India Assessment 2001

Despite visible signs of improvement in certain theatres of conflict in the first three-quarters of 2001, the internal security situation in India continues to be critical. Even as the fall-out of the September 11 terrorist attacks on targets in the United States remains unclear for India, indigenous and cross-border terrorist violence in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), insurgency and ethnic violence in the North East, left-wing extremist (Naxalite) movement in parts of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa, and violence perpetrated by the private armies in Bihar are problems that continue to fester. The proxy war unleashed by Pakistan through its support to various terrorist groups, and the activities of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, in various parts of India, particularly in J&K, the Northeast and some Southern States, continues to remain the major factor in India's internal security scenario. Another serious dimension that poses an enormous challenge to the internal security scenario is the large-scale induction of lethal and sophisticated weapons, narcotics, and fake currency from across India's borders with Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

A negative fall-out that India is likely to face in the near future is the international community’s changing perception of Pakistan. Strident diplomatic efforts by India, being conducted since the latter half of the Nineteen Nineties, had begun to pay dividends, when Pakistan was being globally perceived as a consistent supporter of cross-border terrorism. However, the scale and the complexity of September 11 terrorist attacks in US necessitated President George W. Bush to engage Pakistan as an ally in its campaign against international terrorism. Irrespective of the mutating US and the global community’s perception of Pakistan as also its emergence as a ‘frontline state’ in the US efforts to eradicate Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terror network, the ISI continues its policy of aiding terrorist outfits active in Jammu and Kashmir and other Islamist extremist outfits in other parts of India.

India has been countering a foreign sponsored Islamist terrorist network, active in J&K and other parts of the country, since the last decade. As India has consistently maintained that international cooperation is a necessity to deal with the scourge of Islamist terror, there was no hesitation in supporting the US-led international coalition against terrorism, launched after the September 11 attacks. While supporting the US-led military strikes against Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network, the prime suspect in the September 11 terrorist attacks, and their sponsor, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, India has also emphatically qualified that the war against terrorism should not be restricted to Osama bin Laden and the Taliban. A disquieting development is that in launching the offensive against the Taliban and bin Laden, the US led global alliance has co-opted Pakistan, a country which India identifies as the principal sponsor of terrorists and foreign mercenaries active in J&K.

Any effective strategy to counter the threat posed by the Islamist terrorist network needs to take into account Pakistan’s role in creating and nurturing these forces and its relationship with the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Pakistani state and the Taliban have been co-sponsors of a terrorist network that essentially relies on madrassas (religious seminaries) and the training camps located in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan and Taliban have also shared the task of training and transforming these Islamist extremists into global terrorists. There is little evidence to construe that Pakistan has, despite US pressure, chosen to alter the perverted course of its history. Indeed, Pakistan’s continuing support and succour to terrorism in J&K was propounded once again in the backdrop of the Jaish-e-Mohammed’s (JeM) fidayeen (suicide) attack in Srinagar on October 1, 2001, in which 38 persons were killed. The JeM Chief, Maulana Masood Azhar, who was released in exchange for the hostages aboard aircraft IC 814 in December 1999 in Kandahar, continues to move unhindered in Pakistan. Moreover, even as it redraws its strategy with the Taliban, its erstwhile protégé, the Pervez Musharraf regime has sought to continue providing legitimacy to foreign mercenaries initiating terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir as an ‘indigenous freedom movement’. In the light of such contradictory policy formulations, the current US reliance on Pakistan would have far reaching critical consequences on South Asia’s regional security environment in general and India in particular.

In the context of the global campaign against international terrorist networks, India has emphasised that Islamist terrorist violence being inflicted on Western and Indian targets emanate from the same Islamist extremist sources and are supported by common allies, Pakistan, bin Laden’s Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and hence requires a multilateral response. Furthermore, India has consistently pointed out that any fight against international terrorism needs to effectually discern the relationship between Pakistan and international Islamist terrorist networks. Any attempt to ignore this issue in order to facilitate Pakistan as a ‘frontline state’ and retain its support in the current offensive against the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network, would prove to be counterproductive in the long run.

