|
Assessments lie at the core of
success or failure in any major conflict, and, as Clausewitz has
noted in his classic, On War, "the first of all strategic
questions and the most comprehensive" confronting the statesman
and the commander is "the kind of war on which they are embarking;
neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something
that is alien to its nature."1
And yet, recent experience is
overwhelming testimony to the myopia of leaders and, indeed, of
the tremendous void that has come into existence, globally, in
military doctrine and strategic thinking. Worse, the political
discourse – crucial, in democratic nations, to the strategic impulse
– remains mired in obfuscation, in ideology-led dogma, in denial,
and in the sheer and deliberate opportunism of short-term partisan
political postures.
The most glaring of recent examples
in this context is, of course, the sheer perversion of intelligence
and falsification of reality that preceded – and conjured the
case for – the Iraq invasion. The disastrous consequences of this
misadventure are everywhere in evidence and America has already
paid an unimaginable price for this folly, not only in money and
lives, but in the loss of international prestige and irreversible
damage to its status as the world’s ‘sole superpower’.
Astonishingly, there is little
evidence of learning within at least some sections of the Bush
administration, and there are many and strident voices calling
for US armed intervention in Iran, once again, on intelligence
and assessments that are, at best, dodgy.
In Afghanistan and Pakistan, crucial,
though not as immediately disastrous in potential, miscalculations
remain in evidence. Despite repeated failures of experiments to
include a mythical ‘moderate Taliban’ in the establishment at
Kabul, and various ‘peace deals’ with elements of the Taliban
and various warlords on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border, each
of which has only brought about a further consolidation of power
and operational capacities of the Islamist radicals, efforts for
such rapprochement persist, and have intensified with the
formation of a new, democratic Government in Pakistan. Indeed,
the great faith invested in the ‘fundamental transformations’
that are to be wrought by the ‘new order’ in Pakistan, themselves,
constitute a failure of intelligence, and a grave error of judgment.
Elections and the installation
of ‘democratic’ regimes in regions of instability invariably give
rise to euphoric sentiments and assessments. Regrettably, in all
but the rarest of cases, the electoral exercise does little to
alter the existing equations of power within the system, and the
consequent institutional perversities that continues to operate,
despite the apparent ‘shift’ engineered by ‘democracy’. The situation
in Pakistan is not among the ‘rare exceptions’ in this regard.
The powers of the ‘democratic forces’ remain hostage to the country’s
overwhelming military establishment, though the latter has found
it expedient to execute a tactical retreat from overt control
after the humiliation and discredit accumulated over eight years
of sustained catastrophe under President Pervez Musharraf. To
the extent that Pakistan’s principal challenge remains the struggle
with deep-rooted Islamist extremism, both within the establishment
and in elements now arrayed against it, as well as against the
associated and rising Islamist terrorism within and sourced from
the country, the role of the Army will remain pivotal. The inherent
contradictions of this role – which seeks, at once, to confront
and neutralize the increasing menace of some aspects of Islamist
radicalism, but simultaneously to retain control of the instrumentalities
of Islamist terror within the state’s strategic and tactical arsenal
– have in no measure diminished with the advent of ‘democracy’.
Worse, while the ‘democratic forces’ are currently being lionized,
the reality of their past cannot be ignored for long. These are,
in the main, deeply discredited and compromised parties and leaders,
and most of these have had deep and enduring linkages with the
Islamist extremists and with Pakistan’s project of international
radicalization and terrorism, during past tenures in power. Crucially,
moreover, notwithstanding the ‘marginalization’ of the Islamist
formations in the elections, the disruptive capacities of the
Islamist extremists have in no measure been diluted, nor has their
intent been altered, by the electoral process or the installation
of a ‘new regime’. The reality of power in Pakistan remains an
irreducible conflict between a pre-eminent, but declining, military
power, and a rising, albeit still far inferior, jihadi force.
‘Democratic’ players remain, at best, minor and probably transitional
actors in this theatre.
