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Early Warning & Light Weapons
Tara Kartha*
The past decade has witnessed a rapid escalation in
the intensity and number of conflicts and incidents of weapons-related
violence in South Asia. In the early 1980s, conflict was limited to
small militant movements in Kashmir and Indias Northeast, while
Pakistan was only beginning to cope with the incidence of ethnic violence.
Discontented elements relied largely on the .303 or a few pistols, and
with these they had to be content. Today, militant groups have been
able to access weapons of a higher technology and lethality than available
with the police or even the armed forces of a country. At a secondary
level, weapons have begun to diffuse outwards into society itself, fuelling
ethnic, religious and sectarian conflict. Pakistan is reeling under
a huge spread of more than five million guns of all kinds, while Bangladesh,
Bhutan and Nepal are seeing a rising incidence of weapons-related violence.
Various militant groups in India have, similarly, been able to inflict
higher levels of casualties primarily due to access to rapid-fire weapons,
explosives and rockets. In Sri Lanka, the war drags on with no end in
sight, as the Tamil Tigers spring back to action, armed with newer and
better weapons.
As the bureaucracy and political leaders react strongly
to the rise of terrorism and sponsored violence, the average observer
usually wants an answer to the one question that is absurdly simple
at one level, and extremely complex in its answers at another
did the authorities not learn early enough about the incoming
weapons? If they did, why did they not react in time? The question is
a logical one, and requires to be examined in detail. This paper tries
to answer these and other questions, with the aim of providing a possible
framework of analysis that would provide policy makers with a set of
tools for early warning of impending violence. It takes the stand that,
while even an unarmed mob can cause a certain degree of damage, violence
escalates to the level of a national security issue when weapons are
brought into a conflict situation. The police retreats in the face of
such weaponry, which they are ill-prepared to counter, and the army
is brought in. A conflict is born, that no one then really knows how
to end. The paper has a narrow focus, and concentrates on the weapons
aspect rather than the societal, political, or other factors that push
a disagreement into a full-fledged conflict.
Light weapons and Conflict in South Asia
South Asian conflicts, have in the past, suffered from
an excess of early warnings of impending friction, rather than any lack
of these. This is especially apparent in the area of weapons build up,
proliferation and diffusion. However, since little was done to avert
the slide down the slippery slope of conflict, it is as near a perfect
case as possible to study why the various actors who were monitoring
the conflict the journalists, bureaucrats, police forces and
others were unable to stop the slide. Yet, had these inputs been
disseminated, assessed and acted upon promptly, thousands of lives would
have been saved, and the present diffusion of weapons into society avoided.
Different academic and multilateral organisations are
now working towards a solution be it control of further
proliferation, retrieval of the existing excess, or confronting the
problem from the point of view of conflict itself. Whatever be the persuasion
of different analysts, the first lesson that is abundantly clear from
ongoing efforts is that weaponisation of any internal disagreement,
be it ethnic, religious or political, leads inevitably to a cycle of
events that creates tremendous regional instability and adds to the
further diffusion of global violence. Huge flows of refugees, trans-national
crime, narcotics and weapons trafficking, and human rights violations
are now typical of conflict areas. Ultimately, it is the state itself
that is the prime victim, and when it fails, there is clearly no one
involved who can claim advantage. The tragedy of states like Afghanistan,
Kosovo, Angola or the Republic of Congo is testimony to the kind of
havoc that a proliferation of light weapons can lead to. It has often
been argued that large democracies like India can weather such a diffusion
of weapons without it becoming a major security issue. This mindset
has led to the relegation of the twin issues of militancy and weapons
proliferation into the background. This argument fails completely on
closer examination.
The light weapons argument
The proliferation of light weapons has led not only
to human tragedy in terms of more than 30,000 lives lost, but has also
had its impact on Indias defence and foreign policy. The armed
forces have had to bear the brunt of militancy for more than a decade
leading to troop demoralisation and exhaustion. This is true of any
country that has had to go through sustained anti-militancy operations.
Though it may wish to reduce troop strength, the army cannot consider
such a move unless manpower-intensive anti-militancy operations are
at least substantially reduced. This inevitably affects not only overall
defence expenditure, but also how the monies allotted are spent
in short, less and less of the cake is available for redressing the
crying need for new equipment, as the pay and pension bill expands.
Foreign policy is affected as the government is invariably forced into
a defensive posture on anti-militancy operations, while efforts at regional
co-operation are often politically difficult to push through, as enemy
images are built up, even with regard to small states like Bangladesh.
Constant accusations of cross-border assistance to militant groups and
threats of hot pursuit do little to promote regional good will, which
is undoubtedly the most desirable climate for a country that seeks to
achieve developmental goals.
At another level, it must be realised that a large
democracy espousing secular values is immensely vulnerable to sponsored
militancy and terrorism.
Firstly, Indias very size makes border management
an immensely challenging task. The borders cannot be sealed,
regardless of what the media regularly reports. Arising from this, it
follows that a weaponised neighbourhood is an immediate threat to the
nations security.
Secondly, while espousing the values of secularism,
these secular values are constantly put under test by the threat of
religious and ethnic groups demanding more representation or autonomy.
Weapons infusion into hundreds of pockets of dissension imposes an unbearable
strain on national resources.
Thirdly, and again arising from this, such proliferation
of weapons inevitably leads to a curtailment of democratic rights in
affected areas (the imposition of the Armed Forces Special Power Act
and the Disturbed Areas Act are just two instances of such constraints).
The basic value systems of a democratic polity are consequently put
under strain, even as policy at vital levels is adversely affected.
Why early warning?
Light weapons obviously affect security in multifarious
ways. It is, consequently, logical to seek to limit their spread as
quickly and efficiently as possible.
This, however, is easier said than done. The first
lesson that control analysts working on these issues have learnt is
that once weapons are out of state hands, the difficulties of getting
them back are simply enormous. While there has been some limited success
in gun buy-backs in the US and Australia, the fact remains
that the weapon will not be exchanged for money or land, nor be given
up as long as the owner sees a higher profit in continued ownership,
or sees it as necessary for his continued existence. Where security
is non-existent or is at risk, as is the case in most conflict areas,
any moves at retrieval of weapons will fail. This unfortunate lesson
is coming across more and more clearly in the conflict zones of Africa
where militancy has been replaced by rampant crime (South Africa), or
where fresh eruptions of violence have taken place after one phase of
conflict has formally ended (Congo, Angola). In Bosnia, heavily armed
peacekeepers have so far been able to keep the peace, but there is as
yet no guarantee that matters will change once these peacekeepers move
out. The whole problem, therefore, acquires a certain surreal aspect.
