Jammu and Kashmir Assessment - Year 2001

The State of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) remains among the most troubled areas in the South Asian region even though global attention has focussed on Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on targets in the US. Global media attention remains fixed to the probability of a US retaliation against Afghanistan's Taliban regime and its protected surrogate, Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect in the September 11 attacks, who presides over a decentralised terror network based in Afghanistan and operating all over the world. Even as this terrorism related media attention focuses on the Western frontiers of South Asia, India has sought to shift part of this limelight on terrorist atrocities carried out by foreign mercenaries in J&K.

The Indian position, put forward by External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh during his meetings with US President George Bush and other administration officials on October 2, essentially states that Islamic terrorism being inflicted on Western targets and in India’s J&K, emanates from the same Islamic extremist sources and is supported by common allies, Pakistan, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden; and hence requires a common response. The US response has been ambivalent, attempting to push the issue to the background in order to retain Pakistan’s support in its current offensive against bin Laden.

At a strategic level, while the insurgency in J&K is perceived, within India, as a theatre for Pakistan's proxy war, Western analysts often see the Kashmir issue as a potential flash-point for a future nuclear confrontation between India and Pakistan. Even before the September 11 attacks, Western focus had been shifting, howsoever inadequately, towards the burgeoning danger of international extremist Islamic terrorism located in Pakistan and directed against India. It is partially this concern that was reflected in the US State Department's assertion that the focus of terrorism has shifted from West Asia to South Asia.

Within the subcontinent, the oft stated positions of India and Pakistan, on Kashmir, were revived in the context of September 11 attacks. Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, while going public on his support to US in its global campaign against the bin Laden and the Taliban, a Pakistan protégé, claimed this was being done to prevent harm to Pakistan’s "Kashmir cause". When asked about the changing focus of terrorism to Kashmir during an interview on October 1, he said that would be the most contentious issue and "it will not be accepted at all" in Pakistan.

In a defiant assertion that terrorist activity is ‘legitimate’ in Kashmir, the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) carried out an attack on the State Legislative Assembly complex in Srinagar on October 1, using a car bomb and four suicide terrorists, fidayeen. 38 people, including the four fidayeen were killed in this attack. The insurgency has claimed the lives of 874 civilians and 494 security force (SF) personnel between January-October 7, 2001 while 1525 terrorists have been killed in this period. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks in US, media reports had speculated that foreign mercenaries active in the State were being asked to proceed to Afghanistan in the wake of imminent US military action against the Taliban regime. Casualty figures in J&K during the post September 11 period shows no evidence that this speculation is a fact. 378 people were killed between September 12 and October 7, 2001, which comprised 55 SF personnel, 93 civilians and 230 terrorists.

India and Pakistan’s contradictory positions on the J&K insurgency had also been emphasised during the summit meeting between Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and President Musharraf during the latter’s visit to New Delhi between July 14-16, 2001. While Pakistan, in the run-up to the summit, continued to emphasise on the territorial dispute and the façade of ‘an indigenous freedom movement’, India responded by fixing the focus at cross-border terrorism. As most analysts had foreseen, the summit failed to change ground realities and the state continues to reel under terrorist violence unleashed by Islamic fundamentalist groups based in and drawing their sustenance from Pakistan. 87 people were killed during the three days of the summit, while 256 people were killed in the first 16 days of July 2001. Casualty statistics indicate that violence in 2001 has surpassed that in 2000. It is only the casualties suffered by security forces that has seen a marginal improvement in 2001 as compared to 2000.

 

As such, 2001 has been the most violent year in terms of lives lost ever since the inception of insurgency in the State in 1988. The declining trend in casualties, which began after 1982, reversed in 1998 and has been registering an upward movement ever since.

Annual Trend in Terrorist violence 1988-2001

 

Even as year 2001 began with a government cease-fire in operation (which began on November 27, 2000), trends in the first seven months indicate that this measure failed to change the determination of terrorists creating havoc with their violence. The cease-fire, which was actually a cessation of offensive operations by security forces in the State, was initially ordered by the Prime Minister for a month (November 27 to December 26, 2000). It was subsequently extended thrice until its termination on May 23, 2001 (it was operational for approximately six months). Even though total casualties declined during the cease-fire period as compared to the preceding six- month period, these were due to a fall in the terrorist and SF casualties. Civilian casualties rose considerably during the period.

