Gujarat
Communal Ghetto or Global Enterprise?

I

In the alternating rhetoric of justification and outrage that has characterised the discourse on the Gujarat riots, there are several questions that still remain unanswered. One of the most important, and one that appears not to have been prominently addressed is: In the over two months during which carnage raged across the State, did anyone who mattered really want to stop the killing?

Despite Narendra Modi’s Newtonian theories of communal action and reaction¹, and the apparent mass participation and savagery of the riots – at least in the initial phase – the truth is, once a clear declaration of intent was visible, the ‘action-reaction cycle’ was very quickly brought and held under control, even though there was a significant withdrawal of para-military forces and the Army.² Crucially, a semblance of order was restored by the very Police who had been accused of collapse and complicity in the preceding months, and who the media had pronounced to be incapable of acting impartially. It is consequently and abundantly clear, and has been reiterated endlessly in the ‘secular’ critique of the riots, that the Gujarat government, and possibly the Centre, lacked the ‘political will’ (more crudely, the simple desire) to end the slaughters, and there is ample evidence to suggest that there was a strong motive to trade electorally on the communal polarisation that had been engineered through the violence.

What is unnoticed, however, is the sheer duplicity of all other political formations in the country – and very particularly the combined Opposition. Not a single prominent leader from this Opposition attempted to cool tempers, or chose to visit Gujarat, at the height of the disorder. For all their noble perorations in Parliament, not a single political party launched a single initiative to stem the tide of blood, or to provide some succour and relief to the growing numbers of terrified survivors huddled in the scruffy, under-provisioned camps that were set up by what these parties condemned as a biased and unsympathetic administration.

What could the Opposition do? The power and the resources of the state and the control of its coercive apparatus were in the hands of the Modi Government – and that government, the Opposition argued, was itself a supporter, if not the architect, of the carnage. There is a fairly simple answer to this question, and it was provided in the midst of slaughters far worse than Gujarat witnessed, and by an example that is known even to the most politically naïve and ill informed in this country. When Partition riots raged in both the east and the west, Mahatma Gandhi’s obstinate presence in the worst affected areas of Bengal brought an unexpected peace, at least in this theatre of communal butchery. Can India’s political leadership have entirely forgotten Gandhi’s four month long 116 mile walk through East Bengal? And his fast unto death that later put an end to violence in Calcutta? For those who speak of Force availability and allocation, of police and military responses, it is useful to recall Mountbatten’s words: "In the Punjab, we have 55 thousand soldiers and large scale rioting on our hands. In Bengal, our forces consist of one man, and there is no rioting."³

There is, of course, no leader who could can even stand in Gandhi’s shadow in this present age of the pygmy – as India’s Defence Minister candidly confessed, there are no tall men left among India’s leadership.⁴ But the collective and extended presence of the highest leadership of the Opposition parties in the worst affected areas would certainly have had a dampening effect on the rioters and looters – as on their political sponsors. Some leaders, both in the ruling coalition and the Opposition at the Centre made loud protestations of their dissatisfaction with the course of events in, and desire to go to, Gujarat during the period of violence, but ‘wisely refrained,’ as they had been advised by the Gujarat government that this could be a security risk. But this is precisely what both Sardar Patel and Jawaharlal Nehru told Gandhi before he embarked on his ‘foolhardy’ enterprise in Bengal. In any event, if some of these leaders – with their black cat and NSG security cover backed up even by a comparatively inefficient local detail – had chosen to base themselves in the riot affected areas, it is doubtful if they would have, in doing this, exposed themselves to any significant risk. And yet, Gujarat was singularly divested of the visible presence of prominent political leaders from outside the State in its darkest hour. It was, indeed, not just the State and Central governments that failed the people; it was the entire political leadership.

