Pakistan government's involvement in terrorism

Pakistan Government’s involvement, both covert and overt, in terrorist acts in India has been well-documented. The Pak Government has, however, sought to portray the terrorists as the acts of Kashmiris involved in indigenous struggle for their right to self-determination. That this is not the case is established by the following facts:

a. All the major Kashmiri groups including Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), Al Badr and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) have their Headquarters in Pakistan. These organizations function openly from Pakistan, collect funds and recruit Pakistani youth, all in the guise of Jehad. These activities are carried out openly, not only supported by the Pak Government and its agencies, but are also actively encouraged by them. Details of these outfits may be seen at Annexure-A. A list of some important leaders of these groups are enclosed at Annexure-F.

b. Leaders of these groups continue to make open threats against important Indian leaders and institutions. There have been various occasions when they have openly threatened to assassinate Indian leaders including the Prime Minister. They have also threatened to target the US, describing it as the biggest terrorist. Some statements containing such threats, published in the Pak media, are at Annexure-B.

c. Leaders of Pak based terrorist groups have also claimed responsibility for many acts of terror within India. Such acts which have been owned up by them in the Pakistani media are at Annexure-C.

d. That violence in J&K and elsewhere in India is not indigenous is established by the fact that a large number of Pakistanis have been killed in encounters with security forces and acknowledged by the group leaders, though not by the Pakistan government. An illustrative list of few Pakistanis killed in such encounters, whose death have been acknowledged by the group leaders in the Pakistan media, is enclosed at Annexure-D.

2. The above clearly indicate that terrorist groups such as the LeT, JeM, Al Badr and HuM operate freely out of Pakistan. Their leaders are free to send mercenaries across to India to perpetrate terrorist violence. Clear linkage can be seen between their pronouncements in Pakistan and the subsequent actions by the Pak nationals in India, at the behest of their leaders in Pakistan. The note on the attack on the J&K State Assembly on Oct 1, 2001 was carried out by Pakistani nationals belonging to the JeM at Annexure-E.

3. Two significant announcements were made by President Pervez Musharraf on January 12, 2002 and May 27, 2002 to curb trans-border terrorism. Post January 12 developments indicate that far from the thrust of his rhetoric, actions taken by the Pak government on ground were piecemeal and cosmetic and largely intended to cater to the western world. Developments since May 27 have further demonstrated that the commitments of Pervez Musharraf were not backed by any concrete measures. Recent inputs clearly suggest that elections in Kashmir and the fact that electioneering gained impressive momentum, has forced Pakistan to rethink its strategy. Consequently, the Pak ISI is pulling out all stops to disrupt elections in J&K. Since June 25, when terrorist groups were first instructed to thwart the election process, the terrorists have evolved an elaborate strategy to effect this intent. It was decided that in the first phase, terrorists would attempt to persuade candidates, as well as the voting public, to stay away from elections. Persuasion was supposed to be achieved through both "personal visits and propaganda". In the second phase, Jehadi elements have been instructed to target everyone associated with the elections – candidates, public, polling stations – should the persuasion method fail. The ISI also decided to infiltrate both terrorists and arms and ammunition into J&K. They have been instructed specifically to concentrate on political assassinations and to target public gatherings, besides polling stations.

4. Thus, Kashmir has witnessed a spate of incidents since 7th of September, specifically directed at disrupting the elections. Two candidates have been assassinated, namely, Mr. Sheikh Abdul Rehman (September 6), an independent candidate, contesting from Handwara constituency and Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed Lone (September 11), a National Conference candidate from Lolab constituencyin Kupwara. On September 11, hand grenades were hurled at the residences of two other candidates. On September 11 alone, 20 persons were killed in election related violence. In order to further motivate his cadres, Salahuddin has promised handsome rewards – Rs. 10 lakhs for killing of an ordinary contesting candidate and Rs. 40 lakhs for killing prominent leaders particularly, Dr. Farooq Abdullah, Omar Abdullah and any prominent central leader campaigning in the State.

5. The deceit and chicanery on the part of Pakistani poilcy makers were evident earlier as well. Soon after President Musharraf’s January 12 speech, various members of religious and Jehadi outfits were arrested and offices of terrorist groups closed. Curbs were also put on fund raising by Jehadi Tanzeems.

6. The arrests of so-called militants truned out to predictably cosmetic, with only 150 of the more than 1900 arrested being from JeM and LeT. With the exception of the initial detention of Maulana Masood Azhar and Hafiz Mohd Saeed, no other senior leader of these outfits were detained. Their operational commanders remained largely free. It is also pertinent that no arrests were made in POK. On the contrary, ISI officials who were handling these militant groups continued to covertly assist their cadre with previous level of funding and logistic support. Pak authorities had initially directed militant groups to desist from openly conducting their activities and advised them to temporarily close their offices. A number of militant training camps were then relocated. Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) cadres did not face even this problem as they were allowed to remain at their original places. POK Prime Minister, Sardar Sikander Hayat Khan’s statement that his administration did not plan to arrest any LeT and JeM activist unless they indulged in criminal activities was, indeed, significant.

