2,765 people died in terrorism-related
violence in India during year 2006. A review of the data indicates
that nearly 41 per cent of all such fatalities occurred in Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K) alone as a result of the Pakistan-backed
separatist proxy war in that State. 27 per cent resulted from
Left Wing Extremism (Maoism/Naxalism) across parts of 14 States,
prominently including Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Orissa, West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Karnataka.
23 per cent of the total fatalities in 2006 occurred in the multiple
insurgencies of India’s Northeast.
By comparison, year 2005 witnessed
a total of 3,236 fatalities in terrorism-related incidents across
the country. The fatality index, consequently, registered a definite
decrease in year 2006.
At least 231 of the country’s
608 Districts are currently afflicted, at differing intensities,
by various insurgent and terrorist movements. Terrorism in Jammu
& Kashmir (affecting 12 of the States 14 Districts), in different
States of the Northeast (54 Districts) and Left Wing extremism
(affecting at least 165 Districts in 14 States, estimate based
on end-2005 data) continue to pose serious challenges to the country’s
security framework. In addition, wide areas of the country appear
to have ‘fallen off the map’ of good governance, and are acutely
susceptible to violent political mobilization, lawlessness and
organized criminal activity.
Jammu and Kashmir
Since 2002, terrorism-related
fatalities have demonstrated a secular decline in Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K), and this trend continued in 2006, with a total of 1,116
persons killed. More than 40,000 people have lost their lives
in the conflict since 1989, and, even at present, an average of
nearly 100 lives is lost each month in J&K.
Fatalities
in Terrorist Violence in Jammu and Kashmir
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
2001
|
1067
|
590
|
2850
|
4507
|
2002
|
839
|
469
|
1714
|
3022
|
2003
|
658
|
338
|
1546
|
2542
|
2004
|
534
|
325
|
951
|
1810
|
2005
|
520
|
216
|
996
|
1732
|
2006
|
349
|
168
|
599
|
1116
|
Source:
Institute for Conflict Management database.
(Note: Compiled from news reports and is provisional)
Despite the declines in indices
of violence, the State continues to suffer from high levels of
violence and subversion. Pakistan’s military regime, which was
forced to scale down its proxy-war under intense international
scrutiny, has nevertheless shown no indication of dismantling
the vast infrastructure of terrorism on its soil. According to
the Union Home Ministry’s (MHA) "Status Paper on Internal Security
Situation" (presented in Parliament on November 30, 2006), the
terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir
is yet to be dismantled and is being "used by Pak based and Pak
ISI sponsored outfits like JeM [Jaish-e-Mohammed], LeT [Lashkar-e-Toiba],
Al-Badr, HM [Hizb-ul-Mujahideen], etc."
Amidst the hype on people-to-people
contacts and confidence-building measures (CBMs), it is evident
that the reduced levels of violence in J&K primarily reflect
a tactical rather than strategic shift in the Pakistani calculus,
as a two-pronged strategy of parallel talks and terrorism is pursued
by the Musharraf regime to secure its ambitions against India.
Talks between India and Pakistan
thus continue under the aegis of the Composite Dialogue, even
as terrorism in J&K, and sporadically in other parts of the
India, persists. At the same time, Pakistan has been complaining
bitterly about the slow pace of ‘progress’ towards the goals it
seeks to secure on the negotiating table, having failed to achieve
these through its vicious campaign of terrorism over 17 years.
The peace process, consequently, remains, tactical rather than
substantive, as the hiatus between the rival positions on Kashmir
remains unbridgeable, and much of the ‘progress’ has been in peripheral
areas, such as the restoration of communication links, people-to-people
exchanges, Track Two diplomacy and a range of confidence building
measures. At the same time, the ground situation in J&K remains
a cause for concern, as a stream of infiltrators continues to
find its way into the terror wracked State. While the various
CBMs currently operational between the two countries may have
strengthened processes of 'emotional enlistment', have failed
to alter India's and Pakistan's stated positions on the Kashmir
issue, or to change the fundamentals of the conflict in and over
Kashmir. An end to the bloodshed in the State, consequently, seems
as unlikely today as it was at any given point since the dramatic
escalation of the militancy in 1989-90.