That, however, was not the limit of the failure. Many high profile ‘peoples’ committees’ swarmed in and out of Gujarat at this time, writing poorly investigated, inaccurate and hastily drafted ‘citizens reports’ that, far from documenting the truth and creating pressure for corrective action, exploited the vast and recurrent tragedies of the victims’ lives for personal and partisan projection. Not one of these ‘committees’, whether they belonged to established or quasi-governmental bodies (such as the National Human Rights Commission, the National Commission for Women, etc.), or the many organisations and delegations from the voluntary sector, and the ‘independent fact finding commissions’, camped in the troubled areas for any length of time. Most of them simply flew in and out within twenty-four hours, committing less time to their ‘inquiries’ than was either sufficient to objectively assess what had happened, or to significantly impact on the course of events. These were just photo-ops or worse, excuses to push forward a partisan political agenda.

The truth is, hard calculations were being made on the political outcomes of the killings. And the political consensus across the board was that no one really stood to gain if they were brought to an early end. It was only after the political costs began to appear to outweigh the potential benefits to the ruling party that action was eventually taken in the form of K.P.S. Gill’s appointment as advisor to the Chief Minister.

II

One of the recurrent themes in the discourse on this latest round of riots in Gujarat is that they represent an unprecedented break with the past; that here, in some sense, for the first time in India’s history, or at least in post-Partition history, we witnessed a breakdown of the structures and mechanisms of the state as never before; that ‘Gandhi’s Gujarat’ had finally and abruptly lost its innocence to the ravaging march of ‘fascism’; and that the brutality witnessed here was unique and represented a radical discontinuity with India’s history of communal violence.

Each of these claims is, mildly put, contra-factual. More bluntly, this is all arrant nonsense. Despite the enormous controversy his remarks raised, George Fernandes was absolutely right in pointing out that there was nothing unique in what happened this time round in Gujarat; that this orgy of violence lay squarely along a continuum of recurrent communal confrontations that have been instigated time and again by vested political interests located in parties all along the political spectrum. It is equally true that every major riot in this country has represented a comparable breakdown or collusive dynamic in the state structure, and it has frequently been remarked by police professionals that, with a clear mandate, no riot in India can last beyond 48 hours. It is ludicrous and counter-productive, in our efforts to project and underline the horrors of this latest outrage, to deny the reality of India’s disastrous record of recurrent communal violence since the carnage of Partition. Moradabad, Bhiwandi, Bhagalpur, Nellie, Delhi in 1984, Bombay… Like the events in Gujarat, the atrocities and horrors that are associated with these great slaughters have become iconic in their representation of an evil that manifests itself with appalling regularity. Worse still, it is an evil that, again and again, "bears the imprimatur of the state,"⁵ as parties in power abandon constitutional values and subvert the agencies of the state, giving free rein to the forces of hatred. To suggest that state collusion and ‘breakdown’ were something unique to the Modi government is to deride a long history of savage riots in which the agencies of the state either stood by as silent witnesses, or in some of which they actively participated.

As for ‘Gandhi’s Gujarat’ and the Gujratis’ unique proclivity for peace, this blighted State has been the site of recurrent riots since 1969 – when the official record of fatalities was acknowledged at over 660. 1969, 1981, 1985, 1990, and 1992-3 were each marked by major communal bloodletting.⁶ Another source records 106 ‘major riots’ in the State just between 1987 and 1991.⁷ Bhiku Parekh similarly notes Gujarat’s "dubious distinction of having the highest per capita deaths in such violence in the country and causing the highest number of casualties in a single cluster of riots."⁸

As for the savagery of the latest riots, it was enormous and unforgivable. But it was by no means discontinuous with many that preceded it. Recall Surat in 1992, when the rioters not only raped and murdered Muslim girls, but proudly recorded their ‘contributions’ to the ‘greater glory of their Faith’ on videotapes that were, subsequently, privately circulated among their sympathisers and members of their sponsoring groups, presumably as an inspiration for the future.⁹

None of this detracts from the enormity of what happened in Gujarat after February 27, 2002. It is, however, necessary to fix unwaveringly on reality, if something constructive is to emerge from our analyses. Passionate diatribes and flights of literary fancy about ‘butchers and genocidists’¹⁰ have, of course, a certain utility in the discourse on as inhuman an occurrence as the Gujarat carnage. They arouse our sense of horror, bind us together in our rejection of the primary actors who engineer and execute such atrocities, and, in some measure, help create a partial psychological barrier – however transient – against their recurrence. But their utility in approaching the tasks of reconstruction and long-term prevention is limited. Indeed, they tend to act upon a narrow audience, preaching largely to the already converted, and can often contribute directly to further polarisation and isolation of the communities.

