In a series of
arrests, at once indicating a major intelligence breakthrough
and the sheer spread of the enduring threat of Pakistan-backed
Islamist extremist terrorism in India, as many as 77 persons have
already been arrested across the country in 2014, in connection
with a string of Islamist terrorist plots and subversive activities.
These prominently include Tehseen Akhtar alias Monu, who
had replaced Yasin Bhatkal as the Indian Mujahiddeen's (IM’s)
‘India operations chief’, and was the 'mastermind' of the Bodh
Gaya and Patna
attacks, and who was arrested from Naxalbari in Darjeeling District
of West Bengal [arrest date not disclosed, announcement made on
March 25, 2014], in the eastern corner of the country. Top IM
operative, Pakistani national Zia-ur-Rehman alias Waqas,
was arrested from outside the Ajmer Railway Station in the Western
State of Rajasthan, in the morning of March 22, 2014. In a continuing
series of arrests, Mohammad Mahruf and Mohammad Waqar Azhar alias
Haneef, were arrested from Jaipur on March 23. On the same day,
Shaquib Ansari alias Khalid, was arrested from Jodhpur,
even as "a huge amount of explosive materials, detonators,
electronic circuits/timers" was recovered from "the
residences of these three people from Jaipur and Jodhpur".
Again, on March 25, another three IM operatives, Barkat Ali, Mohammed
Javed and Mohammed Iqbal, were arrested from Jodhpur, followed
by the arrest of five IM operative - Mohammad Aquib, Mohammad
Sajjad, Mohammad Waqar, Mohammad Umar, and Mohammad Wahid - from
Sikar on March 28, 2014. In Uttar Pradesh, two IM operatives,
Murtaza and Owais, were arrested from Gorakhpur on March 26, 2014.
These arrests added
to at least 882 persons arrested since 26/11 (the Mumbai attacks
of 2008), according to partial data compiled by the South Asia
Terrorism Portal (SATP), in connection with Islamist extremism
and terrorism, and including terrorist cadres, Pakistani Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) agents, and Bangladeshi, Nepali and Pakistani
nationals. 151 of these arrests were made in 2013, and another
348 in 2012. These included three top terrorists – Yasin Bhatkal
aka Mohammad Ahmed Siddibappa Zarrar aka Imran aka
Asif aka Shahrukh; Asadullah Akhtar aka Haddi; and
Abdul Karim Tunda – who were arrested from the Indian State of
Bihar along the Indo-Nepal Border in August 2013. Yasin Bhatkal
was thought to be IM's 'operational chief in India', while Tunda
ranked 15th on India's dossier of most wanted terrorists in Pakistani
safe havens.
In Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) at least six persons, including three militants, two
civilians and one soldier were killed in Kathua District on March
28, 2014, when three Pakistani terrorists struck at Tarnah bridge
at Dayala Chak near Hiranagar, killing a Bolero driver before
striking at an Army camp at Janglot. An Army soldier and all three
militants were killed while another trooper was injured.
In the Sukma District
of Chhattisgarh, one of the States worst afflicted by the Left
Wing Extremist insurgency, fifteen Security Force (SF) personnel
were killed in an ambush by Communist Party of India - Maoist
(CPI-Maoist)
cadres, on March 11, 2014. One civilian, Vikram Nishad, also died
in the crossfire, while three were injured. The incident occurred
in the Jeeram Ghati area, barely eight kilometres from the location
of the May
25, 2013, attack, when CPI-Maoist cadres killed
28 persons and injured at least 30 (another three subsequently
died of their injuries), including the top leadership of the Congress
Party in the State.
In the Kokrajhar
District of Assam, in India's troubled Northeast, six persons
were killed when suspected militants of the Ingti Kathar Songbijit
faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS)
opened fire at a bus on National Highway (NH) 31, at Serfanguri.
