Nepal Assessment 2002

The Maoist insurgency in Nepal is in its seventh year. The insurgency and counter-insurgency operations are in a state of lull as in August 2002. In fact, the insurgency came into global focus after the regicide of June 1, 2001.

It was in November 2001 that the insurgency reached unprecedented levels. At that time, the Maoists jettisoned the four month-old cease-fire that they had announced on July 23, 2001, and had launched co-ordinated countrywide strikes on the night of November 23, 2001. The worst among the attacks was the massacre at the Army barracks in Ghorai in which 14 troops were killed and another 30 injured. The Leftwing extremists also looted 99 self-loading rifles (SLRs). Besides, the insurgents have also declared the formation of a ‘Central People’s Government’, implying that they have formed a national-level parallel government. The insurgents were also running a state within a state in their strongholds, including in Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot and Salyan districts. It was in these districts that the insurgency began in 1996.

Faced with an unenviable crisis, the Nepalese government declared a nation-wide ‘state of Emergency’ on November 26 and deployed the Royal Nepal Army to counter the insurgents. The Emergency was then extended for another three months, with Parliamentary approval on February 21, 2002. Thereafter, in May 2002, it became clear to the government that it would not be able to secure Parliament’s consent for another extension. The Opposition parties were determined to vote the extension-proposal down, and to make maters worse for Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, powerful leaders within his Nepali Congress were ranged against him. As a split in the party became imminent, Deuba recommended the dissolution of the House. Nepal is now set to hold mid-term elections on November 13, 2002.

Maoist strikes have been characterised by detailed planning and deadly precision, thus pointing to their sharpened military skills, in no less measure aided by the rigorous training at the hands of retired armed forces personnel reportedly sympathetic to the Maoist cause. Also during the year, the Maoists enhanced their firepower and had for the first time deployed a sophisticated long-range weapon in an attack on troops, in Salleri, Solokhumb district on December 17, 2001. The make and source of the weapon is, however, not known.

At the onset of the year 2001, the insurgents made their presence felt in varying degrees in 68 of the total of 75 districts that constitute Nepal. Of these, the rebels either have a sizeable presence or have established a stronghold in 32 districts. In terms of electoral constituencies, the insurgents are known to be operating in 165 of the 205 parliamentary constituencies.

Available reports have indicated that in the aftermath of the current counter-insurgency operations, there has been a decrease in the number of districts being controlled by the Maoists. Furthermore, the operations have also led to a considerable number of Maoists and reservists surrendering to the authorities. The exact cadre strength of the insurgents is difficult to determine, especially with mounting deaths of Maoist cadres, but reports in early 2001 suggested that there were 2000 cadres and another 10,000 reservists. Because of a state of Emergency being in operation, casualty figures cannot similarly be determined, and with the government being the only source of information there is no independent source to verify the figures. However, approximate estimates suggest that more than 4200 lives might have been lost since the insurgency had commenced in 1996. In the year 2001 alone, despite a four-month truce, more than a thousand––security forces, insurgents, and civilians––people were killed in the insurgency and security forces’ counter-offensives. An overwhelming majority of these fatalities occurred between November 23, 2001––the day the insurgency was re-launched––and the last day of the past year.

The insurgents had apparently utilised the truce period to strengthen themselves and had lulled the government into the mistaken belief that they were willing to find a negotiated political solution to the problem. Even before the rebels re-launched their bloody attacks, the insurgents’ leader, ‘comrade’ Prachanda had given indication that a campaign of violence would soon be resumed. While the peace talks were on, Prachanda asked his cadres to resume, what he called, the "resistance movement’ in the wake of the government asking him to call-off a rally planned for in the capital Kathmandu, on September 21. Prachanda said, in a statement, "If the government does not withdraw its decision and continues to suppress people's right to hold mass meetings and demonstrations, the peace talks may collapse."

Four days after the insurgents commenced, once again, their campaign of violence, Prime Minister Deuba, on November 27, appealed to the citizens to unite for the sake of public interest, the monarchy, the present Constitution, multiparty democracy and the welfare of Nepal and remain committed to root out terrorism. Significantly, it was only after the November 23-attacks that the government began terming the Maoists as terrorists. Deuba expressed concern that the Maoists had "betrayed" him and had chosen to end the truce. Incidentally, Dueba, who had replaced Girija Prasad Koirala in July 2001 in the wake of mounting Maoist violence, had chaired a committee which submitted a report to the Koirala regime in November 2000 on the Maoist insurgency. At the time that Deuba replaced Koirala, the Maoists were holding 71 police personnel as hostages. After abducting them on July 12, 2001 from the Rolpa district, the Maoists had demanded a prisoner swap. Subsequently, through July and August, the government set free all insurgents who had been detained under the Public Security Act (PSA), but kept under detention those arrested under other Acts. Nepal’s Home Ministry, on August 8, 2001, said that there were no more rebels detained under the PSA. On their part, the Maoists, on October 1 and 2, set free 48 of the police personnel they were holding hostage while the fate of the rest is not clear thus far.