The point is, the outrage of the Gujarat riots this year must not simply be limited to the evil of what was done in the two months of orchestrated murder that followed Godhra. To treat this sequence of events as an abrupt, unprecedented and unimagined horror is to deny the logic of events, the rising tide of a cynical communal politics that is not just restricted to the visibly communal parties, and the continuous undermining of social, political and administrative institutions over extended periods of time that lead up both to Godhara and to the riots that followed. It is to deny, equally, the history of neglect and collusion that has succeeded each of the riots in the past, both in Gujarat and in other parts of the country. It is, of course, a simple matter to blame and abuse the Gujarat police for their criminal failure to prevent what happened. But who, in the preceding decades, has protested or resisted the continuous undermining of this Force by the political leadership in the State? Who has remarked on the tattered, tented police posts that were set up in ‘sensitive areas’ after the riots of 1969, and that have undergone a continuous decline in facilities and functions since?¹¹ The limited crisis management that follows each wave of bloodletting is hardly any part of an abiding solution to the problem. Managing the peace is, perhaps, even more important than managing the "cessation of violence;"¹² and there has regrettably been little evidence of any social, political, judicial or even administrative movement in such a direction in the wake of any of the riots in the past. Nor does it appear that appropriate processes are being set in motion to this end at present. The cold truth is, in the absence of a concerted effort on the part of a wide coalition of forces from each of these spheres of activity – social, political, judicial and administrative – another round of riots in Gujarat is inevitable. This may occur within the cycle of 4-7 years that has been the case since 1969; or it may fructify much earlier, given the unique circumstances that have emerged in the recent past, including the activities and natural interests of our neighbourhood exporter of terrorism.

III

It is crucial, within this context, to notice the strengthening tendencies to cycles of communal carnage as "rival religious fundamentalisms and nationalisms feed upon each other"¹³, and with the rising right wing mobilisation and what at least some describe as the consolidation of the ‘Fascist’ forces of Hindutva. It is equally important to recognise, however, that "Facism’s firm footprint"¹⁴ is yet to destroy the vibrancy of India’s democratic credentials. As Saeed Naqvi rightly observes,

I refuse to accept the proposition that the brutalities perpetrated by a lumpen mob in Gujarat, admittedly led by politicians, was somehow a precursor to a takeover of India by the Hindu right. How are we going to gauge the Hindu’s political preferences? By his behaviour in Gujarat or by the electoral verdict meted out by him in UP, Uttaranchal, Punjab, Manipur and the two state assembly seats in the very citadel of the BJP, Gujarat?¹⁵

The fact is that democracy – even as imperfect a democracy as the one that prevails in India – is a system where patterns emerge out of apparent chaos. The communal riots in Gujarat appear to suggest a complete breakdown of democracy and constitutional governance. It is increasingly evident that the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP)-led State government and a compromised State police force were substantially subverted, and sided with the majority community through acts both of omission and commission. The Central government also appeared, in the initial phases, unwilling to take any action to bring the situation under control, beyond issuing a number of ‘strong statements’ – many of which were ambivalent. But talk of the dangers of a Fascist take-over by the forces of Hinduva is premature. Even as the toll of the Gujarat tragedy was mounting – and though those who lost their lives, and others who continue to suffer, can never be adequately compensated – correctives were already being administered, despite the obduracy and obstructive attitude of governments both in the State and at the Centre. The secular spine of India is strong, and has responded vigorously to the subversion of justice in Gujarat. It is true that most of the guilty will never be punished – this record is consistent with that of all major riots in India in the past – but political readjustments and a range of independent institutional responses are already transforming the structures of power. As one among the hundreds of critical articles that have appeared in the Press noted:

