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Though there are
visible signs of improvement in certain theatres of conflict in
the first half of 2002, serious internal security challenges continue
to confront India. Despite mounting international pressure on
Pakistan to put an end to cross-border infiltration
and terrorism in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K),
the impact is still to manifest itself on the ground, and high
levels of violence persist. India’s problems are compounded by
insurgencies and ethnic violence in the Northeast, and left-wing
extremist (Naxalite) movements in parts of Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand,
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa. Another
serious dimension of the prevailing internal security challenge
is the large-scale induction of lethal and sophisticated weapons,
narcotics and fake currency from across India’s borders with Pakistan,
Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar.
India: Conflict
theatres
Since the catastrophic
terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, the US has exercised persistent pressure on Pakistan
to curb cross-border infiltration of terrorists into J&K.
Pakistan has declared that it would put an end to such infiltration
‘permanently’, but there is no clear evidence or stabilizing trends
to suggest that there has been a fundamental shift in Pakistan’s
strategy in J&K. The Pakistani president, General Pervez Musharraf,
in a televised address to the nation on January 12, 2002, had
declared his government’s commitment not to support or permit
the use of its territory for terrorism anywhere in the world,
including J&K, and this was a commitment he reiterated in
his address to the nation on May 27. Available evidence, however,
suggests that the Pakistani government continues its sponsorship
of cross-border terrorism, and terrorism remains an instrument
of its state policy.
Indian diplomatic
pressure on Pakistan intensified after the May 14, 2002, fidayeen
attack on an Army cantonment in Kaluchak, Jammu, in which
36 persons were killed and 48 others injured. India has been maintaining
a major military build up along the borders with Pakistan since
five terrorists of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
attacked India’s parliament on December 13, 2001, and killed nine
security force (SF) personnel and a parliament staff member. All
the five terrorists were killed during the attack. Earlier, on
October 1, 2001, JeM mercenaries attacked the J&K State Legislative
Assembly complex in Srinagar and killed 36 people, including eight
SF personnel and 24 others.
India has been countering
a foreign – primarily Pakistani – sponsored Islamist terrorist
network, active in J&K and other parts of the country, for
over a decade, and has consistently maintained that international
co-operation is necessary to deal with this menace. There was,
consequently, no hesitation in supporting the US-led international
coalition against terrorism. At the same time, India has been
emphasizing that Islamist terrorist violence being inflicted on
Western and Indian targets emanate from the same extremist sources
and are supported by common allies, including Pakistan, the Al
Qaeda network of Osama bin Laden,
and a range of ideological affiliates not only across the Islamic
world, but also now located in many of the Western nations. India
also maintains that any fight against international terrorism
will have to recognize the relationship between Pakistan and the
networks of international Islamist terror. Though the US led global
alliance has co-opted Pakistan as a ‘frontline state’ in its war
on terror, available evidence suggests that Pakistan’s Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI) continues its policy of aiding terrorist outfits
active in J&K and other Islamist terrorist outfits in other
parts of India.
Casualties in Terrorist
Violence in Jammu and Kashmir (2000-2002)
* Data till August 4, 2002
Note:The casualty figures for 2002 are compiled from news reports
and are provisional. For latest data click
here.
This is evident in
J&K where, despite several peace initiatives and international
pressure on Pakistan to abjure terrorism as a foreign policy instrument,
terrorist violence has been sustained at high levels. As a result,
between January 1 and August 4, 2002, a total of 1728 persons,
including 1011 terrorists, 217 security force personnel and 500
civilians were killed in terrorist related violence in the State.
In the year 2001, fatalities totalled 4507 persons, including
2850 terrorists, 1067 civilians and 590 security force personnel.
This was only a continuation of the escalating trends in the year
2000, when peace initiatives failed to check the levels of violence.
The trends indicate that the cosmetic changes within Pakistan
in the post-9/11phase have failed to impress the jehadi groups
operating in J&K.