J&K remains the most serious internal security challenge in the country despite significant peace measures initiated by the government in the year 2000-2001. The unilateral government cease-fire, which came into effect on November 28, 2000, was extended thrice and eventually withdrawn on May 23, 2001, having been in force for approximately six months. This failed to reduce the level of violence as statistics for this period show. All the Pakistan based terrorist outfits had rejected this initiative and stepped up their level of violence in an environment where security forces were ordered by the government to refrain from initiating any offensive operations against terrorists in the State.

While announcing the termination of the cease-fire, the government had also invited Pakistan's then Chief Executive and now President, General Pervez Musharraf, to visit India for a composite dialogue, including the Kashmir issue. Gen. Musharraf, who assumed his country's Presidency on June 20, 2001, arrived in New Delhi on July 14. The Agra Summit, which was held on July 15-16 2001, failed to produce a breakthrough in the context of J&K's terrorist violence. While Pakistan continued to emphasise on the historical background of the Kashmir 'dispute', India responded by focussing on the issue of cross-border terrorism supported and encouraged by Pakistan.

Earlier, the Union government released a statement on April 5, inviting all Kashmiri groups to participate in negotiations to find a solution to the Kashmir problem. K C Pant, Deputy Chairperson of the Planning Commission was appointed as the government's nominee for the proposed talks. This initiative too failed with the main over-ground secessionist outfit, the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) refusing to join the negotiations on the grounds that it was not exclusively invited to the talks.

As a whole, all peace initiatives failed to change the ground situation and there was an escalation of terrorist violence in J&K. In the first ten month of 2001, 3066 people have been killed in terrorist violence which when compared to the 2774 deaths recorded in the first ten months of 2000, indicates that violence in this year may surpass that of 2000. These trends were only a continuation of the scenario in the year 2000. Casualties in terrorist violence increased to 3,288 in 2000, the highest figure for any year since the present phase of militancy began in 1988-89. There were 2,259 terrorism-related deaths in 1999.

Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Jammu and Kashmir (1999-2001)

There was a clear trend of increasing violence perpetrated by Pakistan-based terrorist groupings, and especially by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the JeM, which are dominated by foreign mercenaries and mujahideen. Intelligence sources now believe that over 55 per cent of an estimated 3,500-4,000 terrorists in the State are foreign mercenaries. This proportion is even higher – up to an estimated 75 per cent – if the focus shifts to active terrorists, since the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) cadres scaled down their operations after their July 2000 cease-fire announcement, and the subsequent November cease-fire announced by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. The number of foreign mercenaries killed in encounters within J&K has shown a significant increase from the 349 in 1999 to 403 in 2000.

As expected, most Pakistan-based terrorist outfits have rejected each peace initiative, and have escalated the levels of violence. However, a wide spectrum of political parties welcomed the November cease-fire, and there has been an apparent softening of the hard-line stance taken by the secessionist All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) as its leaders accepted the option of a bilateral dialogue with the Indian Government in place of their earlier insistence on a tripartite dialogue involving Pakistan. Notwithstanding this shift, a visible gap continues to exist between the demands of the Union Government and secessionists in the State. The Hurriyat has demanded that its delegation be allowed to go to Pakistan to meet terrorist outfit leaders based in that country before it begins its talks with the Indian government. The Union government is yet to respond to this demand.

Another trend in the State was the increased firepower and greater experience and training of the new generation of terrorists that has been inducted into Jammu and Kashmir. The leadership of the terrorist movement has clearly passed into the hands of Pakistan-based terrorist groups and there is increasing evidence of the direct involvement of religious organisations based in Pakistan — such as the Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad — and also of a pan-Islamist thrust that seeks to take the conflict beyond J&K to the rest of India. Evidence of Osama bin Laden’s interests and initiative in supporting terrorist and subversive forces in J&K has also been strengthened. There has also been a visible improvement in the firepower available to the terrorists: apart from the ‘standard issue' Kalashnikov rifles, security forces have also seized rocket and missile launchers, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, during the year. In addition, thousands of kilograms of plastic explosives and a variety of sophisticated triggering mechanisms were also seized.