The Northeast
There has been a marginal improvement
in the levels of militancy in the Northeast. While 715 people
died in 2005, 627 people were killed in militancy-related violence
during 2006.
Nevertheless, certain States of
the region have shown remarkable signs of recovery in recent years.
Tripura, once considered to be one of the most violent States
of the country, recorded 59 insurgency-related fatalities in 2006,
down from 75 in 2005, and from a peak of 514 in 2000. Tripura
is "carving out a success story in the troubled setting of India’s
Northeast, as its Police force reorganizes radically to evolve
a counter-insurgency strategy that has left entrenched militant
groups in disarray." Building on a "model of a police-led response
to terrorism, which saw the country’s most dramatic victory over
this modern scourge in Punjab in the early 1990s, Tripura’s Police,
under the leadership of its Chief, G.M. Srivastava, has reversed
the trajectory of insurgent violence and, crucially, mobilisation…
despite continued and vigorous support provided to the insurgent
groups by Bangladesh, and the safe haven each of these outfits
has been provided in that country."
The gains in Tripura are more
than offset by the losses in Manipur, which, at 280 fatalities,
now accounts for nearly 45 per cent of the fatalities in the Northeast
– with just 5.6 per cent of the region’s population. Manipur thus
remains the most violent State in the region, although there is
a relative decline in violence, with total fatalities registering
a decline from 331 in 2005. While a number of other States in
the Northeast have or are being reclaimed from protracted insurgencies,
Manipur continues to remain volatile. Large-scale extortion and
its impact on ordinary lives, as well as on the lives of people
at the helm of affairs in the State, are symptomatic of the virtual
collapse of governance in the State.
Assam too remains a disturbed
State with 174 deaths in 2006 compared to 242 fatalities in 2005.
Assam, which attracts far greater
national attention and accounts for 69 per cent of the population
of the Northeast, saw 174 fatalities in 2006, as against 242 in
2005. The militancy in Assam persists despite continuous and successful
operations by the Security Forces, with the principal terrorist
groups – particularly the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
– finding permanent safe haven and significant state support across
the border in Bangladesh.
Nagaland, where a ‘peace process’
has been in place since 1997, saw the third largest number of
fatalities in the region in 2006, with 90 dead, overwhelmingly
in the fratricidal turf-war between the rival Isak-Muivah and
Khaplang factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland.
Both the militant outfits (NSCN-IM and NSCN-K) are in cease-fire
agreements with the Government in Nagaland, but the Government
continues been held hostage to the diktats of the insurgent groups.
The process of negotiations has been complicated by insurgent
groups that have appropriated the attributes of criminal and extortionist
gangs, and successfully circumvent the due process of law by their
engagement in the negotiation process with the Government.
The fight against insurgency in
Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh remains largely successful.
Fatalities
in Terrorist Violence in India's Northeast, 2005-2006
States
|
2005
|
2006
|
Civilian
|
SFs
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
Civilian
|
SFs
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
Assam
|
149
|
10
|
83
|
242
|
96
|
35
|
43
|
174
|
Nagaland
|
9
|
0
|
31
|
40
|
9
|
1
|
80
|
90
|
Meghalaya
|
2
|
1
|
26
|
29
|
7
|
0
|
17
|
24
|
Manipur
|
138
|
50
|
143
|
331
|
95
|
37
|
148
|
280
|
Tripura
|
34
|
8
|
31
|
73
|
11
|
19
|
29
|
59
|
Total
|
332
|
69
|
314
|
715
|
218
|
92
|
317
|
627
|
Source: Institute
for Conflict Management
(Note: Compiled from news reports and is provisional)
In spite of the Government’s efforts
in bringing all militant outfits to the negotiating table, the
region continues to remain disturbed. Indeed, ‘peace processes’
that have consistently failed to get to the bottom of the core
issues of the conflict, are themselves fraught with problems,
producing a rush to enter into unprincipled agreements with particular,
with little concern regarding the broader outcome on other groups,
and on the region at large. The prevailing orientation to ‘peace
processes’ and negotiations with terrorist groups have often "paralyzed
the state and have even occasionally undermined the will of elements
within the Security Forces to act with determination against terrorism.