These developments
and widely dispersed incidents come as sobering reminders of the
enduring threat of extremist violence across India, despite broadly
positive trends in fatalities and armed violence in a multiplicity
of theatres. Crucially, total terrorism and insurgency related
fatalities collapsed
from a peak of 5,839 in 2001, to just 885 in 2013, according to
the SATP database. The most dramatic drop
has been in J&K, from 4,507 killed in 2001, to just 181 in
2013. Maoist violence, which peaked in 2010, with 1,080 fatalities,
also registered a sharp
contraction, with a total of 421 killed in
2013. In the multiple insurgencies across India's Northeast, fatalities
collapsed from a peak of 1,317 in 2001, to a total of 251 in 2013.
Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorist attacks outside J&K, which
resulted in 364 fatalities in 2008, saw 29 killed in 2013. Significantly,
on November 21, 2013, Syed Asif Ibrahim, Director, Intelligence
Bureau, observed: "The LeT (Lashkar-e-Toiba) and IM have
enlarged their network and developed capabilities to carry out
acts of terror at short notice in various parts of the country...
Evidence gathered from various cases indicates Pakistan continues
to nurture terrorist groups..."
Demonstrating the
fragility of these gains, however, J&K registered a rise in
fatalities, from 117 in 2012, to 181 in 2013. This was compounded
by an escalating campaign of cease fire violations by Pakistan's
Army with at least 195 violations recorded through 2013, resulting
in 10 SF fatalities, as against 93 such violations in 2012, resulting
in three SF fatalities. In the Maoist belt, fatalities rose from
367 to 421 between 2012 and 2013; Islamist terrorist attacks outside
J&K accounted for one fatality in 2012, and 29 in 2013. In
the Northeast, at least two States registered an increase in total
fatalities between 2012 and 2013: Assam, from 91 to 101; and Meghalaya,
from 48 to 60. India's peculiar vulnerabilities, the sheer weakness
of governance and of the internal security apparatus, and the
mercurial geopolitical environment, leaves no room whatsoever
for complacency.
205 of the country’s
640 Districts continued to be afflicted
by varying intensities of chronic subversive, insurgent and terrorist
activity in 2013, including 120 Districts where the Maoists remained
active; 20 Districts in J&K afflicted by Pakistan-backed Islamist
separatist terrorism; and 65 Districts in six Northeastern States
where numerous ethnicity based terrorist and insurgent formations
operate. This is, of course, down from a peak of 310 Districts
so listed in 2010, principally as a result of the abrupt contraction
of the Maoist rampage which had escalated enormously in the 2009-10
period. In 2012, the number of afflicted Districts stood at 252.
The divergent trends
and their causal dynamic in different States and theatres have
been analysed
in detail elsewhere, and need not detain us here. It needs to
be emphasised that a wide range of extraneous factors, often unrelated
to state policy or strategy, have influenced these trends, and
grave dangers of reversal - including the impact of developments
in Afghanistan and a creeping implosion in Pakistan - exist. Crucially,
India's own vulnerabilities and deficits in its security and intelligence
apparatus remain glaring, and there is much reason to be sceptical
of the claim made by Union Minister of Home Affairs, Sushilkumar
Shinde, that "The Government will deal with iron fist (sic)
when it comes to terrorism." Indeed, the lackadaisical, often
corruption-led approach to India's security is everywhere in evidence,
with crucial projects, acquisitions and plans delayed beyond measure,
or implemented in a fitful manner that destroys the very possibility
of their efficacy in securing intended ends. A brief review of
the status of some of the most urgent measures illustrates the
sheer incoherence of approach, despite massive increases in expenditure
on internal security. The annual budgetary allocation for the
Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA), for instance, has escalated
dramatically since 26/11, more than doubling, from INR 254.39
billion in 2008-09, to 592.41 billion in 2013-14. A detailed breakdown
of this expenditure is not available, nor is any detailed assessment
of its components possible here. It is useful, however, to take
an overview of some of the most pressing heads and commitments
made post-26/11, to see the sheer magnitude of implementation
failure. More than five years after the debacle in Mumbai, and
the many political declarations of determination and intent, capacity
augmentation has been no more than marginal, and most state agencies
continue to struggle with manpower, technology and resource deficits
that are little different from the situation in 2008.