…even as Gujarat, and India, copes with the communal outburst, what may be of interest to political observers is to note how fascism is constrained – albeit with great difficulty – by a democratic country. This is not something which has been witnessed before since Hitler had strangled democracy soon after assuming power. There is reason to believe, however, that democratic India will strangle fascism before it can do much damage… the elaborate paraphernalia of a free society – the judiciary, human rights and minority commissions, the media, NGOs, etc., – ensured that the fire did not burn out of control.¹⁶

This is a tentative, uncertain process. Its costs are high and it will leave behind a lingering sense of injustice that will inflict its own evils upon the future. Compare it, nevertheless, with the enormity of what happened at Tiananmen Square in 1989, where an estimated 7,000 unarmed civilians were slaughtered, and another 20,000 injured, by the Chinese Army¹⁷ – with no impact whatsoever on the political structure of the state; and this, despite the immense international reaction to the state’s barbarity towards its own people.

India’s democracy is responding – no doubt in conflicting ways¹⁸ – to the events in Gujarat, and there will, over time, be an approximation towards the larger and pluralistic sentiment that remains the essence of this nation. This approximation will be the greater and the more efficient if active and imaginative interventions are forthcoming from the liberal, secular, democratic elements within the social and political system – beyond the continuous Babel of self-serving voices that are projected through the mass media (though these may serve a limited constructive purpose). The rise of fundamentalist forces of all hues has, in fact, been a direct consequence of the absence of such interventions in the past, and of a continuos chain of betrayals by the political formations that have projected themselves under the secular-liberal ideological umbrella, and who progressively allowed secularism to become "equal license for both fundamentalisms."¹⁹ It has also been, in part, the result of a shrill, uninspired and rhetoric-dominated voluntary sector that has failed to establish emotional connections with the larger mass of people; and of an alienated ‘ivory tower’ intelligentsia and isolated ‘intellectual’ movements in the upper echelons of the social structure that lack a command over the language and idiom of the popular discourse, and the ability to capture the public imagination.

IV

The resistance to the ‘fundamentalisation’ of the political discourse, and to the patterns of communal violence that most recently manifested themselves in Gujarat, would have to comprehend, but simultaneously go well beyond, the local communities where such violence has been witnessed. The sequence of events that led up to the Godhara incident, the pattern of communal mobilisation that enveloped much of the State thereafter, and the subsequent political manoeuvres of the RSS-BJP combine, as well as of its lumpen affiliates, inexorably link this latest round of violence to the Ayodhya – Ram Janmabhoomi issue. On this issue, regrettably, we have consistently been missing the wood for the trees, and the fundamentalists have been entirely allowed to define the agenda.²⁰ There has been a persistent and exclusive focus on precisely what they sought to bring into focus – an apparent quarrel over a piece of land. The ‘solutions’ that are being explored, consequently, are various ‘deals’ on the allocation of this land. ‘Land for peace’ is a ‘formula’ that has recently been bandied about in an unfortuitous choice of words that calls to mind the disastrous quest for a false peace between Israel and the Palestinians. But quibbling over property rights or defining some concessions to appease one or the other extremist faction cannot succeed, and must not, indeed, even be considered as a realistic solution.

This is particularly true at this moment in time, when any conciliation of the Hindutva lobby would only constitute a reward for the savagery unleashed in Gujarat. Gujarat was a victory for those who seek to divide the communities into exclusionary ghettos across the country. The Indian state cannot and must not negotiate a ‘solution’ with the most loutish, intolerant and criminalised elements of a community, and in the shadow of brutal massacres. Any such negotiations would strengthen the very forces that engineered this barbarism.