Weapons worsen conflict, but as long as conflict or an unstable peace
continues, weapons will not be given up for any reason.
Given that weapons limitation or what are generally
called micro-disarmament measures have so far not been very
successful, it would appear that a state under threat of conflict, or
geographically situated in an area of weaponisation, would find it far
more cost effective to set up a system of early warning that would prevent
and effectively interdict even the first movements of weapons or prevent
a slow arms build up, rather than try to retrieve weapons that no one
wants to give up.
Simply put, while an early warning system cannot hope
to keep track of every weapon that comes in, it aims at quick identification
of initial infusion of weapons and arms build up, identification of
the actors, routes and possible sources of such a build up, and the
creation of a framework that effectively nips this phase of conflict
in the bud thereby allowing the state the breathing space to
institute conflict resolution measures. Thus, while the ultimate aim
is to ensure de-escalation of tensions in a potentially volatile area,
early warning is predicated on a more narrow framework than conflict
resolution in that it does not seek to go into the root causes of a
conflict, though political and social issues would be knit in as part
of the early warning indicators.
A word of caution is required here. Early warning is
not aimed at allowing for effective police action alone. To serve as
a continuing and dynamic process, early warning has to be used to trigger
a host of measures that are aimed at social, political, and economic
measures that would proceed side by side with weapons retrieval.
Early warning is, therefore, a process aimed at the
early detection of arms flows and build up, with different instruments
and tools used to shore up this process. These instruments
have so far been limited to inputs from intelligence sources. But the
basic argument of this paper is that, while this is a substantial input,
it is far from adequate. The case studies offered below serve to underline
not only this fact, but also the fact that there are always other units
of early warning the press, analysts, and others which
are routinely ignored. The first objective of this paper is to identify
such instruments of early warning that are ordinarily available to the
public and to policy makers in conflict situations.
Having identified the actors, who in the past provided
early warning, a second objective is to cull possible tools that could
be used routinely as a set of early warning indicators.
A third objective is to provide a methodology for seamless
information dissemination that is, the movement of the signals
provided by early warning actors using standard early warning tools,
to the policy makers.
A fourth objective is the analysis of this information,
and lastly, the identification of the precise inputs (or departments)
that would be able not only to deal with weapons flows on the ground,
but also to prevent further movements through foreign policy,
economic rewards, etc. The selection of these measures,
however, remains outside the scope of the present paper, which is restricted
to conflict prevention measures.
Scope
While all countries in South Asia suffer from various
degrees of light weapons proliferation, it is important to note here
that the problem manifested itself in different ways in each state.
Pakistans role as a conduit for the US Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) weapon supplies in the Afghan conflict led to a massive societal
diffusion of weapons into the hands of ethnic, religious and sectarian
groups that has caused upwards of 2,000 deaths a year in Pakistan itself.
India had to deal with two militant movements in its West, mainly abetted
by Pakistan, and at least four major insurgencies in its Northeast.
Sri Lanka has had to suffer a more than 14-year long war that has pitted
the army against one of the most deadly militant groups in the world,
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Political and student violence
in Bangladesh has been fed by weapons acquired from a growing black
market. Nepal and Bhutan have both become shelters for militant groups,
even as each is now experiencing rising levels of internal violence.
Across these many and varied upheavals, however, the
indicators are not all that different. In short, all of
these problems are associated with the movement of deadly weapons
rocket propelled grenades, mortars, assault rifles and explosives
into the hands of various non-state actors and uncivil society:
criminals, terrorists and others who thrive on the fringe of these conflicts.
Defending the cause of civil society in
each of these theatres are the police, bureaucrats, analysts, and a
variety of non-governmental organisations and players. Some of these
have been more alive to the dangers than others, but few, if any, were
at all inclined to focus on the weapons issue. Attention remained clearly
concentrated on conventional categories of factors, such as the actors
and various national and international political issues (foreign assistance,
fundamentalism, political parties, etc.), by and large ignoring the
weapons factor and this is in spite of an overwhelming number
of indicators that specifically tied weapons to conflict escalation
or formation. The result was that the sudden rise of violence consequent
upon weapons proliferation, in most instances, took the state by surprise
and resulted in what is termed state paralysis.
In attempting to outline a possible model for early
warning, it is necessary to first flag the broad indicators, which are
essentially those that could be used to identify potential hot
spots (situational warning). The specific indicators are more
short-term and deal with arms build up and signals of approaching conflict
(storm warning). An assessment of the role of various actors is given,
followed by an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each of these
actors and why early warning did not follow. Finally, a schematic model
of early warning knits together these various institutions to deal with
future situations.
The outline indicators (situational warning)
- In all cases there was a strong historical precedent of covert arming.
For instance Pakistan had been supporting Afghan rebels since 1973
with military aid.1 Similarly,
Pakistan and India had already fought three major wars over Kashmir,
which continued to be a festering issue. In Indias Northeast,
rebellion had been carrying on since independence, with Chinese support
and sanctuary in Burma. Sri Lankas ethnic dispute also began
with independence, and had always found an echo among
the Tamils of South India. With few resources to draw upon, all these
had been essentially small affairs and, therefore, had limited objectives.
- The near certainty of weapons proliferation and availability as
the scale of the Afghan adventure magnified and weapons supplies increased.
To the East, the lowering of conflict in Cambodia was pushing weapons
outwards.
- In the case of conflict in India, a certain predictability in Pakistans
strategy could also have warned analysts of increasing strife. The
Pakistani army has always leaned heavily towards the use of irregulars2
(in 1947 and 1965) where arms were sent in to foment an uprising,
which was to be followed by the invasion by regular forces. This was
again the formula adopted in Kargil.
- Another indicator was that all conflict areas had been hot beds
of political tension and were obvious magnets for weapons
of any kind. Viewing the problem retroactively, the Sindh Chief Minister
noted "A law and order situation had been developing in Sind
since 1982-83
the situation has deteriorated mainly because
of the massive availability of arms"3
In (Indian) Punjab, vituperative politics and economic slowdown had
caused a general discontent, while in the Kashmir Valley, an almost
complete indifference to governance and all pervasive corruption had
led to the religious rights demands for a change.
