Low intensity conflicts (LIC) and high intensity crime present a
deadly combination, one that constitutes a formidable challenge to
the law enforcement authorities, and even to the armed forces of a
country. These inject an element of political instability into the
system of governance, and are a serious drain on the country's economy.
India has, for nearly five decades, experienced low intensity
conflicts in different theatres, and is now witnessing the emergence
of high intensity crime by organised gangs and crime syndicates, as
well as a complex pattern of co-operation and collusion between these.
A common thread running through both phenomena has been the involvement
of external factors cross-border terrorism from Pakistan
fuels the LIC within the country and crime syndicates operating from
the Middle East, particularly Dubai,
with linkages in Pakistan, perpetrate acts of crime through
their hirelings on Indian soil.
Low Intensity Conflicts
An idea of the magnitude and intricacy of the threat constituted
by LICs can be gained from the definition by the US Commission on
Integrated Long-term Strategy of low intensity conflicts as insurgencies,
organised terrorism, paramilitary crime, sabotage, and other forms
of violence in the shadow area between peace and open warfare involving
large units
a form of warfare in which the enemy
is more or less omnipresent and unlikely ever to surrender. [1] At a conference sponsored jointly by the US
State and Defence Departments at the National Defence University as
far back as 1986, the then Secretary of State, George Shultz, acknowledged
that low intensity conflict is the prime challenge we will face,
at least through the remainder of the century, and that the
future of peace and freedom may well depend on how effectively we
meet it.
[2] What Shultz said for the US for the remaining
part of the twentieth century is true, a fortiori, for India
in the new millennium.
LICs have their own dynamics. Their focus, the issues involved and
the parties engaged may change at different periods of time, and the
exact characterisation of the conflict has to be assessed at a particular
time on the basis of its intensity, spread, popular support, the nature
of armaments used and the degree of external involvement.
If a panoramic view of the last fifty years is taken, a disturbing
pattern emerges with regard to LICs and terrorist movements in India.
Every decade has witnessed the enlargement of the area of LIC to newer
theatres. The Nineteen Fifties saw the Naga Hills going
up in flames. Angami Zapu Phizo propagated that the Nagas had always
been independent and that, therefore, with the withdrawal of the British,
they were independent again. He organised the Naga Home Guards and
the Hongkin Government, and stoked the flames of rebellion. The Naga
insurgency continues to bedevil the Government of India to this day.
It has, in fact, become the role model for insurgency in other parts
of the Northeast.
The Sixties saw the fire spread to Mizoram, Manipur and Tripura.
Besides, there were stirrings in Naxalbari, which gradually spread
to other parts of the country.
The Seventies witnessed turmoil in Assam. The student
community built up a formidable agitation over the infiltration of
foreigners and the alleged neglect of Assam by the Centre.
In due course, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was formed,
and this group continues to wage an armed struggle for sovereign independence.
The Eighties were overshadowed by terrorism in Punjab.
Operation Blue Star hurt the psyche of the Sikh masses, and
Pakistan exploited the situation. Disaffected youth fled
across the border, and were indoctrinated, trained, and given weapons
and explosives to cause destruction and mayhem in the State. Well-organised
counter insurgency operations, however, broke the backbone of the
terrorist movement.
The gains in Punjab, however, were neutralised by increasing
violence in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) as that State came to occupy
the centrestage of LIC in India. Seeking to avenge the
loss of Bangladesh, Pakistan began executing
a plan to wean Kashmir away from India. It trained
and equipped a large number of Kashmiri militants and motivated them
to wage a war for azadi. A sizeable number of foreign mujahiddeen
were also infiltrated into the State to reinforce the local militants.
The proxy war continues.
The LICs in the tribal areas of the Northeast and in the northern
states of Punjab and Kashmir were rooted in feelings of insecurity,
a feeling that their ways of life, culture or even religion may be
swamped in a predominantly Hindu India. The fears were unfortunately
exacerbated by the flawed policies of successive governments. Not
that there was any intention, let alone any effort, to interfere with
the cultural traditions or the religious practices of any of the minority
groups at any stage. The governments failure was that, while
showing excessive concern for the sensitivities of various ethnic
and religious groupings, there was no conscious effort to bring them
into the national mainstream. A conciliatory approach was adopted
towards separatist trends of even smaller sub-nationalities, with
even unreasonable demands meeting with an attitude of compromise and
pacification. This was unfortunately taken to be a sign of weakness
and gave a fillip to secessionist and fissiparous trends. As neighbouring
countries stepped in to fish in troubled waters, the terrorist and
insurgent groups were supplied with arms and explosives, trained in
weaponry and sabotage, and provided sanctuaries. This sustenance from
across the borders ensured a prolonged life to terrorist groups in
the north-eastern parts of India and created a problem
of formidable dimensions in the states of Punjab and J&K.
The Northeast
The secessionist movements in the Northeast can broadly be attributed
to:
a feeling of neglect by the
central government;
false propaganda by leaders
of the area;
alienation of tribals;
changes in the demographic
pattern caused by the influx of people from across the borders;
availability of sanctuaries
in Myanmar and Bangladesh;
assistance to rebel groups
by countries inimical to India; and
inept handling by the Central
government.
Nagaland has been the epicentre of low intensity conflict in north-eastern
India. The Naga leader, Phizo, propagated the idea that
Nagaland had never been a part of India, that it had been
conquered by the British, and that, therefore, when British suzerainty
lapsed, the Nagas ipso facto became independent again. He moved from village to village, organised
a so-called plebiscite, [3] and, in 1954, announced the
formation of a Hongkin Government. An armed wing known as Naga Home
Guards (NHG) was also set up. In due course, these bodies were known
as the Naga Federal Government and the Naga Army.
There were incidents of murder, loot, intimidation, arson and attacks
on security forces. The Hills were set aflame.
The Government of India, while taking effective measures to put
down the rebellion, decided to meet the genuine aspirations of Nagas,
and announced the creation of a separate State of Nagaland.
The State was formally inaugurated by the President of India on December
1, 1963. The Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, passed earlier
in 1962, laid down that no Act of Parliament shall apply to the State
of Nagaland unless the Legislative Assembly of Nagaland by a resolution
so decides, in respect of:
religious or social practices
of the Nagas;
Naga customary law and procedure;
administration of civil and
criminal justice involving decisions according to Naga customary law;
and
ownership and transfer of
land and its resources.
It was virtually a testament of freedom for the Nagas and, as J.H.
