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On Justice Delayed
M.L. Sharma*
By maintaining order the King can preserve
what he already has, acquire new possession, augment his wealth and
power, and share the benefits of improvement with those worthy of such
gifts. The progress of this world depends on the maintenance of order
and the proper functioning of the Government.
The administration of justice punishing the wicked and rewarding
the virtuous is, according to Kautilya, one of the primary
duties of the King. A King prevails only with the help of danda
(punishment). Danda is the real ruler and the King merely an
instrument for its execution. Referring to the aims of punishment,
Kautilya observed that punishment is not an end in itself but only
a means to an end. This end is the maintenance of society and the
protection of all creatures. Punishment achieves this objective in
many ways: by deterring potential offenders from committing crimes
and deviating from the path of duty; reforming evil doers; providing
consolation to the victims; purifying the offender and ridding the
society of criminals.2
The Kautilyan dictum is as true today as it was in
his times, two-and-a-half millennia ago. That punishment purges both
society and the criminal is widely acknowledged by modern criminologists
and social scientists.
In this, however, it is not punishment alone, but the
speed with which justice is administered that is equally important.
Speedy justice is, in fact, the sine qua non of criminal jurisprudence.
It serves the best interests of both the accused and the prosecution
that a trial runs through its course expeditiously. From the point of
view of the accused, speedy trial is important because:
(a) pre-conviction incarceration is minimised
;
(b) the worry, anxiety, expenses and disruption
to vocation and peace are minimised;
(c) undue delay may result in impairment of the
ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death
or disability of witnesses.
Speedy trial is equally necessary from the point of
view of prosecution. Delay in trial prejudices the prosecution due to:
(a) non-availability of witnesses; and (b) disappearance of evidence
by lapse of time. Given the increasing ascendancy of criminal elements
in our public life, these imperatives are made all the more urgent as
a result of the risk of witnesses being threatened, intimidated or bribed
to resile from a truthful version of events.
The concept of speedy trial has been incorporated into
the laws of various countries. It found a place in the Virginia Declaration
of Rights of 1776, and from there into the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution
of United States of America which states that, "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to speedy and public
trial". USA also has the Federal Act of 1974, Speedy Trial Act,
that establishes a set of time limits for all major events in the prosecution
of criminal cases, including information, indictment and arraignment.
Similar provisions exist in Canada as well.
The right to speedy trial is recognised as a common
law right flowing from the Magna Carta in UK, USA, Canada and
New Zealand,3 though this view is
not accepted in Australia.
A variety of international conventions have also endorsed
the significance of the right to speedy trial, including Article 14
of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
Article 3 of the European convention on Human Rights refers to it as
a basic right and provides that, "Every one arrested or detained
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
trial".
In India, neither the Constitution nor any existing
laws or statutes specifically confer the right to speedy trial on the
accused. The genesis of this right lies in the Supreme Court judgement
in Hussainara Khatoon Vs State of Bihar4
where Justice Bhagwati observed:
No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick
trial can be regarded as reasonable, fair or just and it
would fall foul of Article 21 of the Constitution. There can, therefore,
be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental
right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which
would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person
accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived
of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long period of time
and convicting him after such trial would constitute violation of his
fundamental right under Article 21.
Justice Bhagwati also lamented about the shocking state
of affairs with regard to the administration of justice in the State
of Bihar and exhorted subordinate courts to abandon the antiquated concepts
under which pre-trial release is ordered only against bail with sureties,
which, the Court observed, had done more harm than good. The Court further
noted that if the accused has his roots in the community and is not
likely to abscond, he should ordinarily be released on personal bond,
and also defined the considerations on which the accused standing in
the community was to be evaluated.5
The position that a right to speedy trial is implicit
in Article 21 of the Constitution was reiterated by a Constitution Bench
of the Supreme Court in Abdul Rehman Antuley Vs R.S. Naik. The
Court referred to the following observations made in Maneka Gandhi
Vs Union of India regarding integral connection between Articles
14 and 21 of the Constitution :
"The procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer
the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article
14. It must be right and just and fair and not arbitrary,
fanciful or oppressive; otherwise it would be no procedure at all and
the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied".6
After a thorough analysis of the domestic and foreign
case law, the Supreme Court crystallised its view in the form of the
following propositions:
i. Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit
in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to
be tried speedily. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt
or innocence of the accused is determined expeditiously.
ii. Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21
encompasses all the stages namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry,
trial, appeal, revision and retrial.
iii. Delay often prejudices the prosecution. The
accused often indulge in dilatory tactics.
iv. While determining whether undue delay has occurred
(resulting in violation of Right to speedy trial), one must have regard
to all the attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number
of accused and witnesses, the work load of the Court concerned, prevailing
local conditions and so on. It is the obligation of the State to ensure
a speedy trial and State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic
and practical approach should be adopted in such matters instead of
a pedantic one.
v. Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice
the accused. However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive
proof of prejudice.
vi. The demand rule cannot be recognised.
The mere fact that the accused did not ask for a speedy trial at an
earlier stage cannot be put against him.
vii. Ultimately, the Court has to balance and weigh
several relevant factors and determine in each case whether the right
to speedy trial has been denied in a given case.
viii. In case the Court comes to the conclusion
that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed, the nature
of offences and other circumstances in a given case need to be considered
before quashing of a proceedings.
ix. It is neither advisable and nor practicable
to fix any time limit for trial of offences. It is for the Court to
weigh all the circumstances of a given case before pronouncing upon
a complaint of the denial of the right to speedy trial. In this context
it may be noted that the Supreme Court of USA has also repeatedly refused
to fix any such outer time-limit despite the Sixth Amendment.
x. Any complaint regarding denial of Right to speedy
trial and for relief on that account, should first be addressed to the
High Court. The High Court should ordinarily not stay the proceedings
except in a case of grave and exceptional nature.