- One clear signal which should have activated alarm bells among conflict
studies analysts was the steady rise in narcotics cultivation in Afghanistan
and Pakistan noted by the United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP)
as well as the US State Department. What is especially noteworthy
is that, with the withdrawal of Superpower aid, militant leaders and
their backers appear to have turned to refining heroin to sustain
their operations. The involvement of the Pakistani army in such operations
was hardly a hidden factor.4 In the Indian
Punjab, the slow rise of militancy was preceded by an increase in
narcotics seizures,5 and in 1984, operations
against gold and silver smugglers taking place in a different sector
demonstrated that these contraband smugglers were now showing considerable
interest in narcotics as well.6 (The term
"narco terrorism" was not yet part of the international
security lexicon.) In fact as a later report notes, Pakistanis were
apt to see narcotics as a resource in fact comparing it to
the oil of the Middle East seeing it as a problem for the "decadent
West" rather than Pakistanis themselves.7
- The sudden withdrawal of aid (China to Indias rebels in the
Northeast, US to the Afghans, India to Sri Lankan Tamils) should also
have served as a natural indicator that these groups would then turn
to other sources for funding and weapons, since the conflicts remained
very much alive. In the event Afghan splinter groups turned
to regional sponsors, some of whom in turn accessed the international
weapons black and grey market. Others like the Tamil Tigers and Indiass
Northeastern rebels, turned naturally to the Southeast Asian arms
bazaars.
These, then, were the overall indicators. However more
specific data was available. These were clearly signals of an impending
escalation in other words, what have often been called the accelerating
indicators. These indicators were noted by the agencies involved well
before the actual beginning of the conflict.
Arms build up phase the storm warning
- Warning indicators of weapons flows by border forces and security
forces: All conflict areas saw significant border activity at
least two to three years before the actual beginning of violence.8
For example, illegal cross-border traffic along the Punjab border
increased, with security forces apprehending some 45,650 persons trying
to cross the international border illegally (1986-1992).9
In 1988 alone, some 8,421 persons were arrested in the Punjab and
Rajasthan with arms and drugs under the relevant laws.10
In the Indian Northeast, the hostile border prevented significant
seizures, though a large seizure of weapons in 1995 (more than 775
AK-56 rifles and other weapons) provided a warning that militants
were preparing for a fresh assault.11
This border input is not specially seen in Pakistan, or other conflict
areas, since the Pak-Afghan border (the Durand line) had, to all intents
and purposes, ceased to exist as the CIAISI operation was mounted.
However, seizures of weapons from Peshawar to major cities began to
increase from the early 1980s. The ensuing rise in urban violence
was seen as a law and order problem rather than one of
excessive weaponisation arising from policies that created wider dangers.
- Rise of armed crime: This period also saw a rise in bank
robberies, heists and a general rise in law and order problems associated
with armed crime, as militants sought more funds to buy arms. Interviews
with police officers reveal that the use of pistols and revolvers
in such incidents was not associated with the student unrest and violence
that was then hogging the headlines, but perceived as isolated robberies
by armed gangs.12 A similar
trend is noticed when examining the Sri Lankan conflict, where militants
were forced to attack jewellery shops, banks and other centres. Significantly,
such a rise was not apparent in Kashmir, pointing to a steady source
of weapons from across the border. Obviously, payment was not a factor.
Crime in fact followed several years of conflict, arising apparently
from the slow inclusion of criminal elements, a trend that was also
apparent in the Indian Punjab.
- Snatching of weapons: This is again clearly apparent in Sri
Lanka and the Northeast, where early operations were specifically
targeted against police and paramilitary outposts, or individual platoons.13
In Sri Lanka, the dreaded LTTE got its first weapon from a police
officer who was attacked. Subsequently, operatives were told to snatch
any weapons from the site of an attack, with even children trained
to lift weapons after an explosion.14
In Kashmir, a crowd would pelt the police with stones while, in the
ensuing confusion, some .303s would be snatched. These, however, were
hardly used, since the AK made its appearance early in this conflict.15
- The first sightings of rapid-fire and other weapons of a higher
technology: Until 1987, in Kashmir, according to the Director
General of Police (DGP) of that State, there was no evidence of
training and certainly no guns (emphasis mine).16
Between October 1988 and April 1989, more than 100 persons were arrested
with weapons so strange to the police who were still equipped with
.303s that "had to rely on captured extremists to demonstrate to us
[the police] how they are used".17 By
1989, the cry on the streets was "Jo kare Khuda ka Kauf, utha
le Kalashnikov" (All god fearing men should now pick up a
Kalashnikov).18 In 1990, the first firing
incidents on Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) occurred. In the
Northeast, the AK-56 was already in use in 1988, well before the conflict
went into its most difficult phase (in 1990). The RPG made its appearance
a year later, while large-scale use of grenades began in 1992. The
appearance of the Dragunov rifle (1993) was concomitant with the appearance
of trained Afghan mujahideen. Thus, the weapons seized were
indicative of various shifts in the pattern and scale of conflict,
and of the actors involved. Ideally, the response should have been
able to pick up these indicators. In actual fact, the presence of
the RPG was officially noticed in the Northeast only well after the
mid-1990s. Even now, there are persistent rumours of the presence
of anti-aircraft missiles, though these have yet to be confirmed.
- Weapons seizures: Weapons seizures are another indication
of possible shifts in conflicts, or of their escalation into a new
plane of violence. The first seizures of anti-aircraft weapons from
Tamil militants in November 1986 by the Tamil Nadu police should have
spurred a national level endeavour to sensitise intelligence agencies
about the movement of these new weapons. In fact, it was almost a
decade later that the Tigers finally used these guns against Sri Lankan
aircraft in 1995.19 In Kashmir, the first
anti-aircraft gun was seized in August 1997, and a shoulder fired
Chinese missile, the HY-2, was also seized the same year.20
This gave clear indications of a possible escalation. Seizures
of explosives along the Indian coast are certain warnings of an impending
strike against important targets. Careful monitoring of data could
well have prevented one of the worlds worst terrorist strikes
in Bombay in 1993.
- The glut in the black market: The inland movement of pipeline
weapons was clearly evident in Pakistan in the form of a sharp fall
in the prices of popular bores in the black market in major cities.
The cost of a TT pistol in Karachi, once priced at Rs 5,500 went down
to less than Rs 3,000 in 1989,21 while
that of an AK-47 fell from Rs 30-40,000 in the early 1980s, to Rs
13,000 in 1989 and further to Rs. 8000 by 1994,22
at the infamous bazaars along the North West Frontier Province
(NWFP). The sensitivity of the black market was apparent when, following
a ban on the public carrying of weapons, savvy dealers simply changed
their wares to offer smaller and multi-barrel weapons for "rich
people and politicians."23
A similar response is apparent in the Indian Northeast,
where, at an earlier time the local black market could only offer the
.38. It was soon flooded with a much larger selection (which appeared
to have been sourced from China as well as Nepal). However, unlike the
western border, prices remained high. The M-16 was available at Rs.
