent years, while the number of civilians losing their lives as a result of terrorism has remained more or less of a constant, the number of terrorists killed as well as security forces killed has increased, as seen in Graph 1.

Graph 1: Fatalities in Jammu and Kashmir: 1988-2018



Source: *South Asia Terrorism Portal*⁴⁷

While some of the separatist groups support accession to Pakistan, others seek complete independence. The conflict in the State has strong Islamist elements, and many of the ultras identify with Jihadist movements and are supported by foreign Jihadist groups. Democratic development was miniscule in Kashmir, largely up to the late 1970s, and by 1988 many of the democratic reforms provided by the Indian government had been reversed. As a result, non-violent channels for expressing

47 South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Fatalities in Terrorist Violence: 1988-2018”, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm.

discontent were limited catalyzing a dramatic increase in support for insurgents who advocated violent secession from India.⁴⁸ In July 1988, the Kashmir insurgency began with a series of strikes and attacks on the Indian government. In the 1990s, this escalated into the most important internal security issue in India, and currently remains so.⁴⁹

An estimated INR 250 to 300 million is disbursed to terrorist and secessionist groups in J&K each month, from Pakistan.⁵⁰ Except for a small percentage of funds that is raised through collections and donations made in the Kashmir Valley, virtually the entire funding for militancy comes from other countries, including Pakistan, and various international Islamic organisations.⁵¹ The major contributor remains Pakistan through its external intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Also, Pakistan diverts funds to Kashmiri separatists through various ‘charitable organisations’. For instance, according to a July, 2018, report, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) estimates that Pakistan-based terror groups finance terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir by generating millions in donations through their charity organisations. Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FIF), a charity run by terror outfits Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT); and Al Rehmat Trust, backed by terrorists group

48 Bilal Ahmed Khan, “Peace Process and Prospectus for Economic Development in Jammu and Kashmir”, *International Journal of Innovative Science, Engineering & Technology*, Volume 2 Issue 1, 2015, p. 300.

49 Anshu Sharma, “Insurgent Attitude of Jammu and Kashmir State”, *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention*, Volume 3, Number 11, 2014, p. 52.

50 Kanchan Lakshman and Ajaat Jamwal, “J&K: Financing the Terror”, *Kashmir Herald*, 16 October, 2016, <http://www.kashmirherald.com/main.php?t=OP&st=D&no=382>.

51 Ibid.

Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), have been supporting terrorists and funding terrorism in Kashmir.⁵²

The problem does not end with a mere identification of support and funding from Pakistan. Beyond Pakistan, there is tacit support from China, which keeps reiterating that it wants the dispute between India and Pakistan to be settled amicably, but, continues to extend unqualified support to Pakistan, to the extent that Beijing even backs and is actively funding the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which runs through Kashmiri territory occupied by Pakistan. Professor Srikanth Kondapalli notes, CPEC's array of infrastructure projects across Pakistan is expected to boost not only Pakistan's economy, but also stiffen its spine against foreign detractors. With the corridors passage through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), China is telling the Pakistani establishment – read, its Army and ISI – that it has its back and will implicitly support to the latter's policy of continuous exfiltration of terrorism across the Line of Control and International Border, into India.⁵³

Additionally, as has been briefly mentioned previously, in March 2016, China was the only member in the 15 nation United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to put a hold on India's application to list Pakistani terror group JeM 'chief' and Pathankot terror attack mastermind Masood Azhar as a designated terrorist by the UN. Azhar's listing on the 1267 sanctions list would subject him to an assets freeze and travel ban. China had in February, 2016 blocked the US move to designate Azhar as a global terrorist. The deadline for China

52 "Government keeping close watch to check terror funding in Kashmir", *The Economic Times*, 14 July, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/government-keeping-close-watch-to-check-terror-funding-in-kashmir/articleshow/58843981.cms>.