The same principles were reiterated by the Supreme
Court in several subsequent rulings.7
In Sheela Barse Vs Union of India8
where a petition was filed for the release of all children below the
age of 16 years detained in various jails in different States and seeking
detailed information in respect of them, the Court observed that the
problem of children under detention would more easily be solved if the
investigation and trial in respect of the charges against them could
be expedited. The Court directed the State governments to take steps
for completing the investigation within three months in cases lodged
against children and to establish an adequate number of courts to expedite
the trial of such cases. A landmark judgement in this context was Legal
Aid Committee Vs Union of India in which, while dealing with NDPS
Act and Section 309 CrPC, the Supreme Court lay down the conditions
for mandatory release of undertrials on bail where trial was not completed
within a specified period of time. The Courts directions with
respect to pending cases included:
- Where the under-trial is accused of an offence(s) under the Act
prescribing a punishment of imprisonment of five years or less and
fine, such an under-trial shall be released on bail if he has been
in jail for a period which is not less than half the punishment provided
for the offence with which he is charged and where he is charged with
more than one offence, the offence providing the highest punishment.
If the offence he is charged with prescribes the maximum fine, the
bail amount shall be 50% of the said amount with two sureties for
like amount. If the maximum fine is not prescribed bail shall be to
the satisfaction of the Special Judge concerned with two sureties
for like amount.
- Where the undertrial accused is charged with an offence(s) under
the Act providing for punishment exceeding five years and fine, such
an under trial shall be released on bail on the term set out in (i)
above provided that his bail amount shall in no case be less than
Rs. 50,000/- with two sureties for like amount.
- Where the under trial accused is charged with an offence(s) under
the Act punishable with minimum imprisonment of ten years and a minimum
fine of Rupees one hundred thousand, such an under trial shall be
released on bail if he has been in jail for not less than five years
provided he furnishes bail in the sum of Rupees one hundred thousand
with two sureties for like amount.
- Where an under trial accused is charged with the commission of an
offence punishable under sections 31 and 31-A of the Act, such an
under trial shall not be entitled to be released on bail by virtue
of this order.
The Court, of course, imposed certain conditions in
regard to detenues mentioned in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii), including
the deposition of passport by the under trial with the court; the under-trial
was required to report at the Police Station which prosecuted him at
a prescribed periodicity; denial of benefit of these directions to those
accused who are likely to tamper with evidence or influence the prosecution
witnesses; and obligation of the accused not to leave the jurisdiction
of the trial court without the courts express permission.
These norms were further diluted in favour of undertrials
and were extended to all offences in the Common Cause case in 1996.
Common Cause, a Registered Society, had moved the Supreme Court under
Article 32 of the Constitution with respect to cases pending in Criminal
Courts all over the country and asked for certain directions. The Court
after considering the genuineness of circumstances relevant to the subject,
issued, detailed guidelines for the release of under-trials.9
1. (a) In case the accused is facing trial
for offences under IPC or any other law punishable with imprisonment
not exceeding three years, and if trial of such offences is pending
for more than one year and if the accused has been in jail for a period
of 6 months or more, such accused shall be released on bail or on
personal bond.
(b) In case the accused is charged with offences
under IPC or any other law punishable with imprisonment not exceeding
5 years and if the trial for such offences is pending for two years
or more and if the accused has remained in jail for more than 6 months,
such accused shall be released on bail or on personal bond.
(c) In case the offences under IPC or any other
law for which the accused have been charged are punishable with imprisonment
of seven years or less and if the trial for such offences is pending
for two years or more and if the accused has remained in jail for
a period of one year or more, such accused shall be released on bail
or personal bond.
2. (a) In traffic offences pending for more than
two years due to non-service of summons, the accused may be discharged.
(b) In any compoundable IPC offences pending
trial for more than two years, if the trial has not commenced, the
Court shall discharge or acquit the accused and close the case.
(c) In case trial is pending in a non-cognisable
and bailable offence for over two years, the Court shall discharge
or acquit the accused and close the case.
(d) If offence is punishable with fine only and
the trial has been pending over one year, the Court shall discharge
or acquit the accused.
(e) If the offence is punishable with imprisonment
of upto one year and the trial therein has been pending for more than
one year, the Court shall discharge or acquit the accused.
(f) If the offence is punishable with imprisonment
upto three years and if trial therein has been pending for over two
years without any progress, the Court shall discharge or acquit the
accused.
These directions, however, are not applicable to certain
categories of offences:
(a) corruption, misappropriation of public funds,
cheating, whether under the Indian Penal Code, Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947 or any other statute, (b) smuggling, foreign exchange violation
and offences under the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985 (c) Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Food Adulteration Act,
Acts dealing with environment or any other economic offences, (d)
offences under the Arms Act, 1959, Explosive Substances Act, 1908,
Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Act, 1987, (e) offences relating
to the Army, Navy and Air Force, (f) offences against public tranquillity,
(g) offences relating to public servants, (h) offences relating to
coins and government stamp, (i) offences relating to elections, (j)
offences relating to giving false evidence and offences against public
justice, (k) any other type of offences against the State, (l) offences
under the taxing enactments and (m) offences of defamation as defined
in Section 499 IPC.
In the second Common Cause judgement,10
the Supreme Court excluded certain additional categories of offences:
(n) matrimonial offences under Indian Penal Code
including Section 498-A or under any other law for the time being
in force (o) offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act including
offences under Section 138 thereof; (p) offences relating to criminal
misappropriation of property of the complainant as well as offences
relating to criminal breach of trust under the Indian Penal Code or
under any other law for the time being in force; (q) offences under
Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code or any offence pertaining to
law for the time being in force; (r) offences affecting the public
health, safety, convenience, decency and morals as listed in Chapter
XIV of the Indian Penal Code or such offences under any other law
for the time being in force.
The Supreme Courts liberal dispensation towards
the undertrials continued unabated and it pronounced another land mark
judgement giving relief to undertrials in Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Act (TADA) cases in Shaheen Welfare Association vs.
Union of India.11 For the purpose of
grant of bail to TADA detenues, the Court divided the under trials into
four classes:
a. hardcore undertrials whose release would prejudice
the prosecution case and whose liberty may prove to be a menace to
society in general and to the complainant and prosecution witnesses
in particular;
b. other undertrials whose overt acts or involvement
directly attract Sections 3 and/or 4 of the TADA Act;
c. undertrials who are booked in, not because
of any activity directly attracting Section 3 & 4 but by virtue
of Sections 120 - B or 147 IPC; and
d. those undertrials who were found possessing
incriminating articles in notified areas and are booked under Section
5 of TADA.