40,000, while the AK Chinese copy (M-22) was much more expensive at
Rs. 150,000. A Sterling stengun could cost between Rs. 65,000 to Rs.
70,000 though by the end of 1996, almost all prices had gone up in response
to rising demand.24
Sri Lankas black market was, however, a factor
of secondary diffusion, creating a glut as the intensity of conflict
increased. The sources appear to be deserters (28,000 from the army)25,
weapons issued for self-defence to villagers, and former militants,
who have their own weapons for self-defence and are suspected to be
involved in the trade in weapons, with the government understood to
be turning a blind eye.26
At the level of the international blackmarket, the
first warning of an access to outside sources was apparent when the
Tamil Tigers reneged on a hard won peace agreement after a ship arrived
from Singapore carrying weapons (some 700 rifles, ammunition and explosives)
had docked in spite of surveillance by the Indian Navy.27
A similar indication was apparent in the Indian Northeast where the
appearance of weapons that were clearly sourced from the Thai arms market
began to make their appearance (M-16, Chinese bottle grenades, AK-56).
Licensed weapons
Warning signals of an internal diffusion of weapons
were the sudden loosening of the licensing system as the rush to acquire
arms for protection both by householders but mostly by politicians
began. Pakistani reports note that 41,600 guns licenses were
issued between December 1988 and May 1992. Another 92,000 were said
to have been issued in the seven remaining months of 199228
(when the mayhem in Karachi was at it highest).
A series of political assassinations in Sri Lanka led
to the ruling party diluting licensing laws to political parties to
defend themselves, thus, raising the level of weapons proliferation
within the country. A public debate on the issue appeared to point to
the fact that all political parties had been equally responsible for
issuing licenses from the early 1980s.
Though all these indicators were apparent, there was
hardly any reaction by policy makers. In the following paragraphs, we
will examine the inputs from the various actors involved. Again, it
appears that warning was more than available but was not acted upon.
Early warning inputs by intelligence agencies
It was hardly likely that the Pakistani intelligence
agencies would "warn" of impending trouble in Pakistan since
they were the nodal agency not only for the Afghan operation but were
also used by General Zia and his successors to quell political opposition.
Thus, weapons were supplied to various ethnic groups in an endeavour
to "divide and rule."29 The only,
otherwise, stable institution in the state the Army which
might have put the brakes on the slippery slope of conflict could not
provide the warning that the State so urgently needed since, while it
was heavily involved in maintaining internal order and was making lists
of people engaged in drug and arms trafficking, at another level it
was apparently willing to use the proceeds from drug trafficking for
covert operations.30 This dichotomy
possibly eroded its ability to act proactively. The fact that both these
institutions had an axe to grind in the conflict in terms of
both institutional and personal power and profit, effectively eroded
their ability to assess the situation.
In India, the intelligence inputs in the case of Punjab
seem to have been timely. The clear proxy war input was revealed in
1988 when details regarding Pakistans training of militants were
published in the press.31 The drug connection
was also apparent in early 198832 and was
later underlined in 1993, when a CIA report revealed the close links
between politicians and drug smugglers of Lahore who used Sikh militants
as mules.33 This early warning
appears to have prompted the government into constructing an electrified
fence across the border and increasing surveillance. This input may
well have been crucial to the quick winding down of the militancy (1990-1993).
In this case, a close co-operation between the army, police and the
civil administration was crucial in information sharing (which intelligence
agencies generally loath to do) and, therefore, a quick proactive action.
An almost appalling lack of information sharing was
apparent in Indian operations in Sri Lanka. It would seem that the Indian
Army, which was inducted into peace keeping operations under the most
difficult conditions, had little guidance on the kind of resistance
they were likely to meet. This attitude was evident even in the mandate
of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), which required it to implement
disarmament within 72 hours! A comment by the then Army Chief is illustrative.
Queried by the Prime Minister on the Armys opinion on possible
Tamil Tiger intransigence, he is said to have commented that
they had no wherewithal to... confront India and if they did, they
would be neutralised within two weeks.34
In the event, the operation dragged on for four long years.
In Kashmir, interviews by the author clearly reveal
that evidence of training and weapons buildup had been supplied by concerned
intelligence agencies to decision makers at least two years in advance.35
However, the higher ups tended to see these as alarmist
scenarios (possibly due to the rather tired foreign hand
theory that politicians invariably pound during elections). Later, intelligence
collection was handicapped by targeted attacks on lower-rung intelligence
officers, police personnel and key decision makers. Thus, over time,
the intelligence base practically vanished.
Some points are worth noting. In the Northeast and
Kashmir, the police were initially apt to think of the militants as
our boys whom they were loath to imprison. Police sympathy
heightened as New Delhi brought in Presidents rule in an attempt
to control the situation. There is clear evidence that police intelligence
(which is basically street-level) was denied to the Army or paramilitary
forces. Second, competition between different agencies was also clearly
detrimental to the overall operation since local commanders were eager
to get the credit to their own service. Leakage of information
of an impending raid was not uncommon. Third, though intelligence men
filed their reports to the local head, this was usually diluted to make
it more acceptable and less alarmist. Fourth,
during militancy, the agencies of the government itself are usually
infiltrated. Thus, the tendency to maintain secrecy increases manifold,
so that, quite literally, one hand of the state rarely knew what the
other is doing36. Fifth, intelligence briefs
tend to concentrate on the actual persons involved, (Pakistani, Chinese,
etc.) rather than the weapons themselves. Thus, the importance
for example of a sudden rise in ammunition seizures was usually
lost on intelligence analysts. Army intelligence men have similarly
tended to remain unimpressed by the light weapons issue.
Overall, it has been seen that a plethora of ground
level intelligence was available in all cases. Such routine int-reports
(especially in Kashmir) usually warn of militant activity and attempts
at incursions a state of affairs that has been going on for more
than ten years. The lack of reaction that is often noticed, therefore,
may be due to inertia that is inevitable in sustained militancy operations.
