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Pakistan Assessment 2002

Pakistan has, since September 11, 2001, been trapped in an unenviable position, as it struggles, at once, to extricate itself from the web of Islamist terror it had woven through the 1980s and 1990s, to come to terms with the collapse of its long held Afghan policy and its pursuit of ‘strategic depth’, and to continue to maintain what it has long regarded as its ‘core interests’ in Kashmir through covert action. Such contradictions and convulsions have been manifested in two incidents of the year 2002, namely, the abduction cum murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl and the March 17 terrorist attack on a church in Islamabad in which five persons were killed and 40 others injured.   

Daniel Pearl disappeared on January 23 during his attempts to establish contacts with Islamist groups in order to investigate links between Richard Reid, the British man accused of trying to use explosives in his shoes to blow up a Paris-to-Miami jetliner on December 22, 2001 and Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda network. On January 27, Pakistani and US media organisations received an e-mail which said that Pearl was abducted by a hitherto unknown group calling itself "The National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty" (NMRPS). Pakistani police announced on January 30 that it had detained Mubarak Ali Gilani, leader of an Islamist group Jamaat-ul-Fuqra (JF), as a suspect in the case. On the same day, the NMRPS sent e-mails to news organisations threatening to kill him within 24 hours unless the US frees Pakistani prisoners being held at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Even as the series of e-mails and threats continued, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorist Omar Sheikh was arrested in Lahore on February 12 and is currently a prime suspect in the case. Sheikh Mohammed Adeel, a constable with the police department's special branch and a JeM activist is a co-accused in the abduction case. On February 21, US and Pakistan announced that they received a videotape showing scenes of Pearl's murder by his abductors. Investigations thus far have focused on cadres of two terrorist groups, JeM and .Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI). Separately, in what is being discerned as a backlash from the Islamist forces within Pakistan, five persons including the wife of an American diplomat and her daughter, were killed and more than 40 injured, including the High Commissioner of Sri Lanka to Pakistan, in a grenade attack on a church in Islamabad on March 17.

Sectarian Violence in Pakistan (1989-2001)

Casualties in sectarian violence in Pakistan

Source: Constructed from media reports

Earlier, Pakistan was forced to abruptly reverse the course on Afghanistan, apparently severing its deep and continuous links with the Taliban and the Al Qaeda, under extraordinary American pressure after the 9/11 outrage. The severance, in its initial phases, was reluctant and fitful, but the collapse of the Taliban-Al Qaeda axis in Afghanistan, the installation of a new regime in that country, the imminent collapse of Pakistan’s economy in the absence of immediate international financial relief, and the manifest US interests in the destruction of the networks of Islamist terrorism across the world, eventually forced a commitment to the dismantling of what have been referred to as the ‘assembly lines of jihad’ in Pakistan – the complex of Islamist fundamentalist institutions, private Islamist armies and extremist madrassas (religious seminaries) that have sustained sectarian violence within Pakistan and exported terrorism across the globe for over a decade now. Pakistan, consequently, turned against its own protégés and long-time partners – the now fugitive Osama bin Laden, his Al Qaeda and the Taliban. No useful strategic purpose could be served by a continued association with these groupings, and such an association could, in fact, jeopardise Pakistan’s own survival. As it cast itself into the unlikely role of a “frontline state” in the global war against terrorism, however, the Pakistani government has been hard pressed to justify its continuing support to terrorism in the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir, as well as in other theatres.

Despite a ‘radical’ address to the nation on January 12, 2002, in which Pakistan’s military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, committed himself to dismantling the structures and networks of terrorism based in his country, there is yet no evidence to conclude that the Pakistani raison de etre of a radical Islamist political agenda, and its strategy of waging an ‘Islamic jehad’ against India has been abandoned or reversed. Pakistan is yet to demonstrate that it has chosen to alter the perverted course of its history, and terrorist strikes in J&K have, in fact, seen a spurt in the post-9/11 phase. There has also been an escalation in Islamist terrorist violence in other parts of India. Dramatic attacks were, thus, launched against the J&K Legislature complex in Srinagar on October 1, in which 38 persons were killed. Responsibility for the attack was immediately claimed by the now proscribed Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), though it later retracted this claim. Similarly, the December 13, 2001, suicide attack on India’s Parliament, once again engineered by the JeM, brought Indian democracy under direct threat.