A substantial part of the current discourse on Ayodhya is based on denial and a delusionary conviction that a neat legal or political solution can be arrived at through an engineered ‘consensus’, irrespective of the nature of the conflicting parties. This is folly. The issue here is not a piece of land. It is not a mosque or a temple. The real issue is an ideology of hatred and exclusion and the violent strategies and tactics it adopts for its realisation. This ideology – irrespective of its claimed religious affiliation – is indistinguishable from the ideologies that led to India’s Partition, and that, even today, inspire ‘jihad factories’ and armies of terrorists beyond our borders. There is, indeed, no difference between the political groupings that exploit primordial and irrational sentiments constructed around the ‘Hindu’ identity, and those who have been mobilised by Pakistan’s ruling elite to serve the Islamist ‘jihad’. The herd that has been formed through the ideology of ‘Hindutva’ is politically, socially and psychologically indistinguishable from the herd that has been created through the ideology of extremist Islam. Nor, in fact, despite differences in outward symbols and practices linked to their ‘religious’ identity, are there any real differences in their belief systems. What we have here is lunatic Hindutva vs. lunatic Islam; a mirror image of the Taliban is being created among sections of the Hindus in India, and both these, equally, "embody a lethal combination: a primitive tribal creed, a fierce religious ideology, and the sheer incompetence, naivete, and cruelty that are begot by isolation from the outside world…"²¹

These fanatical groups – as we argue constantly in the context of the ‘jihadists’ in Kashmir – cannot be bought over, and are in fact encouraged, by concessions.²² The VHP-Bajrang Dal combine derives its power – and a large proportion of its revenues – by projecting and pursuing maximalist sectarian goals. A concession on Ayodhya will commit them to revive their demands on Mathura and Varanasi – as also the ‘not three, but three thousand’ other sites that recur in their rhetoric. Even if, for a moment, it is assumed that the extremist Hindutva combine does strike a deal – in improbable good faith – and withdraws its demands on the other sites for a settlement on Ayodhya, this will not bring peace. It would only vacate the extremist space, and this would inevitably be filled by other opportunistic factions or breakaways from the present formations themselves. And the success in wrenching concessions on Ayodhya would then be the model and inspiration for these ‘inheritors’ of the extremist Hindu mantle.

If the state continues to make every action or movement that claims a ‘religious’ or ‘political’ motive an exception to the imperatives of the rule of law, there will be no escape from the rising anarchy that is sweeping across India. There is, now, no alternative to the demobilisation of these formations. As for their proclaimed nationalist pretensions these are easily dismissed in view of overwhelming evidence. Those who spoke of ‘rashtriya gaurav’ (‘national’ pride), have brought nothing but contempt and revulsion on the nation by their actions in Gujarat. Those who spoke of a strong India have, in fact, immensely weakened the country’s case at a crucial time in India’s strategic history. These organisations constitute a grave and imminent danger to the survival of the nation and it is necessary that they be proscribed and disbanded.

As for a ‘solution to Ayodhya’ and the umbilically linked ‘not three, but three thousand’, this will follow only when these become politically irrelevant. Then, and only then, can more rational and discerning elements from each community confront the transgressions of their own history, and accept correctives in a spirit of sobriety and magnanimity.

Till this happens, evil must be confronted and defeated. If you negotiate with evil, it will prevail.

V

Gujarat after the Godhra incident of February 27, 2002, and the protracted communal carnage that followed, has become a place of deep communal polarisation. Incidents of communal violence were subsequently contained by the reintroduction of professional policing initiatives, and some measure of security of life and property was certainly restored. The fabric of communal harmony and the tradition of coexistence, however, have been torn asunder by the rage and excesses of months of carnage, and an abiding suspicion and deep hostility continue to prevail between the communities. These fissures are deepened further by the continuance of large numbers of victim families quartered in makeshift relief camps, unable to return home and to their places of work; by the destruction of the economic assets of the riot victims; and often by the destruction or usurpation of their economic and social roles in their original places of residence.

The extended violence also did enormous damage to the economy and work culture of the State, to international perceptions of its dynamism as one of the primary centres of industry in India, and to investor confidence at large. This is crucial for a number of reasons relating not only to the future of the State alone, but of the country at large.

First, Gujarat has an extraordinary place in the national economy, accounting for nearly a seventh of India’s industrial output, and a fifth of its industrial investments.²³ It is an area of high efficiency of use of these resources, virtually doubling its industrial and services sectors every five to six years.²⁴ But, as has been noted in the wake of the riots in the State, "Economies need stability and confidence in their future to attract investment,"²⁵ and protracted violence, instability and the failure or lack of efficacy and impartiality in governance would necessarily undermine such stability and confidence.