Hutton expressed it, the Naga tribes...thus have the best of
two worlds complete self-determination for themselves, as much
or as little administrative isolation from the rest of India as they
wish, and the backing of India of which their country is essentially
a geographical entity. Pakistan, however, through its then eastern
wing, fanned the embers by aiding and abetting the extremist Nagas
who were not satisfied even with these liberal provisions and were
not prepared to accept anything less than complete independence. A
number of Naga gangs went to East Pakistan from time to time and came
back laden with arms, ammunition and explosives. It is estimated that
about 2,500 Naga underground cadres were trained and equipped by the
Pakistani authorities until the liberation of Bangladesh in
1971.
China also meddled in the affairs of the Northeast and, towards
the end of 1966, a three-hundred-strong gang led by Thinuselie and
Isak Muivah went to the Yunan province of China and returned with
sophisticated weapons. The security forces were, however, able to
engage the insurgents, apprehend a large number of them and seize
the bulk of their arms and ammunition. There were also large-scale
surrenders. These developments undermined Chinese confidence in the
potential of Naga insurgency. The Chinese were also disappointed with
factionalism among the Naga tribes. In the post-Mao era, the Chinese
gradually washed their hands off the secessionist movements in the
Northeast.
The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), constituted in
1980, is presently carrying on the movement for an independent, sovereign
Nagaland. Though split into two factions, the NSCN is the most formidable
insurgent outfit in Indias north-eastern States. It is active
not only in Nagaland but also in the Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur
and Myanmar. NSCN leaders have made repeated trips to Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Thailand, Singapore and various European countries, shopping
for arms and seeking international support. Pakistan has been extending
all possible help and Bangladesh has, unfortunately, once again become
a sanctuary for these insurgent groups. The Government of India has
nevertheless been holding peace talks with the NSCN leaders in different
parts of the world like Bangkok, Geneva and Davos, but there is a
stalemate with Muivah having been arrested by the Thai Police.
In Assam, the agitation over the foreigners issue which commenced
in 1979 and the subsequent formation of the ULFA, which has been committing
terrorist acts, has created a serious internal security situation.
Manipur has a three-tier problem: insurgency by Meitei extremists
in the Valley, depredations by the Naga militants in the Hill areas,
and inter-tribal clashes between the Nagas and Kukis over the domination
of the drug route from Moreh to Imphal. In Tripura, the large-scale
influx of the Bengalis into the State in the Sixties reduced the indigenous
ethnic population to a minority, and they have since been rebellious.
The National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All Tripura
Tiger Force (ATTF) have been indulging in violent activities.
An overall view of the north-eastern States affected by insurgency
shows the following common features:
Authority, effectiveness
and legitimacy of the State government(s) have been systematically
undermined.
Corruption level is very
high.
A good proportion of funds
earmarked for development are siphoned off by the militants
There is no long term or
co-ordinated policy to tackle insurgency/terrorism in the area.
A high ranking US State Department official recently quoted in the
Washington Times, stated that Pakistans Inter Services
Intelligence (ISI) was fomenting extremist violence in Indias
Northeast, possibly working through dissident groups with bases in
Bangladesh. The paper also quoted Indian and Bangladeshi sources
to say that ISI agents in Bangladesh were encouraging, training and
arming some of the militants of the ULFA and other groups. [4]
Punjab
Terrorism in Punjab was ruthless and bloody. It is a tragic chapter
in the history of independent India because Punjab was considered
the sword-arm of the country and its people are among the most valiant
defenders of India's sovereignty and integrity. During colonial rule,
the British, in pursuance of their Divide and Rule policy,
tried to give a separate identity to the Sikhs and made liberal concessions
in their favour. However, at the time of Partition, the Sikhs joined
the Indian mainstream. There was, nevertheless, an extremist fringe,
which struck a discordant note from time to time. There was accretion
in their strength when the States Reorganisation Commission (SRC)
refused to concede the Akalis demand for a separate Punjab State
on the basis of language. This led to a prolonged agitation and eventually
Punjab was trifurcated in 1966 into three States, viz. Punjab, Haryana
and Himachal Pradesh. The Anandpur Sahib Resolution (1977) was a landmark
in the history of Sikh separatism. It demanded that the Indian Constitution
be given a truly federal structure with autonomy to the States. In
due course, the Akali Dal clarified that the Central Governments
role should be limited to managing Defence, Foreign Affairs, Post
and Telegraphs, Currency and Railways.
Meanwhile, in a parallel development, fundamentalist trends started
appearing among a section of the Sikhs in the early Seventies. The
majority of Sikhs believe that Guru Gobind Singh was their last Guru,
but there were splinter movements like the Nirankaris, Radhaswamis
and Namdharis, who believe in a living Guru, as personified by the
head of their respective sects. The orthodox Damdami Taksal led by
Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale clashed with the Nirankaris on this issue
on the day of the Baisakhi festival (April 13, 1978). Sixteen followers
of the Damdami Taksal and the Akhand Kirtani Jatha were killed in
the confrontation. The incident is regarded as the beginning of terrorist
violence in Punjab. The fundamentalists were furious and they killed
Baba Gurbachan Singh, the Nirankari Chief. Lala Jagat Narain, the
proprietor and editor of the Hind Samachar group of newspapers
who was critical of the fundamentalists, was also killed. Bhindranwale
became a cult figure and moved from strength to strength. A virtual
parallel administration was set up within the Golden Temple Complex,
where Bhindranwale had entrenched himself, and which became a fortress
in which weapons were stored and from where diktats were issued.
Hit lists were prepared, police officers and men threatened, and people
were tortured and even killed inside the Temple complex. Unfamiliar
with emerging patterns of terrorism, the administration was paralysed.
Its helplessness was exemplified by the killing of A.S. Atwal, Deputy
Inspector General (DIG) of Police, in broad daylight at the main entrance
of the Darbar Sahib (Golden Temple), Amritsar. Fear stalked the land.
It was against this background that the then Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi ordered the Army to move into the Golden Temple, and Operation
Blue Star was launched (June 2, 1984). Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale,
Bhai Amrik Singh of the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF)
and Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Subeg Singh, who had organised the defences
of the Golden Temple, and a host of others were killed in the Army
operation. The temple was cleared of the terrorists, but the damage
to the Akal Takht deeply hurt the religious sentiments of the Sikhs.