They have certainly undermined the capacity of the political and
administrative leadership to define coherent policies against
terrorism, and to implement these consistently."
In spite of the Government’s efforts
in bringing all militant outfits to the negotiating table, the
region continues to remain disturbed. Indeed, ‘peace processes’
that have consistently failed to get to the bottom of the core
issues of the conflict, are themselves fraught with problems,
producing a rush to enter into unprincipled agreements with particular,
with little concern regarding the broader outcome on other groups,
and on the region at large. The prevailing orientation to ‘peace
processes’ and negotiations with terrorist groups have often "paralyzed
the state and have even occasionally undermined the will of elements
within the Security Forces to act with determination against terrorism.
They have certainly undermined the capacity of the political and
administrative leadership to define coherent policies against
terrorism, and to implement these consistently."
The militant groups operating
in various States of the Northeast have usually found refuge in
neighbouring countries like Bangladesh and Myanmar. Fencing along
the 4,096.7 kilometre-long border with Bangladesh, suggested as
a remedy to the problem of militancy, has not been completed,
leaving ample scope for easy entry and exit by the militants.
Similarly, a number of militant groups operating in Assam, Nagaland
and Manipur have taken shelter in Myanmar.
Left-Wing Extremism
Accounting for 27 per cent of
the total fatalities in India during 2006, Left Wing extremism
constitutes what Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh rightly described
as the "single biggest internal security challenge" confronting
the country. The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist),
today, exercises dominance over a large swathe of the country’s
territory, carry out attacks on security forces and symbols of
governance at will. Chhattisgarh has now emerged as one of the
principal centres of a co-ordinated Maoist movement. Indeed, with
361 fatalities in 2006, Chhattisgarh is the most violent State
after Jammu and Kashmir. While the number of Maoist-affected States
in the country is currently pegged at 14, the movement has demonstrated
the intent and potential to spread across the length and breadth
of the country. The Maoist threat has now overtaken all other
insurgencies in the country – at least from the perspective of
geographical spread, with various levels of Maoist mobilisation
and violence currently afflicting at least 165 Districts in 14
States. Over the past years, moreover, while fatalities in various
other insurgencies have tended to decline consistently, fatalities
related to the Maoist conflict have continuously augmented.
A total of 742 persons died in
Maoist-related violence across the country in 2006, up from 717
in 2005. Chhattisgarh in 2006 emerged as the worst affected State
– dramatically displacing Andhra Pradesh – and the Dantewada District
was by far the worst off within the State.
Fatalities
in Maoist Violence, 2005-2006
States
|
2005
|
2006
|
Civilian
|
SF
|
Maoist
|
Total
|
Civilian
|
SF
|
Maoist
|
Total
|
Andhra
Pradesh
|
132
|
21
|
167
|
320
|
18
|
7
|
127
|
152
|
Bihar
|
25
|
29
|
52
|
106
|
16
|
5
|
19
|
40
|
Jharkhand
|
49
|
27
|
20
|
96
|
18
|
47
|
29
|
94
|
Karnataka
|
52
|
48
|
26
|
126
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Chhattisgarh
|
13
|
1
|
3
|
17
|
189
|
55
|
117
|
361
|
Maharashtra
|
2
|
17
|
8
|
27
|
13
|
3
|
33
|
49
|
Orissa
|
2
|
6
|
4
|
12
|
3
|
4
|
16
|
23
|
West Bengal
|
1
|
0
|
6
|
7
|
9
|
7
|
4
|
20
|
Uttar Pradesh
|
5
|
1
|
0
|
6
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Total*
|
281
|
150
|
286
|
717
|
266
|
128
|
348
|
742
|
Source: Institute
for Conflict Management database
(Note: Compiled from news reports and is provisional)
According to the Union Home Ministry’s
Status Paper on Internal Security, the marginal increase in casualties
of civilians is mainly due to high violence levels in Chhattisgarh
and to some extent in Jharkhand. The paper noted that, "Chhattisgarh
alone accounts for 49.30 per cent of total incidents and 59.80
per cent of total casualties in the current year." There is, however,
no assessment of the reasons for the decline in violence in other
States – other than Andhra Pradesh, where focused Police action
has resulted in a flight of the Maoists – and there is reason
to believe that the decline in violence is a Maoist decision,
rather than any significant gain on the part of the state Forces.