The Northeastern region continues to be in turmoil, even as further evidence of growing linkages between certain insurgent outfits and the ISI emerges. Security forces continue to battle with insurgency in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura and Meghalaya. The States of Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram are witness to violence, which primarily emerges from the spillover factor of insurgencies.

In the continuing terrorist violence in Assam, 225 lives were lost between January and May 15, 2001. Despite a change in the State government, outfits such as the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) persisted with their insurgent activity. This is a continuation of the trend in the year 2000 when the State witnessed a rise in insurgency-related violence, with a total of 389 civilians, 74 security force personnel and 315 terrorists were killed. These figures stood at 220, 79 and 212, respectively, in the previous year.

Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Assam (1999-2001)

* Data till May 15.

Of the 43 insurgent groups operating in the state, the ULFA occupied the centrestage. The major trend this year was the targeting of the non-Assamese Hindi speaking population. Between late October and early December 2000, the ULFA killed more than 80 non-Assamese in separate incidents.

Meanwhile, extending the cease-fire with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) on June 14, 2001, the Union government agreed to remove restrictions on the territorial jurisdiction of the treaty. The original agreement between the two parties had restricted its implementation to the State of Nagaland. This was promptly interpreted by other States of the region as recognition of the NSCN-IM's claim of a greater Nagaland, Nagalim. Manipur witnessed wide spread violent protests over this decision. Under pressure from different political formations in Manipur and other States of the Northeast, the Union government was forced to restore the territorial jurisdiction of the cease-fire agreement on July 27.

Earlier, consequent to long-term political instability in Manipur, President's rule was imposed in the State on June 2, 2001. President’s rule has since been extended for a further period of six months with effect from the December 2, 2001. From January 2001 to May 15, 2001, a total of 100 persons lost their lives in terrorist-induced violence in Manipur. This included 30 civilians, 57 terrorists and 13 security force personnel. In 2000, 237 persons were killed, as compared to 231 in 1999. There was a marginal decrease in the number of security personnel and civilians killed, to 50 and 87, respectively, in 2000, as compared to 64 and 89 in 1999. The number of terrorists killed increased to 100 in 2000 as against 78 in 1999.

Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Manipur (1999-2001)

* Data till May 15.

Among the 35 terrorist groups in the State, 18 were reported to be active through the year. Prominent among them were the five outlawed Meitei terrorist outfits – the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) and Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup (KYKL). The NSCN-IM continued to be active in the Naga-inhabited districts of Manipur–Ukhrul, Senapati and Tamenglong. The Kuki-Naga conflict, which had raged for almost a decade, abated, with just two persons killed in 1999, and none in 2000.

Tripura witnessed continued terrorist violence with terrorist groups indulging in extortion, killings and abductions. A total of 132 persons lost their lives in terrorist related violence between January and May 15, 2001. This included 89 civilians, 27 security force personnel and 16 terrorists. In the year 2000, a total of 405 persons lost their lives as compared to 303 in 1999. The casualties among security force personnel, civilians and terrorists were 17, 351 and 37, respectively in 2000, as compared to 41, 240 and 22 in 1999. A significant aspect of the terrorists' operating in the State was the growing evidence of a deepening nexus between major political parties and terrorist groups. Terrorist outfits in Tripura also strengthened their existing network with other groups in the region. These groups, aided by the ISI, exploit the 865 km-long porous border with Bangladesh to establish their hideouts beyond Indian territory. Reports indicate that Tripura has emerged as a corridor for pushing arms into the Northeast, with outfits such as the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) procuring arms and ammunition from South East Asian countries such as Thailand and Singapore, and depositing them at Cox's Bazaar in Bangladesh, one of the major illegal arms centre in the region.

Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Tripura (1999-2001)

* Data till May 15. More Graphs & Data>>

Among the 30 terrorist outfits currently operating in Tripura, two – the NLFT and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) – were responsible for most of the violent subversive activities. Tribal terrorists specifically targeted the Bengali populace, whom they call ‘settler refugees’. Over 10,000 non-tribals have reportedly fled from their home in Tripura. The attacks on non-tribal people became more frequent after the victory of the Indigenous People’s Front of Tripura (IPFT), the political wing of the NLFT, in the Tripura Tribal Area Autonomous District Council elections in May 2000. The level of violence in Tripura has also been heightened by the emergence of Bengali militant outfits like the United Bengali Liberation Front (UBLF) and Amra Bengali. The UBLF came into existence in October 1999 to protect the Bengali population. The group has been involved in a number of activities, including abduction, extortion, arson, bombing and the killing of tribals.

There was widespread approval in Nagaland when the Union government had announced the removal of territorial limits in the cease-fire agreement with the NSCN-IM on June 14. Terrorist outfits such as the Naga National Council-Federal (NNC-F) and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K) joined non-violent state organisations such as the Naga Hoho, the apex tribal council, in welcoming this decision. However, when the Union government re-imposed the territorial restriction on July 27, the NSCN-IM threatened to end the existing cease-fire, renewing prospects of violence in Nagaland. The State remained relatively peaceful in the first six months of the year 2001. A total of 21 persons including four civilians and 17 security force personnel lost their lives in terrorist related violence between January and May 15, 2001. Earlier, on April 30, 2001 the Union Government and the NSCN-K renewed their cease-fire agreement for one year.

Casualties of Terrorist Violence in Nagaland (1999-2001)

* Data till May 15.

In 2000, 13 civilians, four security forces personnel and 82 terrorists were killed as compared to 26, four and 124 respectively in 1999. Apart from the two factions of NSCN, other terrorist outfits remained largely passive. The extension of cease-fire with NSCN-IM for one more year starting from August 1, 2000, remained the most significant development of the year. The arrest of Th. Muivah, the General Secretary of the NSCN-IM, in Bangkok in January 2000, stalled the dialogue process for a considerable period as the outfit refused to nominate another member to take Muivah’s place in the dialogue process. The process was reinitiated in May 2001, when the Union Home Ministry and the NSCN-IM led by V.S. Atem reached a joint agreement to reactivate the Cease-fire Monitoring Group (CMG) to ensure complete cessation of violence. The Mizoram Chief Minister, Zoramthanga initiated a direct dialogue with the NSCN-IM leadership. Zoramthanga, an ex-rebel himself, had two meetings with Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah in Bangkok

Arunanchal Pradesh witnessed the spillover effect of insurgencies from the neighbouring States, particularly Nagaland, Assam and Manipur. The Tirap and Changlang districts in the State are turning into a safe haven for insurgents from the neighbouring States. In 2000, three security personnel, seven civilians and 24 terrorists were killed, as against three civilians and three terrorists in 1999. Insurgent groups such as ULFA, NSCN-K and Bodo outfits are reportedly using Arunanchal Pradesh territory to locate their hideouts and for other subversive activities.

Meghalaya grappled with political uncertainties and problems posed by the two militant outfits, the Hyniewtrep National Libertation Council (HNLC) and the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC). In the year 2000, 13 civilians, seven security force personnel and 15 terrorists were killed in insurgency related violence as compared to five civilians and 17 security force personnel killed in 1999. On November 16, 2000, the Central government banned these two outfits.

Mizoram largely remained free from terrorist violence. During the year 2000, four civilians, seven security force personnel and one terrorist were killed in militancy-related violence. In 1999, two civilians and five security forces personnel lost their lives. On June 30, 2000, seven members of the elite anti-terrorist Hunter Force of the Mizoram Police were killed in an ambush by suspected Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) terrorists along the Indo-Bangladesh border in Mamit district.

