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Status Paper on the Naxal Problem

On March 13, 2006, the Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil tabled in Parliament a Status Paper on the problem of Left-wing extremism in India. Presented below is the full text of the Paper:


1.1The Naxalite movement continues to persist in terms of spatial spread, intensity of violence, mlitarisation and consolidation, ominous linkages with subversive/secessionist groups and increased efforts to elicit mass support. The naxalites operate in vacuum created by absence of administrative and political institutions, espouse the local demands and take advantage of the disenchantment prevalent among the exploited segments of the population and seek to offer an alternative system of governance which promises emancipation of these segments from the clutches of ‘exploiter’ classes through the barrel of a gun.


2.1 Naxalite menace remains an area of serious concern. In 2005, naxalite violence has claimed 669 lives including 153 police personnel in 1594 incidents as against 556 casualties in 1533 incidents in 2004. The quantum of naxal violence has shown a marginal increase of about 4% in 2005, over by 2004, while resultant casualties have however, gone up by 18.1%.

2.2 In the current year (till February) while the number of incidents of naxal violence has decreased by 29% over the corresponding period of 2005 (246 incidents as against 347 in 2005). Civilian and security forces casualties have, however, increased by 11.4% (116 as against 104 in 2005).

2.3 State–wise naxalite incidents/resultant deaths of civilians and security personnel in the years 2003 to 2006 (till February) are at Annexure – 1.

2.4 The substantial increase in naxal violence and deaths in Andhra Pradesh can be attributed to the unilateral withdrawal by naxalites from the peace talks in January, 2005 and consequent stepped up violence by them. In Chhattisgarh, resistance being put up by the Salva Judum (anti- naxal movement by people) activists and the efforts of the security forces to dislodge the naxalites from their strongholds are the main reasons for increased violence and resultant deaths. While the States of Bihar and Jharkhand have recorded decrease in naxal violence in 2005, a few high profile incidents like looting of weapons from the Giridih Home Guard training center on 11-11-2005 in Jharkhand and the jailbreak on 13-11-2005 in Jehanabad, Bihar, have taken place in recent months.

2.5 The first two months of the current year have witnessed some major naxalite attacks in Chhattisgarh. These include killing of 9 personnel of Naga Armed Battalion on 6.2.2006, looting of weapons and a large quantity of explosives from NMDC Magazine at Hiroli on 9.2.2006 and killing of 28 civilians in Konta Block of Dantewada district on 28.2.2006. These incidents have exposed the gaps in the States security and intelligence apparatus.


3.1 Spatial spread

3.1.1 In 2005, naxal violence has been reported from 509 police stations in 11 states which works out to 5.8% of the total number of police station in these states. Statewise spread of naxal violence in terms of the police station affected is at Annexure- II

3.1.2 Available reports, however, suggest that CPI (Maoists) have been trying to increase their influence and act in parts of Kamataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Uttranchal and also in new areas in some of the already affected states.

3.2 Consolidation

After the merger of CPML–PW and MCCI into CPI (Maoist) in September, 2004, they are reported to be trying to woo other splinter groups and have also consolidated their front organizations into ‘Revolution Democratic Front’ (RDF) to intensify their mass contact programme. Fresh recruitment of cadres is also reported. Indian naxalite groups continue to sustain their fraternal and logistic links with Nepalese Maoists, though there are no strategic and operational likes between the two.

3.3 Naxalite Ideology of armed struggle and militarisation

The naxalite leadership continues to pursue their plan to wage protracted people’s war through the armed struggle to capture political power. In the recent past, naxalite groups seem to lay greater focus on organising along military lines. They are also acquiring contemporary weapons. Their constant effort is to upgrade technology and sophistication of their weaponry and techniques.

3.4 Simultaneous attacks

The latest tactics adopted by the naxal outfits are to engage in simultaneous multiple attacks in large numbers particularly against police forces and police establishments. This has led to increased casualties of police personnel in 2005 mainly due to IED/landmine blasts by the naxalites. A total of 153 police personnel have laid down their lives in 2005 in 194 attacks by naxalites on the police as against 100 in 232 such attacks in 2004.


The Government has a clearly defined policy to combat the challenge posed by the naxalite menace. This policy comprises the following components:-

(i) The Government will deal sternly with the naxlites indulging in violence.