Adopting a differential approach towards these categories
of undertrials, the Court ruled:
i. undertrials falling in group (a) cannot receive
liberal treatment;
ii. undertrials falling in group (b) would be
released on bail, if they have been in jail for more than 5 years
and their trial is not likely to be completed within the next six
months, unless the Court comes to the conclusion that their release
may be harmful to the lives of the complainant and witnesses etc.
iii. undertrials falling in group (c) and (d)
can be released on bail if they have been jailed for 3 years and 2
years respectively.
In Rajdeo Sharma vs. State of Bihar,12
the Supreme Court recently supplemented the proposition laid down by
the Constitution Bench in Antulays case by prescribing specified
time limits on various processes in the prosecution of a case:
i. if an offence is punishable with imprisonment
for a period not exceeding 7 years, whether the accused is in jail
or not, the Court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion
of a period of two years from the date of recording the plea of the
accused on the charges framed, irrespective of the fact whether prosecution
has examined all the witnesses or not and the Court can proceed to
the next step provided by law in the trial of the case.
In this category of cases, if the accused has
been in jail for a period of not less than one half of the maximum
period of punishment prescribed for offence, he shall be released
on bail forthwith.
ii. if an offence is punishable with imprisonment
for a period exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail
or not, the Court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion
of a period of three years from the date of recording the plea of
the accused on the charges framed, whether the prosecution has examined
all the witnesses or not within the said period.
The Court, however, also laid down that if the delay
in trial has been caused on account of the conduct of the accused, no
Court is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the period
prescribed above. Further, if the trial has been stayed by the orders
of the Court or by operation of law, such time during which the stay
was in force shall be excluded from the aforesaid period for closing
prosecution evidence.
The Supreme Court also observed in Antulays
case that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are consistent
with the right to speedy trial and if the provisions of the Court are
followed in letter and spirit, there would be little room for any grievance
but, unfortunately, these provisions are honoured more in breach. Section
309 of the CrPC provides that the proceeding shall be held as expeditiously
as possible and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has
once begun, the same shall be continued from day-to-day until all the
witnesses in attendance have been examined.
The cumulative impact of these cases established the
following principles:
a. the accused has the right to speedy trial ;
b. the provisions of the CrPC are consistent with
the right to speedy trial ;
c. if an accused is denied right to speedy trial
for any reasons whatsoever, he will benefit in terms of :
i. grant of bail with or without sureties ; and
ii. quashing of proceedings in certain categories
of offences.
d. The prosecution evidence is mandated to be closed
within the prescribed period of two/three years, as the case may be.
Apparently, the case law referred to is considerably
loaded in favour of the accused in our jurisprudence. It is indisputable
that the trials are inordinately delayed in India and there is statistical
evidence to prove this point. But it needs to be emphasised that the
trials, generally, get delayed due to dilatory tactics adopted by the
accused who hope to benefit from the resultant non-availability of witnesses
and disappearance of prosecution evidence. Delays in trial may also
be caused due to other reasons such as an inadequate number of courts
and systemic factors over which the prosecution has no control. Regardless
of the reasons for delay, the net beneficiary is the accused, who, unmindful
of the gravity of offence, is now entitled to liberal provisions for
bail and even the quashing of criminal proceedings against him. This,
inevitably, results in palpable disadvantage to the prosecution.
Quantification of the Problem
In the beginning of 1997, 5.46 million IPC cases were
pending trial. Only 19.5% of them were disposed off during the year,
leaving a pendancy of 4.39 million cases at the end of the year.13
Similarly, 7.75 million cases under the Special and Local laws (SLL)
were pending trial in the beginning of 1997. 46.8% of them were disposed
off during the year leaving a pendancy of 3.62 million cases.14
Thus, 8.01 million criminal cases were pending trial at the end
of 1997.15
In order to better appreciate the enormity of the situation,
and its impact on law and order and public perceptions of security,
it is useful to take a closer look at the nature of crimes in these
cases pending trial. Table 1 shows that over 2,30,000 murder and attempted
murder cases were pending trial in 1997. The number of theft and burglary
cases was over 700,000. 600,000 cases of hurt and 78,200 cases of molestation
cases were also pending trial. These major crimes affect public peace
and tranquillity and contribute to the widespread and increasing sense
of insecurity among the people, highlighting the need for expeditious
disposal by Courts.
TABLE 116
IPC CASES PENDING TRIAL IN 1997
S.NO. CRIME HEAD PENDING TRIAL
1. Murder 1,30,731
2. Attempt to commit murder 1,05,437
3. Culpable homicide not amounting to murder
13,857
4. Rape 45,955
5. Kidnapping & abduction 51,252
6. Dacoity 30,857
7. Preparation and assembly for dacoity 4,123
8. Robbery 67,323
9. Burglary 2,02,375
10. Theft 5,14,117
11. Hurt 6,13,770
12. Riots 3,55,743
13. Criminal Breach of Trust 63,457
14. Cheating 91,181
15. Counterfeiting 2,079
16. Arson 25,824
17. Hurt 6,13,770
18. Dowry deaths 16,455
19. Molestation 78,200
20. Other IPC offences
19,82,908
TOTAL: 43,95,644
Similarly, as regards pendancies in cases under the
various Special Laws and Legislations, Table 2 shows that over 2,00,000
cases under Arms Act alone and another 18,904 cases under the Explosives
and Explosives Substances Act were pending trial. In the context of
the problem of escalating terrorism in certain parts of the country,
this pendancy assumes serious dimensions. Interestingly, the largest
pendancy is under minor crime heads euphemistically called other
SLL Crimes.
TABLE 217
SLL CASES PENDING TRIAL IN 1997
S.NO. CRIME HEAD PENDING TRIAL
1. Arms Act 2,22,187
2. NDPS Act 81,462
3. Gambling Act 1,95,252
4. Excise Act 2,94,946
5. Prohibition Act 14,32,447
- Explosives & Explosives
Substances Act 18,904
7. Protection of Civil Rights Act 7,369
8. TADA 2,500
9. Essential Commodities Act 24,834
10. Dowry Prohibition Act 6,186
11. SC&ST(Prevention) of Attrocities Act 37,299
12. Forest Act 11,556
13. Other SLL offences 12,80,130
TOTAL 36,25,072
Pendancies are disturbingly high in the High Courts
as well (Table 3). According to the Annual Report of the Ministry of
Law, Justice and Company Affairs (1997-98), 1.13 million cases were
instituted in the High Courts during 1996 and 1.02 million cases were
disposed of. The pendancy of cases as on 31.12.1996 stood at an alarming
3.11 million.18
As regards individual High Courts, the highest pendancy
was in Allahabad High Court (860,000) followed by Chennai (310,000);
Mumbai (234,000); Punjab and Haryana (161,000); Karnataka (150,000).