In the aftermath
of 9/11, links between the Al Qaeda, Taliban
and terrorists in J&K are increasingly recognized by the global
community. There is now overwhelming evidence that groups such
as the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM),
JeM and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
had direct ideological, material and operational links with the
Taliban and Al Qaeda.
Meanwhile, several
peace initiatives were undertaken in 2001 in an effort to resolve
the Kashmir issue ‘politically’. Through an official statement
on April 5, 2001, the Union government invited all Kashmiri groups
to participate in negotiations to end the crisis. Two days prior
to this, Union Home Minister L.K. Advani announced the nomination
of K.C. Pant, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, as the
government's nominee for the proposed talks.
India and Pakistan’s
conflicting positions on the J&K insurgency had also been
emphasised during the Summit meeting between Indian Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee and President Musharraf during the latter’s
visit to New Delhi and Agra between July 14-16, 2001. While Pakistan,
in the run-up to the Summit, continued to emphasise the territorial
dispute and the façade of ‘an indigenous freedom movement’,
India responded by fixing the focus on cross-border terrorism.
As most analysts had foreseen, the Summit failed to change ground
realities. 87 people were killed in J&K during the three days
of the Summit meeting itself.
The Cost of Terrorism:
Civilians and Security Force Personnel killed in Terrorist Violence
in India's Northeast states
* Data till August 4, 2002
Note:The casualty figures for 2002 are compiled from news reports
and are provisional.
Security forces continue
to battle with insurgency in the Northeast States. There was a
marginal decrease in insurgency related violence in the Northeast
in the year 2001. A total of 1380 persons were killed in 2001,
compared to 1559 persons killed in 2000.
Assam
Assam continues to
be the most affected of India’s Northeastern States with a total
of 298 persons, including 184 terrorists, 21 security force personnel
and 93 civilians killed in insurgency related violence between
January 1 and August 4, 2002. In the year 2001 the trends in fatalities
witnessed a significant decline. There were a total of 606 fatalities
as against 758 in the previous year. The newly elected Congress
government made several efforts for a peace with the terrorist
groups. At least three important groups, the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA),
the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
and the United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS),
had defined conditions to open negotiations for a settlement of
their grievances. These, however, turned out to be effective non-offers
as they were based on requirements that would compromise India’s
territorial integrity and sovereignty in the Northeast – conditionalities
that are rejected by the government.
Available evidence
suggests that the ULFA has been using the ‘peace proposal’ to
secure a much needed breather. This is particularly significant
at a time when the outfit is being pressurized by the Bhutanese
government to close down some of its camps in that country. Reports
said the outfit was relocating some of its camps to Bangladesh.
With a new regime in Bangladesh under the leadership of Begum
Khaleda Zia of the Bangladeshi Nationalist Party (BNP), the possibility
of a resurgence of insurgent activities by groups such as the
ULFA and the NDFB has increased. The BNP regime, in its previous
tenure, is known to have provided substantial assistance to these
groups. Apart from the ULFA, the NDFB and the UPDS remained engaged
in insurgent activities throughout the year. Another area of concern
in the State was Islamist militancy, which appeared to be on the
rise in 2001. Outfits such as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, Muslim United
Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), Muslim United Liberation Front
of Assam (MULFA) are active in the State.
Manipur
In Manipur, 130 persons,
including 71 terrorists, 25 civilians and 34 security force personnel
were killed in insurgency-related incidents between January 1
and August 4, 2002. In the year 2001, there was a substantial
fall in fatalities among security force personnel and civilians,
though the number of terrorists killed rose significantly. A total
of 256 persons, including 25 security force personnel, 70 civilians
and 161 terrorists were killed in 2001. This was against 246 persons
killed in the year 2000, which included 51 security force personnel,
93 civilians and 102 terrorists. Terrorist groups active in the
State include various factions of the the Kanglei Yawol Kunna
Lup (KYKL),
the Manipur People’s Liberation Front (MPLF), the People’s Revolutionary
Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK),
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),
the United National Liberation Front (UNLF)
and the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP).