Maoist efforts are evidently and increasingly focused on political
mobilization and consolidation over wider areas.
According to the Union Home Ministry’s
Status Paper on Internal Security, the marginal increase in casualties
of civilians is mainly due to high violence levels in Chhattisgarh
and to some extent in Jharkhand. The paper noted that, "Chhattisgarh
alone accounts for 49.30 per cent of total incidents and 59.80
per cent of total casualties in the current year." There is, however,
no assessment of the reasons for the decline in violence in other
States – other than Andhra Pradesh, where focused Police action
has resulted in a flight of the Maoists – and there is reason
to believe that the decline in violence is a Maoist decision,
rather than any significant gain on the part of the state Forces.
Maoist efforts are evidently and increasingly focused on political
mobilization and consolidation over wider areas.
It is useful to recognize, within
this context, that the threat of the Maoists is "not limited to
the areas of immediate violence, nor does this threat vanish if
violence is not manifested at a particular location for a specific
period of time. It is in the complex processes of political activity,
mass mobilisation, arms training and military consolidation that
the Maoist potential has to be estimated." Significantly, the
CPI-Maoist has established "Regional Bureaus across a mass of
nearly two-thirds of the country's territory, and these regions
are further sub-divided into state, special zonal and special
area committee jurisdictions, where the processes of mobilisation
have been defined and allocated to local leaders. This structure
of organisation substantially reflects current Maoist plans, but
does not exhaust their perspectives or ambitions. There is further
evidence of preliminary activity for the extension of operations
to new areas including Gujarat, Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu
& Kashmir and Meghalaya, beyond what is reflected in the scope
of the regional, zonal and state committees." Maoists have also
articulated a new strategy to target urban centres in their "Urban
Perspective Document", drawing up guidelines for "working in towns
and cities", and for the revival of a mobilization effort targeting
students and the urban unemployed. Two principal 'industrial belts'
have been identified as targets for urban mobilisation: Bhilai-Ranchi-Dhanbad-Calcutta
and Mumbai-Pune-Surat-Ahmedabad. Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil
told the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) on December 5,
2006, that Maoists were now planning to target important installations
in major cities of India. Patil said "Like forests provide safe
hideouts to Naxalites in tribal areas, the cities also provide
them cover. Taking advantage of this, they plan to target major
installations in cities."
The Maoist menace continues to
expand, except where it has been confronted by coherent use of
force – as is presently and substantially the case in Andhra Pradesh,
where area domination exercise under the leadership of the local
Police, backed by the armed reserve forces and the Grey Hounds,
and a well-developed intelligence network, have succeeded in beating
back the Naxalites to a large extent, and have forced their leadership
into flight. The Andhra Pradesh Police has long prepared for this
confrontation and has consistently developed its capacities to
engage with the Maoists in their ‘strongholds’, though it has
been repeatedly inhibited by political constraints from effective
action. These constraints appear, for the moment, to have been
lifted.
Other States, however, remain
far from prepared. Indeed, a consistent feature across all the
major Maoist-affected States is that they have extraordinarily
poor policing capacities. As against a national average of 122
police personnel per 100,000 population, and some peaceful States
with ratios as high as 854/100,000 (Mizoram) and 609/100,000 (Sikkim),
Bihar has just 57, Jharkhand – 85, Chhattisgarh – 103 and Orissa
– 90, and even Andhra Pradesh, just 98 per 100,000 population.
Worse, there is ample evidence that large proportions of the Central
allocation for police modernisation and up-gradation remain unspent
or are being diverted or mis-spent. Utilization of funds has been
particularly poor over the years in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya
Pradesh, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand.