Thus, on March
12, 2013, in a written statement to the Lok Sabha, Minister of
State of Home Affairs, R.P.N Singh disclosed, “As against a sanctioned
strength of 26,867 personnel in IB (Intelligence Bureau), at present
18,795 personnel are available with a total of 8,072 vacancies
(30%).” Improvements in the manpower-strapped IB have been conceived
of as critical to the country's counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-insurgency
(CI) responses, and this single datum, manifesting an manpower
at best marginally different from the situation in 2008, is itself
a comprehensive indictment of the state's approach.
Similarly, the
Government informed the Rajya Sabha on August 22, 2013, that Indian
Police Service (IPS) officers 'in position' as per the 2013 civil
list stood at 3,637, some 1,093 short of the total authorized
strength of 4,730 IPS officers, a deficit of 23.1 per cent, as
compared to the situation in 2008, when a deficit of 14.42 per
cent existed against a lesser sanctioned strength of 3,903. The
actual addition to this cadre has been just 297 officers over
five years. The sanctioned strength, moreover, remains well below
the estimated requirement of Police leadership in the country.
The police-population
ratio has risen from 128 per 100,000 in 2008, to no more than
138 per 100,000 in 2012, as against a general norm of 220 per
100,000 for 'peacetime policing', with some Western countries
maintaining ratios
over and above 220 per 100,000. There is, moreover, no evidence
whatsoever of any significant change in the very poor manpower
profile of the Police Forces, or in their training and capabilities.
Despite the creation of the 'elite' Force 10, Mumbai, today, has
the same general policing capabilities that so dramatically failed
to protect the city against the 26/11 attacks. The State Police
across much of the country, with occasional exception, is measurably
worse in terms of resources, capacities and capabilities.
The Central Armed
Police Forces (CAPFs), the stopgap responders for every emergency
in the country, including the chronic crises generated by enduring
movements of terrorism and insurgency, have seen some increase
in manpower. The sanctioned strength of CAPFs at end-2008 stood
at 838,893, and actual strength at 777,743 (a deficit of 7.28
per cent). By January 2013, according to Bureau of Police Research
and Development data, these numbers had been raised to 984,781
sanctioned, and 883,581 actual (a deficit of 10.2 per cent). Actual
strength has, thus, seen an improvement of 105,838 personnel,
which is significant, but far from adequate to meet the augmenting
challenges of a progressively widening mandate and the geographically
dispersed threats across the country.
While these numbers
may suggest some qualified gains in the CAPFs, the scandalous
pace of capacity development is illustrated by a March 22, 2014,
news report regarding the status of protective headgear for the
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the designated 'lead agency'
for CT-CI operations. Jugal Purohit discloses, in India Today,
that, against an authorisation of 109,000 protective headgear
in two categories - helmets and patkas - the current availability
is an abysmal 762 helmets and under 1,100 patkas. Tortuous
and dilatory bureaucratic processes continue to obstruct necessary
acquisitions, placing SF personnel at unacceptable risk in counter-insurgency
deployments across India. Significantly, at least 226 CRPF personnel
have been killed in the course of their duties between 2010 and
2012.
Shortly after 26/11,
a 'modernization plan' for the CAPFs was announced, with a total
allocation of INR 41.85 billion, to acquire the latest weapons,
surveillance and communication equipment, vehicles, body protection
gear, etc. But only a fraction of these financial commitments
have actually been met. Thus, the CAPFs sought INR 23.60 billion
for 2013 for their CT-CI and border control acquisitions; the
UMHA released just INR 900 million. The CRPF had raised a demand
of INR 8.73 billion, but was sanctioned just INR 200 million.