Second, Gujarat is a border State, with the highest levels of urbanisation in the country. This pattern of development implies that the greatest proportion of its wealth and economic resources is concentrated in a few urban centres which become extraordinarily vulnerable to destabilisation and disruption, especially in view of the intent and activities of a hostile neighbour. The security implications of economic uncertainty and political instability in this State are consequently of immense national significance.

Third, the patterns of economic activity and growth that have been experienced in Gujarat in the past cannot be sustained unless there is free and extensive interaction between people, unencumbered by the suspicions and bias that have crept into relations as a result of the communal violence. Gujarat’s growth is based on the high levels of integration the State’s economy has achieved with the globalised economy. It is, however, not possible to simultaneously sustain a thrust towards international globalisation and regional or local ‘ghettoisation’.

Finally, the sum of the preceding considerations is that any significant injury to the future of Gujarat would directly hurt the national interest itself. To this extent, the violence in Gujarat was not anti-Muslim alone; it was anti-national.

The restoration of order, the containment of all incidents of communal violence, and the registration of FIRs against some of those who were responsible for the carnage, have gone some way in creating an atmosphere of greater confidence among the people at large, and the minorities in particular. The polarisation of the communities, however, remains at a high level, and external perceptions of the State remain substantially negative, as attention continues to be focused exclusively on the causation, dynamics and excesses of the communal conflagration, and particularly on the role of various political formations. While such a focus cannot be ignored or dismissed as unjustified, the prevailing atmosphere is a significant obstacle to the tasks of normalisation, of rebuilding confidence and of re-establishing the dynamic character of the State’s economy and society. These are imperatives if the future conflict potential in the State is to be contained. At such a time, consequently, it is important to take initiatives that would expand the discourse beyond partisan and communal politics, and help define a constructive, positive vision and agenda for the people of Gujarat, and for various social, educational, business and voluntary institutions and organisations operating in the State. Such an exercise would directly contribute to the objectives of de-escalation of tensions, focusing attention on practical and productive avenues of action, and catalysing a discourse within the more progressive, forward looking and dynamic elements of the community.

Critically, however, attention needs to be turned to the long term imperatives of ‘managing the peace’ in a manner that would preclude the possibility of a recurrence of the nightmare to which the State has been periodically subjected. This is a gigantic task, and one that will go against the very grain of the character of politics, of social interaction and of governance that has embedded itself in Gujarat, as also against the currently prevailing psyche, both of its ruling elite and large segments of the general population. But it is these factors, precisely, that make the task of reconstruction and reform the more urgent. If these tasks are, moreover, to meet with a sufficient success to prevent future violence, they will have to comprehend far more than has ever been envisaged as a corrective to communal violence in the past, and must certainly include harsh legislation to punish individuals and groups who engineer or engage in such violence.²⁶ It is improbable that the requisite measures will come spontaneously from the existing political formations in the State, in the absence of substantial pressure from the public, the media and, most importantly, the electorate. In this, the results of the impending elections in Gujarat will prove crucial, though not necessarily conclusive. Eventually, the questions that will be decisive are whether the progressive ‘closing of the Indian mind’ can be reversed; whether the political leadership can be brought to attend to the larger enterprise of democratic governance in an increasingly globalised world order; whether we will allow our national destiny to be defined by groupings – psychologically indistinguishable from the Pakistani jehadis – that seek "smaller worlds within borders that will seal them off from modernity";²⁷and whether our leaders are going to be allowed to continue to squander the enormous resources and virtually unlimited potential for development in this country in the fractious, polarised and fruitless politics of the past.