Indira Gandhi had to pay the price with her life. Her assassination,
in turn, led to anti-Sikh riots at different places in which more
than 3,000 Sikhs were killed, adding to the anguish the Sikhs. The
fact that the perpetrators of the crime belonged to the ruling Congress
and were not brought to book, caused profound resentment and anger
among the Sikh community and, in course of time, led to violence on
a scale, and accompanied by a brutality, perhaps not seen elsewhere
till then.
Pakistan had been watching the developments in Punjab very closely.
The alienation of the Sikhs gave them the opportunity they were looking
forward to. In the wake of Operation Blue Star, a number of
Sikh youth, especially from the border districts, crossed over to
Pakistan. The Pakistanis screened them, indoctrinated and motivated,
trained and equipped them, and then infiltrated them into India to
precipitate terrorist violence. Pakistan's strategy was to:
destabilise the government
apparatus in Punjab;
cause a communal divide between
the Hindus and Sikhs;
encourage secessionist elements
in Punjab and thereby bring about disintegration along Indias
western borders; and
bring the Sikh and Muslim
fundamentalists on a common platform with a view to disrupting Indias
secular fabric.
Under pressure from Pakistan, the Panthic Committee of separatist
Sikhs, announced the formation of Khalistan on April 20,
1986. There was a proliferation of terrorist groups, popularly known
as Jathebandis, the important ones being the Khalistan Commando Force (KCF),
Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF), Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan
(BTFK), Babbar Khalsa (BK), and Khalistan Liberation Organisation
(KLO). The modus operandi of the terrorists included:
indiscriminate mass killings;
attacking security forces
personnel and liquidating suspected police informers;
kidnappings for ransom;
extortion;
bank robberies;
assassination of VIPs; and
hijacking aircraft, etc.
The government responded with a reorganisation of the State police
force, an induction of para-military forces and even the Army, and
made determined efforts to contain terrorist violence. Operation
Black Thunder in 1988 was a landmark. The National Security Guard
(NSG), an elite paramilitary force, assisted by the CRPF and the Punjab
Police, flushed militants out of the Golden Temple in a brilliant
operation in which 38 terrorists were killed and 199 surrendered.
It was a serious setback to the terrorist movement in Punjab. Unfortunately,
the success was not followed up, and terrorist violence picked up
again, reaching a crescendo in 1991, when there were 2,586 killings
in the State, including 493 fatalities among security forces personnel.
The graph of violence, however, started coming down sharply from about
the middle of 1992. This was achieved through a combination of factors:
Border security fencing and
flood-lighting of the Punjab border with Pakistan, which made infiltration/exfiltration
far more difficult, choking the supply lines with Pakistan;
Vigorous anti-terrorist operations,
whose main ingredients were:
· formation of
well trained and highly motivated commando units;
· improving the
intelligence network;
· giving sophisticated
weapons to the police forces;
· employing unconventional
tactics;
· Internecine
killings among the terrorist outfits;
Alienation of the public due
to reckless killings and extortion from all and sundry, and immoral
conduct of the terrorists; and
Revival of political activities
and the democratic process through the holding of State Assembly elections,
and the peaceful conduct of municipal and Panchayat elections further helped to normalise the situation.
Punjab offers a unique example where one of worlds deadliest
terrorism has not only been contained but almost stamped out. There
is however no room for complacency. The fact remains that some hard
core terrorists are yet to be accounted for, that terrorist leaders
are being sheltered across the borders, and that Pakistan continues
to explore avenues to resuscitate terrorist violence in the Punjab.
Jammu & Kashmir
Kashmir has been described in the past as a paradise on earth. This
paradise has unfortunately been bleeding. The Kashmir Valley suffered
repeated aggressions in 1947, 1965 and again in 1971 and has been
the target of cross-border terrorism since 1989.
The Kashmir problem is a legacy of the Partition of the Indian sub-continent
in 1947. Certain territories were carved out to constitute a new State
of Pakistan. The plan for partition did not apply to some 565 Princely
States. The future of these States was left to be decided by their
rulers. By August 15, 1947, most of the States acceded either to India
or to Pakistan. The ruler of the State of J&K, however, prevaricated
and, pending a final decision, concluded a Standstill Agreement with
Pakistan. The Agreement was to ensure continuity of administrative
arrangements in respect of communications, post and telegraphs, central
excise, etc. It was essentially intended to maintain the status
quo, and did not create or affect any rights or obligations that
would arise from the act of accession.
Pakistan however violated the Agreement and began to apply pressure
on J&K to secure its accession. Economic sanctions were imposed.
Supplies and services which Pakistan had agreed to give to Kashmir
under the Standstill Agreement were either withheld or delayed. The
Maharaja, however, refused to be hustled into a decision. Pakistan
precipitated matters on October 22, 1947, by sending tribesmen from
its Northwest Frontiers to invade Kashmir. The invaders caused havoc,
committing savage atrocities on men, women and children, and reducing
the towns and villages they passed through to scorched earth. The
tribesmen overran large areas of the State and were within striking
distance of the State capital, Srinagar. Faced with this grave emergency,
the Maharajah of Kashmir appealed to the Government of India for assistance
and, on October 26, 1947, executed the Instrument of Accession, making
J&K an integral part of the Indian Union. As Allan Campbell &
Johnson concluded in their book Mission with Mountbatten
the legality of the accession is beyond doubt. Indian
troops were flown into Srinagar on October 27, 1947, to stem the tide
of invasion. The invaders were pushed back and large areas occupied
by them were cleared.
It was, however, apparent that Pakistan had embarked on an undeclared
war in Kashmir. All along the Pakistan-Kashmir border, there were
a number of places where invaders were collected and from where supplies
and services to them were being organised. In its anxiety not to aggravate
tensions and worsen Indo-Pak relations, the Government of India decided
to refer the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations' Security Council
(UNSC), hoping that the UN would bring to bear the weight of world
opinion upon Pakistan and prevail upon it to discontinue its aggression
in Kashmir. On January 1, 1948, invoking Articles 34 and 35 of the
UN Charter, India lodged a complaint with the UNSC that Pakistan was
sending its own nationals and tribesmen in the invasion of the State
of J&K, and that such assistance constituted an act of aggression.
The UNSC set up the UN Commission for India and Pakistan and, after
consultations and discussions with the two Governments, brokered a
cease-fire which became effective from 11:59 p.m. on January 1, 1949.
The Truce Agreement recognised the presence of troops of Pakistan
in the territory of the State of Jammu & Kashmir and stated
that this constitutes a material change in the situation.