Barring a few isolated and sporadic incidents of violence, Punjab continued to witness peace for the eighth consecutive year. However, 18 civilians were killed and more than 70 injured in six incidents of bomb explosions reported from different parts of the State during 2000. The developments in Punjab indicate that Pakistan is yet to give up its attempts to co-opt Indian Sikhs to further its design in and on India. Reports point to the existence of a network among Sikh and non-Sikh terrorist groups across the international borders, including various terrorist organisations active in different States, including J&K.

Left-wing extremist groups, the Naxalites, continued to perpetrate violence in their strongholds in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, even as they sustained activities in Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa. Various Naxalite outfits joined hands to float the first united army of the Naxalites, the People's Guerrilla Army (PGA), early in December 2000, in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand and Madhya Pradesh. Formed on the lines of the New People's Army in Phillippines and the People's Liberation Army of Peru, the PGA, the Naxalite leadership claimed, would work alongside extremists of Kashmir, Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and the LTTE, and would even have fraternal relationship with Communist forces in Phillippines, Chechnya, the Kurds and the Chiapas. There was, however, a decline in Naxalite violence in Andhra Pradesh. Bihar and Jharkhand, however, were the worst hit. Violence perpetrated by Naxalite groups such as the People’s War Group (PWG), the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and Ranvir Sena, a private army of landlords, remains a serious security threat. In Jharkhand, in addition to a series of landmine blasts that targeted security force personnel, MCC cadres killed the Lohardaga Superintendent of Police, Ajay Kumar Singh, and the Hazaribagh District Collector’s wife. The year 2000 also saw the emergence of a Muslim extremist outfit, the Ali Sena, in Mandar near Ranchi. The State government has approved the recruitment of local youth as ‘home guards’ to counter the Naxalites in 600 villages in the Naxalite-affected areas.

The Central government continued with its efforts to contain Naxalite violence. The Co-ordination Centre set up in the Ministry of Home Affairs approved a scheme for the reimbursement of 50 per cent of security-related expenditure incurred by all the affected States during the period between April 1996 – March 2001. The Co-ordination Centre continuously assesses the measures taken by the State Governments to combat the menace of left wing extremism.

Islamist extremism has been on the rise in several other States of India. The proscribed Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Deendar Anjuman are reportedly involved in several subversive activities and also in promoting extremism. Police in various States carried out a joint operation and arrested several SIMI activists and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen terrorists, exposing their emerging alliance. Among several subversive activities, the SIMI is suspected of involvement in the twin blasts in Delhi on May 9, 2001 in which one person was injured. The first bomb exploded near the Army Headquarters and another at a parking lot on the Dalhousie Road.

The Cost of Terrorism: Civilians and Security Force Personnel killed in Terrorist Violence

The year 2000 also witnessed disturbing trends along India's borders with Nepal and Bangladesh, which have become a safe and secure smuggling route for the arms trade, and for the movement of subversives and terrorists. The Bihar-Uttar Pradesh belt also witnessed increasing activities of the ISI, including the proliferation of madrassas (religious seminaries) along the Indo-Nepal border. To counter this, the governments of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal have decided to establish a new task force to patrol the 720-km long stretch along the Indo-Nepal border to counter subversive activities and the movement of arms and narcotics. In July 2000, India and Nepal agreed on the need to improve management of the India-Nepal border in order to prevent trans-border activities of terrorists, criminals and other undesirable elements, without affecting legitimate cross-border activities of ordinary law-abiding citizens.

The Degree of Success in India's Counter-Terrorism operations: Terrorists Killed

Illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals into India and the use of Bangladeshi territory by various Northeast insurgents remained a grave security concern. To stop such illegal migration, the Government of India has decided to fence the entire Indo-Bangladesh border at an estimated cost of Rs.13.34 billion.

India consistently highlighted the need for a unified international response to transnational and trans-border terrorism at different international fora and also called for a concerted global action to counter terrorism and to ensure the enactment of measures such as sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism. As a result of New Delhi's efforts, some countries including USA, Canada, Britain, France and Israel have agreed to set up Joint Working Groups with India to tackle cross-border terrorism.