FOOTNOTES

1. See "'Newton' Modi has a lot to answer," The Times of India, New Delhi , March 02, 2002.
2. "Army withdrawn from Gujarat, being deployed at border", The Deccan Herald, Bangalore, May 21, 2002.
3. A widely quoted statement made by the last Viceroy of India, Louis Mountbatten in his telegram message to Mahatma Gandhi in Calcutta on August 26, 1947. Gandhi was then working tirelessly to maintain peace in Bengal.
4. See George Fernandes, "'No tall men around, only struggle for power'", Times of India, March 3, 2002.
5. Neera Chandoke, "The new tribalism", The Hindu, April 4, 2002.
6. Asghal Ali Engineer, "Gujarat: Laboratory of Hindutva," Progressive Dawoodi Bohras, March 2002, http://wwww.dawoodi-bohras.com/spotlight/riots.htm.
7. K.M. Chenoy, S.P. Shukla, K.S. Subramanian & Achin Vanaik, Gujarat Carnage 2002 – A Report to the Nation by an Independent Fact Finding Mission, April 10, 2002, http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/GujCarnage.html.
8. Bhiku Parekh, "Making sense of Gujarat," Society Under Seige, Seminar 513, May 2002, p. 26.
9. See M J Akbar, "Ruling by riots", http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/india_ayodhya/viewpoint.html. Also, Sumit Sarkar , "The Fascism of the Sangh Parivar", http://www.mnet.fr/aiindex/sSARKARonSANGHPARIVAR.html.
10. Arundhati Roy, "Democracy: Who is she when she’s at home?" Outlook India, New Delhi, April 28, 2002.
11. Sheela Bhatt, "There is a realisation there should be peace in Gujarat," Rediff Interview with K.P.S. Gill, May 20, 2002, http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/may/20inter.htm.
12. See, Praveen Swami, "Towards cessation of violence", interview with K.P.S. Gill, Frontline, Volume 19 - Issue 11, May 25 - June 07, 2002.
13. Paul R. Brass & Achin Vanaik, Competing Nationalisms in South Asia, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2002, p. 4.
14. Arundhati Roy, "Democracy: Who is she when she’s at home?" Outlook India, April 28, 2002.
15. Saeed Naqvi, "Introduction", in Amrita Kumar & Prashun Bhaumik, Lest We Forget: Gujarat 2002, New Delhi: World Report & Rupa, 2002, p. 9.
16. Amulya Ganguli, "Fascists in open society," New Delhi: The Hindustan Times, April 22, 2002.
17. James Conachy, "Ten years since the Tiananmen Square massacre," World Socialist Website, http://www.wsws.org/articles/1999/jun1999/tian-j04.shtml.
18. There are, for instance, indications that the BJP-RSS combine is hardening its stance to consolidate the ‘Hindu vote’. See "Katiyar faces tough UP test", The Indian Express, New Delhi, June 26, 2002; "Familiar rant", Indian Express, July 1, 2002.
19. Meghnad Desai, "Gujarat and its bhasmita," Society under Seige, Seminar 513, May 2002, p. 57.
20. The arguments in this section are substantially an elaboration of views expressed in Ajai Sahni, "Ayodhya: Any Solutions?" Economic Times, March 12, 2002.
21. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Lawless Frontier," The Atlantic Monthly, September 2000, http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/09/kaplan2.htm.
22. K.P.S. Gill & Ajai Sahni, "The J&K ‘Peace Process’: Chasing the Chimera," Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution, Volume 8, New Delhi: ICM-Bulwark Books, April 2001, pp. 1 – 40.
23. Yoginder K. Alagh, "The powerhouse and its nemesis," Society under Seige, Seminar 513, May 2002, p. 74.
24. Ibid.
25. Cyrus Guzder, "Is secularism good for business," Society under Seige, Seminar 513, May 2002, p. 70.
26. Bhiku Parekh notes, "If we can have POTA, there is no reason why we cannot enact a far more relevant Prevention of Communal Violence Act." Bhiku Parekh, op. cit., p. 30.
27. Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad vs. McWorld", The Atlantic Monthly, March 1992, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/foreign/barberf.htm.

(Edited version published in Black Book of Gujarat, Edited by Prof. M.L. Sondhi & Apratim Mukherjee, Manak Books, 2002..)