The J&K Constituent Assembly confirmed the legality of its accession
to India in 1954 and drafted a Constitution for the State, which formally
came into effect from January 26, 1957. The Constitution declared
that the State of Jammu & Kashmir is and shall be an integral
part of the Union of India.
Pakistans case in Kashmir is based mainly on its assertion
that the majority of Kashmiris are Muslims and that, therefore, Kashmir
must become a part of Pakistan. The premise is that the religion of
a given people determines their nationality and their political affiliation.
Whatever may have been the validity of this argument in the medieval
past, such a premise can never be accepted today. It would, indeed,
be dangerous if it were otherwise; for its acceptance would provide
a basis for subverting, in the name of religion, the loyalty of a
people to the country of their birth. Pakistans argument, if
stretched to its logical conclusion, would threaten the survival of
pluralistic nations all over the world.
The Pakistani position, moreover, ignores the fact that the State
of J&K has three well-defined geographical regions: the Kashmir
Valley, the Jammu region, and Ladakh. Only the Valley has a majority
of Muslims, Jammu has a preponderance of Hindus, and Ladakh is essentially
a Buddhist Shangri-La. India, moreover, has the second largest
Muslim population in the world, next only to that of Indonesia.
Pakistan has also been repeating ad nauseum that Kashmiris should have the right of self-determination. It
is true that, notwithstanding the accession, assurances were given
by eminent Indian leaders that the wishes of the people of J&K
would be ascertained with regard to the State forming a part of India.
These assurances were, however, given in the context of vacation of
the Pakistani aggression and withdrawal of Pakistans forces
from Kashmir as a condition precedent.
Pakistan started abetting terrorist actions in J&K as far back
as the early 1970s. Terrorists belonging to the Jammu & Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF), which was formed in 1965 in Pakistan with
the object of 'liberating' Kashmir, hijacked an Indian Airlines aircraft
in 1971 and again in 1976. In January 1984, a group of JKLF terrorists
operating from the United Kingdom kidnapped an Indian diplomat and
demanded the release of Maqbool Butt, who had been sentenced to death
by an Indian court for his involvement in terrorism. The diplomat
was later murdered. There were strong grounds to suspect that Amanullah
Khan, the founder member of the JKLF, was responsible for the incident.
The British authorities ordered Amanullah Khan to leave UK and he
returned to Pakistan, where he was given shelter by the then military
regime, and helped to reorganise the activities of the JKLF. His return
to Pakistan saw the beginning of the escalation of Pakistani abetment
of the terrorists in J&K, through the provision of money, weapons,
training facilities and sanctuaries.
The separatist movement in Kashmir began to metamorphose into militancy
in April 1988 due to a combination of factors, primarily external
and partly internal. The external factors included the resurgence
in the activities of the JKLF and the involvement of Pakistan's intelligence
agencies such as the ISI Directorate and the Field Intelligence Unit,
in imparting arms training to the Kashmiri youth. On the domestic
front, the alliance between the Congress (I) and the National Conference
(F) created a political vacuum which was exploited by anti-national
elements. The expulsion of the Jamaat-e-Islami from the Muslim
United Front in June 1988 led to the party assuming a pronounced anti-national
posture; it was no longer inhibited by electoral or political constraints.
The Jamaat-e-Islami also entered into a tactical alliance
with secessionist and pro-Islamic forces, including the Peoples League
(PL), Islamic Students League (ISL) and Islamic Jamaat-e-Tulba (IJT).
In 1989, the situation had undergone a sea change with the use of
sophisticated firearms and extensive use of explosives, which were
smuggled in from Pakistan. Infiltration of Pakistan-trained Kashmiri
youth also went up. On January 19, 1990, therefore, Governors
Rule was promulgated in the State. Pakistans role in sponsoring
international terrorism and promoting insurgency in J&K has been
comprehensively unmasked in a report prepared by the Task Force
on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, a Republican Research
Committee of the US House of Representatives. It stated that Pakistan
started playing this nefarious game as early as the 1970s, when Islamabad
commenced training of Sikh militants and members of other separatist
movements in India as a part of Zulfiqar Ali Bhuttos strategy
of forward strategic depth, as also of his effort to avenge
the loss of Bangladesh. By the mid-1980s, as brought out by the Task
Force, Islamabad began to broaden its horizons and set its
sights on bigger goals. With growing experience in training,
organising and running the mujahideen campaigns in Afghanistan, and with vast military supplies available
(through US, Saudi and other foreign assistance), Pakistan began expanding
its operation to sponsor and promote separatism and terrorism, primarily
in Kashmir, as a strategic long term programme.
Muslim fundamentalists in Pakistan saw the movement in Kashmir as
the long awaited hour for jihad against Indian infidels,
a holy war for which Pakistan must funnel material and moral backing.
Pakistans obsession with Kashmir, according to the Republican
Research Committee, stemmed from three basic factors. First, the
tension over Kashmir creates a diversion from the frustrations at
home. Second, the Kashmir cause allows Islamabad to rally the support
of Pakistans Islamist parties and their loyalists in the military
and the ISI. And, third, it provides the regime an important access
point to the markets of Central Asia.
The armed Islamic movement as well as several Saudi, Gulf, Arab
and other supporters of the 'Islamic cause' put Kashmir high on their
list of jihads to be fought. Kashmir is seen as a relatively
easy target. Many Islamic groups believe that the wresting of Kashmir
from India would be a great prize acquired at minimal cost and would
inspire their followers and further their cause. An environment has
been created in which ideological zeal and strategic and political
considerations have coalesced.
It was estimated by the Task Force that a total of about
20,000 Kashmiris were trained and armed by/in Pakistan. Logistical
support, primarily weapons and ammunition, is brought from Pakistan.
Training, organisation, propaganda and indoctrination are carried
out in the safety of Pakistani sanctuaries. It further stated
that by 1990 there were well over 30 militant groups in Kashmir representing
a wide array of ideologies. Of these, as many as 29 groups were receiving
assistance and shelter in Pakistan. Yossef Bodansky, Analyst with
the Freeman Centre for Strategic Studies, aptly stated:
For Islamabad, the liberation of Kashmir is a sacred mission, the
only task unfulfilled since Muhammad Ali Jinnahs days. Moreover,
a crisis in Kashmir constitutes an excellent outlet for the frustration
at home, an instrument for the mobilisation of the masses, as well
as gaining the support of the Islamist parties and primarily their
loyalists in the military and the ISI. [5]
The infiltration into J&K of mujahideen from Afghanistan and other Muslim countries in Central Asia, North
Africa and parts of Europe has completely changed the complexion of
militancy in the State. In December 1993, during his visit to Pakistan,
the Deputy Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Maulana Arsalan Rahmani,
admitted that Afghanistan was providing military assistance to various
insurgencies because we cannot remain aloof from what is happening
to the Muslims in occupied Kashmir, Tajikistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Burma,
Palestine and elsewhere. He hailed Afghanistans active
support to Islamist militants in different parts of the world and
stressed that we dont consider the support as intervention
in any countrys internal affairs. Rahmani added that Afghanistan
had played a major role in the merger of Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami and Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen into the potent Harkat-ul-Ansar, and said that there are about 8,000 members of Harkat-ul-Ansar
who are supporting the Kashmiri struggle against Indian occupation.