The government continued its cease-fire policy despite the fact that all terrorist outfits operating in the State had rejected the initiative and claimed that they would heighten their violence. A government press release on May 11, 2000 gave a comparative picture of the scene for two parallel periods, the first, between November 28, 2000 and April 26, 2001 and the second, between November 28, 1999 and April 26, 2000.

There were several instances of major terrorist attacks during the cease-fire period. After an abortive attempt on January 7, 2001, terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba’s (LeT) suicide squads, fidayeen, successfully stormed the Srinagar Airport on January 16. Four SF personnel and two civilians were killed in this attack and so were six members of the Lashkar squad. A Lashkar statement claimed that the leader of the squad had made a successful escape after the attack. Attacks on SF bases too were frequent and in one such instance, a four-member squad attacked the Police Control Room in the city killing eight SF personnel and injuring seven others, before they were killed. In an ambush by unidentified terrorists at Morha Chatru in Rajouri district, on March 2, 15 SF personnel and two civilians were killed. Besides, two massacres of civilians too were perpetrated by the outfit, the first at Mehjoor Nagar in the capital Srinagar, on February 3, where six Sikhs were killed and the second, at Morha Saluhi in Rajouri district, on February 10, in which 15 Hindus were killed.

In response, counter terrorism efforts, severely restricted by the embargo on offensive operations, yielded commendable results. SF sources reported that several instances where terrorists, who were located and asked to surrender, launched attacks instead leading to major encounters. Prominent among the terrorists killed in these encounters were the Lashkar's Salahuddin, suspected by security forces to be the main brain behind the outfit's suicide squads. He was killed on March 28 at Pohru in Budgam district. Another notable success was the elimination of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen's (HM) Rajouri district chief 'Col. Zaki'; in an encounter at the Nangali forests of Rajouri. Tracking the perpetrators of the February 10, Morha Saluhi massacre (see para above), SF personnel located and engaged them in a series of encounters on February 18-19 at Kot Chadwal, Rajouri and killed 10 Pakistani mercenaries of the LeT and Harkat-ul-Jehad Islami (HUJI).

The counter-terrorism response in the post cease-fire phase has been vigorous, particularly in the second week of July. Of the 280 terrorists killed until August 8, 42 were killed on a single day (July 15) while 15 and 14 terrorists were killed on July 5 and July 10 respectively. July 15 was particularly successful since SF forces, based on intelligence information, raided several terrorist hide-outs in the Hill Kaka forests of Poonch district where a meeting of top Lashkar and Jaish terrorists was on. From the debris of six hide-outs destroyed in the operation, the bodies of 21 suspected Pakistani and Afghan mercenaries were recovered. On the next day, July 16, Nadeem, suspected to be the chief of the Al-Badr’s suicide wing, was killed along with two associates in an encounter at Ganderbal. Meanwhile, in quick succession, two top Hizb ‘commanders were killed. The outfit’s second in command within the State, Abdul Hamid Tantray alias ‘Commander Masood’ was killed at Paloo in Pulwama district on July 24. In less than a week, Mustafa Khan, reported to be the chief of the outfit’s wing entrusted with eliminating SF informers and counter-insurgency operatives, was killed along with two associates at Goigam in Budgam district on July 30.

Terrorist violence too, has been aggressively maintained in the post-cease fire period. Promises made, by various terrorist outfits, of renewed violence in the aftermath of the Indo-Pak summit, were kept with a series of massacres in which 31 civilians were killed in Doda district on July 21 and August 2. All the massacred civilians were non-Muslims. Similarly, the Jammu railway station was the scene for two attacks, a bomb explosion on June 25 which injured 45 persons and indiscriminate firing by three Lashkar fidayeen which killed seven civilians and two SF personnel, even as one fidayeen was killed in retaliatory firing by SFs.

Meanwhile, several peace initiatives were undertaken in 2001 to address the Kashmir issue. After considerable speculation on the government's possible approach to the peace process after declaring the unilateral cease-fire, through an official statement on April 5, the government invited all Kashmiri groups to participate in negotiations to end the crisis. Two days before this, Union Home Minister LK Advani announced the nomination of KC Pant, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, as the government's nominee for the proposed talks.