The Border Security Force (BSF) sought INR 6.94 billion, but received
just INR 200 million.
Coastal security
was identified as one of the priority areas of security reform
after 26/11, with its utter and comprehensive vulnerability demonstrated
in the Mumbai attacks. That India's coastline remain just as vulnerable,
was dramatically demonstrated with the discovery of the 390 tonne
Seaman Guard Ohio, owned by a private US firm, AdvanFort, which
its commander admitted had been functioning undetected as an illegal
'floating armoury' for merchant vessels in Indian territorial
waters for 45 days prior to its detention 10 nautical miles off
Tuticorin along the Tamil Nadu coastline, on October 12, 2013.
35 weapons, including 34 rifles, one pistol and ammunition were
recovered from the vessel. The vessel was supposedly checked and
found clean when it had berthed on August 23, 2013, at Kochi in
Kerala, suggesting, either, that the inspection was far from thorough,
or that the arms had been acquired in Indian waters before the
vessel reached the point of its interception. Clearly, a terrorist
attempt to pass through Indian waters to a target port would take
considerably less than 45 days of undetected movement.
Even more startling
was the evident and continuing vulnerability of the Mumbai coast
demonstrated by three
incidents in 2011, when three massive vessels
simply drifted into Mumbai, completely unnoticed by the numerous
Coastal Police Stations, check-posts, outposts, and sea and land
patrols that had been established after 26/11.
With tens of thousands
of vessels, large and small, at sea along India's vast coastline
each day, it is impossible, irrespective of the intensity of patrolling,
to identify the interloper or deviant, unless there is a GPS tagging
system to identify those whose presence is legitimate. The rudiments
of such a system are yet to be created.
Substantial expenditure
has certainly been incurred on various initiatives intended to
secure India's coastline, but the systems are far from functional
and effective. A Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report
released in July 2013 noted: “72 per cent of the fast patrol vessels
(FPVs)/inshore patrol vessels (IPVs), 47 per cent of the advanced
offshore patrol vessels (AOPVs) and 37 interceptor boats were
either on extended life or their extended life had expired..."
Many of the coastal Police Stations and Posts sanctioned had not
been established. Sea patrolling was a fraction of the prescribed
frequency, and there had been no night flying. "Out of the
50 CCPs [Coastal check-posts] and COPs [Costal outposts] completed,
36 remained non-operational as police personnel were not deployed…"
Unsurprisingly,
National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon, observed, on November
21, 2013, “Coastal areas in southern states of India can be potential
targets for terrorists to infiltrate into the country.”
Vulnerabilities
along the country's land borders also persist. Home Minister
Shinde noted on December 20, 2013, that “anti-national” elements
were taking advantage of “friendly borders”, and described the
task of guarding open and friendly borders with countries like
Nepal and Bhutan as a “big challenge”. The problem along borders
with not-so-friendly countries is obviously greater. According
to partial data compiled by SATP, at least 43 attempts at infiltration
were made from across the International Border and Line of Control
in J&K in 2013. The movement of terrorists and subversive
from Pakistan into India, through friendly countries such as Nepal
and Bangladesh has also been frequently documented, and remains
a persistent threat to internal security.
The multi-agency
centre (MAC), which coordinates all intelligence generated by
various central intelligence agencies, prominently including the
Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), National Technical Research
Organisation, Military Intelligence, among others, as well as
the Intelligence Bureau’s (IB's) Subsidiary Intelligence Bureaus
(SIBs) in the State, became active sometime in May-June, 2012.
This has resulted in significant improvements in the acquisition,
coordination and dissemination of available intelligence, but
falls considerably short of creating a national database on terrorist
and insurgency activities - an objective that can only come to
fruition with the creation of the Crime and Criminal Tracking
Network and Systems (CCTNS) project, which is intended to link
up all Police Stations in the country, and which received sanction
on June 19, 2009. The CCTNS project is yet to take off, with several
States failing even to initiate first steps. The National Crime
Records Bureau (NCRB), which has been charged with the implementation
of the process, is yet to finalize an MoU between itself and the
software developing agency that is to take the project forward.