(ii) Keeping in view that naxalism is not merely a law & order problem, the policy of the Govt. is to address this menace simultaneously on political security, development and public perception management fronts in a holistic manner.

(iii) Naxalism being an inter–state problem, the states will adopt a collective approach and pursue a coordinated response to counter it.

(iv) The states will need to further improve police response and pursue effective and sustained police action against naxalites and their infrastructure individually and jointly.

(v) There will be no peace dialogue by the affected states with the naxal groups unless the latter agree to give up violence and arms.

(vi) Political parties must strengthen their cadre base in naxsal affected areas so that the potential youth there can be weaned away from the path of naxal ideology.

(vii) The states from where naxal activity/influence, and not naxal violence, is reported should have a different approach with special focus on accelerated sociw-economic development of the backward areas and regular inter action with NGOs, intelligencia, civil liberties groups etc. to minimize over ground support for the naxalite ideology and activity.

(viii) Efforts will continue to be made to promote local resistance groups against naxalites but in a manner that the villagers are provided adequate security cover and provided adequate secutrity cover and the area is effectively dominated by the security forces.

(ix) Mass media should also be extensively used to highlight the futility of naxal violence and loss of life and property caused by it and developmental schemes of the Government in the affected areas so as to restore people’s faith and confidence in the Government machinery.

(x) The states should announce a suitable transfer policy for the naxal affected districts. Willing, committed and competent officers will need to be posted with a stable tenure in the naxal affected districts, These officers will also need to be given greater delegation and flexibility to deliver better and step up Government presence in these areas.

(xi) The Government of Andhra Pradesh has an effective surrender and rehabilitation policy for naxalites and has produced good results over the years. The other states should adopt a similar policy.

(xii) The State Governments will need to accord a higher priority in their annual plans to ensure faster socio- economic development of the naxal affected areas. The focus areas should be to distribute land to the landless poor as part of the speedy implementation of the land reforms, ensure development of physical infrastructure like roads, communication, power etc. and provide employment opportunities to the youth in these areas.

(xiii) Another related issue is that development activities are not undertaken in some of the naxalite affected areas mainly due to extortion, threat or fear from the naxalite cadres. In these areas, even contractors are not coming forward to take up developmental work. Adequate security and other measures would need to be taken to facilitate uninterrupted developmental activities in the naxal affected areas.

(xiv) The Central Government will continue to supplement the efforts and resources of the affected states on both security and development fronts and bring greater coordination between the states to successfully tackle the problem.


5.1 While the overall counter action by the affected states in terms of naxalites killed, arrested, surrendered and arms recovered from them has shown much better results in 2005, there is an urgent need to further improve and strengthen police response particularly by the states of Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Maharashtra by improving actionable intelligence collection and sharing mechanisms and strengthening their police forces on the pattern of Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh. Even as the states of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh to some extent, need to sustain their present momentum of effective counter action against the naxalites and their infrastructure.

5.2 The Government has taken the following measures to control the naxal problem.

5.2.1 Modernization of State Police

Funds are given to the States under the Police Modernization Scheme to modernize their police forces in terms of modern weaponry, latest communication equipment, mobility and other infrastructure. The naxal affected States have also been asked to identify vulnerable police stations and outposts in the naxal areas and take up their fortification under the Scheme. However, some of the States need to improve the level of utilization of funds under the Scheme.

5.2.2 Revision of Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme in February, 2005.

The level of reimbursement under the Scheme has been raised from 50% to 100% and new items like insurance scheme for police personnel, community policing, rehabilitation of surrendered naxalites, expenditure incurred on publicity to counter propaganda of naxalites, other security related items not covered under the Police Modernization Scheme etc., have been covered. The Scheme also allows release of funds to the naxal affected States as advance. It is hoped that the revised scheme will enable higher level of utilization of funds under this Scheme.

5.2.3 Supply of Mine Protected Vehicles

Keeping in view the increased casualties of police personnel due to IED/land mine blasts, the naxal affected States have been provided Mine Protected Vehicles (MPVs) under the Police Modernization Scheme. Their supply has been streamlined by taking up the matter with the Chairman, Ordinance Factory Board.