53 Srikanth Kondapalli, "As PM Modi Skips China Summit, Beijing Stakes Are High", *Indian Defence Research Wing*, April 25, 2017, <http://idrw.org/as-pm-modi-skips-china-summit-beijing-stakes-are-high/>.

to take action on its technical hold was till August 2, 2016. After the deadline of August 2 passed, China again extended by three months its technical hold on the US, France and UK-backed proposal to list Masood Azhar as a designated terrorist by the UN.⁵⁴ In October, 2016 again, China blocked the move to list Azhar in the designated list of terrorists. In 2017, for the fourth time, China blocked India's bid to list Azhar at the 1267 committee.⁵⁵ In September 2018, Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi defended Beijing's repeated blockade of India's bids at the United Nations to list Azhar as a global terrorist, arguing that the issue lacks 'consensus' among the members of the UN Security Council and the concerned parties – India and Pakistan.⁵⁶

The Indian government approach to the insurgency in J&K is to seek dialogue with key stake holders in the Valley, instead of an outright repression of Kashmiri aspirations. What needs to be pointed out in the context of Kashmir is the presence of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). The law was first implemented on July 5, 1990, when the entire law and order machinery collapsed in the Valley and normal law was found inadequate to tackle rising armed militancy. The then State Government declared the Kashmir Valley as a disturbed area under Section 3 of AFSPA. Later, on August 10, 2001,

54 "China Again Blocks UN Terror Tag For Jaish Chief Masood Azhar", *NDTV*, August 3, 2017, <http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/china-again-blocks-un-terror-tag-for-jaish-chief-masood-azhar-1732841>.

55 "China blocks moves to list Masood Azhar as global terrorist: Official", *The Economic Times*, November 2, 2017, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/no-consensus-over-listing-azhar-as-global-terrorist-china/articleshow/61457780.cms>.

56 "Chinese FM defends move to block India's bids at UN to list Azhar Masood as global terrorist", *PTI*, September 29, 2018, Accessed on November 24, 2018, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/chinese-fm-defends-move-to-block-indias-bids-at-un-to-list-azhar-masood-as-global-terrorist/articleshow/66004247.cms>.

the J&K government extended the disturbed area provision to the Jammu province as well.⁵⁷ There have been several complaints of human rights violations by the armed forces in the Valley. However, the violations are not government policy, as is the case of Xinjiang where discriminatory laws dictate personal matters, such as those of religion and personal faith.

NAXAL AFFECTED AREAS IN INDIA AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

The Left Wing Extremism (LWE) Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) observes,


A number of Left Wing Extremist outfits have been operating in certain remote and poorly connected pockets of the country for a few decades now. The CPI (Maoist) Party, is the major Left Wing Extremist outfit responsible for majority of incidents of violence and killing of civilians and security forces and has been included in the Schedule of Terrorist Organisations along with all its formations and front organisations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The CPI (Maoist) philosophy of armed insurgency to overthrow the Government is unacceptable under the Indian Constitution and the founding principles of the Indian State. The Government has given a call to the Left Wing Extremists to abjure violence and come for talks. This plea has been rejected by them, since they believe in violence as the means to capture State power.⁵⁸

57 Naseer Ganai, “25 years on, AFSPA remains a dirty word in Jammu and Kashmir”, *India Today*, July 9, 2015, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/afspa-disagreement-jammu-and-kashmir-armed-militancy-cmp-bjp-pdp/1/450142.html>.

58 “The Dynamics of Maoist Insurgency”, Left Wing Extremism Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, Accessed on November 24, 2018, https://mha.gov.in/division_of_mha/left-wing-extremism-division.

The MHA’s Annual Report, 2017, noted that there had been a decline in Left Wing related incidents. In 2016, the number of LWE related incidents and deaths was 1,048 and 278, respectively; the comparable numbers in 2015 were 1,089 and 230, respectively.⁵⁹ Graph 2 reflects the trends in LWE-linked fatalities.

GRAPH 2: FATALITIES IN LEFT WING EXTREMISM: 2005-18



Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal⁶⁰

Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha and Maharashtra are presently considered the worst affected states. Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Telangana are the other affected states.⁶¹

59 Ministry of Home Affairs, “Annual Report 2016-17, 2017, p 4, https://mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/annual_report_18082017.pdf.