On September 15, 2001, the Pakistani government had announced that it would extend ‘full support’ to the world community in combating international terrorism, consistent with its policy of support to the decisions of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. However, the government clearly stated that it would not permit US ground forces to land on its soil for any possible attack on Afghanistan. At the outset, Pakistan assured the US administration that 'every possible help' against terrorism would be rendered in the best national interest of Pakistan. President Pervez Musharraf on September 18, is reported to have said, during a meeting with former foreign ministers, former generals and others, that the decision to extend ‘unstinting support’ to the United States had been taken under ‘tremendous pressure’. He added, during this meeting, that the US authorities had conveyed in categorical terms that Pakistan’s decision would determine its future relationship with Washington. The President also indicated that the US Administration had fixed a deadline on Pakistan’s accession to US demands regarding extension of support, including the use of airspace, as well as logistic and intelligence support.

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Pakistani government had initiated apparent attempts to prevail upon its protégé, the Taliban, to hand over bin Laden to the US. Towards this end, a delegation of senior Pakistani officials – headed by Lt. General Mahmud Ahmed, the then Chief of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s external intelligence agency – undertook a trip to Kandahar, headquarters of the erstwhile Taliban regime in Afghanistan, on September 17, 2001, in order to convince the Taliban militia to either deport bin Laden, or risk a massive retaliatory action by the US. Media reports, however, suggest that the delegation did “exactly the opposite.”

There were some protests and agitation by religious extremist groups in the country against the government’s policy shift. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) called for the resignation of President Pervez Musharraf on October 28, 2001, and demanded that the reigns of power be handed over to a ‘national government’. Several groups announced plans to recruit volunteers who would be sent to aid the Taliban regime in the fight against the US offensive, and several thousand ‘volunteers’ did cross over into Afghanistan in the initial stages. However, with the rapid collapse of Taliban authority in Afghanistan, particularly after the second half of November 2001, these groups sought to maintain a low profile.

Prior to the Taliban reversals in Afghanistan, different strands of Pakistan’s Islamist groups had issued appeals to the Muslims of the world to be prepared for waging a jehad against the US and its allies when the US offensive against the Taliban commenced. Various religious organisations and political parties, while opposing US retaliatory military action against the Taliban regime and the Al Qaeda, also clearly stated their opposition to the use of Pakistani soil for any proposed US military action in Afghanistan. The Pakistan-Afghanistan Defence Council (PADC), a conglomeration of some 40 religious parties headed by Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam (JuI-Samiul Haq faction) chief Maulana Samiul Haq, was at the forefront of the opposition to the US military strikes, as also against the Federal government’s new Afghan policy. It organised several protest demonstrations in various parts of the country, some of them violent in nature, and approximately 20 to 25 persons were killed. News reports in the first week of December 2001 revealed that most of these demonstrations were infiltrated by security agencies and thus kept largely under state control, as a result of which the levels of violence were relatively low. The PADC initiated its protests with the primary focus on the aspect that any attack on Afghanistan would be contemplated as an assault against Islam. Consequently, the Ulema (religious scholars) also gave a call for jehad against the US, adding that the jehad had become mandatory for all Muslims. JeI chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, on September 24, 2001, while giving a countrywide strike call for September 28, to protest against the Federal government’s decision to join the US-led retaliatory strikes on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, stated that "retaliatory action against Afghanistan would be considered an attack on Pakistan itself and it is our religious duty to defend Afghans against foreign invasion."

Various Pakistan-based terrorist organisations and religious parties took out countrywide processions against US military action in Afghanistan. Among the terrorist groups and religious parties that participated in these protests were the Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), JeM and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI). While criticising the military regime in Pakistan for extending support to the US they termed it as an ‘anti-Islamic’ approach. The Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan (TJP) was the only sectarian outfit to come out openly in support of the Musharraf regime’s Afghan policy when the outfit’s chief Allama Sajid Ali Naqvi said in Sukkur, on October 30, that the government's Afghan policy was positive and in accordance with international commitments and national interests.

In one violent protest demonstration in Karachi on September 21, 2001, four persons were killed and several others including police personnel were injured. Another protest in the city on October 12, 2001, turned violent and a security force personnel was killed and approximately seven persons injured. More than 70 persons were arrested in connection with these incidents. Pakistani media reports have indicated that at least two restaurants owned by an American fast food chain were ransacked, two cars belonging to local bodies’ representatives were set ablaze, and over two dozen other cars were damaged during the day-long clashes in Karachi.

Three persons were killed and nine others injured in firing by police on a protest rally, staged by Afghan refugees, that turned violent and attacked a police station in Kuchlak, some 20 kilometres north of Quetta, on October 9, 2001. The protesters ransacked the local branch of the Muslim Commercial Bank, the railway station and post office, and attacked many vehicles. Four persons, including a child and a woman, were also injured in an exchange of fire between anti-US protesters and law enforcement agencies at Wana, South Waziristan Agency, on October 15, 2001. The tribesmen of South Waziristan took out the procession from Wana as a mark of solidarity with the Taliban regime. Some 10 activists of the JeI were injured and over hundred others arrested in Jacobabad on October 23, 2001, during a protest demonstration. Protest demonstrations were also reported from Nawabshah, Shikarpur and Sukkur.