In addition to the local insurgency, internecine clashes between
the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) factions also
disturbed peace in the districts bordering Nagaland. The Prevention
of Terrorism Act (POTA),
2002 labelled as many as six groups in the State, out of a total
of 10 identified across the Northeast, as terrorist organisations.
There was no breakthrough in the efforts to negotiate with terrorist
organisations. The PREPAK and the Toijamba faction of the KYKL
rejected the then Chief Minister, Radhabinod Koijam’s month-long
‘unilateral cease-fire’ offer in March 2001.
The decision of the
Union government, on June 14, 2001, to extend the area of cease-fire
with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)
‘without territorial limits’ provoked a violent reaction in Manipur.
As many as 19 persons were killed in this spree of violence, which
its perpetrators claimed was intended to protect the State’s territorial
integrity. The violence ended only after July 27, 2001, when the
Union government announced the reversion of the cease-fire agreement
to the pre-June 14 status quo, implying that the agreement
would be applicable only in Nagaland.
Tripura
In Tripura, in the
year 2002, a total of 103 persons, including 28 terrorists, 10
security force personnel and 65 civilians were killed in insurgency
related violence till August 4, 2002. Like Manipur and Assam,
Tripura also witnessed a fall in terrorist violence in the year
2001. A total of 312 persons, including 239 civilians, 42 terrorists
and 31 security force personnel were killed in 2001. In 2000,
a total of 514 persons, including 453 civilians, 45 terrorists
and 16 security force personnel were killed. Among the terrorist
outfits, the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)
and All Tripura Tigers Force (ATTF)
were most active. Both the NLFT and the ATTF operate from well-entrenched
bases in neighbouring Bangladesh and mainly engage in hit-and-run
guerrilla strikes. Reports of a strengthened nexus between elements
in the Bangladesh Army and the NLFT and ATTF pose supplementary
challenges for the security forces. This problem has deepened
with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is far more
supportive of the insurgents operating against India than the
predecessor regime, coming to power.
Nagaland
In Nagaland, a total
of 10 persons, including eight terrorists and two security force
personnel, were killed between January 1 and August 4, 2002. In
2001, 103 persons, including 76 terrorists, two security force
personnel and 25 civilians, were killed in terrorism related incidents.
In 2000, a total of 100 persons were killed, which included 84
terrorists, four security force personnel and 13 civilians.
Despite a four-year-old
cease-fire between security forces and the State’s main insurgent
group, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM),
a basic disagreement persists between the government and the outfit’s
goals. This fundamental disagreement continues to overshadow the
prospects of a final solution to the conflict in the State.
Mizoram
Compared to other
States in the Northeast, Mizoram not only remained peaceful in
the year 2001 but the incumbent Chief Minister, Zoramthanga also
contributed in the ongoing Naga peace talks. After talks with
the National Socialist Council of Nagaland- Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM)
leaders in May 2002 in Bangkok, he expressed the opinion that
the leaders were willing to come to New Delhi for further negotiations.
Within the State, talks between the Bru National Liberation Front
(BNLF) and the State government did not yield any substantial
results. The BNLF has been demanding a separate autonomous district
council for Bru tribals in the north-western belt of the State
since 1997. The government opened negotiations on the issue of
repatriation of Bru tribals from Tripura, but these proved abortive
because of differences over the modalities of the negotiation
process. The Mizoram government has stated that repatriation of
the Brus would not be taken up unless the BNLF terminated violence
and came over-ground.
Arunachal Pradesh
Arunachal Pradesh
continues to witness the spillover effect of insurgencies in neighbouring
States. A total of 63 persons were killed in terrorist related
violence in the State in the year 2001. This includes 40 civilians
12 security force personnel and 11 terrorists. In the year 2000,
the figure was 34, which included 7 civilians, three security
force personnel and 34 terrorists. NSCN-IM, NSCN-K and NDFB maintain
bases in the State. The NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K maintain a large
number of camps in State’s Tirap and Changlang districts and has
been using these two districts as corridors reportedly to ferry
arms from Myanmar and other Southeast Asian countries. Both these
outfits also reportedly run extortion rackets in these two districts.
