Status Paper on the Naxal Problem
On March 13, 2006, the Union Home
Minister Shivraj Patil tabled in Parliament a Status Paper on
the problem of Left-wing extremism in India. Presented below is
the full text of the Paper:
1.1The Naxalite movement continues to persist in terms of spatial
spread, intensity of violence, mlitarisation and consolidation, ominous
linkages with subversive/secessionist groups and increased efforts
to elicit mass support. The naxalites operate in vacuum created by
absence of administrative and political institutions, espouse the
local demands and take advantage of the disenchantment prevalent among
the exploited segments of the population and seek to offer an alternative
system of governance which promises emancipation of these segments
from the clutches of exploiter classes through the barrel
of a gun.
2. VIOLENCE PROFILE
2.1 Naxalite menace remains an area of
serious concern. In 2005, naxalite violence has claimed 669 lives
including 153 police personnel in 1594 incidents as against 556 casualties
in 1533 incidents in 2004. The quantum of naxal violence has shown
a marginal increase of about 4% in 2005, over by 2004, while resultant
casualties have however, gone up by 18.1%.
2.2 In the current year (till February)
while the number of incidents of naxal violence has decreased by 29%
over the corresponding period of 2005 (246 incidents as against 347
in 2005). Civilian and security forces casualties have, however, increased
by 11.4% (116 as against 104 in 2005).
2.3 Statewise naxalite incidents/resultant
deaths of civilians and security personnel in the years 2003 to 2006
(till February) are at Annexure 1.
2.4 The substantial increase in naxal
violence and deaths in Andhra Pradesh can be attributed to the unilateral
withdrawal by naxalites from the peace talks in January, 2005 and
consequent stepped up violence by them. In Chhattisgarh, resistance
being put up by the Salva Judum (anti- naxal movement by people) activists
and the efforts of the security forces to dislodge the naxalites from
their strongholds are the main reasons for increased violence and
resultant deaths. While the States of Bihar and Jharkhand have recorded
decrease in naxal violence in 2005, a few high profile incidents like
looting of weapons from the Giridih Home Guard training center on
11-11-2005 in Jharkhand and the jailbreak on 13-11-2005 in Jehanabad,
Bihar, have taken place in recent months.
2.5 The first two months of the current
year have witnessed some major naxalite attacks in Chhattisgarh. These
include killing of 9 personnel of Naga Armed Battalion on 6.2.2006,
looting of weapons and a large quantity of explosives from NMDC Magazine
at Hiroli on 9.2.2006 and killing of 28 civilians in Konta Block of
Dantewada district on 28.2.2006. These incidents have exposed the
gaps in the States security and intelligence apparatus.
3. RECENT TRENDS/DEVELOPMENTS
3.1 Spatial spread
3.1.1 In 2005, naxal violence has been
reported from 509 police stations in 11 states which works out to
5.8% of the total number of police station in these states. Statewise
spread of naxal violence in terms of the police station affected is
at Annexure- II
3.1.2 Available reports, however, suggest
that CPI (Maoists) have been trying to increase their influence and
act in parts of Kamataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Uttranchal and also
in new areas in some of the already affected states.
After the merger of CPMLPW and
MCCI into CPI (Maoist) in September, 2004, they are reported to be
trying to woo other splinter groups and have also consolidated their
front organizations into Revolution Democratic Front (RDF)
to intensify their mass contact programme. Fresh recruitment of cadres
is also reported. Indian naxalite groups continue to sustain their
fraternal and logistic links with Nepalese Maoists, though there are
no strategic and operational likes between the two.
3.3 Naxalite Ideology of armed struggle
The naxalite leadership continues to
pursue their plan to wage protracted peoples war through the
armed struggle to capture political power. In the recent past, naxalite
groups seem to lay greater focus on organising along military lines.
They are also acquiring contemporary weapons. Their constant effort
is to upgrade technology and sophistication of their weaponry and
3.4 Simultaneous attacks
The latest tactics adopted by the naxal
outfits are to engage in simultaneous multiple attacks in large numbers
particularly against police forces and police establishments. This
has led to increased casualties of police personnel in 2005 mainly
due to IED/landmine blasts by the naxalites. A total of 153 police
personnel have laid down their lives in 2005 in 194 attacks by naxalites
on the police as against 100 in 232 such attacks in 2004.
4. POLICY TO DEAL WITH THE NAXALITE
The Government has a clearly defined
policy to combat the challenge posed by the naxalite menace. This
policy comprises the following components:-
(i) The Government will deal sternly
with the naxlites indulging in violence.
