The most recent twist in the meandering, much-flogged conflict resolution
process in Sri Lanka is the entry of the Government of Norway as a facilitator
to initiate talks between the Sri Lankan Government and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Governments of some countries in the
West, including Norway, are said to have maintained contact with the
two protagonists over the past few years and, on several occasions,
offered their good offices to help resolve the armed conflict between
the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL) and the LTTE. But the former steadfastly
rejected the offers on grounds that the conflict is an internal affair
whilst keeping a door ajar for an external third party to facilitate
the commencement of negotiations; the latter insisted that a non-Sri
Lankan agency must mediate future negotiations. The effectiveness of
Norways intervention would, therefore, crucially depend on its
ability to straddle the status divide between facilitator and mediator.
If the role of the Government of India between 1983 and 1990 qualifies
as the first foreign involvement in the armed conflict, the Norwegian
initiative, evidently endorsed by many Governments in Western Europe
and North America, is the first international intervention. Its relevance
is heightened by the apparent prospect for forging a bipartisan consensus
between the two main Sinhalese political parties in Colombo, the Sri
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP). President
Chandrika Kumaratunga, who is Deputy Leader of the SLFP, met Ranil
Wickremasinghe, Leader of the Opposition and of the UNP, on theMarch
9, 2000. The event is significant because both the SLFP, the dominant
member in the current Peoples Alliance (PA) coalition government,
and the Opposition UNP had avoided any bilateral contact to formulate
a common approach in Colombo to the armed conflict during the past
two-and-half decades.
[1]
Predictably, the unprecedented meeting between the two arch political
rivals is being hailed as a historic breakthrough. Viewed in conjunction
with Norways involvement at the request of GSL and
wish of LTTE, hopes are high that the two parties would
reach a Sinhalese consensus on a conflict resolution proposal (CRP),
popularly referred to as the peace package. These developments,
together with the anticipated subsequent negotiations between the
Sinhalese-controlled GSL and the LTTE, the cutting edge of the Ceylon
Tamil
[2] national movement in the Tamil-majorityNorth-EastProvince
(NEP),
[3] on the basis of that CRP are seen in Colombo as constitutive
of the most favourable window to peace thus far.
But journalistic euphoria, however understandable, is no substitute
for rigorous analysis. This paper seeks to dig deeper, reflecting
on the historical background provided by the previous instance when
talks were held between President Kumaratungas delegation
[4] and ranking members
of the LTTEs political wing
[5] over the period October 1994
to March 1995.
[6] Thereafter, it examines the significant
provisions of the CRP and assesses the alleged convergence of interest
between the SLFP and the UNP with the primary intention of exploring
the logic and trajectory of the underlying political dynamic. In conclusion,
it evaluates the scope for hammering out a political solution between
the PA Government and the LTTE-led Tamil national movement.
The conceptual underpinnings
The GSLs approach which encapsulates Sinhalese perceptions
was enunciated in May 1994 by Kumaratunga, ethnically Sinhalese
and the then Prime Ministerial candidate. In an interview published
in a Tamil daily newspaper,
[7] she had elaborated the policy
of her future SLFP-led PA Government on conflict resolution thus:
1. A political solution to the Tamil
problem could be achieved based on a form of decentralisation of authority
which includes an institutional mechanism for centre-region interaction.
She excluded devolution of power and instead intended at best to
lubricate decentralisation through an unspecified centre-region institutional
interface.
2. Such a political solution must apply
equally to all parts of the country.
In other words, she ignored the central issue, namely, the Tamil
national movement, which is specific to the NEP.
3. The intransigence
of the LTTE is the only obstacle to a negotiated peace.
The implication here was that her future Government would keep open
the military option to deal with the LTTE-led Tamil national movement.
Nevertheless, Kumaratunga campaigned on the optimistic platform
of peace at any cost that was sensitive to the widespread
desire for an end to the armed conflict among the majority of Sinhalese
and Tamil voters. The PA won the parliamentary elections in August
1994 and she took over as Prime Minister.
The LTTE reciprocated her stated commitment to peace. Its Leader,
Velupillai Prabhakaran, wrote to her in early September, inviting
her to commence negotiations.
[8] About two weeks later the organisations
political advisor, Anton Balasingam, announced that the LTTE was willing
to drop the demand for an independent State of Tamil Eelam; that it
was prepared to accept a substantial (devolution) package
as an alternative to the demand. Deputy Minister of Defence
Anuruddha Ratwatte signalled Prime Minister and Minister of Defence
Kumaratungas willingness to dialogue and the first meeting for
talks was held on October 13, 1994 in Jaffna.