Available evidence suggests that the ULFA and NDFB reportedly
procure arms and ammunition through the Indo-Myanmar border.
Meghalaya
In Meghalaya, 36
persons, including 13 terrorists, 12 civilians and 11 security
force personnel were killed in insurgency-related incident between
January 1 and August 4, 2002. A total of 40 persons were
killed in terrorist related violence in the year 2001. These included
24 civilians, 8 security force personnel and 8 terrorists. In
the year 2000, the figure was 36, which included 12 civilians,
seven security force personnel and 17 terrorists.
Terrorist outfits
that are active in the State are the Hynniewtrep National Liberation
Council (HNLC)
People’s Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLF-M).
The State government has been asking the HNLC to show its willingness
for talks. In December 2001, the new Chief Minister, F.A. Khonglam
announced the formation of a Cabinet sub-committee to help the
State government to bring the HNLC and ANVC to the negotiating
table. The sub-committee would explore the ways and means to bring
the outfits to the mainstream of the society.
Available evidence
suggests that the ULFA is expanding its area of operation into
Meghalaya with assistance from the ANVC. The increasing alliance
between the ULFA and ANVC
could be the result of the alienation of the ANVC from the NSCN-IM
over the issue of territorial extension of the Naga cease-fire.
Evidence also suggests that, under heavy pressure from the Bhutanese
authorities, the ULFA is reportedly attempting to relocate its
camps and bases in the Garo Hills of Meghalaya. There are also
strategic reasons, as the ULFA hideouts have become well-known
in Assam, and a broader broad base will facilitate their operations.
Since the State’s had contiguous borders with Assam, it will be
easier to strike at targets in Assam and sneak back to their shelters.
Left Wing Extremism
Even as the attempts
of the Andhra Pradesh government to initiate a peace process with
the People’s War Group (PWG),
the most powerful and organised Naxal group in the country, failed
to produce any results, various left-wing extremist––Naxalite––groups
continue to perpetrate violence in their strongholds in Jharkhand,
Bihar and Andhra Pradesh, even as they sustained activities in
parts of Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, West
Bengal and Uttar Pradesh.
Between January 1
and August 4, 2002, a total of 152 persons were killed in left-wing
extremist violence. This included 83 Naxalites, 46 security force
personnel and 41 civilians. In the year 2001, a total of 412 persons
were killed in Naxal violence, which included 156 Naxalites, 109
security force personnel and 144 civilians. The worst affected
States were Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar.
Casualties in Left
Extremist Violence (2001-2002)
* Data till July 31, 2002
Greater evidence
of co-ordination among different Naxal groups within India and
outside surfaced in the year 2001. Available evidence suggests
that the Naxals in collaboration with Maoist insurgents in Nepal
are trying to create a ‘compact revolutionary zone’. The zone
envisages declaring a stretch of area running from Nepal to Andhra
Pradesh as a ‘liberated zone’.
On July 1, 2001,
Naxal organisations of four South Asian countries—India, Nepal,
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka joined hands to form an umbrella organisation
named the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisation
of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) to ‘unify and coordinate the activities
of the Maoist parties and organisations in South Asia’. The Naxal
outfits are reportedly planning to carve out a ‘compact revolutionary
zone’.
Within the country,
the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)
and the PWG, in a joint statement in Patna on August 30, 2001,
expressed their resolve to end their conflict. Among the Naxal
outfits, the MCC and PWG have worst of relations. In the last
five years, an estimated 300 persons from both the organisations
have reportedly been killed in internecine clashes.
On December 5, 2001,
the Union government invoked the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance
(POTO) [now Prevention
of Terrorism Act (POTA)]
and banned the PWG and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC).