The project received approval of the Cabinet Committee on Economic
Affairs (CCEA) on June 19, 2009. Crucially, the CCTNS project
is a reinvention of the PolNet (Police Network) project, which
was sanctioned as far back as 1996, with the same objective of
linking the Police Stations across the country. INR 2.76 billion
was allocated for the CCTNS project in 2013-14, but most observers
believe it will take years before the network is ready.
Similarly, the
National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) project, which was intended
to integrate 21 existing databases - including banking, finance,
and transportation databases - and which the Government claimed
would help 'fight terrorism', has also failed to take off. Nevertheless,
the foundation laying day of the NATGRID data centre in New Delhi
was observed on December 19, 2013. The NATGRID data centre and
other administrative infrastructure are intended to be completed
over the succeeding 30 months, inside a CRPF campus in south Delhi,
will cost INR 2.34 billion. NATGRID's potential impact on terrorism
is, moreover, debatable, and its efficacy has been questioned
even by within the intelligence community. Crucially, sources
indicate that the project is "several months to several years"
away from providing any useful inputs to the security establishment.
The National Investigation
Agency (NIA), which was hurriedly established in the immediate
wake of the 26/11 attacks, has expectedly failed to impact significantly
on the trajectory of terrorism, despite occasional successes.
The total cases registered by NIA currently stand at just 72,
in a country where thousands of terrorist offences are committed
every year. Charge Sheets have, thus far, been filed in only 33
cases. Convictions have been obtained in seven cases. The number
of persons convicted stands at 11, with one of these, Samir Ahmed,
convicted in two cases. Interestingly, NIA has failed to obtain
a conviction in any major case of terrorist attack. Significantly,
many of the investigations 'taken over' by the NIA had already
been at least partially completed by State agencies. The cumulative
CT impact of the NIA - if at all measurable - would at best be
negligible. It is useful to note that the total strength of all
Crime Investigation Departments (CID) in the State Police across
the country stood at 11,729 personnel in 2011; with as many as
6,252,729 offences registered that year, yielding a ratio of 533.09
cases per officer (it is no surprise that most of these cases
go uninvestigated). NIA has a sanctioned strength of 650 officers
and 72 cases - yielding an investigative caseload that can only
be the envy of agencies in the States.
The Government
quickly implemented the decision to establish 'hubs' of the elite
National Security Guard (NSG) in four major metropolitan centres,
but the utility of this move has always been in question. Moreover,
the hubs continue to function under acute limitations for training
and readiness of the units, even as the NSG suffers from a critical
leadership shortfall, with a deficit of over 22 per cent against
its sanctioned strength of officers.
Despite numerous,
sometimes dramatic, successes by India's resource strapped security
and intelligence agencies, both at the Centre and in the States,
the reality is that India's internal security apparatus continues
to suffer from gaping vulnerabilities. While we may celebrate
the relief that declining overall trends in terrorism and insurgency
related fatalities offer, the truth is, these trends are overwhelmingly
a consequence of factors other than measurable improvements in
state capacities and capabilities. This is unsurprising. According
to NCRB data for 2012, India's per capita expenditure on State
Police, for instance, works out to a pitiable Rs. 1.25 per day
- a fraction of what a cup of tea would cost at a roadside stall.
Only the blind and congenitally stupid could expect an effective
policing and internal security system at this kind of cost.
India's internal
security apparatus continues to suffer extreme susceptibility
under the control of an ignorant, deeply compromised and corrupt
political executive. The system lacks the capacities even to deal
with current challenges and transient emergencies, and will certainly
and comprehensively fail if a generational shift in terrorist
capabilities or intent - to include catastrophic or chemical-biological-radiological
and nuclear terrorism (CBRN) - occurs.
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