(ii) Keeping in view that naxalism is
not merely a law & order problem, the policy of the Govt. is to
address this menace simultaneously on political security, development
and public perception management fronts in a holistic manner.
(iii) Naxalism being an interstate
problem, the states will adopt a collective approach and pursue a
coordinated response to counter it.
(iv) The states will need to further
improve police response and pursue effective and sustained police
action against naxalites and their infrastructure individually and
(v) There will be no peace dialogue by
the affected states with the naxal groups unless the latter agree
to give up violence and arms.
(vi) Political parties must strengthen
their cadre base in naxsal affected areas so that the potential youth
there can be weaned away from the path of naxal ideology.
(vii) The states from where naxal activity/influence,
and not naxal violence, is reported should have a different approach
with special focus on accelerated sociw-economic development of the
backward areas and regular inter action with NGOs, intelligencia,
civil liberties groups etc. to minimize over ground support for the
naxalite ideology and activity.
(viii) Efforts will continue to be made
to promote local resistance groups against naxalites but in a manner
that the villagers are provided adequate security cover and provided
adequate secutrity cover and the area is effectively dominated by
the security forces.
(ix) Mass media should also be extensively
used to highlight the futility of naxal violence and loss of life
and property caused by it and developmental schemes of the Government
in the affected areas so as to restore peoples faith and confidence
in the Government machinery.
(x) The states should announce a suitable
transfer policy for the naxal affected districts. Willing, committed
and competent officers will need to be posted with a stable tenure
in the naxal affected districts, These officers will also need to
be given greater delegation and flexibility to deliver better and
step up Government presence in these areas.
(xi) The Government of Andhra Pradesh
has an effective surrender and rehabilitation policy for naxalites
and has produced good results over the years. The other states should
adopt a similar policy.
(xii) The State Governments will need
to accord a higher priority in their annual plans to ensure faster
socio- economic development of the naxal affected areas. The focus
areas should be to distribute land to the landless poor as part of
the speedy implementation of the land reforms, ensure development
of physical infrastructure like roads, communication, power etc. and
provide employment opportunities to the youth in these areas.
(xiii) Another related issue is that
development activities are not undertaken in some of the naxalite
affected areas mainly due to extortion, threat or fear from the naxalite
cadres. In these areas, even contractors are not coming forward to
take up developmental work. Adequate security and other measures would
need to be taken to facilitate uninterrupted developmental activities
in the naxal affected areas.
(xiv) The Central Government will continue
to supplement the efforts and resources of the affected states on
both security and development fronts and bring greater coordination
between the states to successfully tackle the problem.
5. COUNTER MEASURES
5.1 While the overall counter action
by the affected states in terms of naxalites killed, arrested, surrendered
and arms recovered from them has shown much better results in 2005,
there is an urgent need to further improve and strengthen police response
particularly by the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Maharashtra
by improving actionable intelligence collection and sharing mechanisms
and strengthening their police forces on the pattern of Greyhounds
in Andhra Pradesh. Even as the states of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh
to some extent, need to sustain their present momentum of effective
counter action against the naxalites and their infrastructure.
5.2 The Government has taken the following
measures to control the naxal problem.
5.2.1 Modernization of State Police
Funds are given to the States under the
Police Modernization Scheme to modernize their police forces in terms
of modern weaponry, latest communication equipment, mobility and other
infrastructure. The naxal affected States have also been asked to
identify vulnerable police stations and outposts in the naxal areas
and take up their fortification under the Scheme. However, some of
the States need to improve the level of utilization of funds under
5.2.2 Revision of Security Related Expenditure
(SRE) Scheme in February, 2005.
The level of reimbursement under the
Scheme has been raised from 50% to 100% and new items like insurance
scheme for police personnel, community policing, rehabilitation of
surrendered naxalites, expenditure incurred on publicity to counter
propaganda of naxalites, other security related items not covered
under the Police Modernization Scheme etc., have been covered. The
Scheme also allows release of funds to the naxal affected States as
advance. It is hoped that the revised scheme will enable higher level
of utilization of funds under this Scheme.
5.2.3 Supply of Mine Protected Vehicles
Keeping in view the increased casualties
of police personnel due to IED/land mine blasts, the naxal affected
States have been provided Mine Protected Vehicles (MPVs) under the
Police Modernization Scheme. Their supply has been streamlined by
taking up the matter with the Chairman, Ordinance Factory Board.