Naxal violence in
Andhra Pradesh registered a decline consequent to the peace talks
(now aborted) between the PWG and the State government. On May
7, 2002, the PWG declared an unilateral month-long cease-fire
in Andhra Pradesh. Three rounds of preliminary talks took place
between PWG emissaries and the government amidst an atmosphere
of scepticism and distrust. The talks broke down when the government
refused to accede to PWG demands to declare a cease-fire, lift
the ban imposed on the PWG, stop ‘fake encounters’ and arrests
of Naxalite cadres. A few encounters during the peace process
had a negative impact. On June 24, two women Naxalites were killed
in an encounter in Khammam district. Again on July 1, 2002, four
Naxalites wree killed in Karimnagar district. On July 7, the State
Technical Committee member of the PWG was killed in an encounter
in Guntur district. After these encounters, the PWG toughened
its stand and its emissaries pulled out of the talks in protest
against fake encounters. The continuing hostilities between the
State government and the PWG reached a flashpoint with the latter
calling for a two-day State bandh from July 11 in protest against
those encounters. The PWG withdrew from talks on July 19, a day
before the date set for direct talks between leaders of the PWG
and government representatives. Thus, possibilities of the first-ever
direct talks between the government and the PWG, more than three
decades after the Naxal movement began in the State, ended.
Earlier, in the year
2001, despite a number of murders, committed mainly the PWG, Naxal
violence registered a decline by about 30 per cent in Andhra Pradesh.
Available evidence suggests that the PWG is losing its base in
the Telangana region. On January 10, 2002, girijan (tribal) leaders
in Andhra Pradesh declared the Naxalites guilty of killing 194
tribals and leaders after branding them (the tribals) ‘police
informers’. Several villages in Karimnagar and Warangal districts
– traditionally the Naxalite heartland – have taken an oath that
they would not allow Naxalites, who were obstructing development
activities, into their villages, and would work to ensure the
surrender of underground Naxalites from these villages. Due to
dwindling support in the Telangana region, the Naxalites were
increasingly active on the borders with Orissa, Chhattisgarh and
Madhya Pradesh. Their activities are now concentrated along the
AP – Orissa border; the AP-Orissa Special Zone Committee has been
very active for some time now.
Jharkhand remained
one of the worst affected States. There were a number of attacks
on security force personnel there. On May 7, 2002, during an economic
blockade called by the MCC and the PWG, an estimated 15 police
personnel were killed and 10 others injured in a landmine blast
triggered at Mithadih village, Kodarma district. On January 27,
2002, nine personnel of the Jharkhand Armed Police (JAP) and two
others were killed in landmine blast triggered by the PWG in the
Chainpur police station limits, in Gumla district. On October
31, 2001, 13 police personnel were killed in an attack on the
police station in Topchanchi, Dhanbad district. Four police personnel,
including a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), were killed
and four others seriously injured in a landmine blast triggered
by the Naxalites, near Bargarh, Garhwa district in Jharkhand,
on October 4, 2001. 12 personnel of the Central Reserve Police
Force (CRPF) were killed and five injured in a landmine blast
triggered by MCC Naxalites in the Abroj forest area, Hazaribagh
district in Jharkhand, on September 23, on 2001. Two senior police
officials, DIG Hazaribagh and SP Chatra, were among seven police
personnel seriously injured in a landmine blast triggered by the
MCC at Karmara, Chatra district, on May 6, 2001.
On April 14, 2001,
14 persons, including an 18-month-old baby, were killed by the
MCC at Belpu village, Hazaribagh district in Jharkhand. Most of
those killed belonged to the ‘gram suraksha dal’ (village protection
force), which the villagers had raised three years ago to guard
against MCC attacks.
In the month of November
2001, the Jharkhand government launched a major offensive code-named
Operation Eagle in the districts of Dhanbad, Hazaribagh,
Giridih and Garhwa to counter Naxal violence. The government also
prepared a ‘surrender policy’ to deal with the Naxal problem.
The policy includes provisions for rehabilitation and financial
assistance to militants who surrender.
In Bihar, an assessment
report on the ‘red terror’ prepared by the State police in the
year 2002 says left-wing extremism or Naxalism has grown in Bihar
in the past two years, especially since the creation of the State
of Jharkhand. It says the PWG in Bihar is the more systematic,
calculating and expansionist of all the Naxalite outfits. It adds
that the PWG and the MCC have been growing at the cost of mainstream
moderate Left parties, like the Communist Party of India (CPI)
and the Communist Party of India–Marxist (CPI-M), among others.