The lowest pendancy of just 88 cases was in the Sikkim High Court.
TABLE-319
PENDENCY OF CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT
Year No. of Cases Year No. of
Cases
1950 690
1955 1,338
1960 2,656
1965 2,622
1970 8,663
1975 15,147
1980 37,851
1985 88,718
1990 1,06,027
1991 1,06,397
1992 97,276
1993 58,794
1994 52,950
1995 36,056
1996 23,246
1997 19,032
1998 20,358
The situation in the Supreme Court also worsened steadily
right up to the early 1990s, but appears to have turned the corner over
the last few years (Table 3). Starting from a situation where pendancies
were negligible in the 1950s, a steady deterioration continued right
up to the 1980s, when there was a drastic worsening. The highest point
was reached in 1990 when pendancies stood at 1,09,237. Since then, there
has been a systematic decline: 40% in 1993 over 1992; 32% in 1995 over
1994. Pendancies in 1998 stood at what must appear in comparison to
the situation in 1990 as a manageable 20,358. It is understood that
the improvements over the past few years have been the result of the
application of modern management techniques, computerisation of case
records, and the bunching of criminal cases involving common legal points.
Greater stringency in the admission of Special Leave Petitions (SLPs)
has also helped.
Unfortunately, the methods adopted by the Supreme Court
have not been emulated or adopted by the High Courts and the trial courts,
where the situation continues to worsen steadily.
The impact is disastrous. Increasing delays in trial
have resulted in poorer conviction rates (Table 4). As the percentage
of trials completed in IPC cases has declined over last three and a
half decades, so has the conviction rate. The disposal of cases fell
from 30.3% in 1961 to 16.1% in 1997, and the conviction rate followed
suit, crashing from 64.8% in 1961 to 38.2% in 1997. There is thus a
clear and direct co-relation between the percentage of trials concluded
and the conviction rate, and the impact of delays on law enforcement
and internal security can well be imagined.
We have looked at the problem from the point of view
of crime cases instituted. Now, let us also look at the problem from
the angle of persons involved. While it is pertinent to point out that
2.57 million persons were arrested under various IPC crimes during 1997,
what is most disturbing is that 11.65 million persons (constituting
1.2% of the countrys total population) were awaiting trials for
various IPC offences in Criminal Courts during that year.21
Cases in respect of just 18.8% of accused persons were disposed
off, leaving 9.46 million trapped in the uncertainty of a protracted
trial process. The overall conviction percentage
in IPC cases stood at 32.4%, virtually corresponding to the conviction
rate obtained in the criminal cases.
TABLE-422
DISPOSAL OF IPC CRIME CASES BY COURT. (PERCENTAGE)
S.No. Year Trial Completed Conviction
1. 1961 30.3 64.8
2. 1971 32.0 62.0
3. 1981 23.9 52.5
4. 1991 16.8 47.8
5. 1994 15.5 42.9
6. 1995 15.1 42.1
7. 1996 15.9 37.8
8. 1997 16.1 38.2
In addition, 8.70 million persons were facing trial
under SLL cases in various Courts in 1977.23
Cases of 3.82 million persons were tried during the year and, of these,
3.31 million persons were convicted for the offences. Thus, the conviction
percentage in SLL cases was 86.7 % while the disposal was 46.6 %. SLL
crimes are, of course, not as grave as IPC offences, and a number of
factors will have contributed to the higher conviction rate. However,
the expeditious disposal of these cases will certainly have contributed
to the much higher conviction rate, which is almost two and a half times
the conviction rate in IPC cases.
Time Taken For Trial
Section 167 CrPC prescribes a statutory time frame
for conclusion of investigation and filing of charge-sheet, failing
which the accused in custody is liable to be released on bail. Certain
State Governments, particularly the Government of West Bengal, have
amended Section 167 CrPC. to the effect that if investigation is not
completed within the prescribed time frame, the Magistrate will not
take cognisance of such offences. In other words, it is now a statutory
requirement for the Investigating Officer to conclude the investigation
within the prescribed time frame failing which the case is virtually
lost. The Common Cause and the Raj Deo Sharma ruling have
further aggravated the problem. On the other hand, however, no such
time frame has been prescribed for conclusion of trials in the statutes.
The Supreme Court of India, alarmed at the ever increasing number of
cases pending trial, and the incarceration of the accused for years
on end, pronounced rulings mandating quashing of criminal proceedings
in certain circumstances, and the release of accused persons in custody
on bail/bond on liberal terms and conditions. Unfortunately, there are
still no firm statutory prescriptions for a time frame for the conclusion
of trials.
This clearly loads the situation against the prosecution,
who is only one party in the trial. But the co-operation of the Defence
Counsel is necessary for a speedy trial, and the docket of the Presiding
Officer is also an important consideration. Further, the time taken
in a trial depends on the nature and complexity of the case. The Supreme
Court rightly observed in Rajdeo Sharma that while determining
whether undue delay has occurred it is necessary to have due regard
for all the attendant circumstances, including the nature of offence,
the number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the Court concerned,
prevailing local conditions and other factors that contribute to what
are called systemic delays. The Supreme Court has recommended a realistic
and practical approach in the matter instead of a pedantic one. Such
pragmatism is also embraced in other nations, as expressed by Justice
White in US Vs Ewell:
"The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial
is necessarily relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly
expedition, rather than mere speed, as its essential ingredient; and
whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to unconstitutional
deprivation of rights depends upon all the circumstances."