5.2.4 Longterm deployment of Central
Para Military Forces
In order to supplement the efforts of
the States in providing an effective response to the naxal violence,
Central Para Military Forces have been deployed on a long-term basis
as requested by the affected States. The Central Government has also
exempted the states from the payment of cost of deployment of these
forces for a period of three years from 1-7-2004 involving an amount
of nearly Rs. 1,100 crores.
5.2.5 India Reserve Battalions
The naxal affected States have been
sanctioned India Reserve (IR) battalions mainly to strengthen security
apparatus at their level as also to enable the States to provide gainful
employment to the youth, particularly in the naxal areas. Recently,
additional IR battalions have also been approved for the naxal affected
States. The Central Government will now provide Rs. 20.75 crores per
IR battalion as against the earlier amount of Rs. 13 crores per battalion.
The States have been asked to expedite raising of these battalions.
5.2.6 Deployment of SSB along Indo-Nepal
In order to ensure that there is no
spillover effect of the activities of Nepalese Maoists to our territory,
SSB has been given the responsibility to guard Indo-Nepal Border.
The Government has also recently sanctioned new raisings for the SSB
to further improve management of borders in these areas. A modernization
plan involving an outlay of Rs.444 crores has also been sanctioned
for the SSB.
5.2.7 Recruitment in Central Para Military
In order to wean away the potential
youth from the path to militancy or naxalism, recruitment guidelines
have been revised to permit 40% recruitment in Central Para Military
Forces from the border areas and areas affected by militancy or naxalism.
5.2.8 Backward Districts Initiative
Since the naxalite menace has to be
addressed on the developmental front also, the Central Government
has provided financial assistance of Rs. 2,475 crores for 55 naxal
affected districts in the 9 States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh,
Orissa, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh &
West Bengal under the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) component
of the Rsahtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY). Under this Scheme, an amount
of Rs. 15 crores per year has been given to each of the districts
for three years so as to fill in the critical gaps in physical and
social development in the naxal affected areas. The Planning Commission
has been requested to include other naxal affected areas under their
proposed Scheme of Backward Regions Grant Funds (BRGF) for which an
outlay of Rs. 5,000 crores has been set apart from this fiscal year
5.2.9 Tribal and Forest elated issues
In order to address the areas of disaffection
among the tribals, the Government has introduced the Scheduled Tribes
(Recognition of Forest Rights) Bill, 2005, in Parliament on 13.12.2005.
Further, to facilitate social and physical infrastructure in the forest
areas, Ministry of Environment and Forests has, as requested by the
MHA, issued general approval to allow such infrastructure by utilising
upto 1 hectare of forest land for non-forest purposes. That Ministry
has also permitted upgradation of kutcha roads constructed prior to
01.09.1980 into pucca roads.
5.2.10 Effective implementation of land
reforms and creation of employment opportunities in the naxal areas
Naxal groups have been raising mainly
land and livelihood related issues. If land reforms are taken up on
priority and the landless and the poor in the naxal areas are allotted
surplus land, this would go a long way in tackling the developmental
aspects of the naxal problem. The States have been requested to focus
greater attention on this area as also accelerate developmental activities
and create employment opportunities in the naxal affected areas with
special focus on creation of physical infrastructure in terms of roads,
communication, power as also social infrastructure such as schools,
6. MONITORING MECHANISMS
6.1 The Central Government accords a
very high priority to review and monitor the naxal situation and the
measures being taken by the states on both security and development
fronts to control it. Several monitoring mechanisms have been set
up at the Center to do so. These include a periodical review by the
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) Of the naxal situation, Standing
Committee of the Chief Ministers of the naxal affected states chaired
by the Union Home Minister, Quarterly Coordination Center meetings
chaired by the Union Home Secretary with the Chief Secretaries and
the Directors General of Police of the affected states and the monthly
Task Force meetings of Nodal Officers of naxal affected states/Central
agencies chaired by Special Secretary (IS), MHA. The states have also
been asked to hold a monthly review by the DGP and the naxal situation
and the measures and strategies to contain the naxal problem .
The Central Government views the naxalite
menace as an area of serious concern. The Government remains firmly
committed and determined to address the problem. The current strategy
is (i) to strengthen intelligence set-up at the state level; (ii)
pursue effective and sustained intelligence driven police action against
naxalites and their infrastructure individually and jointly by the
states and (iii) accelerate development in the naxal affected areas.
The Central Government will continue to coordinate and supplement
the efforts to the state governments on both security and development
fronts to meet the challenge posed by the naxal problem.