The Naxalites spread
their influence in hitherto unaffected areas in the northern part
of the State. On June 24, 2001, the MCC attacked a police picket
in Dhekuli, Sheohar district, and looted six rifles and a large
quantity of ammunition. Three police personnel were injured in
the incident.
In Orissa, the Naxalites
were active mainly in Malkangiri district. On August 9, 2001,
six police personnel were killed and an estimated 22 were seriously
injured when PWG Naxalites attacked the Kalimela and Motu police
stations. Two Naxalites were also killed in the incident. On August
28, 2001, the PWG attacked the Kalimela police station once again.
On September 1, the PWG attacked the Motu police station for a
second time. A Naxalite was killed in the incident.
In Maharashtra, on
February 11, 2002, Naxalites of the PWG killed the district president
of the Congress party at Bhamragarh, Gadchiroli district. Earlier,
in July 2001, the PWG had sent a letter to the Maharashtra Tribal
Development Minister, Madhukar Pchad, saying that teachers in
all government schools who were not from the district should be
replaced with local educated youths by July 20, 2001. The rural
education department agreed to ‘review’ the appointments made
in those schools.
In Chhattisgarh,
the Naxalites were active mainly in Bastar division. Reports in
the month of March 2001 said the PWG had set up more than 40 Local
Guerrilla Squads (LGS) in three districts in that division. The
police launched Operation Trishul in 110 villages of the
district to tackle the Naxalites.
The ISI &
Islamist Subversion
Outside J&K and
the Northeast, Pakistan-based terrorist outfits, with support
from its external intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI), were also active in different parts of the country. These
groups have been threatening to launch attacks on major Indian
cities. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs’ annual report for
the year 2001 states that the authorities had unearthed 101 modules
of the ISI throughout the country.
Delhi has been emerging
as a junction of the ISI-backed terrorist-criminal network active
in India, to facilitate the flow of finance and logistics in other
parts of the country. According to official sources, police in
Delhi arrested 42 terrorists who were planning to cause explosions
or target political leaders in the year 2001. Speaking to the
media on January 8, 2002, the then Commissioner of Delhi Police,
Ajai Raj Sharma said most of the terrorists were Pakistanis or
were trained in Pakistan. In addition to the December 13, 2001-attack
on Parliament, there were a number of other subversive activities
in Delhi. On April 11, police discovered and defused a bomb kept
near the entrance to the office of the Union Finance Ministry.
In the months of January-February 2002, the Delhi police discovered
and disabled an elaborated terrorist module – with linkages extending
across Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Gujarat and Maharashtra – which
was planning to carry out subversive activities across the country.
The network was allegedly being run at the behest of the ISI.
On May 9, 2002, there
were two bomb blasts in the high security zones in Delhi. In the
same month, the police unearthed a plot to bomb the US Embassy
and arrested two persons, including a Sudanese diplomat linked
with Osama bin Laden. Police sources said the Sudanese, Abdel
Raouf Hawas, and an Indian associate of his, Shamim Sarwar, confessed
that they planned to attack US missions in Delhi and Dhaka.
But Delhi is just
one point on a much larger canvas. In a countrywide joint operation
by Union and several State police forces, 23 terrorists of the
HM and activists of the proscribed Students Islamic Movement of
India (SIMI) were arrested
on July 30-31, 2002. The arrests covered Delhi, Hyderabad in Andhra
Pradesh, Jalgaon in Maharashtra and Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh. The
Union Home Secretary disclosed that those arrested were responsible
for numerous terrorist and subversive activities, including plans
to kill prominent political personalities, the planting of explosive
devises at high security zone in Delhi, firing of a grenade at
the Border Security Force (BSF) headquarters in Delhi, explosions
in the Gomti Express and Sabarmati Express trains in 2000, and
plans to carry out further explosions in Hyderabad and Delhi,
including a suicide attack on Sena Bhavan (the Headquarters of
the Defence Ministry) in Delhi. The arrests also exposed the HM’s
strategy of fanning out into the hinterland to enlist the support
of fundamentalist groups like SIMI. The Union Government had imposed
a ban on SIMI on September 27, 2001 after it had launched a campaign
in support of Osama bin Laden in the post-9/11 period, distributing
a large number of posters and cassettes in support of the Al Qaeda
in Agra, Azamgarh, Bahraich, Muzaffarnagar, Meerut, Gonda and
Kanpur (Uttar Pradesh).