5.2.4 Long–term deployment of Central Para Military Forces

In order to supplement the efforts of the States in providing an effective response to the naxal violence, Central Para Military Forces have been deployed on a long-term basis as requested by the affected States. The Central Government has also exempted the states from the payment of cost of deployment of these forces for a period of three years from 1-7-2004 involving an amount of nearly Rs. 1,100 crores.

5.2.5 India Reserve Battalions

The naxal affected States have been sanctioned India Reserve (IR) battalions mainly to strengthen security apparatus at their level as also to enable the States to provide gainful employment to the youth, particularly in the naxal areas. Recently, additional IR battalions have also been approved for the naxal affected States. The Central Government will now provide Rs. 20.75 crores per IR battalion as against the earlier amount of Rs. 13 crores per battalion. The States have been asked to expedite raising of these battalions.

5.2.6 Deployment of SSB along Indo-Nepal Border

In order to ensure that there is no spillover effect of the activities of Nepalese Maoists to our territory, SSB has been given the responsibility to guard Indo-Nepal Border. The Government has also recently sanctioned new raisings for the SSB to further improve management of borders in these areas. A modernization plan involving an outlay of Rs.444 crores has also been sanctioned for the SSB.

5.2.7 Recruitment in Central Para Military Forces

In order to wean away the potential youth from the path to militancy or naxalism, recruitment guidelines have been revised to permit 40% recruitment in Central Para Military Forces from the border areas and areas affected by militancy or naxalism.

5.2.8 Backward Districts Initiative (BDI)

Since the naxalite menace has to be addressed on the developmental front also, the Central Government has provided financial assistance of Rs. 2,475 crores for 55 naxal affected districts in the 9 States of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh & West Bengal under the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) component of the Rsahtriya Sam Vikas Yojana (RSVY). Under this Scheme, an amount of Rs. 15 crores per year has been given to each of the districts for three years so as to fill in the critical gaps in physical and social development in the naxal affected areas. The Planning Commission has been requested to include other naxal affected areas under their proposed Scheme of Backward Regions Grant Funds (BRGF) for which an outlay of Rs. 5,000 crores has been set apart from this fiscal year (2005-06) onwards.

5.2.9 Tribal and Forest elated issues

In order to address the areas of disaffection among the tribals, the Government has introduced the Scheduled Tribes (Recognition of Forest Rights) Bill, 2005, in Parliament on 13.12.2005. Further, to facilitate social and physical infrastructure in the forest areas, Ministry of Environment and Forests has, as requested by the MHA, issued general approval to allow such infrastructure by utilising upto 1 hectare of forest land for non-forest purposes. That Ministry has also permitted upgradation of kutcha roads constructed prior to 01.09.1980 into pucca roads.

5.2.10 Effective implementation of land reforms and creation of employment opportunities in the naxal areas

Naxal groups have been raising mainly land and livelihood related issues. If land reforms are taken up on priority and the landless and the poor in the naxal areas are allotted surplus land, this would go a long way in tackling the developmental aspects of the naxal problem. The States have been requested to focus greater attention on this area as also accelerate developmental activities and create employment opportunities in the naxal affected areas with special focus on creation of physical infrastructure in terms of roads, communication, power as also social infrastructure such as schools, hospitals etc.


6.1 The Central Government accords a very high priority to review and monitor the naxal situation and the measures being taken by the states on both security and development fronts to control it. Several monitoring mechanisms have been set up at the Center to do so. These include a periodical review by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) Of the naxal situation, Standing Committee of the Chief Ministers of the naxal affected states chaired by the Union Home Minister, Quarterly Coordination Center meetings chaired by the Union Home Secretary with the Chief Secretaries and the Directors General of Police of the affected states and the monthly Task Force meetings of Nodal Officers of naxal affected states/Central agencies chaired by Special Secretary (IS), MHA. The states have also been asked to hold a monthly review by the DGP and the naxal situation and the measures and strategies to contain the naxal problem .


The Central Government views the naxalite menace as an area of serious concern. The Government remains firmly committed and determined to address the problem. The current strategy is (i) to strengthen intelligence set-up at the state level; (ii) pursue effective and sustained intelligence driven police action against naxalites and their infrastructure individually and jointly by the states and (iii) accelerate development in the naxal affected areas. The Central Government will continue to coordinate and supplement the efforts to the state governments on both security and development fronts to meet the challenge posed by the naxal problem.





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