Cases that are prosecuted by the Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) present special problems, in that they are often
extraordinarily complex, involve large numbers of witnesses, and often
take an inordinately long time to try. As on 1.5.99, 4354 cases prosecuted
by the CBI were pending trial. Among these, pendancies ranged from 1
year to as much as 30 years and more. Of these 4354 cases, Table 5 shows
that 2612 had been pending trial for less than 5 years; 1041 for 5 to
8 years and the remaining 711 for over 15 years. Some of the most sensational
cases investigated by CBI remained under trial for more than a decade:
the case relating to the assassination of Sant Harcharan Singh Longowal
was charge-sheeted in 1985 but the trial was concluded in 1998 i.e.
after 13 years. The Chandigarh Hijacking case was instituted in 1984
but the trial was concluded in 1996 i.e. after 12 years, despite the
fact that the case was being tried by a Special Court that had no other
work. Dr. M.S. Dahiya, who was charge-sheeted for killing his wife in
Belgium on 31.7.1985, was ultimately convicted in 1999, after 15 years.
The case relating to the murder of Nirankari Baba case was charge-sheeted
on 20.2.1984 but the trial was concluded only on 27.3.1993, i.e. after
9 years. Syed Modi, an international badminton player was murdered in
1988 at Lucknow, but the trial remains inconclusive till date. The catalogue
of such cases is unending. I am personally aware of certain cases relating
to violation of fiscal laws that have been pending trial for over three
decades. Here, one may reiterate the fact that inordinate delay in trial
prejudices the prosecution case.
TABLE 524
TIME TAKEN FOR TRIAL IN CBI CASES
Years Cases Years Cases
Under 1 506
1 to 2 528
2 to 3 477
3 to 4 597
4 to 5 494
5 to 6 465
6 to 7 335
7 to 8 241
8 to 15 88
15 to 20 415
Over 20 208
Total 4,345
Now let us look at average time taken in a trial in
USA (Table 6), which works to an average time taken in all offences
of 9.6 months. Property offences, it may be noted, take relatively longer
to dispose off, at an average of 12.8 months. Crucially, one may note
here as well that cases resulting in conviction take a much shorter
time on the average than cases that result in acquittal. This is, perhaps,
due to the high incidence of guilty plea by the accused in USA.
TABLE 625
MEAN PROCESSING TIMES FROM RECEIPT TO FILING OR DECLINATION,
BY OFFENCE 1993 (IN MONTHS): UNITED STATES
Crime
Head
|
Total
|
Disposed by Magistrate
|
Disposed by US District Courts
|
|
|
Total
|
C
|
N.C
|
Total
|
Pros.
|
Dec.
|
All
Offences
|
9.6
|
6.2
|
1.8
|
10.7
|
9.9
|
7
|
15.4
|
Violent Offences
|
6.2
|
5
|
3
|
5.6
|
6.3
|
4.1
|
11.5
|
Property Offences
|
12.8
|
7.7
|
3.1
|
12.7
|
13.1
|
9.4
|
17.6
|
Drug Offences
|
7.8
|
8.5
|
1.9
|
13.6
|
7.7
|
6
|
14.4
|
Public Order Offences
|
8.7
|
5.1
|
1.3
|
9.3
|
9.6
|
6.8
|
13.9
|
C: Convicted N.C: Not Convicted Pros:
Prosecuted
Dec: Declined
The judicial system in Japan by far is the most efficient
and average time taken in the conclusion of a trial is just about three
months. One of the basic reasons for this is that over 80% criminals
in Japan plead guilty even in cases involving grave offences, and this
naturally expedites trials. Table 8 shows that, in Japan, over 70% cases
were disposed of by the District Courts in less than 3 months. Summary
Courts disposed of about 90% cases within 3 months. In the District
Courts, only 5.3% of cases remained pending over one year and just 0.3%
over 3 years. In the Summary Courts, these percentages were still lower
at 1.8% and 0.1% respectively.
TABLE 726
AVERAGE TIME TAKEN IN TRIAL OF CASES JAPAN
|
1mth.
|
2 mths
|
3mths
|
6mths
|
1 year
|
More than 3 years
|
District Court
|
2.8
|
38.7
|
30.1
|
21.2
|
5.3
|
0.3
|
Summary Court
|
9.1
|
54.9
|
22.9
|
10.4
|
1.8
|
0.1
|
This is a far cry from the position obtaining in India.
There are, of course, many reasons for prolonged pendancies in this
country, and it is not within the ambit of this paper to explore these.
It is important, however, to notice one striking difference between
USA and Japan, on the one hand, and India on the other: the percentage
of total cases which are formally tried for delivery of judgement in
Japan is as low as 7.8% (in 1994) and between 5% and 8% in USA; whereas
almost all cases are formally tried in India. In other words, Japan
and USA have been able to keep the arteries of their criminal justice
system unclogged, making speedy trials possible. This, unfortunately,
is not the case in India.
Is the situation in our country really beyond redemption?
It is important to reiterate that speedy trial is beneficial both to
the accused (and specially the innocent) and to the State. Our legal
instrumentalities and administrative processes, consequently, need to
be geared to achieve this objective.
As stated above, 8.01 million criminal cases were pending
in trial courts at the end of 1997. An additional 3.11 million cases
were pending before the High Courts, of which, assuming the proportion
of criminal cases at half the total number, it may be assumed that some
1.55 million were criminal cases. Needless to say, we need an adequate
number of Judicial Officers to handle these cases. Justice A.S. Anand,
the Chief Justice of India, has acknowledged and emphasised the need
for increasing the number of Judges and improving infrastructure in
the High Court and the subordinate courts. He cited the examples of
several European countries such as Britain where the number of Judges
per million of population ranges between 90 and 100. In India, however,
this number is only 11, which was "rather disappointing".27
To my knowledge, no in-depth study has been carried
out by any authority to determine norms for final disposal of cases
by the Judicial officers on a monthly or annual basis. Notwithstanding
the fact that disposal of a case, inter alia, depends on several
factors, including the nature of the case and the complexity of the
issues involved, it is still possible to evolve some, albeit crude,
norms that could help fix accountability on Judicial Officers. It is
now imperative for the superior judiciary to initiate an in-depth study
of the problem and to evolve definitive norms. This would also create
necessary pressure on the Government to provide for an adequate number
of judicial officers.
The Delhi High Court is understood to have prescribed
some norms to determine the number of courts required in a given jurisdiction.
The formula defined to calculate the number of courts required is:
No. of cases x 8 = No. of courts
900
To illustrate, if, say, 1000 murder cases are pending
in Delhi, the number of courts required would be
1000 X 8 = 8.8 or, say 9 courts.28
900
According to this norm, each court would handle about
111 cases at a given point of time. I am not in a position to comment
on the validity of this proposition. It is, however, equally important
to determine how many cases a court can finally dispose off in an year
and, based on the normative assumption that a case should be concluded
in say 2,3 or 4 years, the number of courts could then be correctly
determined.