Along with the religious and terrorist outfits, tribesmen in the Federal Administered Tribal Agency (FATA) also staged protest demonstrations on different occasions at different places against the US strikes on Afghanistan. The Jehad Defence Forum (JDF), comprising eight terrorist outfits engaged in terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir, announced at Lahore, on September 25, 2001, that it would join the Jehad in Afghanistan. Anti-US protestors also undertook recruitment of ‘volunteers’ in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan to fight alongside the Taliban regime in Afghanistan against US–led forces. In Mohmand, Bajaur, Khyber, Orakzai and North and South Waziristan tribal agencies, all part of the FATA, ‘offices’ enlisting volunteers for the jehad were opened and a campaign to collect donations for the Taliban was also undertaken. Reports mentioned that tribesmen and Afghan refugees supporting the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance and former Afghan King Zahir Shah were threatened with social boycott, externment and violence. Certain pro-Taliban tribesmen in areas such as Makeen in South Waziristan reportedly announced plans to collect heavy arms for delivery to the Taliban. Media reports of October 23, 2001, indicated that approximately 5,000 ‘volunteers’ in Mansehra, Battagram, Kohistan and the tribal belt of Kala Dhaka had reportedly registered their names to take part in the ground war in Afghanistan, while thousands of others had donated approximately Rs. Two million to support the Taliban militia. Reports indicated that ‘volunteers’ registered their names with the Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam (JuI), Jamaat-e-Islam (JeI) and PADC to take part in the ground war.

The concentration of madrassas run by the pro-Taliban Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam factions of Maulana Fazlur Rahman and Maulana Samiul Haq in the NWFP is an important reason for the strong opposition to the US air strikes on Afghanistan. As the academic sessions in the religious schools had ended, reports mentioned that their students, mostly Afghans, evinced interest in leaving for Afghanistan to join the Taliban in their fight against the US. Elders and religious leaders from Orakzai, Kurram, Khyber, North Waziristan and South Waziristan agencies also supported the JuI. At a meeting at Darul-ul Uloom Zargari in Hangu, they decided to work under the leadership of Fazlur Rahman to prepare people for jehad in Afghanistan.

Various religious groups also initiated the process of enlisting Jehadis to fight alongside the Taliban militia in Afghanistan. Chief of his own faction of JuI, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, ordered his party to start recruiting terrorist cadres. Speaking in Rawalpindi on October 5, 2001, he called on all affiliates of his organisation to "… start enlisting trained people to fight with the Taliban on Afghan soil, if they are attacked."

The Pakistani government, however, banned recruitment of people for jehad in Afghanistan. News reports also indicated that the government informed the then Taliban regime that nobody from Pakistan should fight against the Northern Alliance, as it was their internal battle and not jehad. It also clarified that no Pakistani would be allowed to get any sort of training in Afghanistan.

In Karachi, approximately a dozen mosques and madrassas, especially the Binori Town seminary, the largest Deobandi madrassa in Pakistan, were at the forefront of the enlistment drive. The Binori Town clergy, including Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, are reported to be very close to the Taliban chief, Mullah Mohammed Omar. Shamzai was also a prominent leader in the abortive delegation which accompanied a former ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Mahmud to Kandahar in an attempt to impress upon Mullah Omar to hand over bin Laden to the US authorities. Maulana Masood Azhar, JeM Chief, also maintains close linkages with the Binori Town clergy.

In view of the growing countrywide unrest and protests by the pro-Taliban elements and religious organisations, as also the negative image it was creating vis-à-vis the international coalition against global terror, the Federal government arrested many top religious leaders, including the two faction chiefs of the JuI, Fazlur Rahman and Samiul Haq, and SSP chief, Maulana Azam Tariq, on October 8, 2001. The JeI chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmed was arrested on October 25, 2001, from Lahore. These arrested extremist leaders were kept under house arrest for a considerable period of time. On October 30, 2001, Police in Quetta registered treason cases against 10 senior leaders of religious organisations on charges of using objectionable language against the government. Cases were registered against Maulana Fazlur Rahman, Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri, Liaquat Baloch, Maulana Abdul Ghani, Hafiz Hussain Ahmed Sharodi, Maulana Noor Muhammad, Fazal Muhammad Baraich, Maulana Abdul Baqi, Maulana Mehmood Ghaznavi and Maulana Abdul Haq Baloch.