The Prime Minister’s concern on insurgency was equally shared by King Gyanendra when he said, on December 10, in an interview to a vernacular daily, that "the prevailing circumstances had forced the imposition of Emergency" and the Army "has no other option but to disarm" the Maoist insurgents. Further, on December 25, the King, as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, broadcast a message to troops over state-run radio and extolled the pride of place that martyrdom occupies among Nepalese.

The Maoists who had all along been demanding the abolition of Monarchy and turning Nepal into a Republic, during the negotiations period almost climbed down, but were steadfast on their other two principal demands––election of a new Constituent Assembly and replacing the present Constitution of Nepal.

The Maoist insurgents have been attacking high-profile targets. Prominently, the house of former Chief of Staff of the Royal Nepal Army, Garud Shumsher J.B. Rana was attacked on January 25, 2002, in Bara district, southern Nepal. The private residence, in Chitwan district, of Cabinet Minister Chiranjivi Wagle, who was the leader of the government delegation at the failed peace talks with the insurgents, was destroyed on December 23, 2001. Besides, the house of Water Resources Minister Narayan Sharma Poudel, also in the same district, was burnt down four days earlier, on December 19. Maoist insurgents on December 27 set off an explosion and damaged the residence of Assistant Law Minister Nagendra Kumar Raya in Phulparasai village, Sarlahi district while grievously injuring the Minister’s brother. The house of Minister of State for Education and Sports, M P Saud, was massively damaged in a an explosion triggered by suspected Maoists, in early February 2002. Almost a year before, Chief Justice Keshav Prasad Upadhyay narrowly escaped an ambush laid on his convoy by the Maoists on February 3, 2001, at Chhyasatti, Surkhet, 500 km west of Kathmandu. Six others, including a judicial officer, were injured in the incident. In a similar attack 40km away from the capital Kathmandu, the Maoists had, more than a year later, on March 13, 2002, shot dead six police personnel detailed for the security of Taranath Ranabhatt, the Speaker of Nepal; but the Speaker’s vehicle was not in the convoy.

The insurgents continued to target airports. In one such instance, on February 16, 2002, they had stormed the Sanphebagar airport, in Accham district, and killed 24 persons, most of them security force personnel posted there to provide cover from Maoist attacks.

Since the time the Army has been deployed––November 26, 2001––troops have been conducting search and seek operations on a daily basis. Initial reports have indicated that the counter-offensive launched by government forces has begun to yield results. Among these successes was the reported killing of 70 Maoists who were preparing to lay an ambush on security force personnel in Salyan district on November 28. In a separate operation, on the same day, 11 Maoists were killed by troops at Tribhuvan in Dang district. A few days into the offensive by the Army, on December 6, Information Minister Jaya Prakash Prasad Gupta while informing that 250 insurgents were killed at different places, added that it was difficult to determine the exact numbers of those killed. The Defence Ministry said on February 25, 2002 that, in the biggest military operation till date, the Army on February 23 killed at least 67 Maoists at various places in Kalikot district after they had fled Mangalsen, 600km southwest of the capital Kathmandu on February 13 following their eliminating a platoon of 55 soldiers. In a major operation against the insurgents, on March 17, 2002, 65 Maoist insurgents and their trainers were killed in an attack on a insurgent training centre in Rolpa district, at Gumsa.

There have been a spate of reported surrenders after the security forces went on the offensive since November 26. No sooner than the November offensive began, the Home Ministry claimed that 664 Maoist insurgents in eight districts had surrendered on December 2-3 in Okhaldhunga, Nuwakot, Ramechhap, Rasuwa, Sankhuwasabha, Gorkha, Syangja and Baglung districts. In early January 2002, the Home Ministry claimed that 9000 insurgents had surrendered since Emergency was imposed. It is difficult, however, to state with certainty how many among those surrendered are the insurgents themselves and how many more are sympathisers or alleged sympathisers.

Several members of the various parallel government bodies formed by the Maoists, too, have begun to disassociate from these bodies. For instance, as reported on November 30, 16 persons from Sano Sirubari, Kanchok, Sopa Pokhar, Jyamire and Mankha Village Development Councils (VDCs), including the ward chief of the Maoists’ ‘people’s government’, have quit the movement.

In the early part of 2001, the Maoists had launched a weeklong campaign of violence in different parts of Nepal to coincide with the sixth anniversary of the movement on February 13, 2001. Unprecedented security arrangements were made in the capital, Kathmandu on the occasion. However, the Maoists did not create any disturbances there, restricting themselves to public rallies through their front organisations. However, elsewhere in the country, they attacked several police stations and posts as well as government offices, and caused moderate to extensive damage.

Faced with an unenviable situation, the government asked the Army to impart training to the police. The Army trained approximately 1,000 personnel in 1999 to tackle the insurgency. Furthermore, the government while forming the National Security Council also decided to develop a para-military force, the Armed Police Force, which would eventually have a strength of 25,000 personnel.

It remains to be seen if the current counter-insurgency measures would succeed in quelling the Maoist insurgents. In the past, the insurgents have been able to garner substantial public support primarily due to misgovernance and internal rancour that has enveloped the political establishment. Political ambitions of individual leaders have prompted them to use the Maoist issue to score political points, which consequently hampered counter-insurgency measures.

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