The reaction of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to these peace intitatives was keenly awaited. Initially displaying confusion, the Hurriyat failed to issue an official reaction to the government's invitation for talks. The alliance's top-most decision making body, the Executive Committee, on April 15, referred the issue to the Working Committee and the larger General Council that includes the seven members of the Executive Committee and representatives of all constituent parties. After a session of the Working Committee on April 21 and that of the General Council on April 23, the issue was tossed back to the Executive Committee which, on April 28, rejected the government's offer. This stand was an endorsement of the views expressed by several Hurriyat leaders, including its Chairman Abdul Ghani Bhat (who were speaking for themselves) rejecting the invitation for two reasons. First, the government had failed to permit a proposed APHC delegation visit to Pakistan to confer with terrorist outfits based in that country and second, that the invitation was open to all Kashmiri bodies, which meant that the government was not willing to endorse the amalgam's self-assumed mandate of being the 'sole genuine representative' of the State's people.

The Hurriyat's official rejection, taking both points into consideration said, "We are ready to enter into a dialogue with the Centre provided we are allowed to go to Pakistan, and New Delhi accepts Hurriyat Conference as the only representative body in Jammu and Kashmir." Stressing the second point, the statement added that the alliance "...is not ready to join the crowded train which goes nowhere’

Abandoning moves to involve the Hurriyat in negotiations, the government decided to respond to the series of signals emanating from Islamabad which said that the Pakistan government wanted a summit level meeting on Kashmir. The Indian government announcement which ended the Ramadan cease-fire also invited Pakistan’s Chief Executive and now President, Pervez Musharraf to visit India for a composite dialogue, including the Kashmir issue. Responding to this invitation, Pervez Musharraf, who assumed his country’s Presidency on June 20, 2001, visited India, though, as mentioned before, the summit was variously interpreted as either inconclusive or a failure.

These trends were only a continuation of the scenario in year 2000 which showed that peace initiatives do not necessarily imply a respite from violence. Fatalities both among security forces and terrorists were well above the figures for 1999. The increase in civilian casualties, however, was marginal, and there was also a decline in the total number of incidents recorded (by approximately 5 per cent). Total casualties, however, were significantly higher, testimony to the increased focus and lethality of violence in the State. The casualties suffered by the security forces showed the most dramatic increase (79 per cent over 1999) followed by terrorist casualties (67 per cent).

The year 2000 had repeatedly seen hopes of peace destroyed by senseless acts of violence. Three phases stand out in this context, underlining the fact that freedom from terror remains an elusive goal for the people of the State. These three landmarks include the government cease-fire since November 2000, the Hizb cease-fire of July-August 2000, and the visit by US President Bill Clinton in March 2000.

Seizing the initiative on November 19, 2000, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee announced that security forces were being directed to cease all offensive operations against terrorists in J&K during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, commencing at midnight on November 27/28. Subsequently, three extensions were announced and the last on February 22 extended its validity till end-May 2001. As mentioned before, the cease-fire was withdrawn on May 23, 2001, having been in effect for approximately six months

The reactions were mixed. Most terrorist groupings that operate under the facade of Islamic 'jihad' rejected the offer. Even before the cease-fire could take effect, terrorists responded with two massacres on November 21, 2000, and November 23, 2000, in Doda district. A series of attacks on security force establishments and on patrol parties occurred, despite the unequivocal renunciation of any offensive and pre-emptive strikes by security forces against terrorists in the State. Striking away from the State, terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toiba also attacked an army garrison within the Red Fort in India's capital, New Delhi, on December 22, 2000. An attempt was made on the life of State Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah on January 14, 2001, while he was addressing a public meeting in Srinagar. Terrorists of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen fired two rifle-grenades targeting the venue, both of which missed the target.

Some comparative statistics on casualties for two months preceding and succeeding the November 27/28 cease-fire indicate that terrorists enjoyed a greater degree of impunity particularly when it came to incidents of attacks with Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that left a large number of civilians and security force personnel injured. The lower casualty figures suffered by terrorists demonstrate the discontinuation of offensive operations by the Security Forces.