The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), in accordance with a government decision on September 25, 2001,ordered banks in the country to freeze all accounts of the Karachi-based Al-Rasheed Trust (ART) and the HuM. These two outfits were included in a list released on September 25 by US President George W. Bush, of 27 individuals or groups identified as being linked to terrorism. As a follow up measure, Pakistani authorities, on September 29, closed down offices of the HuM, declared by the US as a terrorist outfit, within hours after of the United Nations (UN) Security Council ordering all its member-states to crack down on terrorist outfits. HuM ‘commander’ Sajjad Shahid said it was closing down its seven offices under instructions from the government. Besides, Pakistani media reports indicated that HuM chief Maulana Fazalur Rehman Khalil and another key HuM leader Farooq Kashmiri had gone underground following the September 11-terrorist attacks in the US. Separately, the HuM on September 30, declared that it had relocated its head quarters.

The ART, on its part, said on October 3 that it would oppose the US decision in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), as it claimed it had no links with terrorism. The ART clarified that it was a ‘purely welfare organization’ rendering welfare services for common Muslims and abiding by all government laws, rules and regulations. Meanwhile, a government spokesperson said on October 4 that Pakistan had asked the US Administration to provide evidence against the ART, which, it believed, was primarily a charity organization working for the welfare of Afghan refugees. The Federal government also froze bank accounts of two more groups, terrorist outfit JeM and the Lahore-based Islamic charity Rabita Trust on November 6. Earlier, on October 7, the State Bank of Pakistan, in accordance with United Nations Resolutions No. 1276 and No. 1333 passed in 1999 and 2000, respectively, froze the bank accounts and assets of top Taliban leaders in Pakistan. The accounts of Osama bin Laden and his associates, too, were frozen.

However, the freezing of accounts of terrorist organisations in Pakistan was, by and large, cosmetic. For instance, between September 11 and December 6, 2001, acting under Executive Order 13224, the United States blocked a total of 79 financial accounts in America, freezing US$33.7 million. This included the blocking by the Department of the Treasury of the property and interests in property of several institutions, primarily the Osama bin Laden affiliated al Barakaat trust. The British Government followed by freezing 35 suspect bank accounts, immobilising more than £63 million of suspected terrorist funds.  France announced the freezing of assets worth £2.7 million. Given its vast network of jehadi institutions and activities, it was expected that action in Pakistan would have frozen considerably larger, or at least comparable, assets. “On the contrary,” as one commentator observed, “the total amount was derisively low.  The two accounts of the HuM [Harkat-ul-Mujaheddin] had a total of Rs. 4,742, the JeM had Rs. 900, the al Rashid Trust, which handled the accounts of the Taliban and the LeT, had Rs.2.7 million and US $ 30. Ayman al-Zawahiri, of the al-Jihad, Egypt, who operated the accounts of the al Qaeda, had just US $ 252.” (Pakistani Rs. 68 are equivalent to one US dollar.) The News of Islamabad reported as follows on January 1, 2002: “The frozen accounts had a balance of $190,554 and close to Rs. 10 million till December 20, 2001. The Government has sent the details of these bank accounts, including that of the Afghan Embassy in Islamabad, to the US authorities. Experts said the policy to freeze the accounts in ‘pieces’ gave ample time to most of these account-holders to withdraw their money.”

The US State Department included the JeM and three other Pakistan outfits in its list of Terrorists and Groups Identified Under Executive Order 13224 signed by President George W. Bush on September 23, 2001. The list includes Haji Abdul Mannan Agha, described as an operator of a hawala (illegal money transfers) outfit Al Qadir Traders in Quetta. The others in the list include Mufti Rashid Ahmed Ladeyaznoy, reported to be in Karachi and linked to the ART and the Rabita Trust of Lahore. The US Secretary of State, while designating the JeM and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) as foreign terrorist organizations, said, “these groups, which claim to be supporting the people of Kashmir, have conducted numerous terrorist attacks in India and Pakistan. As the recent horrific attacks against the Indian parliament and the Srinagar state legislative assembly so clearly show, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and their ilk seek to assault democracy, undermine peace and stability in South Asia, and destroy relations between India and Pakistan."

In a major reshuffle of the Army leadership, on October 7, 2001, ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, was prematurely retired and Lt. Gen. Ehsanul Haq, Corps Commander of Peshawar, was appointed as the new Director General. Reports speculated that that the reshuffle was carried out against the backdrop of US air strikes in Afghanistan which were launched on the same day, and those officers who were not considered to be ‘like-minded’ were shifted. Three other senior army officers were also removed on October 8 with General Mahmud. Gen. Mahmud, who was in the US during the September 11 terrorist attacks, also led a delegation of Pakistani mullahs (clerics) to Afghanistan to negotiate the surrender of Osama bin Laden. However, he is reported to have advised Mullah Omar on ways to counter Washington’s planned offensive. Media reports quoting diplomatic sources in Lahore indicated that the US administration had also complained to Pakistan about Gen. Mahmud’s failure to provide crucial intelligence inputs to track bin Laden, despite firm commitments in this regard during his visit to Washington.