The day after Prime Minister Kumaratunga was sworn in as President
on November 12, Prabhakaran offered a one-week Cessation of Hostilities
(COH).
[9] President Kumaratunga responded
by inviting the LTTE to communicate the offer of COH officially to
the Government and by offering a two-week extension of that COH.
[10] It is unclear whether the LTTE acceded to the Presidents
request; nevertheless the violence abated. At the end of November,
Prabhakaran announced that the LTTE was ready to consider regional
self rule.
[11]
Almost simultaneously, in November, a one-page anonymous note titled
Framework for constitutional restructuring to end the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka was circulated in Colombo. It contained the following broad suggestions
for conflict resolution:
1. Assure the unity of Sri Lanka through the powers of the
Executive Presidency.
2. Under the President there shall be two Councils, one for
safeguarding the Constitution and other for minority interests.
3. There shall be two Parliaments, one for Singhala Ratta and
one for Tamil Eelam, each with a Prime Minister and a Cabinet assuring
the rights of self determination of the two principal nationalities
of Sri Lanka, namely Tamils and Sinhalese who are distinguished by
a history of self government.
4. The Sri Lankan armed forces shall consist of three independent
structures, namely the armed forces of Singhala Ratta, Tamil Eelam
and a national co-ordinating army.
5. After constitutional restructuring, peoples wish to
resettle in a place of their choice shall be supported by the State.
6. The North and East shall be permanently merged. If necessary
the areas of Padaviya (Padavil Kulam), Thambankadavai East (Mannampity)
and Wilpattu be exchanged for the District of Amparai.
7. Abolish Provincial Councils.
The contents of the note were believed by some to reflect the almost
confederal parameters of a devolution proposal that may be acceptable
to the LTTE and which President Kumaratunga, therefore, could advantageously
incorporate in her CRP.
The second meeting for talks was held in Jaffna on January 3, 1995 and optimism was heightened
when the President formally declared a temporary COH with the LTTE
on January 8. The LTTE Leader welcomed the Presidents action
and reciprocated by proposing that the COH be made permanent. The
President disagreed. Nevertheless the third meeting for talks took
place on January 14.
In early March, the LTTE reiterated its readiness to abandon the
demand for a separate State and outlined the contours of a viable
CRP by enumerating Four Principles that should be incorporated in
such a proposal. They were:
Ř The problem of the Tamils
should be accepted as a national issue.
Ř The Tamil people must
be accepted as a national entity.
Ř The traditional homeland
of the Tamils should be accepted.
Ř The rights and sovereignty
of the Tamils should be accepted.
[12]
Sifting through the semantic jugglery, it is possible to discern
two issues central to the Tamil national movement and on which the
two protagonists held diametrically opposite views. The GSL defined
the Tamil people as a minority whilst envisaging a 'decentralisation' of authority equally to all
provinces on a territorial basis. The Sinhalese position, therefore,
was that the conflict should be resolved within the framework of the
existing unitary State. In contrast, the LTTE conceived the Tamils
as a nation whose political aspirations could be realised
only under a 'devolution' of power
[13] unique to
Tamils on a linguistic basis in the NEP. The structural requirement
for conflict resolution from the standpoint of the LTTE, short of
complete independence, was a change to a confederal system of government.
The fourth meeting for talks was held on April 10, 1995. By then, however, the exchanges
between the protagonists had turned increasingly acrimonious. The
LTTE requested, and the President agreed, that the GSLs economic
embargo on the NEP should be lifted and normal living conditions restored
for Tamil civilians. The LTTE specified two additional conditions,
which concerned military aspects, including the removal of the army
camp strategically located south of Jaffna in Pooneryn. The GSL did
not lift the economic embargo; nor did it concede the other two conditions.
The President claimed she could not unveil her CRP, if any did exist,
allegedly because the LTTE opposed its publication. But the
LTTE countered that it refused to discuss a proposal until the President
met the conditions it had specified.
In the midst of this political tug-of-war, the President announced
the intention to unilaterally formulate plans for the reconstruction
of the Jaffna Peninsula. In the absence of a CRP, the LTTE interpreted
the proposed SLR 39 billion programme (approximately US $ one billion
at that time) as an 'economic carrot' dangled before the war-ravaged
Tamil community, and as part of a strategy to drive a wedge between
the Tamil people and the LTTE.
Not surprisingly, by this time mutual suspicion became intense.