60 South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Fatalities in Left-wing Extremism: 2005-18”, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/maoist/data_sheets/fatalitiesnaxal05-11.htm.

61 Arjun Raghunath, “Maoists Bid for Base Foiled: MHA”, *Deccan Chronicle*, April 19, 2017, http://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/in-other-news/190417/maoists-bid-for-base-failed-mha.html?fromNewsdog=1&utm_source=NewsDog&utm_medium=referral.


The Government of India's approach has emphasised security, development, ensuring entitlements and rights of local communities, improving governance and public perception management. High level deliberations and interactions with the State Governments concerned has been a constant. The various forces that are executing not just counter insurgency operations, but also efforts to restore the stability of the affected areas, include the Central Armed Police Forces, India Reserve Battalions, State Police Forces, State Special Forces and the Central Reserve Police Force's Commando Battalion for Resolute Action. A number of Counter Insurgency and Anti Terrorism schools have been set up to improve the response capabilities of the States. The underlying philosophy of the Government has been to enhance the capacity of the State Governments to tackle the Maoist menace in a concerted manner.

With respect to the Forces, there have been several complaints and grievances of citizens in affected areas. Some of these cases have been taken up by State or National Human Rights Commissions; while grievances have been addressed, others remain.

NORTHEAST INDIA AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

A quick look at available statistics reveals that in the year 2016, there were 160 terror related casualties in Northeast India. This sees a reduction from 2015, the number of which stood at 273. Graph 3 shows casualties related to terrorism in the region.

GRAPH 3: FATALITIES DUE TO TERRORISM IN NORTHEAST INDIA: 1992-2018



Source: *South Asia Terrorism Portal*⁶²

There are over a hundred groups which use terrorism as a tool and have operated in the Northeastern region at various times since India’s independence. Almost all the groups are either seeking (or sought) independence or autonomy. Shared international boundaries and the geographical terrain actually make counter-insurgency difficult in the region. Out of the four countries that the region shares boundaries with, three are known to have been sanctuaries for terrorist groups. Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan share over 4,500 miles of border territory with India, with varying levels of security. Almost all of the Indian terror groups operating in the Northeast have had camps that provided or provide sanctuary, training, and external support. Many borders lack absolute and clear demarcation and are culturally porous, with similar ethnic groups on both sides of the existing boundaries, making cross border absorption and assimilation even easier. In the past,

62 South Asia Terrorism Portal, “Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in India’s Northeast 1992-2018”, <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/fatalitiesnortheast2006.htm>.

India has had either joint patrolling or operations with the help of its international counterparts or intelligence sharing to address this form of terrorism. For examples, Myanmar and India established border agreements to address drug trafficking. In 1995, the two sides also launched Operation Golden Bird, which tracked down and neutralized a rebel column that picked up a large consignment of weapons at the Wyakaung Beach on the Myanmar- Bangladesh coast, south of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. The consignment was moving through the jungles of Mizoram.⁶³ In January 2006, India and Myanmar conducted some joint military operations inside Myanmar to flush out militants from National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Khaplang (NSCN-K) group. This was supposedly done in exchange of transfer of some military equipment to the Myanmar Army by India, following high-level visits by the Indian President, Defence Minister and Air Force chief to Myanmar.⁶⁴ With Bhutan, in 2015 India announced an agreement to increase the Bhutanese military presence on the border. In December 2003, “Operation All Clear” was conducted inside Bhutan to eliminate Northeastern militant groups based in South Bhutan, and about 30 militant camps belonging to the United Liberation Frontiers of Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Frontier of Bodoland and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) were targeted. The then Indian Army Chief, General N.C. Vij, had announced that 650 militants had been “neutralised” — either killed or

63 “Lest We Forget: Operation Golden Bird (Mizoram Border, April-May 1995)”, *The Northeast Today*, 17 June 2016, <https://thenortheasttoday.com/lest-we-forget-operation-golden-bird-mizoram-border-april-may-1995/>.