In early 1994, according to Bodansky, Pakistan had a force of 2,000-2,500
highly trained mujahideen assigned to Kashmir and that the
key force includes 1,000 Pakistanis (including Pakistan-born Kashmiris),
500 Afghans, as well as numerous Saudis, Egyptians, Sudanese, Algerians,
Nigerians, Jordanians, Palestinians and other foreign volunteers. [6] The summer of 1994 witnessed a fundamental
turning point in the conduct of the Pakistan-sponsored jihad
in Kashmir, when Islamabad organised the 13 leading Islamist
organisations into the United Jihad Council (Muttahida
Jihad Council - MJC) under the leadership of Manzur Shah and the
overall control of the ISI. Its members included the Harkat-ul-Ansar, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen, Al-Jihad, Al-Barq,
Ikhwan-ul-Mussalmin, Tehriq-ul-Mujahideen, and several other Islamist
militant organisations.
Kashmir has, in fact, ceased to be a simple territorial dispute
between Indian and Pakistan. The United Nations Commission had noted
as far back as August 13, 1948, that the presence of Pakistani troops
in J&K had brought about a material change in the
situation. Later, Gunnar Jarring, UN mediator and subsequently President
of the UNSC, reported to the Security Council on April 29, 1957, that
he could not fail to take note of the concern expressed in connection
with the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding
the whole of the Kashmir question together with the changing pattern
of power relations in West and South Asia. The situation has
since undergone a complete metamorphosis. There is aggression by
the fundamentalist Islamist forces from several countries - an aggression
organised, co-ordinated and spearheaded by Pakistan. It is part of
the so-called jihad which the fundamentalist forces have started
all over the world. Gen. Hamid Gul, a former Director of ISI, is on
record as having stated that it was Pakistans divine destiny
to form a Unified Islamic Entity in Southern and Central
Asia. We have nuclear weapons, experience of Afghan jihad and the wherewithal in the shape of Islamic zealots and volunteers
to carry out such a global campaign.
Despite the sustained onslaught, the restoration of the democratic
set up in J&K, together with the launch of well co-ordinated counter-insurgency
operations, brought about an improvement in the situation, albeit
temporarily. In the Assembly elections held in September 1996, Farooq
Abdullahs National Conference (NC) got a massive mandate, winning
57 out of the 87 Assembly seats. A US Congressional Study acknowledged
that India has slowly gained the upper hand against the Kashmiri
secessionists. The advantage has unfortunately been frittered
away by politicians who are unresponsive to the aspirations of the
people and bureaucrats who lack commitment.
The intrusion in Kargil (1999) demonstrated that Pakistan was determined
to keep the pot boiling. It is another matter that the military adventure
failed and led to a political upheaval in Pakistan, culminating in
the ouster of Nawaz Sharif and the capture of power by the Pakistan
Army. Kargil was a triumph; it was also a tragedy. It was a triumph
for the Indian forces. It was a tragedy in the sense that the intrusions
need not have taken place at all and that the resultant loss of precious
lives was avoidable. The security establishment of the country was
caught napping, and by the time Rip Van Winkle awoke after nearly
four months, the enemy had dug in and fortified itself well inside
Indian territory. India's failure was basically on two fronts: intelligence
and operational. The intelligence furnished was much too general and
vague for any military effort to be mounted. Operationally, the Army
committed the cardinal sin of withdrawing during winter from posts
it should have continued to hold.
The massive infiltration in Kargil and the paramount need to drive
away the intruders made it imperative that the Army formations closest
to the area of confrontation should be diverted there. And so, troops
of the 15 and 16 Corps in J&K were withdrawn from counter-insurgency
duties and diverted to pushing back the intruders. The Corps Commanders
of these formations, who were security advisors with the Unified Headquarters,
were replaced by the Director General of Rashtriya Rifles
(RR) at the instance of Army Headquarters. The Central and State governments
were, perhaps, not consulted in the new arrangement. This was resented
by the State government, as also by the paramilitary forces. The security
grid, which regulated the deployment of forces and ensured operational
co-ordination between them, became loose in the process and even showed
centrifugal tendencies. Meanwhile, about 1,200 foreign militants took
advantage of the thinning down of troops and their diversion to operational
sectors to infiltrate into the Valley. There has, as a result, been
a stepping up in the tempo of militancy marked by daring attacks on
the security forces establishments.
Pakistans strategy in Kashmir could be summarised as follows:
Continue fanning the flames
of insurgency by providing
· Training facilities;
· Sanctuaries;
· Financial help;
and
· Arms / ammunition
/ explosives to the militants.
Raising the level of violence
by
· Providing more
sophisticated weapons and communication equipment to the militants;
· Upgrading their
training skills; and
· Inducting mujahideen
from foreign countries.
Expanding the arc of violence
to
· the Jammu region
of the State; and
· Other parts
of India.
Subverting / sabotaging the
political structure in the State;
Raising the issue at international
fora from time to time; and
Bringing the fundamentalists
elements, viz., Kashmiri militants, Sikh terrorists, and communal
groups on a common platform with a view to:
· Disrupting Indias
secular character;
· Causing communal
disturbances in different parts of the country; and
· Working for
the disintegration, particularly of the border States.