According to Pakistani media reports of October 16, 2001, law-enforcement agencies finalised a list of 3,000 religious and political activists involved in various incidents of violence and terrorism in the country during the anti-US protests. The list, from all the four provinces, was prepared following President Musharraf's directive to initiate stern action against violators of the law. Official sources indicated that the list also included names of leaders of various religious parties advocating violence against the government and its assets. Official sources were quoted as stating that activists of various extremist groups that had been proscribed had merged with other Islamist extremist formations and were indulging in attacks on law-enforcers.

Sources quoting senior religious leaders indicated that cadres of various religious and terrorist organisations, including HuM and LeT, fought alongside the Taliban militia against the US-led forces. The Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi  (TNSM), a Maidan-based militant Wahabi outfit, decided to send the first batch of its cadres into Afghanistan to fight against the US and its allies on October 25, 2001. It was headed by Malik Mahmud Jan and included the TNSM Chief Maulana Sufi Muhammad. Meanwhile, the Islami Jamaat Talaba (IJT) issued a threat to the government that it would convert the educational institutions of Sindh into training camps for jehad in Afghanistan if the administration did not stop handing over airbases to the US forces. On October 26, the TNSM Chief Maulana Sufi Muhammad, speaking in Chakdara, said that a 20,000 strong armed Lashkar (Army) of the TNSM was set to leave for Afghanistan on October 27 to take part in Jehad against the US and Britain. Approximately 1,200-armed cadres of the TNSM entered Afghanistan via the Kunarh province on November 1 to join the Taliban ranks. The TNSM Chief Maulana Sufi Muhammad proceeded to Afghanistan to discuss with the Taliban authorities the possibility of his cadres assisting them in their fight against the US. Sufi also asked TNSM cadres between the ages of 25 and 50 years to continue training and be ready to go to Afghanistan. Another group of more than 1,500 Pakistani tribesmen, reportedly TNSM cadres, crossed into Afghanistan on November 8 to fight alongside the Taliban militia, despite government efforts to seal the border.

With the rout of the Taliban, however, this flow was rapidly reversed. The TNSM Chief Maulana Sufi Muhammad, who, with 30 cadres, had been awaiting clearance from the Interior Ministry to enter Pakistan through the Kurram Agency since November 16, 2001, admitted that 700 TNSM cadres have been either arrested or killed inside Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance forces. The Northern Alliance commander at Jalalabad in Afghanistan captured 300 TNSM cadres as prisoners on November 27. TNSM also pointed out that out of the over 8,000 TNSM cadres who went to Afghanistan to reinforce the Taliban militia, between 2500 and 3000 were missing.

Pakistani media reports, in one of the first accounts regarding Pakistani extremists fighting in Afghanistan, indicated that 34 Pakistani HuM terrorists were killed when a building in Kabul, where they were holding a meeting, was bombed by US planes on the night of October 22, 2001. Initially, the Pakistani government attempted to block the entry of the bodies of these slain terrorists at the Torkham border checkpost. On October 24, however, eight of these bodies were permitted to be brought into Pakistan through the Mohmand tribal area amidst tight security. Reports on October 24, 2001, indicated that 23 Pakistan-based terrorists were killed during US-led military strikes in Afghanistan, including cadres of various religious and terrorist organisations such as HuM and LeT.

The dead bodies of six Pakistani nationals, who were reportedly killed on October 27, 2001, in Afghanistan, were brought to Chaman, Quetta, on October 29. Pakistani news sources indicated that they were JuI cadres and residents of Chaman who had joined the Taliban militia in year 2000. They were reportedly killed while fighting against Toran Ismail forces of the Northern Alliance in Badghis province, north west of Kandahar, bordering Turkmenistan.

While claiming that the Taliban militia was living in the mountains, Hafiz Mohammed Saeed, the erstwhile chief of LeT said in Hyderabad, Sindh, on November 23, 2001, that many Lashkar terrorists were also fighting alongside the Taliban militia.

85 Pakistani cadres of the terrorist group HuJI were killed when US warplanes bombed a defence line at Darae Noor in the Dara-i-Souf valley, Balkh province, during air raids on Afghanistan on November 8, 2001. The organisation had deployed its cadres in the area to help the Taliban militia fight the opposition Northern Alliance. Approximately 200 pro-Taliban Pakistani Jehadis were killed in Mazar-e-Sharif on November 9 and 10 following capture of the strategically significant Afghan city by the Northern Alliance forces. Haji Mohammed Muhaqiq, who heads the faction representing the Shia Hazara community, said that the NA had encircled approximately 1,200 Pakistanis in the Maktab Soltan Raziyeh area, and they could not escape along with the Taliban.