In the absence of firm norms, it is not possible to
accurately define the number of courts required to liquidate existing
pendancies. There are presently some 11,000 subordinate courts in the
country, and this number is evidently inadequate. It would, in the absence
of any objective criteria, be advisable at least to double this number
in a phased manner over next 5 years.
It is equally important, moreover, to explore alternative
fora of adjudication. With the regular courts over-burdened, Lok Adalats
can provide an alternative that can help manage this load. 22,452 Lok
Adalats are reported to have already been organised all over the country
till March 1998,29 and had disposed off
6.62 million cases. These cases were not criminal in nature in the true
sense of the term, largely being related to day to day difficulties
that citizens had with various Public Utility Departments. Without going
into the authenrticity of the statistics quoted above, it is undeniable
that Lok Adalats have tremendous potential in finding solutions by settlements.
It is heartening that the Parliament, by enacting the Legal Services
Authority Act, 1987, has conferred legitimacy and recognition on the
Lok Adalat system. It is now time to seriously examine the viability
of handing over to the Lok Adalats all criminal cases punishable with
imprisonment of 3 years or less. Under existing law, the award of the
Lok Adalat is deemed to be a decree of the civil court, and every such
award is final and binding on the parties to the dispute. No appeal
is provided to any court against the award. The Legal Services Authority
Act, 1987, would require suitable amendment to bring criminal cases
into the ambit of Lok Adalats.
Another method of taking off the burden of regular
courts may be the appointment of Advocates with requisite experience
and reputation as Temporary Magistrates with the authority to dispose
of cases that may be tried by a Magistrate. India has a large legal
community of over 600,000 qualified professionals. Not all of these
have flourishing practices, and at least some of them are imbued with
a sense of public service. Panels consisting of a sitting High Court
Judges as Chairman with District Judges and the Chairmen of the Bar
Councils as members, could be authorised to prepare panels for each
District drawing on Advocates who were willing to be appointed as Temporary
Magistrates for fixed tenures of 2 to 3 years. Their number would naturally
vary from district to district, depending on the work load. While functioning
as Magistrates, they would be deemed to be public servants and would
not be allowed to practice privately, and would revert to legal practice
after the expiry of their tenure. With 5000 such Temporary Magistrates,
assuming that each one of them disposes off 40 cases in a year, 200,000
cases could be cleared annually, with as many as 2 million cases removed
from the docket of regular courts over a 10 year period.
Plea bargaining also offers an important option of
reducing the number of pending criminal cases. This system was practised
in USA for about a century without any legal sanction and with commendable
results. Eventually the US Supreme Court, in Brady Vs United States
and Santo Bello Vs New York, upheld the constitutional validity
of plea bargaining and it has been continued to play a significant role
in the disposal of criminal cases in that country. The concept of plea
bargaining is, however, alien to Indian criminal jurisprudence. It incorporates
two essential components: charge bargaining which refers
to a promise by the prosecutor to reduce or dismiss some of the charges
brought against the accused in exchange for guilty plea; and sentence
bargaining which refers to a promise by the prosecutor to recommend
a specific sentence or to refrain from making any sentence recommendation
in exchange for a guilty plea. In practical terms, it is a mix of the
two that works on the mind of the accused to plead guilty and avoid
a cumbersome trial.
The 142nd Report of the Law Commission of
India has given ample justification for the introduction of plea bargaining
into Indian jurisprudence. It argued that:30
i. It is not just and fair to treat the accused
who wants to plead guilty at par with the one who claims to be tried
at considerable time cost and money cost to the community.
ii. It is desirable to infuse life in the reformatory
provisions embodied in section 360 of the Code and in the Probation
of Offenders Act which remain practically unutilised at present.
iii. Plea bargaining would be preferred by the
accused rather than the prospect of remaining an undertrial prisoner
for the following reasons:
a. End of uncertainty;
b. Saving in litigation cost;
c. Saving in anxiety cost;
d. Being able to know his fate and to start life
afresh;
e. Saving avoiding visits to lawyers office
and to court on appointed dates.
iv. It will reduce the backbreaking burden of
the court without detriment to the public interest;
v. It will reduce congestion in jails;31
vi. In the USA nearly 75% of the total convictions
are secured as a result of plea bargaining.
vii. Under the present system 75% to 90% of the
criminal cases, if not more result in acquittals.
In its 154th Report, the Law Commission
strongly recommended that the plea bargaining concept be introduced,
at least as an experimental measure, for offences which are liable for
punishment with imprisonment of less than 7 years, including the offences
covered by section 320 of the Code.32
Underlying all other reforms, however, is the need
to improve the quality of legal professionals in the country. Legal
practitioners in India are, of course, legion, but is this great number
necessary? The answer, obviously, would be in the negative. India has
followed the British/American system of legal education that is entirely
dependent on market forces. The result is that out of hundreds of thousands,
a few prosper and the rest are marginalised. On the other hand, in the
Japanese system, entry into the National Law Institute is based on a
stiff national competitive examination, and training is supervised by
the Supreme Court. After training, a law graduate has the option either
to become a Judge, or a Public Prosecutor or to practice at the bar,
and Law is a highly esteemed profession in that country. We cannot,
of course, entirely dismantle the present system, but it can be improved
by imposing more stringent standards for entry into Law Colleges. The
overall induction into Law Colleges in a given year, moreover, needs
to be consistent with macro-requirements of the country. The progressive
induction of a higher calibre of entrants would bring about qualitative
improvements in the profession.
A related aspect is the imposition of certain ethical
norms on legal practitioners. Malpractice, such as the exploitation
of clients, non-appearance in courts on appointed dates, misbehaviour
with Judges and involvement in questionable and unethical practices,
need to be rooted out. The Bar Councils must play a more active role
in enforcing good conduct amongst their members. A qualitative improvement
in the legal profession is the surest way of reducing delays in the
administration of justice.