The strategy has acquired a sharper edge over the past months, particularly
after Pakistans failure to gain ground in Kargil and the hijacking
of an Indian Airlines Airbus, which culminated in the release of three
notorious militants including Maulana Masood Azhar. The Maulana
subsequently threatened to organise a 500,000 strong mujahideen
force to wage jihad against India and declared that he would
not rest until Kashmir was liberated. [7] The Pakistan-based religious
extremist groups have also threatened that their jihad would spread beyond the Kashmir Valley and that the Islamic flag
would be unfurled on the Red Fort. [8]
The United States has taken cognisance of these developments. The
Clinton Administrations top counter-terrorism official, Michael
A. Sheehan, while testifying before a Senate Sub-committee, accused
Pakistan of becoming a base for terrorist attacks in India. Within
Pakistan, there are numerous Kashmiri separatist groups and sectarian
groups involved in terrorism, which use Pakistan as a base
We
have continuing reports of Pakistani material support for some of
these militants, he said. [9] The Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) Director, George Tenet has also stated before a Senate Committee
that Pakistan is now one of the breeding grounds for extremists and
there is now an intricate web of alliances among Sunni extremists
world-wide, including North Africans, radical Palestinians, Pakistanis
and Central Asians. [10] Madeleine Albright, US Secretary
of State, has also conceded that Pakistan had become a transit
point for terrorists.
The Government of India claims to have a multi-dimensional strategy
to tackle the situation. It includes, inter alia, strengthening the border management, neutralising the militants
by proactive action against them, gearing up the intelligence machinery,
reorganising the police forces and giving them sharper teeth, raising
special battalions of Central Paramilitary Forces for counter-insurgency
operations, providing the Village Defence Committee (VDCs) with sophisticated
weapons and integrating them with the counter-insurgency grid, greater
functional integration through an improved institutional framework
at the Unified Headquarters and, at the same time, accelerating the
economic development of the State. [11]
The territorial, ethnic, religious and political disputes in the
region have, nevertheless, the potential to escalate into a fourth
Indo-Pakistan war with nuclear dimensions. The Director of the Non-Proliferation
Project of the Carnegie endowment recently stated that the South Asia
region is most likely to see the combat use of nuclear weapons
as Kashmir continued to be a frightening flash-point [12]
High Intensity Crime
The virulence of the widening arc of low intensity warfare is compounded
by the increasing incidence and influence of high intensity crimes,
a phenomenon that includes:
violent crimes;
crimes by organised gangs;
hijackings; and
Crimes by Left-wing extremists
or Naxalites.
Violent crimes have been divided by the National Crime Records Bureau
(NCRB) into crimes affecting life, affecting property, affecting public
safety and affecting women. There has been a steadily increasing trend
in violent crimes against life during the last three years (from 95,939
in 1995 to 98,638 in 1997) and violent crimes against women (from
13,754 in 1995 to 15,330 in 1997). The incidence of murder went up
by 31.7 per cent over the decade 1987-1997. The highest incidence
of murder (7,756 cases) was reported from Uttar Pradesh followed by
Bihar (5,354 cases). [13]
The mega-cities, with a population of over one million, showed an
overall increase of 4.7 per cent in crime during 1997 compared to
the previous year. The share of crime reported in Delhi has been the
highest (21.1 per cent) followed by Bombay (12.3 per cent) and Bangalore
(11.5 per cent).
The total quantum of crimes will inevitably show an upward trend
reflecting increases in population, industrialisation, urbanisation,
economic disparities, the growth of slums, unchecked migration and
a host of other factors. It is not surprising, therefore, that there
were a total of 6.41 million cognisable crimes reported in 1997, representing
an increase of 28.3 per cent over the preceding ten years. On an average,
12 cognisable crimes were reported every minute in one part of the
country or another.
Among the states, Madhya Pradesh reported the highest incidence
of crime with 205,026 cases, which amounted to 11.9 per cent of the
total Indian Penal Code (IPC) crimes reported during the year in the
country. The other States, which reported more than 150,000 cases
were Maharashtra (1,85,122 cases, 10.8 per cent), Rajasthan (1,65,469
cases, 9.6 per cent) and Uttar Pradesh (1,52,779, 8.9 per cent).
The courts' inability to dispose-off the registered cases, has also
contributed to the worsening of the crime situation. Disposal of cases
by the police has not been up to the mark, but the disposal of cases
by the courts has been pathetic. During 1997, a total of 21,95,848
cases, including those pending from the previous years, were awaiting
disposal or investigation by the police. The police were able to clear
16,72,386, that is 76.2 per cent of the total IPC cases. Actually,
the pendancy of cases awaiting disposal by the police has fluctuated
around 20 per cent during the decade 1987-1997. On the other hand,
there were a total of 54,61,004 cases pending trial in 1997, including
the pending cases of the previous year. At the end of the year, 43,95,644,
that is 80.5 per cent of these cases were still pending trial in various
criminal courts. The pendancy increased by 3.1 per cent in 1997 as
compared to 1996. The NCRB concludes that the ratio of disposal of
IPC cases by the Police to Courts is around 80:20. The police may
be the villain, but this is no compliment to the judiciary.
A disturbing fallout of the pendancy of cases has been that as many
as 1,16,54,404 persons (including those from previous years) constituting
1.2 per cent of the countrys total population, were awaiting
trial at various criminal courts in the country during 1997. The figure
is simply too high for comfort. Those concerned with the administration
of criminal justice will have to sit up and think of ways and means
to reduce the pendancy and bring down the number of persons held in
custody. The conviction rate, that is, the ratio of cases convicted
to the total number of cases tried, was a mere 38.2 per cent, which
is far from satisfactory. The principle of jurisprudence, borrowed
from the British, that it is better that nine guilty men go unpunished
rather than that one innocent man be punished, perhaps deserves a
second look in the light of our experience over the last fifty years.
In our keenness to save the one innocent man, we have repeatedly allowed
the nine guilty persons to cause havoc in the society.
Organised Crime
Organised crime is increasingly becoming virulent and devastating
in its spread and effect on the socio-economic life of the people.
It implies unlawful activities by members of a highly organised and
disciplined association, engaged in supplying illegal goods and services.
It has generally a ruthless leader at the top with a well-defined
hierarchical structure. Its members are bound by a strict code of
conduct and those deviating therefrom are punished with liquidation.
Corrupt police and public officials, lawyers and judicial officers,
political leaders and businessmen provide a protective shield for
their operations. The specialist support is extended by sharpshooters,
telecom experts and computer wizards. It is the underworlds
government, often with a trans-national network, providing services,
allocating resources and territories and settling disputes. The INTERPOL
has defined organised crime as:
Any enterprise or group of persons engaged in continuing illegal
activity which has as its primary purpose the generation of profits
irrespective of national boundaries.