In the eastern part
of the country, in January 2001, the Army and intelligence agencies
reportedly unearthed an ISI plot to convert North Bengal into
a trouble spot, so that the Indian Army would have to maintain
round-the-year deployment in the region. One of the conduits of
this plan, Gorkha Liberation Organisation (GLO) leader Chhatre
Subba, was arrested. Subsequent investigations revealed that the
GLO leader had been selected to create disturbances along the
Siliguri corridor. The Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO)
is also active in the same area, and had been receiving arms training
from the ULFA.
Available evidence
also suggests increased activities of Islamist terrorist outfits
along the Indo-Nepal border in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal,
where there has been a proliferation of madrassas (seminaries)
along the international borders. Intelligence agencies are reported
to have gathered evidence that some of these madrassas
have been harbouring terrorists belonging to various Islamist
terrorist groups and have also been preaching terror. Of late,
Nepal has emerged as a safe haven for Islamist terrorists and
terrorist groups operating in India.
A senior Uttar Pradesh
police official, while speaking to newsmen in Ghaziabad, on September
3, 2001, said Pakistan’s ISI has entrenched itself in 22 districts
in the State. The ISI has used enormous funds to woo criminals,
religious fundamentalists and even security force personnel to
realise these ends.
In western India,
the border areas of Rajasthan also witnessed ISI activities. On
January 12, 2001, police seized a large cache of explosives, arms
and ammunition from Biryani village, Jaisalmer district. The seizures
includes 8.66 kg RDX, 16.95kg plastic explosives, a wireless set,
an AK-47 rifle, 380 magazines, 109 live cartridges, detonators,
timers, chargers and coils of electric wire. Official sources
said the ISI has made plans to smuggle fake currency into India
through Jaisalmer, taking advantage of dust storms during a heat
wave.
Available evidence
also points to the growing nexus between organised crime and Pakistan-based
terrorist outfits. The Mafia is known to take increasing help
from terrorists in order to procure arms, as well as for abductions
and killings, while the terrorists have been using established
criminal routes and couriers to smuggle huge quantities of arms,
explosives and communication systems into the country. The arrest
of Aftab Ansari alias Farhan Malik, a Dubai-based underworld operative,
for his role in the January 22, 2000-terrorist attack outside
the American Centre in Kolkata provided hard evidence of this
convergence of organized crime with terrorism. Four persons were
killed and 17 others injured in this attack. Ansari’s interrogation
led to a series of arrests and also unearthed existing networks
in Agra, Mumbai, Jaipur, Kolkata, Varanasi, Malegaon, Bhopal,
Hazaribagh and Surat. The international linkages that were disclosed
by Ansari’s confessions have substantially been confirmed by disclosures
made in Pakistan by Sheikh Omar Saeed, the new poster boy of Islamist
terrorism.
Another case of terrorism-underworld
linkages came to light in Gujarat on October 27, 2001 when the
CBI seized a truckload of arms near the India-Pakistan border
at Santalpur, Patan district. The consignment included 14 kilograms
of RDX, two AK-47 rifles, two pistols, 296 pistol cartridges and
an assortment of electronic detonators and timing devices and
other explosives. Subsequent investigations unearthed a nexus
between local crime networks and Pakistan-based terrorist groups.