Violence in the preceding and succeeding two months
of the November 27 Cease-fire

Casualties

Instances of Terrorist Violence

A wide spectrum of political leaders advocating secession of Kashmir from India, including those with the APHC, however, welcomed the ceasefire announcement. The APHC has even dropped its earlier condition that it would only enter into a dialogue if it was trilateral in nature, involving the governments of India, Pakistan and 'Kashmiri representatives', and accepted a bilateral dialogue between India and Hurriyat leaders, on the one hand, and separately between the APHC and Pakistan, on the other. Unofficial parleys for formulating the modalities of the proposed dialogue, ‘talks about talks’ are being held. The Hurriyat nominated a delegation from among its Executive Council members for a proposed visit to Pakistan for talks with government officials there, and with terrorist groups based in that country who operate in J&K. The modalities for the visit are still to be worked out.

The negative response by terrorist outfits to any peace initiative, expressed through heightened violence, has become the norm, particularly among groups dominated by foreign mercenaries. Earlier, in July 2000, just as hopes of normalcy were rising after the unilateral offer of a cease-fire by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen was speedily accepted by the Union government, other terrorist organisations indulged in a series of massacres, including several incidents on August 1-2 which left an estimated 100 dead. The Muttahida Jihad Council, an umbrella body for 14 Pakistan-based terrorist outfits operating in Kashmir, had publicly disassociated itself from the Hizb's peace initiative. The Hizb is the largest among the terrorist outfits operating in the State and its cadres are substantially drawn from within Kashmir.

The first signs of a prospective peace process in the State had emerged in the aftermath of the visit by the US President to India in March 2000. Speculation on a bilateral dialogue surfaced after the government released all major Hurriyat leaders in May 2000, after a detention of over six months. These speculations were soon overshadowed when the 'Chief Commander (Operations)' of the Hizb-ul Mujahideen, Abdul Majeed Dar, made a conditional offer of cease-fire at a Press Conference in Srinagar on July 24, 2000. The endorsement of this offer by the group's supremo, Syed Salauddin alias Pir Sahib, followed at a Press Conference in Islamabad on July 25. This was the second instance when a terrorist outfit in Kashmir had declared a cease-fire. The Yasin Malik faction of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) did so in 1994. Unlike the cease-fire declared by the JKLF, which still holds, the Hizb withdrew its cease-fire on August 8, 2000, on the grounds that the Indian government had not taken any initiative to involve Pakistan in the dialogue on the Kashmir issue.

All subsequent prospects of a dialogue were blocked by the gap between the perceptions of the Union Government and secessionists in the State. The Union Government continued to insist that talks with Pakistan on the Kashmir issue could be conducted only after the latter stopped its support to the terrorist violence in the State, while secessionist leaders wanted unconditional talks.

A substantial gap continues to exist between the minimum expectations held by the government and the secessionist forces in the State. While the Union government repeatedly stressed that any discussion would have to be within the framework of the Indian Constitution, the Hurriyat has rejected such a pre-condition and continues to harp on the inclusion of Pakistan in any proposed solution. During the Hizb cease-fire, the Prime Minister had briefly hinted that the 'spirit of humanity' would guide the dialogue, but immediately returned to the position that dialogue would have to be within the framework of the Constitution.

Just as the August 1-2, 2000, massacres coincided with the first contacts between the government and the Hizb-ul Mujahideen (bureaucrats from the Home Ministry were reported to have contacted a Hizb representative on August 1), the Chattisinghpora incident occurred during President Clinton's visit in March 2000. Indian intelligence agencies' had predicted an escalation in violence by terrorists to draw the attention of the US President and international media. There fears were realised when terrorists massacred 35 Sikhs in cold blood at Chattisinghpora on March 20, even as President Clinton was on his way to New Delhi from Dacca. This massacre was perpetrated by a joint group of the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Hizb-ul Mujahideen.

In all the massacres through 2000, the primary targets have been members of the two dominant minority communities i.e. Hindus and Sikhs, leading to the government's perception that these incidents are part of the ethnic cleansing drive launched by Islamic fundamentalist groups active in J&K. However, the overwhelming majority of civilian casualties in the State continues to be Muslims. Out of 9955 civilians killed between 1988-2000, 8407 or 84.45 per cent were Muslims.