Islamist Terrorism outside
J&K and the Northeast
At least 270 people died in Islamist
terrorist violence in locations outside J&K and the Northeast
during 2006. The significant incidents included:
March 7: At least 21 civilians
were killed and 62 others injured in three serial bomb explosions
at a temple and railway station in Varanasi. Seven bombs were
later defused, including four that had been planted on the Gowdolia-Dasashwamedh
Ghat Road near the Kashi Vishwanath Temple. Hours after the blasts,
a suspected LeT terrorist was shot dead during an encounter with
the police in the Gosaiganj area on the outskirts of Lucknow city.
April 14: Two bombs exploded inside
the Jama Masjid at Delhi injuring approximately 14 persons, including
a woman and a girl.
June 1: Three suspected LeT terrorists
were shot dead during an abortive attempt to storm the headquarters
of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, a right-wing Hindu organization,
at Nagpur in Maharashtra.
July 11: At least 200 persons
were killed and over 700 others injured in seven bomb blasts targeting
the railway network in the city of Mumbai. First class compartments
of local trains at Mira-Bayandhar, Jogeshwari, Mahim, Santacruz,
Khar, Matunga and Borivli stations on the Western Railway were
targeted.
September 8: Forty people killed
and 65 sustain injuries in three bomb explosions at Malegaon town
in the Nashik District of Maharashtra.
According to the MHA’s Status
Paper, the current strategy of Pakistan-based terrorist groups
is to:
- Maintain a continuous flow of finances to sustain
the terrorist networks in India
- Target vital installations and economic infrastructure
in India
- Recruit and train local modules
- Attack soft targets like market places, public
transport system, places of worship and congregation, etc.
- Provoke communal tensions to create a wedge
between communities
- Supply hardware through land and sea routes
The Status Paper discloses that
the LeT and JeM also use territory and elements in Bangladesh
and Nepal for movement of terrorists and finances. Army chief
J. J. Singh, on December 27, 2006, stated that "As terrorists
are finding it hard to penetrate the fence and new anti-infiltration
systems placed all along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir
and in Punjab… The areas bordering Nepal and Bangladesh are still
porous and intelligence reports suggest that terrorists are trying
to use them to infiltrate into India."
According to data compiled by
the Institute for Conflict Management, at least 81 Inter-Services
Intelligence-Jihadi modules have been disrupted just over the
years 2004-2006, leading to hundreds of arrests across India –
outside Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast – in locations that
extend from Uttaranchal in the North, to Andhra Pradesh in the
South, and from Gujarat in the West to West Bengal in the East.
These modules had been tasked to target security and vital installations,
communication links, and commercial and industrial centres, as
well as to provoke instability and disorder by circulating large
quantities of counterfeit currency and by drug trafficking. The
National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan had stated, on July 28,
2006, that Indian security and nuclear installations are under
"very serious threat" from the LeT, which may be planning a "major
assault".
Worse, terrorist attacks by Pakistan-backed
groups have occurred in places as far as Delhi, Mumbai, Malegaon,
and Varanasi in 2006. Terrorist attacks in places like Mumbai
and Varanasi in 2006 and earlier at Bangalore (December 28, 2005)
and New Delhi (October 29, 2005) are only the more visible evidence
of a long-term war of attrition by Pakistani state agencies and
their jihadi surrogates, intended to undermine India’s political
stability, by increasingly attacking its economic, scientific
and technological strengths. The frequency, spread and, in some
cases, intensity of these operations in other parts of the country
has seen some escalation in the past years, as international pressure
on Pakistan to end terrorism in J&K has diminished levels
of ‘deniable’ engagement in that theatre, and as violence in J&K
demonstrates a continuous secular decline since the events of
September 11, 2001 in the US.
It is important to note, however,
that despite occasional and inevitable terrorist ‘successes’,
this relentless strategy – which has targeted virtually every
concentration of Muslim populations in India for decades – has
overwhelmingly failed to secure a base within the community, beyond
a minuscule radical fringe. Further, the record of intelligence
and security agency successes against such subversion and terror,
although lacking the visibility and drama of a terrorist strike,
is immensely greater than the record of the successes of this
strategy.
|