Another approximately 600 youth from Pakistan, who had gone to support the Taliban militia, were killed in various other theatres in Afghanistan. Of these, 28 belonged to Hyderabad, Sindh, 180 to Sukkur and the remaining were residents of Karachi, Larkana and Mirpur Khas. Furthermore, 67 Pakistani nationals, part of the Taliban cadre captured in Kunduz, were imprisoned in a school by the Northern Alliance troops and later killed by US bombings.

The US administration confirmed on November 28, 2001, that 208 Pakistani citizens had been arrested by it in connection with the September 11 investigations. US Attorney General John Ashcroft further disclosed that Pakistanis were the largest group arrested in the US on immigration charges.

Meanwhile, in an attempt to counter opposition from religious extremists, President Pervez Musharraf ordered a countrywide ‘comprehensive' and 'sustainable' crackdown on the madrassas. The new policy was primarily aimed at madrassas imparting terrorist training. Provinces and intelligence agencies were reportedly issued strict instructions to collect visible evidence against these madrassas and terminate their source of funds, cancel their registration and also initiate legal action against them. Legal action is also reported to have been initiated against madrassas set up by Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Maulana Samiul Haq, faction leaders of JeI, who were at the forefront in criticising the government's Afghan policy. Musharraf while conceding that mosques and madrassas were being used to spread religious and sectarian dissension added that the ‘silent majority’ of moderate Pakistanis should isolate the extremists in their ranks. Although official statistics indicate that there are approximately 7000 madrassas, liberal accounts estimate the number to be between 40, 000 to 50, 000.

Moinuddin Haider, Interior Minister, said in an interview in January 2002 that the military regime was planning to regulate the madrassas wherein they would have to be registered and also sources of funding disclosed to enforcement agencies. He disclosed that some of the students from madrassas were involved in terrorist violence. Haider also disclosed that the madrassas had approximately 6,00,000 students including about 20,000 foreign students – of whom almost 18,000 were identified as Afghans, with the rest from Myanmar, the Central Asian countries or the Middle East. According to him, between Shias and Sunnis, the two major sectarian groups, one party has 166 madrassas and the other has 119.

Under General Musharraf’s proposals to regulate and modernise the madrassas in Pakistan, computerised profiles of all such institutions are expected to be prepared by the authorities under a $100 million package to be funded by the US administration. While the money is to be used for the broader agenda of controlling the militant and sectarian elements in Pakistan, these profiles are intended to maintain a record of the clergy. Under the same programme, authorities would be keeping vigilance on publications by these seminaries in support of their terrorist agenda. Under the package, the government, in collaboration with Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) would draw up a fresh curriculum for the madrassas; create a special cell in the police department to train officials for penetration into the seminaries for intelligence and vigilance; approach publishers and printing firms to acquire timely information on publication activities of the sectarian outfits; and analyse information received by informers on the activities of the individuals listed as suspects.

According to a February 13, 2002, report, more than 8,000 students, both Afghans and Pakistanis, have been relieved from 55 madrassas in the Mardan division since January 12, the day President Musharraf announced a crackdown on Islamist extremists. The report also said that more than 100 madrassas were operating in the Mardan division, of which 55 were considered large institutions, where 2,500 Afghan and 5,500 local students receive education.

The administrators and principals of leading seminaries have rejected General Musharraf’s proposals for madrassa reforms, terming these as 'a Western conspiracy’ to destroy the seminaries and the Islamic education imparted there. While indicating that the policy was a threat to Islam, they have declared that they would not permit any scrutiny of accounts or funding, nor any review of the madrassa curriculum.

Even before the 9/11 attacks, the Federal government in Pakistan had begun to crackdown on Islamist extremists indulging in sectarian strife within the country. Two sectarian outfits, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and the Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan (SMP) were banned on August 14, 2001, following which the SBP had issued a circular to all banks and monetary agencies to freeze accounts of the proscribed organisations.

In the post-9/11 scenario, the military regime initiated a crackdown on various terrorist groups exporting terrorism as well, and in this context, arrested JeM chief Maulana Masood Azhar and LeT chief Hafiz Mohammad Saeed in December 2001. About a hundred workers from both LeT and JeM were also arrested and their offices in many cities including Karachi, Islamabad, Bahawalpur, Multan, Rahim Yar Khan and Sukkur were sealed during the last days of the year 2001. As already stated, the regime also froze the accounts and assets of Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, JeM, LeT, the Al-Rashid Trust (ART) and the Rabita Trust.