64 Sushant Singh, “Myanmar strike: Not the first time Army conducted cross-border operations”, *The Indian Express*, June 10, 2015, <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/army-crossed-border-to-target-militants-in-the-past-too/>.

captured — during the operations.⁶⁵

With Bangladesh, various forms of border cooperation have helped in delivering a substantial blow to the ULFA. The process commenced in 2009, after the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League Government came to power, and the first few years witnessed the most significant gains with the expulsion of all major terrorist groups from Bangladeshi soil. The report of ULFA ‘chairman’ Rajiv Rajkonwar *alias* Arabindo Rajkhowa’s arrest in Bangladesh on November 30, 2009, and his handover to India signaled the beginning of significant cooperation between India and Bangladesh with regard to terrorism. In 2010, Bangladesh arrested ULFA leader Ranju Chowdhury from its northern District of Mymensingh.⁶⁶ Further, in 2015, in a move that was seen as a major boost to security cooperation, authorities in Dhaka handed Anup Chetia, a top ULFA leader, over to India, 18 years after his arrest in Dhaka.⁶⁷ Besides these developments, the defense services of the two countries have also been participating in joint counter-terrorism exercises. Sampriti, the joint exercise operation between the Indian and the Bangladeshi armies has completed seven rounds,⁶⁸ the last of which was held at the Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School in Vairengte, in Mizoram (India) in 2017.

65 Ibid.

66 “ULFA leader arrested in Bangladesh”, *PTI*, June 7, 2018, <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ULFA-leader-arrested-in-Bangladesh/articleshow/6019587.cms>.

67 Haroon Habib and Vijaita Singh, “Dhaka hands over top ULFA leader to India”, *The Hindu*, November 11, 2015, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ulfa-leader-anup-chetia-handed-over-to-india-by-bangladesh/article7865894.ece>.

68 “India, Bangladesh hold joint military training exercise”, *PTI*, July 12, 2018, Accessed on November 25, 2018, <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-bangladesh-hold-joint-military-training-exercise/articleshow/61675156.cms>.

In 2017 the two countries resolved to step up anti terror cooperation, as PM Narendra Modi termed the spread of radicalism as a grave threat not just to the two countries, but to the entire region. Previously, in 2016, India and Bangladesh agreed to enhance anti terrorism cooperation, during the India-Bangladesh Home Ministers' Dialogue. During the Dialogue, the bilateral extradition treaty was also amended to facilitate prompt exchange of wanted terrorists and other criminals.⁶⁹

In the case of China, such cooperation is rare. In November 2015, the two countries issued a joint statement on internal security, marking out new areas for cooperation in meeting counter-terrorism challenges, exchanging information on terror groups and streamlining channels of communication on security-related issues. The brief statement – issued by India's Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security of China – laid out the contours of cooperation under the broad theme of “combating international terrorism”⁷⁰.

Since Xi Jinping took office in 2013, he has often publicly spoken of ways to bring about a safer world. At the SCO summit in Astana in 2017, he stated “destabilising factors and uncertainties are on the rise”. China is willing to work together with all parties to “build a common home of security, stability, development and prosperity”⁷¹. At the UN, in January 2017,

69 “India Bangladesh to Fight Terrorism Jointly”, *PTI, India Today*, July 28, 2016, Accessed on August 9, 2017, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/india-bangladesh-to-fight-terror-jointly/1/726467.html>.

70 Sutirtho Patranobis, “India, China issue joint statement on counter-terrorism cooperation”, *Hindustan Times*, November 21, 2015, <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/india-china-issue-joint-statement-on-counter-terrorism-cooperation/story-eoce8KHUNJDg3tkyCsMunL.html>.

71 “Full Text of Chinese President's Speech at 17th SCO Summit”, *Xinhua*, June 9, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-06/09/c_136353884.htm.