Early warning by think tanks and non-governmental
bodies
Overall, it appears that the strategic and analytical
community among NGOs were far more alive to an impending conflict than
government bodies (at least at the higher levels). Significantly, the
most notable warning in the case of Kashmir came from a research group
and their publication of a document by a leading defence journal of
India called "Op Topac".37 It
outlined what many believed was a Pakistani plan of subversion. Written
in July 1989, it was the result of meticulous research by a team of
specialists presented in a narrative form. As a piece of early warning
it is unique since the scenario that unfolded was almost identical as
far as the strategy and tactics followed were concerned.
Another unique analysis was from the doyen of strategic
studies in India, K. Subramanyam, the then Director of the Institute
of Defence Studies and Analyses, who, in 1981, was warning of both the
dangers of the Afghan war and the costs to Pakistan. He observed, "If
arms can flow in one direction, they can flow in the reverse direction,"
and later warned that the increased supply of arms in one country could
lead to a greater flow into other trouble spots on the globe.38
Think tanks in Pakistan had not been particularly involved
in the past but individual analysts have courageously pointed out the
dangers of a proxy war policy. I.A. Rahman noted that the repeated bomb
blasts in Karachi and the NWFP were hardly a law and order
problem, but were linked to the Afghan problem. "Neither the authorities
noise about vigilance against terrorists, nor President Zia ul Haqs
discovery of the Kashmir dispute as the second most important issue
before the nation," he asserted, "has prevented a debate on
the central cause of Pakistans predicament, namely its involvement
in the Afghan conflict."39 This perception
was not shared by a majority of Pakistanis that was affected by the
violence traders who downed shutters, for instance, saw it as
a law and order problem.
Again, the Church in the Northeast was considerably
involved in conflict reduction, but it is not clear whether they were
specifically aware of the weapons problem. Though NGOs like the International
Red Cross and Medecins sans Frontiers were particularly involved
in Sri Lanka and were willing to talk in private, few were at all comfortable
about talking to the press or government agencies.
Overall, the relationship between the think tanks and
the Press was two-way, and where the relationship was close, good analytical
pieces were seen. However, the Press in India, and in some instances
in Sri Lanka, remained unable to assess the weapons issue, though this
has changed recently.
The Press as an early warning input
The Press, like the analysts, is quick to pick up information
on the ground, or investigate stories that are supplied by intelligence
agencies or police officers. In Pakistan, the Press was most energetic
in projecting issues that the authorities wanted to hush up.
The most courageous and diligent among these were the Karachi-based
Herald and the Peshawar-based Frontier Post, both of which
underwent considerable harassment later. The Heralds story
in September 1985 on the Armys involvement in narcotics trafficking
was one of the earliest bits of public information available regionally.
The Press was also the first to warn of the consequences of an uncontrolled
spread of Islamic fighters and their outfitting, as it was
to note the sudden rise in the number of madrassas (Islamic schools)
which imparted military training to their students.40
Foreign investigative journalists gave an excellent coverage of
the Afghan conflict and the intermeshing of the narcotics and weapons
trade with Pakistan,41 (which provided
a great deal of data to researchers). However, a precise focus on the
weapons issue was non-existent.
Similarly, in the case of Punjab, the Press functioned
clearly as an early warning input and remained close to decision making
circles and the police throughout.42 The
Press in Southern Sri Lanka was fairly impartial in its reportage, but
was dependent on government handouts for actual reports on the fighting.
In the East, they were unabashedly the mouthpieces of the Tigers. Reports
from the Indian Press were more analytical, with investigative journalists
often providing an early warning intelligence of the mood of the Tigers.
Journalists were among those who warned Indian decision-makers on the
Tamil Tigers decision to renege on the Agreement, and the inadvisability
of turning against them. This advice appears to have been disregarded.43
In both Kashmir and the Northeast, the contrast is
marked. With targeted killings of pressmen and repeated threats, the
local Press was completely cowed down, and, as the Governor had put
it, "were reporting at gun point."44
Editors and journalists were one at admitting that they simply published
what was given to them or alternatively filed reports that
were slanted heavily in favour of the militants, or simply published
notices calling for strikes.45 One vernacular
paper notes that local journalists were well aware of the coming of
Pakistan-trained militants as well as the conviction engendered in the
Valley that independence was approaching (though no one
had the slightest idea of how this was to be implemented). Pressmen
noted that their representations to bureaucrats had been ignored, and
that the state bureaucrats had been compromised well before the uprising
began.46 In the Northeast, the sway of
the militants was so complete (for a period of about two years) that
a journalist was to observe "Its writ ran unchallenged...not
a leaf stirred without its approval."47
The national Press and Television were unable to get ordinary Assamese
even to admit the existence of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
while those who did do so (under anonymity) admitted that, far from
running a parallel government, ULFA was the government.48
It was only later that some members of the Press were used by the government
as mediators.
The Bureaucracy
It needs to be stated clearly that the bureaucracy
is by its very nature not suited to be an early warning instrument.
It can, however, be expected to respond swiftly to indicators and warnings
by other actors. In South Asia, the bureaucracy tends to be so secretive
as to make any real analysis difficult. Thus, the Press is usually confined
to drafting stories from press releases. However, it would appear that
bureaucrats work in unison (instead of being departmentalised) when
there is strong leadership from above.
In Pakistan, the bureaucracy seemed to be divorced
from reality. Often, it appeared that the Press was far ahead in its
awareness of the situation than the government. For instance, a Special
Committee which submitted a 77 page Report (December 1989) on violence
in the Sindh province (which was receiving daily coverage) merely mentions
the need to have a ban on unlicensed arms and to eliminate
the drug mafia;49 the remainder is devoted
to the political and social history of the province. In another instance,
as the country reeled under sectarian violence, a report to the Prime
Minister alleged large-scale external funding of training centres by
"friendly Islamic nations" and gave a detailed summary of
the activities of religious groupings,50
almost ten years after the problem had surfaced and the issue had been
widely commented upon in the Press. By this time prominent journals
were already noting that "there seems little argument that Pakistan
is currently the world leader in hosting international terrorist organisations."51
The power of the Pakistani bureaucracy, however, is
not to be underestimated. Its members usually work closely with the
army, and the fact that a civil servant, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, eventually
became the President is one indicator of this authority. Nevertheless,
decision making is considerably politicised and slow in
the extreme. In rural areas, decision making follows traditional tribal
patterns, with an overlay of modern corruption. Similar to the Indian
system, the bureaucracy can, if it so wishes, hasten policy making or
bring it to a standstill.
