Bhutan Assessment 2003

Bhutan did not witness any significant terrorist activity during the year 2002. However, it remained home to at least three terrorist outfits operating in India’s northeast causing concern to both India as well as Bhutan. The activities of Ngolops (armed Nepalese dissidents) posed another serious threat to the security of Bhutan. Ngolops, referred to by Bhutanese authorities as anti-nationals, are people of Nepalese origin who claim that they are Bhutanese citizens forcibly evicted by the Royal government of Bhutan.

The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) had set up camps in Bhutan after they were driven into the Bhutanese foothills by a major Indian military offensive in 1990-1991. With nowhere to go, they found the 266-kilometer Bhutan border convenient because of its proximity with the northeast Indian State of Assam. However, in recent times the Royal Government of Bhutan has been applying pressure on various Indian terrorist groups like the ULFA, the NDFB and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) to remove their camps from Bhutanese territory. Under an agreement between the ULFA and the Royal Government on June 18, 2001, the former had agreed to shut down four of the nine camps they have been operating in that country, and to relocate their cadres to some other destination, by December 31, 2001. It had also stated its intention to reduce the strength of its cadres in the remaining five camps. The Royal Government of Bhutan had threatened use of force in case of non-compliance with the December 31, 2001 deadline.

Home Minister Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho confirmed that, as of December 31, 2001, the ULFA had closed down the four camps it had agreed to: Gobarkonda, Nangri, Deori and the Military Training Centre in Martshala Geog. Bhutanese officials subsequently inspected the camps and all of them were burnt down to ensure that they would not be used again. However, soon after it was found that the ULFA had opened a new camp on a mountain ridge above the Samdrup Jongkhar – Trashigang highway. As a result, the ULFA currently has six camps within Bhutan. Official sources in Bhutan also admitted that it was ‘difficult to confirm’ whether terrorists from the camps closed down had left the country. Further, ULFA leaders themselves had conceded that most of the men and materials could not be taken out of Bhutan in time as the Indian Army had sealed the Indo-Bhutan border.

The issue of terrorists and their activities was discussed in the Bhutanese National Assembly on July 4, 2002. Members considered that the agreement with ULFA was a partial success as the outfit had closed four camps but also opened a new one. Moreover, it was believed that ULFA had not agreed with the second clause of the agreement of reducing the number of terrorists in the remaining camps. Members were also not sure whether ULFA has closed the four camps or simply merged them with certain others.

Available reports indicate that infiltration of terrorists into Bhutan continued despite an agreement between the Royal Government and the ULFA to the contrary. Though strict checking was done on all the motorable and known routes, terrorists used the various footpaths on the porous Indo Bhutan border to infiltrate and also secure supplies from Assam. Reports also indicated that terrorists from at least two ULFA camps in Bhutan were ready to surrender but the group’s leadership prevented them from doing so for their own survival and sustainability. Moreover, in September 2002, the ULFA had reportedly shifted two of its training camps from their unspecified location in Bhutan to Narphung, also in Bhutan, under pressure from the Royal Government. The NDFB had established three main camps and four mobile camps between Lhamoizingkha and Daifam.

For the first time in year 2002, Bhutan confirmed the presence of a third Indian terrorist group, the Kamtapur Liberation Organization, within its territory. The discovery of KLO’s operations on Bhutanese soil has further complicated the issue of the presence of Indian terrorists in that country. While the ULFA and Bodo groups are located in the State of Assam, the KLO are Rajbongshi tribals of North Bengal, bordering Chukha and Samtse dzongkhags (districts). The KLO had set up two camps, one under Bhangtar Dungkhag and another near Piping under Lhamoizingkha Dungkhag. The increased activities of the KLO along the West Bengal – Bhutan border forced the Indian government to issue a shoot-at-sight order in September to restrict the group’s movement and several encounters were reported between the security forces and KLO cadres in the border areas.

The terrorists based in Bhutan have executed a series of attacks on security forces in Assam and West Bengal. They also targeted civilians and vital installations of the Government of India. After attacking their targets in India, these terrorists invariably return to their bases inside Bhutan. Some of these incidents included the following:

At least 22 people were killed and several injured when NDFB terrorists raided a village on the Indo-Bhutan international border in Assam's Kokrajhar district on October 27, 2002. The victims were from Bihar and Nepal. Four policemen were also injured in a bomb explosion while they were going to investigate the massacre.

An encounter took place between security forces (SF) and suspected KLO terrorists in the Changmari forests, Alipurduar subdivision, Jalpaiguri district, near the Indo-Bhutan border on September 17, 2002. But the terrorists were able to escape after the incident.

On May 26, 2002 terrorists blew up a vehicle carrying Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel inside the Buxa Tiger Reserve located between West Bengal and Bhutan. Six jawans (soldiers) were injured in this attack. Moreover, this was the first attack since the Gorkhaland agitation in the 1980s in which remote-controlled devices were used in West Bengal. After the attack, the terrorists, who belonged to the ULFA, the NDFB and the KLO, fought a pitched battle for six hours with the reinforcements that were rushed to the spot. They set on fire a CRPF camp, which had been established following the increased terrorist activity in the area, before returning to their camps in Bhutan. Though it was known for quite sometime that the KLO had developed links with separatist organisations in Assam such as ULFA and the NDFB, this link was conclusively established after this incident. Reports also indicated that these outfits have formed an umbrella organization to coordinate their activities in the region.