Xi urged all countries to build a world of common security for all, observing,

A country cannot have security while others are in turmoil, because threats facing other countries may haunt it also. When neighbours are in trouble, instead of tightening your own fences, you should extend a helping hand to them.⁷²

Yet, as stated by India's former Foreign Secretary, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the first ever India- China Think Tanks' Forum in New Delhi in 2016, there is no effective cooperation mechanism between India and China to deal with the issue of terrorism.⁷³ The example of blocking India's attempts at the UN to list Masood Azhar in the 1267 Committee is worthy of mention again in this context. In contrast to what Xi Jinping stated at the UN regarding extending a helping hand instead of tightening one's own fences, when a neighbour is in trouble, China has actually been not just tightening its own fence, but sitting on the fence and urging trouble makers to further trouble an already troubled neighbour. Beyond utter disregard for as burning an issue as terrorism at the level of the UN, China has tacitly aided terrorism backed by Pakistan as also in India's Northeast, while stonewalling complaints from the Indian side.

CHINESE SUPPORT TO TERRORISM IN NORTHEAST INDIA

In the month of June 2017, two discrete events took place in India, which have a common linkage to terrorism in terms of ammunition and training. One was the Police and the Special Forces – 10 (SF-10) encounters with the Garo

72 "Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind", *Xinhua*, January 19, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/19/c_135994707.htm.

73 S. Jaishankar, "No effective India-China cooperation in fighting terror: Jaishankar", India-China Think Tanks Forum, December 9, 2016.

National Liberation Army (GNLA) in West Khasi Hills, which left two cadres dead, and where a Chinese rifle and one Single Barrel Muzzle Loading (SBML) gun were recovered.⁷⁴ The second was the neutralization of an illegal gun manufacturing unit in Langol Games Village in Manipur. It was reported that, along with the guns, 97 demand letters of the “Terrorist Revolutionary Army”, and a few more intriguing articles were recovered from the unit.⁷⁵ Earlier, in 2015, days after a terrorist attack in Manipur in which 18 Indian soldiers were killed, Indian intelligence agencies stated that they suspected a Chinese angle. News reports citing a senior government official claimed that NSCN-Khaplang abrogated its ceasefire pact with the Centre following instructions from China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).⁷⁶ In response, Chinese officials refuted these allegations, declaring such charges “absurd” and such a linkage “impossible”.⁷⁷ It is already common knowledge that the leader of the group, S.S. Khaplang, when he was alive, and Paresch Baruah of ULFA, often shuttled between Taga in Myanmar and Ruili in China – and were in regular touch with Chinese officials. *The Hindustan Times* reported in 2015 that

74 Sidhanth Majumder, “Chinese Claw in Northeast India Insurgency: An exposition on NE terror outfits”, *The Northeast Today*, June 15, 2017, <https://thenortheasttoday.com/chinese-claw-in-northeast-india-insurgency-an-exposition-on-ne-terror-outfits/>.

75 “Manipur: Revolutionary Peoples’ Front (RPF) militant involved in attack on security convoy arrested”, *The Northeast Today*, July 22, 2017, <https://thenortheasttoday.com/manipur-revolutionary-peoples-front-rpf-militant-involved-in-attack-on-security-convoy-arrested/>.

76 “Did NSCN-K scrap truce with India following directive from Chinese army?”, *DNA India*, June 8, 2015, <http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-did-nscn-k-scrap-truce-with-india-following-directive-from-chinese-army-2093633>.

77 “After Myanmar strike, China denies PLA links with Manipur attackers”, *The Indian Express*, June 10, 2015, <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/china-denies-pla-links-with-manipur-attackers/>.