Furthermore, in the context of increasing international pressure, President Musharraf on January 12, 2002, announced during his televised address to the nation, the proscription of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Toiba, and sectarian groups Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Jaferia Pakistan and the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi. According to official figures quoted in the media on January 17, 2002, approximately 1,975 persons of various terrorist and sectarian groups were arrested and 615 offices of these organisations sealed and their records seized in the countrywide crackdown on terrorist and sectarian groups launched on January 12, 2002. The government is also expected to investigate various foreign channels of financial assistance to the five banned outfits. All the five proscribed organisations had been reportedly receiving extensive financial aid from some countries in the name of Islam and welfare-oriented activity. Reports have indicated that prior to proscription, the Interior Ministry had written letters to the funding nations and held meetings with the Ambassadors of these countries, asking them to discontinue such assistance, and to provide credible and satisfactory evidences on fund transfer. The proscribed organisations were allegedly securing funds from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Kuwait and Iraq.

In response to the proscription, Abdullah Sayyaf, a Lashkar-e-Toiba spokesperson, in a statement faxed to the press on January 13, 2002, stated, "Pakistan has no right to ban LeT without any proof because it is struggling against the Indian occupant forces in Kashmir for the liberation of the held valley." He said such proscriptions would not affect the terrorist operations, and that these would continue until "Indian forces vacate occupied Kashmir." Separately, Bakht Zamin Khan, chief of Al-Badr, said, "Pakistani nation and government must keep it in mind that struggle for liberation of Kashmir is actually an endeavour to uphold Pakistan's solidarity, and any measure damaging it is absolutely against national interests."

There may also be a significant increase in terrorist movement within Pakistan. LeJ chief, Riaz Basra, one of the ‘most wanted terrorists’ in Pakistan, along with another front ranking terrorist Akram Lahori, reportedly entered Pakistan following the US attacks on Afghanistan. These terrorists, along with many others, had escaped to Afghanistan after committing several terrorist crimes in Pakistan. Several such terrorists had been based in training camps in Jalalabad and Kabul.

Afghan-sponsored terrorism is estimated to have resulted in the death of approximately 479 persons in the Punjab during the last decade. Out of a total of 65 Proclaimed Offenders (POs) of the proscribed Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), for instance, approximately 29 were reportedly based at a training camp near Sarobi Dam, Kabul. Sources also indicated that, Qari Asadullah, leader of a breakaway faction of the LeJ, was reportedly supervising training facilities for terrorists of Pakistani origin at Kabul. Pakistani law enforcement authorities had, on several occasions, demanded from the then Taliban regime that these terrorists be deported to Pakistan, but the Taliban authorities claimed that these persons were ‘outside their reach’.

With the collapse of the Taliban, these terrorists are, once again, expected to seek entry into Pakistan. Thus, a report on October 23, 2001, citing Interior Ministry sources, stated that Riaz Basra and Akram Lahori were seen in Karachi, while other terrorists were reportedly hiding in the tribal areas and in the North West Frontier Province. Security forces in Baluchistan and the NWFP were placed on a high alert towards the last week of November to track down as many as 96 ‘most wanted’ sectarian terrorists, who had been hiding inside Afghanistan since 1996, but were widely expected to cross the border into Pakistan. Much of this is speculative intelligence, however, and a December 2001 report indicated that Basra may have been killed at Mazar-e-Sharif or was trapped with Taliban fighters in Kunduz.

In June 2001, the Federal government had also launched a much-publicised, countrywide ‘de-weaponisation’ campaign. Available indicators, however, suggest that this drive is yet to yield significant results. The Musharraf government had notified the Surrender of Illicit Arms Act (SIAA) 1991 to provide legal cover to its de-weaponisation campaign and to invoke stringent penalties contained in it, including life imprisonment for those possessing illegal arms. The primary objectives of the campaign were to control sectarian killings in the country, contain the violent impact of the proliferation of arms and improve the country’s image globally. Pakistan is reportedly spending Rs. 100 million in its attempts to recover illicit weapons. Rs 35 million of this amount was disbursed in the financial year (2000-2001) and Rs 65 million are to be expended in the current financial year (2001-2002).

On September 31, Moinuddin Haider, Interior Minister, had announced that 123,000 illegal weapons including missiles, an armed personnel carrier, anti-aircraft guns, rocket launchers, guns, Klashinikovs and other weapons had been seized since the launch of the operations. However, the ISI is said to have informed the Federal government that the illicit weapons recovery campaign had failed and in its report, the ISI stated that, while local security agencies had been provided with a list of names and addresses of 3,772 persons who either possess deadly weapons or were smugglers of arms and ammunition from Baluchistan, Sindh and NWFP in June 2001, action had been taken against only 389 individuals.