The US Task Force Report, 1967, described the phenomenon in the
following words:
Organised crime is a society that seeks to operate outside the
control of the American people and their Governments. It involves
thousands of criminals working within structures as complex as those
of any large corporation, subject to laws more tightly enforced than
those of legitimate governments. Its actions are not impulsive but
rather the result of intricate conspiracies, carried on over many
years and aimed at gaining control over whole fields of activity in
order to amass huge profits.
The UN Human Resource Development Report has sounded the alarm bell
on how organised crime cartels could, in the coming years, establish
an iron grip on the world's economies. It is estimated that these
syndicates have a turnover of $1.5 trillion, which exceeds the combined
Gross National Product (GNP) of more than 50 of the least developed
nations of the world. These groups have, in fact, been dubbed as crime
multi-nationals. Syndicates such as the Six Triads in China,
which controls the restaurant trade of London, the Japanese Yakuza
who are in the business of promoting pornography, and the US-based
Cosa Nostra controlling the heroin trade, have developed strategic
alliances with key partners in different parts of the world.
The nature and extent of organised crime in India has changed substantially
during the last few decades. Its important forms today are:
Arms trafficking;
Drug abuse and drug trafficking;
Smuggling;
Money laundering and hawala;
Terrorism and Narco-terrorism;
Contract killings;
Kidnappings for ransom;
Trafficking in women and
children/prostitution;
Illegal immigration; and
Counterfeiting currency.
Mumbai is the nerve centre of organised gangs in the country. The
first gang to acquire notoriety in that city was that of Vardharaj
Mudaliar, popularly known as Vardha Bhai. Starting from bootlegging,
he graduated to gold smuggling, matka gambling, extortion
and supari(contract) killing. The other gangs that acquired
eminence in the early phase were those of Haji Mastan, Yusuf Patel
and Karim Lala. Mastan and Patel specialised in gold smuggling.
Lala, a Pathan, dealt in drugs.
The serial blasts in Bombay in March 1993, in the wake of the demolition
of the Babri mosque, showed that Pakistan's intelligence agencies
had used three mafia dons of Bombay, namely, Dawood Ibrahim, Tiger Memon and Mohammad Dossa
to inflict serious damage on the countrys economy and to destabilise
its communal equation. Dawood, Memon and Dossa now operate from Dubai
and Karachi. Their henchmen extort large sums of money from builders
and film producers and undertake supari killings. A study
conducted by a former Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, on behalf of
the Centre for Police Research, Pune, showed that the majority of
gangsters came from outside Bombay city, and that thirty per cent
were from outside the State of Maharashtra. They were not divided
on the basis of region or religion, but after the 1993 bomb blasts,
Hindu gangsters dissociated themselves from the Dawood gang.
Dawoods is the most powerful gang with a network all over
the country and with linkages abroad. The gang is mostly involved
in drug trafficking, smuggling, extortion and contract killings. It
has a strength of about 4,000 men and the turnover of its business
empire is estimated to be around INR 20 billion per year. Apart from
his brothers, who are Dawoods chief counsellors, he is assisted
by Abu Salem and Chhota Shakeel.
There is yet no comprehensive law in the country to deal with the
phenomenon of organised crime. The offences have to be dealt with
under different sections of the IPC, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, Arms Act, Explosives Act, Immoral Traffic (Prevention)
Act, Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, etc. Countries like the United
States, Japan and Italy have legislation on the subject. The US deals
with the problem under the Organised Crime Control Act, 1970. Japan has a Prevention of Irregularities
by Gangsters Act. Italy deals with it under Article 416 of its
Penal Code.
The Government of India, conscious of the need to tackle organised
crime in a systematic manner, has drafted an Organised Crime Control
Act. It defines an organised criminal gang as:
A band of two or more persons who commit or attempt to commit or
cause to be committed, either individually or collectively, in furtherance
of a common object or objects and on a continuing basis, for material
gains or otherwise, by taking recourse to use or show of violence
or threat of violence, either direct or implied, or by fraudulent
or dishonest means corrupting the public servants, any of the acts
listed in Schedule - I to this Act.
Schedule-I of the draft includes most of the major criminal offences
like murder, physical harm, smuggling, trafficking in drugs, kidnapping
for ransom, espionage, causing bomb blasts, aircraft hijacking, hostage
taking, mass killing, contract killing, gang rapes, extortion, etc.
The draft, significantly, also provides for the setting up of a national
body to co-ordinate efforts against organised crime and setting up
of Organised Crime Cells at the State level.
Organised crime in India, according to the CBI, is on the rise.
Extortion, kidnappings for ransom, gun running, illicit trafficking
in women and children, narcotics trade, money laundering using the
hawala network, every conceivable kind of cheating and fraud,
bank scams and so on, not only spread a sense of insecurity in the
common man but also drain the country of thousands of crores of rupees.
What gets reported to and investigated by the law enforcement agencies
is only a minuscule percentage of the overall quantum of organised
criminal activity. [14]
Hijacking
The hijacking of the Indian Airlines Airbus-300 (Flight IC-814)
on December 24, 1999, was the thirteenth episode of its kind since
1971, when the first hijacking took place involving a Fokker friendship
aircraft. The Government of India, after a prolonged drama lasting
over a week, exchanged three militants for the release of the hostages
on board the Airbus at Kandahar. As stated by Brahma Chellaney, whatever
the apparent and hidden costs of the Kandahar deal, the main lesson
of the hijack crisis is obvious: India is under siege from fundamentalist-terrorist
forces fattened by a thriving heroin trade, plentiful supply of modern
weapons, and aid from regimes lacking legitimacy. [15] A leading national daily also deplored that
the Indian Republic has been outmanoeuvred by terrorists and
by a neighbour which supports them and unleashes them on this country
and that the decision to free three notorious terrorists will
be hailed as a great victory by Islamabad in its proxy war. [16]
Naxal Crimes
The Naxalite movement, which erupted violently in 1967, actually
originated from a small village by the name of Naxalbari at the tri-junction
of India, Nepal and what was then East Pakistan. Two decades had passed
since the dawn of freedom and yet large segments of the Indian population
- peasants, workers and tribals - continued to suffer from the worst
forms of exploitation. The peaceful political process, it was felt,
would not be able to bring about the necessary changes because vested
interests controlled the levers of power, regulated the wheels of
industry and had a feudal stranglehold over the predominantly agrarian
economy. An armed struggle, it was consequently argued, was the only
way out. The movement attracted some of the finest brains and some
of the finest among the countrys youth. Charu Mazumdar, the
ideologue, gave a call for the annihilation of class enemies,
which was projected as a higher form of class struggle and the
beginning of guerrilla war. The identified 'class enemies' included
the landlords and their agents, rich peasants, moneylenders, and policemen
and their informers. The fire spread to several parts of the country.