Chinese intelligence played “an active role” in assisting nine northeast Indian insurgent groups to form a united front.⁷⁸ The illicit flow of Chinese arms to India was confirmed by the then Home Secretary G.K. Pillai in 2010.⁷⁹

Bertil Lintner, in his book *China’s India War*, rightly notes that Chinese influence on India’s Northeast is immense, that China has not ceased support to the rebels in the Northeast, and that these groups buy weapons on what is euphemistically called the black market in China.⁸⁰

THE CONVERGENCES AND THE DIVERGENCES

In 1901, following the assassination of the then US President William McKinley by an anarchist terrorist, Theodore Roosevelt stated that anarchy is a crime against the entire human race, and that such a crime should be made an offence against the law of nations, like piracy and the slave trade; as anarchy was a “far blacker infamy than either”.⁸¹ Post 9/11, a period of history has begun where states in the international system have been challenged in unorthodox ways. Such challenges come from within and from outside, and are backed by a host of parties with global linkages. Each state in the system has been trying to meet these challenges and has had varied levels

78 Brahma Chellany, “Doklam standoff: India must be ready to give China a real bloody nose”, *Hindustan Times*, July 22, 2017, <https://www.hindustantimes.com/opinion/doklam-standoff-india-must-be-ready-to-give-china-a-real-bloody-nose/story-APFZAV2LoQH2QErI5AykDL.html>.

79 Shashank Ranjan, “Militarisation of India’s Maoist Movement: Arms Production, Прокьюремент and Proliferation”, *CLAWS Journal*, Winter 2015, p.79, http://www.claws.in/images/journals_doc/1990977502_shashankranjan.pdf.

80 Bertil Lintner, *China’s India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2018, p.27.

81 Theodore Roosevelt, *Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Project Gutenberg: Washington, 2012, p. 32.

of success as well as failure; India and China are clearly no exception to this phase of history. Even though the challenge more or less remains the same for states, the measures adopted have varied widely. While there are some similarities in the approaches that have been adopted to deal with non-traditional security threat, several dissimilarities persist.

As far similarities are concerned, both India and China have understood that surveillance in areas prone to terrorist challenges is a must. In 2015, Xi Jinping declared that in order to stabilise Xinjiang, the state's surveillance net needed to "spread from the earth to the sky". In India, in December 2016, it was reported that surveillance cameras were to be reinstalled across the Kashmir Valley, starting with 46 locations in Srinagar⁸² – although the intensity of surveillance conceptualized is a mere shadow of the Chinese project. There is also similarity in the Indian and Chinese responses to terrorism with regard to mobilisation of security forces. In 2014, it was reported that 3,000 former members of the PLA were shipped into communities in Xinjiang in an attempt to maintain stability following a wave of riots and terror attacks.⁸³ Also, in 2016, it was reported that 10,000 soldiers of the PLA's Xinjiang Military Command participated in a military drill. In the Indian case, the much-detested AFSPA already exists in both J&K, and several Northeastern states. Additionally, the Central Paramilitary Forces are frequently called in to address the Maoist insurgency. In both, India, as well as China, insurgents and terrorists get material and arms support from

82 Abdul Mohamin, "New Surveillance Cameras Come Up", *Kashmir Reader*, December 28, 2016, <http://kashmirreader.com/2016/12/28/new-surveillance-cameras-come-up/>.

83 Tom Phillips, "China sends thousands of troops to combat Xinjiang violence", *The Telegraph*, November 28, 2014, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11259959/China-sends-thousands-of-troops-to-combat-Xinjiang-violence.html>.

across international boundaries, besides having access to safe havens across international borders.

The divergences in attitudes and approaches to terrorism between India and China are far greater in comparison to the convergences. To start with, the perception on Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism is vastly different in India and China. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang told reporters in Beijing, “China thinks that the international cooperation against terrorism should be enhanced and stepped up. The international community should give full recognition and affirmation to Pakistan’s efforts in this regard”.⁸⁴ The second divergence lies in listing JEM chief Masood Azhar at the 1267 Committee. India, of course, sees Pakistan as a principal source of terrorism in the country and across the region.