7. Very soon, the offices of Jehadi groups re-opened. They were allowed to use communication equipment and arrests of their cadres were suspended. By 15.2.2002, all further arrest of militants was prctically stopped. Militants were being tipped off by the authorities of possible raids on their offices and there appeared to be no visible restriction on trans-border infiltration. On March 8, 2002, Pakistan government announced a general amnesty to all arrested militants of the banned outfits except those awere pending. Thus, for the militant groups, it was business as usual leading later to further terrorist incidents in J&K, including Kaluchak. Later, the ISI is learnt to have issued instruction to the militant outfits to shift their camps to interior areas. Thus, the camps remained, although relocated. The Tanzeem leaders have, however, agreed to dismantle communication antennae and reduce quantum of trans-border wireless communication. This was more in the nature of a tactical response.

8. The instructions of the ISI to militant groups to suspend cross-border activities had not been received favourably by terrorist groups. They cautioned that, at the beginning of the infiltration season, it would adversely affect the replenishment of arms and ammunition and other stocks and stoppage of violent actions would cause heavy losses to their cadres, once Indian security forces intensified actions against the militants. The terrorists maintained that any disruption of action would provide India an opportunity to permanently finish Jehad. It is learnt that in the face of this opposition of the terrorist groups, the ISI has assured them that the suspension of cross-border activities was purely temporary and ephemeral.

9. Reports also suggest that hardcore militant outfits, which could also include elements from Al-Qaida and the Taliban, feel that forcing India to launch a war against Pakistan would bring greater dividends to their Pan-Islamic programme. Some hawks in the Pak military hierarchy also subscribe to this view.

10. Currently, highly trained and heavily armed terrorists are located at various points along the LOC/IB waiting for an opportune moment to infiltrate. Once the international community would reduce its focus on cross-border infiltration, there could be infiltrated into J&K.

11. In the above context, it is perceived that far from removing the terrorist infrastructure in POK and other areas, merely cosmetic exercises addressing western concerns have been undertaken, so far. There is no meaningful focus on the real issue in so far as New Delhi is concerned i.e. to resort to measures that could be deemed as positive from India’s security perspective.

12. There is a misconception in many parts of the world that Pakistan’s involvement in instigating and sustaining terrorism in India is confined only to the State of J&K. This is not correct. Ever since its inception in 1947, after separation from India, Pakistan has found it difficult to accept that a large number of Muslims preferred to stay on in India. This reality on the ground went against the very foundation of Pakistan’s separation from India and its formation as a separate nation, i.e. Hindus & Muslims would find it difficult to live together. Pakistan has also always remained uncomfortable with a larger neighbour, which is secular. The separation of East Pakistan and the formation of the independent country of Bangladesh in 1971 was viewed in Pakistan yet another set back. As a result, Pakistan has been continuously making attempts to destabilize India since the 1950s.

13. Support, both morally & materially, to Indian separatists commenced in the 1950s when they helped separatist groups operating in the North-Eastern states of India. The NSCN (I/M) chief, Th.Muivah, was detained in Bangkok while returning from Pakistan on a forged South Korean passport. A detailed note on ISI’s links with North Eastern terrorist groups is at Annexure-G. This policy of formenting terrorism has also been witnessed in Pak support to Sikh terrorists, who carried out violent acts allegedly as part of a campaign to create an independent Sikh nation out of the Indian state of Punjab. With this in view, they have given shelter to many pro-Khalistani leaders. Prominent amongst these are Wadhawa Singh, Ranjit Singh @ Neeta, Lakhbir Singh Rode, Paramjit Singh Panjwar and Gajinder Singh. Details of pro-Khalistani terrorists, who have been given refuge in Pakistan, and who are waging acts of terror from there, are at Annexure-H. Pak ISI agents regularly escort Sikh militants for trans-border movements and provide safe havens for their shelter and dumps of weapons and explosives. Pak ISI operatives have recently stepped up recruitment of Sikhs particularly among drug edicts and illegal immigrants abroad for training in Pak camps. A detailed note on ISI support to the Sikh terrorist groups is at Annexure-I.

14. The Pak government also continues to give refuge to the notorious criminal operative, Dawood Ibrahim, who had masterminded the serial bomb blasts in Mumbai in March, 1993. Details pertaining to Dawood Ibrahim, including his address in Pakistan, is at Annexure-H.

15. Activities of Pakistan-trained terrorist groups are not confined to only India. International investigations, after the September 11 attacks, have revealed the central role of Pakistan and its proxies in providing terrorist training for diverse groups around the globe and inter-linkages among these groups, facilitated by the elebrate network of training camps run by the ISI. The Annexure at ‘K’ gives a list of terrorist acts in South East Asia and Europe, where the Pakistani link is quite conspicuous.

Note :- As stated earlier, efforts have been made by the ISI to move the offices of some terrorist groups from Pakistan to POK and, therefore, many of the offices mentioned in this note are in the process of being shifted to POK. Similarly, many Sikh terrorist leaders have been shifted from their earlier addresses to new places

Source: Govenment of India.