Bureaucrats in India shared the Pakistani instinct
of hushing up unrest, rather than dealing with it with determination.52
In 1988, the Kashmir Governors address to the Legislature reflected
little of the trouble brewing, noting that the last vestiges of terrorism
were being wiped out.53 The panic had that
set in with the arrival of the first few AK-47s is well documented in
an account by the then Governor of the state.54
In the Northeast, the state bureaucracies have either
been co-opted or sidelined by terror tactics. The Report of the then
Governor of Assam, D.D. Thakur, to the President55
is an indictment of a government paralysed it speaks of Central
assistance in the form of additional vehicles and arms remaining unutilised,
and of training camps run in broad daylight and in public view.56
Army action in 1990 and 1992 led to the militants taking up residence
in neighbouring Bangladesh, which proved to be a better outlet since
the groups could easily visit Thailand and Bangkok from there. This
possibility was apparently overlooked by the local bureaucracy that
was lauding itself on dealing firmly with militancy. When
the ULFA reappeared there was little surprise among the locals, the
Press, or police officials.
In Sri Lanka again, policy makers appear to have grossly
underestimated the Tamil Tigers capability and commitment to their
own homeland. When the Tigers were pushed to the wall by the IPKF, the
Sri Lankan government armed the Tigers with several truckloads of weapons,
ammunition and explosives.57 After having
got the IPKF out, the Tigers again turned upon the hapless Sri Lankan
army; the war continues to date.
In Punjab, matters were somewhat different. As noted
earlier, it seemed that all concerned were working together for
instance, following a Prime Ministerial meeting in April 1988, a decision
was made to seal the border. Various other measures to deny
entry to terrorists and weapons from Pakistan were also defined. Moves
were also made to step up border security in neighbouring states. The
state government, with the strong backing of the Centre, set out to
revitalise a highly demoralised police force, increasing its firepower,
mobility and communications capabilities (all of which were more or
less non-existent prior to the Operations initiated at this time). Police
crackdown and enhanced border security ensured by the Army resulted
in a dramatic reduction in militant violence and its complete cessation
by 1993. Again, this one instance stands out for the (relative) success
that is possible when early warning is combined with prompt action.
Conclusions
Assessing drawbacks and strengths
When assessing the inputs from various actors
such as the Press, bureaucrats and others, it must be noted that the
problem of light weapons proliferation or references to the Kalashnikov
culture are very much a thing of the late 1990s, and, therefore,
may not have elicited the same reaction in the 1980s, when the Cold
War threat overshadowed most of these problems. This aspect needs to
be duly noted. Even Pakistan, which had a severe problem with societal
arming, was more inclined to see and discuss it as a law and order problem
in Sindh, as a refugee problem in Baluchistan, and as a political problem
in the Punjab. In New Delhi, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, mired in political
scandal and bereft of experienced advisors, was too preoccupied to note
the trouble in the Valley till late 1989. The government itself was
busy drafting condemnation of arms and training given to Kashmir separatists,
even as New Delhi warned Islamabad of serious consequences of such actions.
Bureaucracies (not just in South Asia) are traditionally
given to playing down a problem, assigning all kinds of roles to opposition
parties, the foreign hand and others. The heavily departmentalised
approach in this region means that each authority will not share information
with others which, this is most apparent in Pakistan while least apparent
in Sri Lanka (where the bureaucracy is more compact). Bureaucracies
have traditionally reacted only after receiving inputs from intelligence
agencies or facing sharp criticism by the Press. It was only in the
Indian Punjab that all systems the government, the police, bureaucracy
and the army worked together, thus, swiftly reversing a situation that
threatened to go out of control. It is, in fact, the one success story
in an otherwise dismal show by the respective governments. Some points
that stand in an evaluation of these facts included the following:
- In India, governmental bodies like the Border Security Force, were
valuable inputs in warning of impending light weapons flows. The collated
data, which is published as an open source, received some attention
from the Press and did alert think tanks. Similarly, the Narcotics
Control Bureau (NCB) produces relevant statistics, as do Governmental
institutions like the Crime Records Bureau, which has noted the rise
in crime in states neighbouring conflict areas. In Pakistan, data
collection on the Karachi issue appears to be efficient. However,
few countries have public access to date bases, which remain either
inconsistent or at least two years behind time. None of the available
inputs appears to have been factored into decision making.
- In all of the instances related above, the Press provided strong
early warning inputs, especially, news magazines which devote greater
space to analysis and strong criticism of the government. However,
given the nature of its job, the Press cannot continuously focus attention
on a subject once its news value diminishes.
- Non-governmental think tanks in Sri Lanka and India, while producing
quality analyses of impending crises, have, however, not been able
to sensitise governments on issues where the dangers are not obvious
like light weapon flows. When these are presented as clear
proxy war instances, the reaction is likely to be more encouraging.
- Thus, bureaucracies reacted only when presented with terms that
they were familiar with. The weapons proliferation issue in its many
dimensions remains one that evokes little interest, and is seen as
one of peripheral security interest. The relationship between think
tanks, the Press and the bureaucracy remains sketchy, with the first
two at the mercy of the government when in need of hard data.
- Intelligence agencies have always provided early warning. However,
since this is often a daily exercise, the significance of particular
events in a mass of data tends to get lost. What emerges is a general
picture of the intention of the protagonists (Pakistan/India, fundamentalists,
etc.) rather than forecasting of possible outcomes. Since weapons
trade needs a widely flung net for analysis, spot intelligence rarely
helps. Moreover, inter-agency rivalry considerably erodes efficiency.
- The beat policeman is usually aware of developments in his area,
but these reports appear hardly ever to be carefully read until a
conflict breaks out. Sympathy factor works strongly against reporting
on militant activities. Corruption is also generally higher, and while
a few may wink at arms induction, fewer still may actually realise
its significance. At the higher level, police officers have proved
efficient in tackling a situation when backed by the political leadership.
However, once the weapons are on the streets, the police usually have
to retreat and leave the situation to the army. Conversely, once the
army is called in, the police usually refuse to part with information.
- NGOs and religious organisations rarely consult the organs of the
State, seeing their job as separate from the conflict
issues. For instance, the Church, in Indias Northeast, only
became involved in certain areas when it was required to pay tax
to militants. In Pakistan, however, the clergy are part of the problem,
while some NGOs have made themselves unpopular as intelligence moles;
most prefer to "live with the weapons problem"58
rather than to assist the government in tackling it.