Innumerable undertrials charged for petty offences
often spend years in prison as a result of their inability to engage
competent defence counsel. Indigent litigants suffer enormously, despite
the power of the court to appoint an amicus curaie. Cases are
often delayed when the accused insist on the appointment of a leading
lawyer as the amicus curaie, since the fees demanded by such
lawyer exceed the amounts sanctioned by the Government. Clearly, the
Free Legal Aid system needs enormous reform and expansion to tackle
the challenge of mounting arrears in our justice system.
The option of summary trials has also not been adequately
exploited in India. Chapter XXI of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals
with summary trials. With Sections 260 to 265 detailing the procedure.
According to 260 CrPC, a CJM or a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate
of the First class specially empowered by the High Court may try the
case under summary processes. This section also specifies the offences
which can be summarily tried as including offences not punishable with
imprisonment for a term exceeding two years; offences relating to minor
thefts; offences relating to receiving of stolen property of small value;
and offences relating to insult with intent to provoke a breach of peace.
It may be noted that as many as 1.982 million cases under the head Other
IPC Offences were pending trial in 1997 (Table 1). Most of these
offences would generally be punishable with imprisonment of less than
two years and are, therefore, fit for summary trial. Nevertheless, despite
the manifest provisions of law, Magistrates appear reluctant to adopt
this procedure as it is not legally mandatory for them to try the offences
summarily. The attitude of defence counsels is also generally negative,
as a quicker trial would mean less money for them. Furthermore, muffusil
Magistrates need special authorisation from the High Court for adopting
this procedure, and the Chief Judicial Magistrates are saddled with
graver offences not falling within the ambit of chapter XXI of the CrPC.
As summary trial is a very effective method of disposing of pending
cases, it would be expedient to draw a comprehensive list of cases that
may be tried under this procedure, and summary trials thereof should
be made mandatory rather than discretionary as they presently are. Necessary
amendments in law need to be made in this regard.
A comprehensive strengthening of the prosecution mechanism
is also an urgent necessity. While it is generally true that the accused
is largely responsible for delay in trials in the Indian context, the
prosecution mechanism is often also a contributory factor. Before the
enactment of the new Code of Criminal Procedure in 1973, the prosecuting
agency was under the control of the District Superintendent of Police
(SP), who was naturally interested in the successful and early conclusion
of cases in the courts. As a result, there was a greater co-ordination
between the investigating and prosecution wings to this end. Under the
new Code, however, the prosecuting wing has been placed under the District
Magistrate at the District level and the Home Secretary at the State
level. This has resulted in a lack of co-ordination between the prosecution
agency and the police. The prosecution mechanism has, consequently,
become somewhat disjointed and tardy. From time to time, and with increasing
frequency, summons issued by courts are not served by the police; witnesses
appearing before the courts are not examined due to the absence of Public
Prosecutors; Public Prosecutors do not adequately brief witnesses, undermining
the strength of evidence; adequate security personnel are not provided
to the jail authorities to escort prisoners to the courts. All these
contribute to cumulative delays in the trial process. Even though it
may be against the trend of times, it would be expedient to revert to
the old system and place the prosecution agency under the control of
the District SP. This would improve co-ordination between the prosecution
agency and the police and, consequently, the pace and quality of trials.
The career prospects of the Public Prosecutors also need to be improved
in order to attract better talent.
The 154th Report of the Law Commission of
India (1973) focused on the CrPC, and devoted a separate chapter (XXI)
to Speedy Justice. Elaborate recommendations were made in
this chapter to secure a more efficient management of existing dockets
and pendancies. They included the following:
1. There should be a separate cadre for the Investigating
Agencies in every District and an officer of such Agency should be
in charge of the case throughout, till the conclusion of the trial.
He should be enjoined the responsibility of production of witnesses,
production of accused and for assisting the prosecuting agency.
2. There should be a proper co-ordination between
the Investigating Agency and Prosecuting Agency.
3. A Directorate of Prosecution may be established
in each State for co-ordinating the prosecution work.
4. Adequate number of Public Prosecutors/Assistant
Public Prosecutors should be appointed by the Government u/s 24 and
25 of the CrPC.
5. Sections 377 and 378 of CrPC should be amended
to provide for filing of appeals in the Sessions Court against the
judgement of the Magistrate in respect of enhancement of punishment
or against the order of acquittal.
6. The Summons procedure may be dispensed with
and all Summons cases should be tried summarily except those which,
by virtue of their nature or circumstances of the offences or the
case, warrant a regular full trial when the court finds that the summary
procedure is not salutary. Suitable amendment may be made in section
260 of the Code.
7. The statements/documents relied upon by the
prosecution in a police case should be supplied to the accused at
the time of the filing of the charge sheet.
8. The listing of cases should be done in such
a manner that the witnesses who are summoned are examined on the day
they are summoned and adjournments should be avoided meticulously.
9. Adequate allowances should be paid by the State
to the prosecution witnesses.
10. In order to reduce the docket explosion
in the courts, State should enact legislation on Nyaya Panchayats
to suit the local needs and conditions. The Andhra Pradesh Nyaya Panchayat
Bill, 1995, may be adopted as a model on the composition, powers and
jurisdiction of the Nyaya Panchayats.
11. The court should frame the charge against
the accused after deep deliberation. Accused should be given an opportunity
to produce any materials even at charge stage which could clinch the
issue and the court should take into consideration such matter at
this stage itself.
12. The IO should be vested with the authority
to compound offences that are punishable under law at the investigation
stage itself.
13. The concept of plea bargaining should be introduced
as an experimental measure for offences which are liable for punishment
with imprisonment of less than 7 years and/or fine. However, plea
bargaining should not be available to the accused involved in social/economic
offences of a grave nature and offences against women and children.
14. Accused are often responsible for delaying
trials so that prosecution witnesses are not examined. Hence, the
suggestions made by the Law Commission in its 77th report regarding
delay in respect of civil cases may be made applicable to criminal
cases also.
15. Priority should be given to the trial of old
cases.
16. Effective steps should be taken to ensure
prompt service of summons or execution of warrants issued by the court.
17. Lack of police personnel to escort the accused
to the court is yet another cause for the delay. Therefore, a special
machinery has to be provided with proper vehicles for producing the
accused in the courts on the appointed dates.