Major differences also exist in the policies adopted in Xinjiang versus those adopted by India. While ‘striking hard’ as a policy has been advocated and adopted in Xinjiang, along with a curtailment of forms of religious expression including beards, clothing or cultural manifestations, in India there is the existence of Article 370 in J&K, which allows for a separate Constitution for the State, an expression of the hope that someday the people of the State will themselves seek full integration with the Indian state, on par with other States of the Union. Similarly, in Northeast India, political space has been created to accommodate ethnic diversity by the creation of new States or, for example in Assam, the creation of various territorial councils such as the the Bodoland Territorial Council.

In the Chinese case, there are no official statistics available on the number of casualties or number of terrorist attacks. In

84 “China defends Pakistan, says Islamabad was at frontlines of fight against terrorism”, *The Indian Express*, June 28, 2017, <https://indianexpress.com/article/pakistan/china-defends-pakistan-says-islamabad-was-at-frontlines-of-fight-against-terrorism-modi-trump-joint-statement-4726032/>.

fact, there is absolute lack of even secondary data on the issue for China. In the Indian case, detailed data is available from the MHA, as well as from various State police forces.

In China, the effort to combat terrorism also includes plans of establishment of military bases in Pakistan. In June 2017, it was reported by the Pentagon, “China most likely will seek to establish additional military bases in countries with which it has a longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic interests, such as Pakistan.”⁸⁵ In 2016, China began building its first overseas base in the African nation of Djibouti, which is already home to Camp Lemonnier, a U.S. installation, responsible for counter terrorism operations in the Persian Gulf and east and north Africa⁸⁶. India does not have bases in other countries; neither does it have plans of setting up military bases on the grounds of fighting terrorism.

While in Xinjiang, the state engages in demographic engineering through the active resettlement of Han Chinese, in India the status of local populations is protected. In J&K, for example, Article 35A, though hotly debated, restricts the right to property to local ‘residents’ alone, and outsiders to the State cannot own any property in the State. Further, religious freedoms is a fundamental right in India, while invasive limitations are imposed on religious practices in China.

While there are several allegations of human rights violations by security forces in sensitive areas such as J&K,

85 Phil Stewart, “U.S. says China likely to build more overseas bases, maybe in Pakistan”, *Reuters*, June 7, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-military-idUSKBN18X2W8>.

86 Benjamin Haas, “China to set up military bases in Pakistan – Pentagon report”, *The Guardian*, June 7, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/07/china-to-set-up-military-bases-in-pakistan-pentagon-report>.

the Maoist belt, and Northeast India, these occur as individual aberrations and correctives in the form of constitutional bodies such as the National and State Human Rights Commissions, as well as an activist Court system, have long been in existence. In Xinjiang or Tibet there is no appeal to any independent authority for any excesses committed by the State, and a wide range of abuses are integral to state policy.

The geographical spread of extremism is restricted to the Western provinces in China. In India's case, the spread of terrorism or extremism is across the length and breadth of the country. The underlying causes of extremism in India are greater than China's, as reasons comprehend economic deprivation, religious and ethnic fissures, contested land ownership, and a range of other grievances. In India, the government has had several dialogues with separatists and extremist groups, be it in J&K, in Northeast India or with the Left Wing Extremists. In Xinjiang, such a dialogue is yet to take place.

In China's position on terrorism there are divergences between its official statements and its actual actions. The exemplifying case in this context is that of blocking India's bid at the 1267 committee to list Azhar as an international terrorist. India has not engaged in such double speak. Further, in its attempts to eradicate extremism and terrorism, China has undertaken a more concerted approach at the level of SCO. In India's case such cooperation on terrorism, despite several attempts, has not been possible, largely because of Pakistan's double standards on terrorism. Cooperation on the issue of terrorism is extremely difficult for India and China which have different approaches and stances towards international terrorism. Nevertheless, more dialogue on the issue to find out possible future areas of cooperation would be welcome.

SOUTH ASIA TERRORISM PORTAL

SOUTH ASIA TERRORISM PORTAL (SATP) is a major platform for the projection of data, research, analysis and news on terrorism in South Asia, and provides critical new inputs for the counter-terrorism effort. SATP is the largest and most comprehensive Portal of its kind, and already contains over 85,000 pages of information.

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