A strategy for the future: Creating a national early
warning system
In sum, it appears that a wide variety of data is available
from different sources for early warning of weapons flows, both in proxy
war and in black market operations. The crux of the problem is integrating
the whole to allow greater linkages between specialists, information
gatherers and decision makers. Specialists here refers to
those whose profession, by its very nature, requires them to be aware
of illegal weapons flows. Such actors are border forces (inclusive of
coast guard, and air surveillance), immigration officials and customs.
This is referred to as the "first circle" of surveillance.
The second circle of information is represented by the police forces
and internal intelligence (including narcotics), who monitor events
within their districts or areas. The third circle includes the concerned
ministries involved in the South Asian case this would mean primarily
the Home Ministry, the Defence Ministry and Foreign Ministry liasing.
Each of these has its own intelligence sources, and these would provide
additional inputs. The primary aim would be to speed up information
between these circles.
At a second level are the inputs from NGOs, think
tanks and the Press. The Press clearly has a greater reach than the
others in creating awareness, which is its main strength, while think
tanks have greater ability to provide analytical solutions and inputs
(formal and informal) into decision making centres. The main strength
of NGOs would be that they are often closer to the problem than others,
though their advantage lies in their relative anonymity. Given that
they would dislike approaching the government, a greater lateral integration
between these three would also be needed to complement each others
skills.
At a third level are the static systems, which are
required to quickly analyse data. These are the central data collection
agencies in India they are called the Criminal Records Department
whose input would be invaluable for both levels. This system,
which is more or less defunct in other South Asian countries (and non-existent
in others), depends on accurate and timely information from the first
and second circles of early warning.
The process
Since early warning is clearly a process the objective
would be to speed up information gathering, dissemination and analyses
between and within these levels identified above. This essentially means
that the two circles of primary information need to utilise the Press
at the earliest possible moment on weapons seizures, which, in turn,
would assist the work of government think tanks, an analysis which would
be immediately available to the concerned ministry. Data also needs
to be fed into the third level (criminal records bureau) if possible,
in real time, thus, creating a data base on weapons movement, increase
or decrease, which in turn would be made available to the Press, interested
NGOs or think tanks. Relative changes in a given area or within a given
group, therefore, would be immediately recognised. This information
needs to be relayed back to the action takers (the police, security
forces, narcotics bureau and revenue departments) who could act upon
this constant update of information.
The third circle of information (ministries + intelligence),
in turn, would be sensitised by the above analysis of impending
danger from a particular direction allowing intelligence agencies to
focus their attention along one direction. This would also allow a paring
down of intelligence assets to allow for greater specialisation and
expertise, instead of the present diffuse set up. These bodies cannot
be expected to divulge their activities however, some yearly
risk assessment would help the other two circles immensely
in providing a framework for activity.
At the apex of all this activity would be an early
warning panel, made up of the chiefs of all the concerned departments
including the Home and Foreign ministries, with a senior level politician
in the chair to ensure co-ordination. Alternatively, an early warning
panel could provide weekly briefings to a national security council
(where relevant). The Press and think tanks should be part of selected
sittings, where data is made public, or may be called in to provide
expert, outside opinions. The emphasis would need to be on transparency,
with the clear realisation that secrecy benefits the militant and the
criminal not the State. This process is hardly one dimensional,
but a schematic representation is given below.
Ultimately, this process is based as much on new information
technology, which includes not only the hardware, but organisational
flexibility and speed. If the nodal group were to function just like
any other government group, (i.e., based on rigid hierarchical orders)
it would remain ineffective.
At the international level, such nodes of warning should
be linked to UN groups set up for the purpose, which would have a direct
link to the Secretary General. Links to relevant multilateral organisations
would also be useful in attracting attention especially in the
case of State-sponsored war or irresponsible supplies of weapons. Denial
of equipment, cut-off of aid, and other tools of multilateral persuasion
could be applied.
Many a proposal that would at one time have been discarded
as hopelessly optimistic is now at least being considered at the international
level. Regional co-operation initiatives like the Organisation of American
States (OAS), Convention and the European Union Code of Conduct are
milestones along the way to greater awareness of the problem of light
weapons proliferation as a threat to every country, regardless of its
developmental status. At the United Nations level, the Disarmament Division
is as much taken up with "micro-disarmament" issues as it
is with conventional arms trade. The World Bank now has a specific unit
to deal with post-conflict situations. On the realistic side, it is
also important to note that there are a large number of organisations
willing to get on to the bandwagon and that not all are effective or
even desirable. However, the fact that the subject is on the international
agenda is an encouraging sign.
The one lacuna that still exists is that, while international
declarations say a great many things, there is as yet no legislation
(barring the OAS Convention) that makes illegal arming a crime, much
less proxy arming. The latter is clearly still an operation that a large
number of states find useful. Until it is realised that proxy arming
is, in the long-run, a zero sum game that benefits no one, measures
at any level can hardly hope to succeed. Ultimately, the strengthening
of norms against arms dealing should itself help in focussing attention
on States which go against this. The State eventually, has to realise
its own interest in either desisting from such practices, or as a victim,
in focussing early attention on them. After all, no problem can be handled
unless its potential dangers, opportunities and options are well understood.
There is little doubt that an early warning structure
would be immensely useful to developing states enmeshed, as they
are, in diverse demands upon their limited resources. The costs to the
State of weapons diffusion are not clearly quantifiable. Apart from
the clear economic losses, costs of state forces, costs of refugee repatriation,
etc., there can be no quantity assigned to the loss of a
child to its mother, or the gunning down of the helpless and the weak.
Early warning is a tool that allows the State to fulfil its primary
function that of ensuring the safety and security of its citizens.
Unfortunately, it seems to be a function that most States have forgotten.
- Ms. Tara Kartha is a
Fellow of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, and a frequent
contributor to a variety of journals on strategic and security issues.
She is the author of the book, Tools of Terror: Light Weapons and
India’s Security.
-
See WIRSING, Robert
G., Pakistan’s Security under Zia, 1977-78, Houndmills: Macmillan
1991. Also see, LAMB, Christina, Waiting for Allah, London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1991.
-
See COHEN, Stephen
P., The Pakistani Army, New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1984.
-
Herald (Karachi), July
1993, p. 60.
-
See Herald, 1985. Also
see, RUBIN, Barnett, Fragmentation of Afghanistan, Yale: Yale University
Press, 1995.
-
Crime In India––1988,
National Crime Records Bureau, New Delhi.
-
Joint-operation by
Revenue and Finance Ministries along the coasts of Gujarat, Tamil
Nadu, Maharashtra, Kerala and also in New Delhi. The operation netted
some 140 smugglers and goods worth Rs. 900 million in 1988.