On February 19, 2003, a suspected KLO terrorist was killed in an encounter at Joydebpur Tapu near Kumargramduar, Jalpaiguri district. The slain terrorist and 11 others belonging to the KLO and the ULFA reportedly had come down from the Bhutan hills and gathered at the spot probably to raid Kumargram. But their plan was foiled by timely police action.

Eighteen persons were killed on January 21, 2002, when approximately 40-armed terrorists belonging to the NDFB attacked the Jangalbari Paharpur village situated on the Indo-Bhutan border.

The Police and paramilitary forces engaged in counter-insurgency operations in north Bengal and Assam feel restricted, as they cannot pursue the militants back to their hideouts in Bhutan. India has refrained from sending its security forces inside Bhutan keeping in view Bhutanese sensitivities. There are an estimated 4,000 ULFA and about 1,000 NDFB militants, as well as an unspecified number of KLO activists, holed up in Bhutan.

According to Bhutan, ULFA has six known camps; the NDFB has seven known camps, including three main camps and four mobile camps between Lhamoizingkha and Daifam, and the KLO has two known camps. However, certain unconfirmed Indian reports have indicated that ULFA, along with the NDFB, runs 22 training camps in Bhutan. It was also reported that several training camps were jointly run by the ULFA and KLO.

To deal with the Indian terrorists, Bhutan had declared a four-pronged strategy – peaceful solution through talks; stopping of supplies and rations; prosecution of those assisting the militants; and military action. The Government has now decided to hold talks with the chairman and the military commander of ULFA together because, in the past, it was on the pretext of the absence of one or the other that no final decisions could be taken during the meetings. The Bhutanese Government also no longer wishes to restrict itself to discussions for reduction of camps; it wants ULFA terrorists to close their main camp serving as their headquarters. The Gvernment has also expressed willingness to take military action against the leaders of the ULFA if they refused to relocate their headquarters.

Some Bhutanese nationals were suspected to be involved in providing logistical support to terrorists operating in their country. The West Bengal police detained four Bhutanese nationals on December 22, 2003, at Kumargram near Siliguri, for allegedly providing logistical support to terrorist camps inside Bhutan.

In a significant attempt to check terrorist activity and also to strengthen bilateral ties, India and Bhutan held a border district co-ordination meeting at Jalpaiguri in the Indian State of West Bengal between January 7 and 9, 2002. The meeting decided to take up immediate steps for the identification of the international boundary with realignment of the pillars that were missing, and to share information about militants and criminals. The Government of Bhutan decided to construct a stonewall along the border for security reasons near the border town of Phuentsholing, as this area was being used by the terrorist groups active in West Bengal and Assam.

Another outstanding problem in Bhutan is the issue of refugees (ngolops), which still remains unresolved.

In 1991, there were about 84,000 people in the camps in Nepal who claimed to be Bhutanese refugees.

By the year 2002, this number had risen to almost 100,000 with around 10,700 of them born in the camps.

Both Nepal and Bhutan have agreed to solve this problem bilaterally. The issue of joint verification of refugees was discussed in the Bhutanese National Assembly on July 5, 2002, where Bhutan’s right to screen the refugees was reiterated. The National Assembly also advised the Government to continue discussions with the Government of Nepal to seek a lasting solution to the problem. Home Minister Gyamtsho has claimed that a large proportion of the refugees in the seven camps in Nepal were not genuine Bhutanese citizens.

Bhutan contends that many of these were non-Bhutanese who, after working in Bhutan, had gone to the camps claiming to be refugees. Some ngolops were non-Bhutanese students who had studied in Bhutan.

It also believes that the number of refugees in the camps has swelled because of the easy life in the camps.

With aid coming from international agencies, even local Nepalese had reportedly registered themselves as refugees.

The refugees have demanded publication of the results of joint Bhutan––Nepal verification exercise on the status of refugees, early repatriation and commencing the verification process at the six remaining camps in Jhapa and Morang.

Some significant progress on the issue of refugees was made during the 12^th round of the Ministerial Joint Committee (MJC) meeting between Bhutan and Nepal at Kathmandu in the first week of February 2003. The MJC discussed the resumption of the work by the joint verification team (JVT) so that an early and lasting solution on the refugee problem could be arrived at. In a joint press release in Kathmandu, Foreign Ministers of both the countries expressed their firm commitment to arrive at a "lasting solution" to the issue of refugees through a bilateral process.

A significant development in the Bhutanese polity during year 2002 was the submission of the first draft of the new Constitution by the Constitution Drafting Committee on December 9, to King Jigme Singye Wangchuk. According to the Head of the Committee, Chief Justice Lyonpo Sonam Tobgye, the draft included state policies, rights and duties of citizens, religious pluralism and the state-monastic community, separation of powers, democratic government based on the party-system, political neutrality of the civil service, autonomy of constitutional offices, local governance and decentralisation, structure of government and power and authority of the state apparatus. He added that the draft was drawn largely from the Bhutanese experience as well as from a study of numerous existing Constitutions.

However, several prominent Bhutanese citizens, including the National Assembly Speaker Dasho Ugyen Dorji and chairman of the Royal Advisory Council Dasho Rinzin Gyeltshen, expressed concern over the impact of the changes that the Constitution would bring, at a time when the nation was enjoying unprecedented peace and stability, and called for safeguards in the proposed institutions and systems. However, the Bhutanese king has accepted the draft and expressed the hope that people would handle the transition to Constitutional governance well. He also expected the Constitution to fulfill the aspirations of Bhutan’s people and establish clear rules and regulations governing the King and the royal family.

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