The ‘democracy delusion’ is conspicuously
manifest in Nepal as well. A party committed to a totalitarian
ideology of violent transformation has now nearly secured the
seizure of state power through a tactical subordination of the
democratic process – at the end of a ten-year campaign of its
explicitly violent ‘people’s war’. Apologists for the new fait
accompli are, of course, vigorously celebrating the ‘victory
of democracy’. But the seizure of power, though still in its execution,
is no less a reality merely because it was not effectively resisted
by democratic forces or the existing state apparatus; nor, indeed,
is the Maoist ideology any less totalitarian because power is
secured through a manipulation of democratic processes and institutions;
moreover, the state may not have manifestly been captured through
the ‘barrel of the gun’, but it has certainly been secured under
the shadow of the gun, in a situation of widespread intimidation
and the denial of democratic space to political rivals by the
Maoists. This outcome has, moreover, been achieved through a long
succession of political and strategic blunders on the part of
each of the powers involved – both domestic and international
– which have aided, inadvertently but invariably, in the consolidation
of the Maoist stranglehold over Nepal.
Infirmities of perception are
also endemic in India’s multiple internal conflicts – including
the persistent proxy war that Pakistan continues to wage, through
Islamist extremist instrumentalities, in Jammu & Kashmir and
in progressively wider areas across the country. Such errors are,
however, most dramatically exemplified in the irreconcilable conflict
of views that has persisted, for nearly four years now, between
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Minister of Home Affairs,
Shivraj Patil, on the threat of Left Wing Extremism or Maoism/Naxalism
in India. The Prime Minister has, variously and repeatedly, articulated
the view that "Left Wing Extremism is probably the single
biggest security challenge to the Indian state", and has
advocated the strongest measures for the suppression of this threat,
noting, "We need to cripple the hold of Naxalite forces with
all the means at our command... we also need to choke their support
infrastructure." His Home Minister has, however, explicitly
rejected this assessment, has repeatedly sought to minimize the
Maoist threat in India through statement and statistical manipulation,
and has insisted that, in dealing with "our children"
and with "our brothers and sisters", "the Government
is not interested in using weapons." The impact, down the
chain of command and operation, of such ambivalence – indeed,
contradiction – at the highest levels of Government, can only
be imagined.
It is significant, however, that
wherever a sufficient measure of clarity has been secured in counter-terrorism
perspectives and doctrine in India – as was the case in Punjab
and, more recently, in Andhra Pradesh and Tripura – the results
have been the most astonishing and swift reverses inflicted on
anti-state forces.
As with all wars or major conflicts,
strategies of response to insurgency and terrorism relate essentially
to the acquisition and disposition of force and resources. The
degree to which this task is effectively and imaginatively addressed
– in conformity, not with some particular rigidity of theory,
ideology or vested interest, but with an objective and accurate
assessment of the challenges at hand – defines the measure of
success that is attainable. The critical imperative is to define
clear objectives and ends for our strategies, and to assess these
strategies in terms of the quantifiable advances they secure towards
these specific goals and objectives.
It is only a continuous study
of the specific details and dynamics of the forces and conditions
operating on the ground that can yield a sufficient understanding
of, and framework of response to, the rising terrorism and sub-conventional
wars of our age. It is to such study that Faultlines is
dedicated.
Ajai Sahni
New Delhi, April 25, 2008
- Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and
trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976, p. 88.
- Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, "Speech
at the Chief Ministers' Conference on Internal Security,"
New Delhi, December 20, 2007, http://pmindia.nic.in/speeches.htm.
- Ibid.
- "Naxal threat has not become worse: Patil,"
CNN-IBN, February 16, 2008, http://www.ibnlive.com/news/naxal-threat-has-not-become-worse-patil/59198-3.html.
- Home Minister's statement on September 17,
2004. See also, Ajai Sahni, "Bad Medicine for a Red Epidemic,"
South Asia Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 12, October 4, 2004,
South Asia Terrorism Portal, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/3_12.htm#ASSESSMENT2
- Union Minister's statement at a meeting with
representatives of political parties and voluntary organisations
in Bangalore, The Telegraph, April 25, 2005, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1050425/asp/nation/story_4658169.asp
- Ibid.
|