Reports have indicated that the military regime has decided to re launch the de-weaponisation campaign in April 2002 as the earlier campaign had failed to mop up the huge number of illegal weapons present in the country. Lack of effective implementation by the provinces is reported to be one of the major reasons for the failure of the campaign. Although target areas had already been identified by intelligence agencies, no raids were conducted by the provinces. It is to be noted that the SIAA 1991 is not applicable in the tribal areas of Baluchistan and NWFP. The provinces have been are arguing that in a tribal culture weapons are necessary to ensure personal security and to preserve peace.

The proliferation of weapons, a by-product of Pakistan’s involvement as a ‘frontline state’ during the anti-Soviet campaign of the 1980s, has aided the phenomenon of Islamist extremism in spreading violence within Pakistan and beyond its borders. Baluchistan and NWFP, the two provinces contiguous to Afghanistan, have an entrenched arms culture and have also witnessed a huge proliferation of small arms and light weapons since the Afghan war. The inflow of arms from neighbouring Afghanistan continues and proto-types of all prohibited bores of automatic and semi-automatic weapons are reportedly manufactured in the gun-manufacturing town of Dara Adamkhel. There are approximately 500 arms factories and about 6000 arms shops with 70,000 people engaged in the business of manufacturing weapons in Dara Adamkhel.

Afghan war veterans, hired by various feuding combatants in the tribal areas, possess and operate these weapons. Former Afghan warlords, who returned to Peshawar after the rout of the Taliban were seen openly displaying sophisticated weaponry. Young tribesmen have also sought donations from their respective tribes to procure arms and ammunition, fuelling tribal feuds. Sources indicate that there is at least one AK series rifle in every house in the NWFP.

Districts that have a history of sectarian violence have also failed to deliver any noticeable results in the de-weaponisation campaign. These include Lahore, Sheikhupura, Okara, Hafizabad, Sargodah, Bhakkar, Faisalabad, Jhang, Toba Tek Singh, Multan, Khanewal, Sahiwal, Pakpattan, Muzaffargarh, Layyah and Bahawalpur. Religious and political parties that bankroll armed wings have rejected the call to surrender arms and are unwilling to co-operate with the government. In their perception, disarming Muslims and discouraging jehad is the US agenda and the move would ultimately benefit India.

Islamist extremism had been used by the ISI, since the Nineteen Eighties, to further the country’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India. Initially operating under the control of the ISI, some of these groups, guided by their narrow sectarian outlook, eventually turned inwards and initiated a violent sectarian movement which peaked in 1998-99. Though sectarian violence showed signs of decline after the military coup of October 1999, it is far from having been eliminated, and targeted killings of sectarian opponents continue. In a major incident, an SSP controlled mosque was attacked by suspected SMP terrorists on March 12, 2001; nine worshippers were killed and 12 others injured. In another brutal massacres, 17 members of the Christian community, including five children, were killed and nine others injured when six unidentified gunmen opened indiscriminate fire on a church in Model Town, Bahawalpur, on October 28, 2001. The dead included 12 members of a single family. The 40-year-old St Dominic's church, the massacre site, was previously run by American preachers, but most of them had reportedly left Pakistan in the wake of the 9/11 strikes in the US. Christian Liberation Front of Pakistan spokesperson, Shahbaz Bhatti, said that Islamist extremists had been calling for jehad in the town since the US-led air strikes began against the Taliban in Afghanistan on October 7. He claimed that the assailants were from either the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) or Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM). Javed Ashraf, Pakistan Communications and Railway Minister, stated in Dubai on January 17, 2002, that approximately 400 persons were killed in Shia-Sunni violence in Karachi in the year 2001.

SATP documentation of casualties in various sectarian and terrorist related incidents in Pakistan between January 1 and December 31, 2001 indicate that 261 persons were killed and 495 others injured. Monthly estimates are tabulated below.

Sectarian Violence in Year 2001

Month

Incidents
Killed
Injured

January

8
50
18

February

18
21
11

March

17
53
44

April

13
4
65

May

17
18
52

June

14
18
31

July

10
15
26

August

16
23
84

Sept.

18
19
64

October

10
25
55

November

7
11
4

December

6
4
41

Total

154
261
495

Source: Figures are compiled from news reports and are provisional

Sectarian Violence in Year 2002

Month
Incidents
Killed
Injured
January
6
4
7
February
11
22
45
March
17
35
85
April
5
17
37
May
14
32
80
June
4
6
0
July
0
0
0
August
2
1
3
September
2
2
0
October
1
1
0
November
1
1
0
December
0
0
0
Total
63
121
257

Source: Figures are compiled from news reports and are provisional.

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