The year saw terrorist violence continuing unabated with several further developments. The most notable feature of terrorist strategies in the State was the continued use of the fidayeen or 'suicide squads' primarily of the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed, in high-profile attacks against military targets. The fidayeen were first inducted in the aftermath of the Kargil 'War' in late 1999, and their main strategy involves small groups (2-5 members) storming a security force camp and killing as many personnel as possible before taking defensive positions within the camps, and engaging the SFs till they are killed. In a few cases, members of the squad successfully fled after the initial attack. This happened at Mendhar in Rajouri district on December 16; and at Mahore, Udhampur district, on November 5. The year 2000 also saw the first incidents of the suicide bomber: the army camp at Batwara in Srinagar was attacked twice by suicide terrorists using cars laden with explosives on April 19 and December 25. In the first attack, four personnel sustained injuries while in the second, nine personnel were killed. The fidayeen in both incidents were killed in the explosion.

Another disturbing development was the recovery of three ballistic missiles from a terrorist hideout in Rajouri district on April 8, 2000, and intelligence reports indicated that terrorists may have acquired the capability to strike at aircraft landing and taking off from Srinagar. Four major seizures of RDX explosives reported in Srinagar on April 15, June 13, July 17, totalling 687 kg of RDX, were believed by security forces to have been intended to target prominent political personalities. Several other major seizures of RDX explosives have also been reported from other parts of the State.

The increasing use of sophisticated explosive devices and grenade launchers has had devastating consequences as seen in the May 15, 2000, assassination of State Power Minister, Ghulam Hassan Bhat, and several attacks on security forces. Three abortive attempts have also been made to target the State Secretariat and Legislative Assembly buildings with rifle grenades.

These attacks represent the increasing firepower, greater experience and training of the new generation of terrorists that has been inducted into J&K. A majority of these are foreign mercenaries, most of whom have seen significant action in Afghanistan. An estimated 60 per cent of all terrorists operating in the State are of foreign origin, a majority drawn from Pakistan, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Afghanistan, but with others coming from another 11 countries. There has also been a visible improvement in the firepower available to the terrorists. The Kalashnikov is now virtually standard issue for the terrorists and increasing numbers of rocket launchers are available and have been used in all major attacks. Arms seizures also register missile launchers, anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, and a significant number of flame throwers, in addition to thousands of kilograms of explosives and a variety of sophisticated triggering mechanisms.

The leadership of the terrorist movement in the State has, in the late nineties, clearly passed out of the hands of the groupings that dominated the earlier phases of militancy, such as the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the ‘over ground’ political coalition of separatist forces, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), and squarely into the hands of Pakistan-based groupings such as the Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen (HuM, the rechristened version of Harkat-ul-Ansar), the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed. The last of these was created in the year 2000 itself by Azhar Masood, the terrorist released by the Government of India in the ‘deal’ to secure the release of the passengers of the hijacked Air India Flight, IC 814 on December 31, 1999. The JKLF and some other constituents of the Hurriyat seek the independence of Kashmir, while other Hurriyat factions and Pakistan-based groupings seek amalgamation with that country under an inchoate Pan-Islamic ideology. There is increasing evidence – including frequent statements by their leadership – of the direct involvement and authority of the same religious organisations based in Pakistan, such as the Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad, that created the Taliban in Afghanistan, and also of Osama Bin Laden’s interest and initiative in supporting subversive forces in J&K.

Carrying the Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict from Pakistan into J&K, an attack was carried out, using an IED, at a public meeting addressed by a former State Minister and Shia leader, Maulvi Ifthikar Hussain Ansari at Pattan in Baramulla district on June 2, 2000. While Maulvi Ansari escaped with injuries as did 16 others, 11 persons were killed in the incident. Another Shia leader, Aga Syed Mehdi was killed in a land mine explosion in Budgam district on November 3, 2000.