There were acts of terrorism involving targeted killings. Naxalite
violence touched a peak between the middle of 1970 and the mid-1971,
when there were a total of about 4,000 violent incidents in which
565 persons lost their lives. The Government of India thereupon initiated
joint operations by the Army and the Police in the worst-affected
areas of West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The leading cadres of the
movement were apprehended or killed. The movement suffered a setback.
Intra-party differences weakened it further. The formation, in 1980,
of the Peoples War Group (PWG) in Andhra Pradesh gave a fresh
lease of life to the movement. Gradually the PWG emerged as the most
formidable and the most aggressive Naxalite formation in the country,
spreading its tentacles to the adjoining areas of Madhya Pradesh,
Maharashtra and Orissa. Bihar has also witnessed fierce Naxalite violence,
particularly by the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC).
Naxalites have been killing about four to five hundred persons a
year through the nineties, demonstrating thereby their lethal punch.
The PWG in Andhra Pradesh has lately been on a rampage to express
its protest and anger over the encounter in which three
of their top comrades were killed. It was alleged that PWG Central
Committee Members Nalla Adi Reddy, Y. Santosh Reddy and Seelam Naresh
were whisked away from Bangalore and thereafter killed in what was
described as an encounter between Naxalites and the police in the
forests of Karimnagar district on December 2, 1999. The Naxalites
gave a call for a two-day State bandh in mid-December during which they set off landmines, blasted railway
tracks, burnt houses of ruling party legislators and torched State-owned
buses. Seven Andhra Pradesh Police personnel were also killed by the
Naxalites in an attack on the Dorukonda armed outpost in a dense forest
area, about 180 kilometres from the port city of Vishakhapatnam, on
February 18, 2000.
The PWG in Andhra is believed to have a formidable arsenal. Organised
into 54 dalams the Naxals have, according to the State Police, a total of 1,690 weapons
including 90 AK 47 rifles, 650 revolvers and pistols and 950 other
weapons. [17]
In Madhya Pradesh, the Naxals hacked to death the State Transport
Minister, Lakhiram Kavre at Sonepuri village, Balaghat district, on
December 15, 1999. They followed this up by killing 23 policemen in
a landmine explosion near Narayanpur in Bastar district on February
20, 2000. Those killed included Additional Superintendent of Police,
Bhaskar Dewan. It is estimated that out of the 150 people killed by
Naxalites in Madhya Pradesh during the past decade, 122 have been
policemen. The Bastar division has been the worst affected, with 86
killings.
In Bihar, the MCC killed 12 members of the minority community at
Loto village, 42 kilometres from Daltonganj, on November 16, 1999.
The marauders, said to number 200, slit the throats of the victims,
not even sparing women and children. The MCC also tried to disrupt
the recently held Assembly elections in the State. In the violence
let loose by them, eight CRPF jawans and four Border Security
Force (BSF) personnel lost their lives. The Naxalites also killed
eight Bihar Military Police jawans and a driver in a landmine
explosion at Lamari village under the Majhiaon police station of Garhwa
district on March 11, 2000, and decamped with their rifles and a large
amount of ammunition.
State governments have generally made the mistake of treating the
Naxalite problem as a law and order problem alone. They forget that
development has exposed the tribals to economic and social injustice,
and that this draws them towards the Naxalites, who take cudgels on
their behalf to protect them from forest contractors and middlemen.
The process of globalisation has unfortunately sharpened the divide
between the haves and have nots. As stated by Pranay Gupte, Editor
of The Earth Times:
Yet political freedom hasnt brought a better life for most
of the worlds people. As a new millennium dawns, the global
imbalance of misery is far more dramatic than anything
even imagined:
2 billion of the worlds population of 6 billion live under the
poverty line, subsisting on less than the equivalent of $1 a day.
While industrialised countries are largely awash with prosperity,
the benefits of globalisation seem to elude growing number of people
in more and more countries. For many of these people, it has been
a transition from Raj to rags. [18]
Tackling the Terror
Low intensity conflicts and high intensity crime are a serious threat
to regional political stability and a big drain on the countrys
economy. Moreover, they generate social tensions, dividing people
along caste, ethnic, communal, sectarian and regional lines. They
need to be tackled in a comprehensive manner. The basic requirements
necessary for engagement in LIC, according to Kimbra L Krueger, are: [19]
1. Insurgency and counter
insurgency;
2. Combination of military
and political means to achieve well defined goals;
3. Covert action including
SOPs and HUMINT (Special Operations and Human Intelligence);
4. Protracted commitment
to protracted conflict;
5. Hierarchical and
integrative policy co-ordination, execution and implementation;
6. Unitary command structure
integrated with civilian and diplomatic efforts;
7. Peace Operations based on the principles:
Peace keeping preferred to
peace enforcement;
Planning for a political
end state and a clear exit point for the peace keepers;
Effective policy co-ordination,
implementation and execution;
Strict adherence to objectives;
Humanitarian Assistance;
Exit point;
Effective cease fire in place;
Limited and specific goal
with reasonable chance of success;
Low risk environment.
India will have to evolve a long-term policy for tackling LICs,
and has to examine the basic causes that have led people in a particular
area to take up arms. These causes should be analysed threadbare and
the legitimate grievances addressed. At the same time, there should
be a conscious effort to bring disaffected groups into the national
mainstream without snapping their cultural moorings. Counter-insurgency
operations should be well orchestrated, with complete unity of command
at the apex. Human rights must be respected and there should be no
recourse to short-cut methods. Intelligence available with different
agencies needs to be pooled. External involvement and support, where
it exists, must be cut-off. The local police needs to be energised
and motivated to engage the insurgent outfits. The paramilitary forces
require greater mobility, weaponry and improved communications. It
will also have to be ensured that the right force is deployed at the
right place. There is also urgent need to reform the civil administration
in order to make it more loyal, committed and responsive to the aspirations
of the people.
A note prepared by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) contained
the dismal observation that there is widespread corruption and
leakage of funds, that the politician/ bureaucrat / businessman
/ contractor nexus has defeated all attempts to tackle insurgency,
and that the insurgent activities had become a self-sustaining
system promoted and kept alive by the very people charged with its
eradication. As long as this nexus persists, and accountability
cannot be enforced at all levels, all efforts to bring the unending
tragedies of escalating violence under control will remain doomed
to failure.