-
The Friday Times (Lahore),
September 3, 1993.
-
Between 1988 and 1990,
over 1474 AKs, and over 1,000 mines and 2,994 grenades were seized
by police and border forces in Kashmir. India, Government of, Ministry
of Home, Annual Reports, 1989 and 1991.
-
Crime in India––1992,
New Delhi: National Crime Records Bureau.
-
Crime in India––1988,
New Delhi: National Crime Records Bureau.
-
For a description
of the operation see SINGH, Jasjit, ed., Light Weapons and International
Security, New Delhi: Pugwash––IDSA, 1995.
-
Interviews by author
with police officials, now retired, who had earlier been at the
helm of affairs during that period, July 1994.
-
Here even a pistol
was initially a highly valued possession, with only area commanders
sporting these. Interviews with militants by author, July 1994.
-
The killing of the
Mayor of Jaffna and, subsequently, a police officer yielded the
first light machine gun. See KARTHA, Tara, Tools of Terror: Light
Weapons and India’s Security, New Delhi: Knowledge World––IDSA,
1999.
-
Interview with a police
official, January 22,1999.
-
India Today (New Delhi),
May 31,1989, p. 71.
-
Ibid.
-
India Today, December
31, 1989.
-
The Tamil Tigers shot
down two SLAF Avros in April 1995 and one Puccarra shortly after.
The missiles were suspected to be SA-7’s, though this has not been
confirmed. The Times of India (New Delhi), April 30, 1995.
-
KARTHA, op. cit.
-
View Point (Karachi),
May 31, 1990, p. 8.
-
For a price comparison,
see Rahimullah Yusufzai, Newsline, October 1989. For 1994 prices,
see SINGH, Jasjit, ed., op. cit.
-
See KARTHA, Tara,
"The Diffusion of Light Weapons in Pakistan", Small Wars
and Insurgencies, Vol. 8, No 1, Spring, 1997, pp. 71-87.
-
Interview with sector
commander of ULFA (1988), April 28, 1996.
-
Brig Tissa Jayatunga,
Army spokesman, c.f. Asian Recorder (New Delhi), January 1-7, 1997,
p.26156.
-
There is no clear
indication of this, but media persons, students and others repeated
the allegation during the course of the author’s visit.
-
SINGH, Lt Gen (Retd.),
Depinder, "The IPKF in Sri Lanka" Trishul (New Delhi),
1992, p.77
-
The figures for 1992
are not entirely clear. See Heraldi, 1990. Also see HUSSAIN, Navaid,
in Dawn (Karachi), March 31,1996.
-
Analysts in Pakistan
believe that the ethnic group the MQM (Mohajhir Quami Movement),
created by General Zia as a foil to the nationalist movement under
Benazir Bhutto, was armed by the intelligence. When it became too
strong, a splinter group was similarly armed.
-
Nawaz Sharif, then
in the Opposition, The News (Islamabad), September 13, 1994.
-
Asian Recorder, June
17-23, 1988, p. 20066.
-
Militants arrested
revealed that weapons had come from a well guarded "bungalow"
(large house) in Lahore (Pakistan) where large quantities of missiles,
weapons and ammunition was regularly stored to be passed on to Sikh
militants. The main contact man was a well known heroin smuggler.
For more details, see Ibid.
-
CIA Report as published
in Friday Times (Karachi), September 13, 1993.
-
Account of the then
Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka. See DIXIT, J.N., Assignment
Colombo, New Delhi: Konarak, 1998, p.143.
-
Interview with officials
by author, November 1998.
-
These conclusions
have been arrived at after repeated interviews with various heads
of services in the concerned states during the period 1995 – 1997.Their
names have been withheld for obvious reasons.
-
Indian Defence Review,
(New Delhi), July 1989.
-
SUBRAMANYAM, K., "Arms
for Afghan Rebels", Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), Vol. IV.
No 10., January, 1981.
-
For a collection of
essays on the political state of the country, see RAHMAN, I.A.,
Pakistan Under Siege, Lahore: Rohtas, 1990.
-
Dawn, January 30,
1995.
-
For some excellent
accounts, see LAMB, op. cit. Also see DUNCAN, Emma, Breaking the
Curfew, London: Michael Joseph, 1989.
-
In Punjab, major newsmagazines
noted the fact that weapons had reappeared within the Golden Temple
Complex (after the army action which cleaned up the area) and that
the fight for "Khalistan" by violent means was hardly
over, unlike claims by the bureaucrats that the situation was "normal".
They maintained a spotlight on the activities of the religious and
separatist heads, and noted that in spite of a clutch of laws passed
to prevent such activity, it was obvious that weapons were once
more part of the politico-religious scene. See Asian Recorder, April
29-May 5, 1988, p. 19989.
-
Prominent among these
were reports filed in Frontline (Madras) which were detailed and
of a high quality. Particular mention needs to be made of reports
filed by V. Jayanth and P. S. Suryanarayana.
-
See for an account
by the then Governor of the province JAGMOHAN, My Frozen Turbulence,
New Delhi : Allied Publishers, 1991.
-
Author’s interviews
with reporters and correspondents of major weeklies and lithos.
Srinagar, May 1998.
-
Author’s interviews
with local journalists of vernacular and English press. April 16,
1998. Names of papers have been withheld at their request.
-
HAZARIKA, Sanjoy,
Strangers in the Mist, New Delhi: Viking, 1994, p. 189.
-
Newstrack, September
1990.
-
Report of the Special
Committee of the Senate, The Situation in Sindh, December 8, 1989.
See Herald, January 1990, for an analysis of this report.
-
Report detailed in
The News, May 6, 1997.
-
Jane’s Intelligence
Review (London), March 1997, p.136.
-
As a journalist notes,
in New Delhi, the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi mired in political
scandal and short of experienced advisors, was too preoccupied to
give adequate attention to the trouble in the Valley and remained
dependant on the inputs of a new inner circle members. SINGH, Tavleen,
Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors, Viking: New Delhi, 1995). p.109.
-
Hindustan Times, February
27, 1988.
-
JAGMOHAN, op. cit.
-
Report of the Governor
to the President of India, November 1990. Tabled in Lok Sabha on
December 27, 1990.
-
Ibid.
-
The Report of the
Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry probing into the assassination
of Lt. Gen Kobbekaduwa, Government Publication Bureau, Colombo,
Sessional Paper No IX- 1997
-
As noted to author
by NGO members in the Northeast, November 1998.
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