Counter-insurgency operations conducted by security forces in the State notched several successes during 2000. Several prominent terrorists were killed in the course of the year, including the Hizb's Gadda 'Bombar Khan' on March 15, 2000. The slain terrorist was the prime accused in the 1998 Wandhama massacre, in which 26 Hindus were killed. The chief of a Hizb sub-unit, the 'Pir Panjal Regiment', Abu Bilal, was killed on October 4, 2000, and the very next day, a Lashkar 'deputy commander' for the State, Pale Khan, was also killed. In a major operation, security forces in Poonch district killed 25 terrorists in different encounters on September 16 and 18, 2000.

Security forces responded to the use of new weapons and strategies by terrorists, by inducting new technological inputs into their counter-terrorism operations. Helicopter gun-ships were first used in the State on March 28, 2000. A large number of electronic jammers to prevent remote detonation of Improvised Explosive Devices have also been inducted.

An unfortunate consequence of the Chattisinghpora massacre was the civil turmoil that ensued after five persons, suspected of participating in the massacre, were shot dead at Pathri Bal on March 25. Locals alleged that the Pathri Bal encounter was ‘faked’, and that five innocent civilians had been killed. Later, a protest march at Brakpora was fired upon by security forces on April 3, 2000, leaving seven dead and 10 injured. Two inquiries were ordered by the State government into the alleged encounter and the subsequent firing on the protesters. Similarly, in the aftermath of the August 1, 2000, massacre of pilgrims at Pahalgam, there were allegations that, after the initial terrorist attack, blind firing by security force personnel detailed for security of the pilgrims had caused the death of some pilgrims. A separate inquiry was ordered by the State government into this incident as well. Inquiry reports on the Brakpora and Pahalgam incidents have held several personnel from security forces guilty on various counts, and the State Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah promised action against those held guilty.

On the political front, the ruling National Conference in the State raised the issue of a return to the pre-1953 Constitutional arrangement according to which the Union Government was given authority only over the subjects of Defence, Currency and Foreign Policy; all other issues coming under the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Legislative Assembly. An Autonomy Resolution to this effect was passed by the State Legislature on June 26, 2000. The Union Cabinet rejected this proposal. The fact that the demand for Autonomy and the Autonomy Resolution came after the Centre released the Hurriyat leaders initiated talks with them, suggested that the motivation, at least in part, was a degree of competitive brinkmanship.

Meanwhile, over 400,000 Kashmiri Pandits – out of an original population in the Kashmir Valley of 425,000 prior to 1989 – continue to be displaced. Official records indicate that some 216,820 of them live as migrants in makeshift camps at Jammu, another 143,000 at Delhi and thousands of others are now dispersed across the country. Many of those registered at the camps have also been dispersed according to the exigencies of employment and opportunities for education, trade or business. There has been little effort to facilitate their return to the Valley over the past year (2000), as earlier attempts were neutralised by brutal campaigns of selective murder, including the killing of seven Pandits at Sangrama in Budgam district in March 1997, three at Gul in Udhampur district in June 1997, 26 in the massacre at Wandhama in Srinagar district in January 1998, and 26 at Prankote in Udhampur district in April 1998. The possibility of reversing the terrorists’ ethnic cleansing of the Valley remains remote, and there are now reports of a hidden migration from some of the border areas in the Jammu region where the Hindus are a minority.

The US presidential visit in March 2000 revived calls from separatist forces within J&K and Pakistan for US mediation in the conflict. While the US President rejected the idea of mediation unless asked for by all parties involved in the conflict, he stressed the need for ending violence, respecting the Line of Control, renewing negotiations and reducing tensions. This theme, repeated in Islamabad, is yet to have an impact on the insurgency scenario of Kashmir.

It is also evident that the Indian government is yet to put in place a coherent strategy of response to terrorism. Indeed, most institutions of civil governance in the State have suffered a complete breakdown in the face of the terrorist onslaught. This includes the judiciary, which, after more than ten years of terrorist strife, has pronounced just four convictions in cases of terrorist crime. Even these convictions have been obtained for relatively minor offences of illegal arms possession (three cases) and illegal border crossing (one case). With 10783 civilians and 2870 security force personnel killed and thousands others injured in the State as a result of terrorist activities till the end of the year 2000, the judiciary is yet to convict a single perpetrator for the crime of murder/attempted murder of causing grievous injury in any of these cases.

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