Again on December 17, the CBI recovered around 5.20kg of RDX and
other arms and ammunition in Patan, and later in the same month,
35kg of RDX, detonation fuse wire and an AK-47 rifle, allegedly
smuggled from across the border, were recovered during combing
operations 40km north of the Hajipir-Bhiata, Banni grasslands,
Rann of Kutchch. Police sources said they acted on a tip-off by
a Pakistani infiltrator, a suspected terrorists of the LeT arrested
on May 27, 2001, lodged at the Joint Interrogation Centre in Bhuj.
He reportedly told the police that he had cross over into India
with four others. They buried the consignment they brought in
for later retrieval.
India has been consistently
highlighting the need for a unified international response to
transnational and trans-border terrorism at different international
fora and has also called for concerted global action to counter
terrorism and to ensure the enactment of measures such as sanctions
against state-sponsors of terrorism. UN Security Council Resolution
No 1373 passed on September 28, 2001, was seen as a positive step
in this direction, though its translation into concrete mechanisms
and action is yet to be seen.
India has also engaged
in a number of bilateral initiatives to enhance international
co-operation on the issues of counter-terrorism. In November 2001,
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee visited Russia, where the
two countries signed a new Moscow declaration on international
terrorism, which included a joint call for the ‘completion of
negotiations under the UN auspices on the draft Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism and Convention for the Suppression
of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism’. November 2001 also saw the first
ever one-to-one discussion between Prime Minster Vajpayee and
US President George W Bush, at Washington, and the announcement
that they would co-operate to fight terrorism in all its forms.
Union Home Minister L.K. Advani visited the US in January 2002,
where he received the assurance that the US would stand by its
promise to eliminate terrorism ‘wherever it exists in the world’.
In December 2001, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Japan, and the
two countries decided to set up a joint working group on terrorism.
German Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder visited India in October 2001, and expressed
the view that Jammu and Kashmir could not be left out by the international
coalition against terrorism. A mutual legal assistance treaty
to co-operate on criminal investigations and to combat drug trafficking
was also ratified. Earlier, in June 2001, Home Minister L.K. Advani
visited Germany where both the countries agreed to work together
to get India sponsored International Convention on Terrorism adopted
at the UN. There was also agreement on institutionalised exchange
of information and co-operation for fighting terrorism.
On September 25,
2001, 157 countries met at the Interpol Headquarters in Budapest
to chalk out a global strategy to fight terrorism. The Director
CBI, who represented India, made a strong plea that member countries
should make special laws to ensure swift extradition of wanted
terrorists, adding that existing provisions were not sufficient
to locate, identify and extradite suspected terrorists. Over 70
terrorists wanted in India are currently hiding in various parts
of the world, including Pakistan,
Afghanistan, the Gulf, and many Western countries.
In the month of April
2001, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Iran, where both the countries
signed the Tehran Declaration on International Terrorism, condemning
international terrorism and criticising nations which aid, abet
and support it. The declaration demanded a stronger international
legal regime against terrorism, besides endorsing the Comprehensive
Convention on Terrorism currently being considered in the United
Nations. Both the countries also agreed to enhance mutual co-operation
to safeguard peace and stability in the region which is witnessing
the rise of extremist forces, terrorism and enhanced flow of illicit
drugs. In January 2002, India and Iran agreed to put in place
an institutional mechanism for tackling terrorism by either constituting
a new Joint Working Group (JWG) on counter terrorism, or by expanding
the scope of the present JWG on Drug Trafficking.
India is also working
closely with Nepal to address the problem of Maoist
insurgency and activities of the ISI in Nepal. Both the countries
have underlined the need for co-ordinated action on the border
to check terrorist activities.
India is exploring
the possibilities of co-operation in countering international
terrorism with China.
On the domestic front,
the CBI, on September 15, 2001, constituted a core group to assess
and review the entire information on activities of various terrorist
groups. The core group will provide a readymade data bank on all
terrorist organisations with their international linkages.
The Prevention of
Terrorism Act (POTA)
came into effect in March 2002. So far, the Act has proscribed
32 groups as terrorist organisations. Prior to this, India has
had no special legislation to control terrorism since the Terrorism
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA)
was allowed to lapse in 1995.
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