A question is often asked whether the Indian judicial
system is inherently defective or whether the problem lies with the
practitioners of the system. We have adopted the common law system which,
inter alia, is characterised by the assumption of innocence of
the accused; right of the accused to remain silent and his right to
cross-examine prosecution witnesses. This system is being followed in
a large number of countries across the world, and was introduced in
India some 150 years ago by the British. A similar system was introduced
by the British in several other erstwhile colonies, including Malaysia
and Singapore. Singapore is a shining example of the success of the
system inasmuch as the average time of trial is very short. What then
causes the virtual breakdown of the same system in India? The answer
lies in our practice, our slovenliness and moral degradation, and in
the unethical patterns of behaviour that afflict the system in India.
A system is good or bad by comparison. The alternative
systems of jurisprudence prevailing in the world are the Continental
System and the Islamic (Shariat) System. The strengths and weaknesses
of both these are too well known to be recounted. In any event, it is
easier to reform and improve the existing system than it would be to
supplant it with another. We have been practising the common law system
for over a century and it would be expedient and practical to reinvigorate
it rather than to look for a new one. This, however, would not be possible
without the radical reforms, some of which have been outlined in this
paper, that can ensure the efficient administration of justice and the
conclusion of the trial process within a reasonable span of time.
APPENDIX I
Number of Cases Instituted, Disposed of, & Pending
During 1996 in the High Courts
Name of High Court
|
No. of cases instituted
|
No of cases disposed
|
No. of cases pending
(on 31.12.96)
|
Allahabad
|
163920
|
116977
|
865455
|
Andhra Prd.
|
120997
|
134024
|
135621
|
Mumbai
|
91621
|
74674
|
234058
|
Calcutta
|
68424
|
58481
|
264312
|
Delhi
|
57812
|
52487
|
153537
|
Guwahati
|
20958
|
19311
|
33018
|
Gujarat
|
NA
|
NA
|
139821
|
Himachal Prd.
|
14599
|
16505
|
17166
|
J&K
|
21567
|
18853
|
96414
|
Karnataka
|
70739
|
81267
|
150965
|
Kerala
|
101492
|
80692
|
217823
|
Madhya Prd.
|
NA
|
NA
|
75616
|
Chennai
|
105442
|
97163
|
310640
|
Orissa
|
47666
|
32788
|
66820
|
Patna
|
76743
|
78878
|
93310
|
Punjab &
Harayana
|
117304
|
105807
|
161562
|
Rajasthan
|
55028
|
52628
|
97768
|
Sikkim
|
216
|
209
|
88
|
Source: Annual Report of the Ministry of Law, Justice
& Company Affairs, 1997-98, Government of India.
*
|
Mr. M.L. Sharma is an officer of the Indian Police
Service, and currently Joint Director, Central Bureau of Investigation.
|
-
KAUTILYA, Arthashashtra,
Trans: K. N. Rangarajan, p. 108.
-
AGGARWAL, K.M., Kautilya
on Crime and Punishment, pp. 16-18.
-
154th Report of the
Law Commission of India.
-
(AIR 1979 SC 1360)
3
-
length of his residence in the community
;
-
his employment status, history and
his financial condition ;
-
his family ties and relationships ;
-
his reputation, character and monetary
condition ;
-
his prior criminal record including
any record or prior release on recognizance or on bail;
-
the identity of responsible members
of the community who would vouch for his reliability;
-
the nature of the offence charged and
the apparent probability of conviction and the likely sentence in
so far as these factors are relevant to the risk of non appearance
;
-
any other factors indicating the ties
of the accused to the community or bearing on the risk of willful
failure to appear.
-
AIR 1982 SC 1701
-
State of Bihar v. Uma
Shankar Ketriwal(1982) 1 SCC 75; Kadar Pahadiya v State of Bihar,
(1983) 2SCC 104: 1983 SCC (Cri) 361: State of Maharashtra v Shampalal
Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610: 1981 SCC (Cri) 762: (1982) 1 SCR
298: T.V Vatheeswaran v. State of T.N. (1983) 2 SCC 68: 1983 SCC
(Cri) 342: (1983) 2 SCR 348: Sheela Barse v. Union of India (1986)
3 SCC 632: S. Guin v Grindlays Bank Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 654: Raghubir
Singh v. State of Bihar (1986) 4 SCC 481: 1986 Sppl. SCC 505: Srinivas
Gopal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (1988) 4 SCC 36: T.J.
Stephen v Parle Bottling Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1988 Svppl. SCC 458.
-
AIR 1986 SC 1773.
-
Common Cause Vs Union
of India (1996) 4 Supreme Court Cases 33.
-
(1996) Supreme Court
Cases 775.
-
(1996) (2 ) Scale.
-
(1998 (S) Scale).
-
Crime in India, 1997,
A Govt. of India Publication.
-
Ibid.
-
Ibid.
-
Ibid.
-
Ibid.
-
As the Annual Report
does not give separate numbers of criminal and civil cases, it is
presumed that the figures mentioned above include civil cases also.
-
Source: Registry of
the Supreme Court of India.
-
Crime in India, op.
cit.
-
Ibid.
-
Ibid. .
-
Ibid.
-
Source: Policy Division,
CBI.
-
The Compendium of
Federal Justice Statistics, 1993, Bureau of Justice Statistics(USA).
-
Outline of Criminal
Justice in Japan, Supreme Court of Japan, 1995.
-
"CJI for revamp
of High Courts", The Pioneer, 18.10.98; "CJI: Need to
increase number of judges", The Hindustan Times, 18.10.98.
-
This information was
given to me by Shri MS Bali, Joint Director, CBI.
-
Nyayadeep, July, 1998.
-
Law Commission of
India 142nd Report, Chapter IX. Paras 9.1-9.40 pp 24-34.
-
As per statistics
collected by the National Crime Record Bureau, Govt. of India, the
total prison population in the country in 1996 was 2,57,235. Convicted
felons constituted only 27% of the total prison population. The
percentage of convicts was one of the lowest in Delhi (12.3%), Chandigarh(10.93%),
Uttar Pradesh(13.3%), Karnataka(14.5%), J&K (9.8%) and Haryana(17.7%).
Relatively higher percentages obtained in Kerala(54.4%), Gujarat(37.7%),
Madhya Pradesh(35.5%), Tamil Nadu(36.9%), A&N Islands (63.7%)
and Pondicherry(40.8%).
-
Law Commission of
India, 154th Report. Chapter XIII paras 8&9 pp: 161-66.
|