On March 27, the President, speaking in New Delhi, offered to lift
the fuel embargo on the NEP. The LTTE Leader, in turn, delivered a
three-week notice for the termination of the COH on April 19, if the
Presidents offer was not implemented; implementation failed
and the LTTE ended the COH on that day.
The contentious matters that bedevilled the talks, however, could
not detract from the fundamental political chasm between the Sinhalese-controlled
GSLs insistence on classifying Tamils as a minority and the
LTTE-led Tamil national movements stance that Tamils constitute
a nation. This is not merely a semantic dispute. The point at issue
is whether or not the Tamil people possess the right to national self-determination.
The Governments assertion was that Tamils, as members of a minority
group, are entitled to individual rights guaranteed to all citizens; the movements position
was that Tamils, as a nation, enjoyed the collective right of national self-determination.
The CRP currently under consideration needs to be assessed against
this historical backdrop.
The proposal for constitutional reform
The Parliamentary Select Committee Report on Constitutional
Reform, [14] tabled in Parliament in October
1997, excluded Article 2 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka, which states: The Republic of Sri Lanka
is a UnitaryState. The Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC)
report which is the current CRP instead proposed to
describe the country as a Union of Regions [Article 1(1)].
The use of the word Union
[15] evoked potentials of the Indian constitutional model. Moreover,
the absence of Article 2 held out the possibility of the CRP moving
beyond the confines of the unitary State to set up, and devolve power
to, federalist institutions to satisfy, to a large extent, the political
aspirations of Tamils.
But Article 92(1) of the PSC Report stated: Parliament shall
not abdicate or in any manner alienate its legislative power, and
shall not set up any authority with legislative power, a verbatim
re-statement of the controversial Article 76
[16] of the Constitution that forbade devolution of power. Thus,
Article 1(1) merely conjured up the illusion of federalism and the
CRP, too, in fact, permitted only political decentralisation.
Secondly, the PSC Report re-named the province as a Region, envisaged
the establishment of a Regional Council (RC) in each region, and decentralisation
of authority uniformly to all (Articles 127 to 139).
[17] This apparently egalitarian
approach denied acknowledgement of the unique political context thrown
up by the Tamil national movement in the NEP; it, therefore, rejected
the need for qualitatively different powers and a higher level of
autonomy for that Province. Consequently, neither the institutional
framework of the proposed RC nor its anticipated legislative and executive
powers have any relevance to the national aspirations of Tamils.
Moreover, after tabling the PSC report in Parliament, Minister of
Justice, Constitutional Affairs, Ethnic and National Integration Prof.
G.L. Peiris explicitly stated that the CRP would not be communicated
to the LTTE until there was a substantial laying down of arms
by that organisation. In other words, the GSL reserved the military
option to deal with the LTTE-led Tamil national movement.
The CRP, therefore, embodied the three main perceptions of the Sinhalese
people enunciated by President Kumaratunga in May 1994. It was concerned
only with political decentralisation; it ignored the historical specificity
of the Tamil national movement and reiterated the GSLs preference
for a military solution to the armed conflict.
Indeed, the CRP that was announced in Colombo and the military campaign
in the NEP are inter-related aspects of a unified politico-military
approach to the Tamil national movement. Minister Peiris had candidly
explained the strategy in August 1995 after the first of four CRPs
[18]
was released to the public: Some want to know the necessity
for a political solution when a war is raging. True, what we need
to win the war is armaments not a political solution. But we have
been able to procure military hardware because we have presented a
political solution. The Presidents leadership has gained international
acceptance today. Therefore, we experience no difficulty to get our
arms requirements. The President and the Government have succeeded
in convincing the world community that restoration of peace is possible
through the political package. We cannot expect the co-operation
of the international community [to execute the military campaign]
without seeking a political solution.
[19] (Emphasis added)
The main objectives of formulating the CRP were revealed when the
Minister outlined the tortuous stages through which it would be put
through. He qualified the August 1995 proposals as the Presidents
own views or basic ideas
almost in the form of a Green
Paper. The next stage is for the draft chapter of the new constitution
on devolution to be presented to the PSC on Constitutional Reform.
Within about two to three weeks we will try to finalise that document
and that will be placed before the PSC
we will have full discussion
to reach consensus within that forum. Thereafter it could be presented
in Parliament where we would need a 2/3 majority.
[20]
If timing is everything in politics, even a cursory knowledge of
the ground situation in Sri Lanka would show that the long-drawn-out
four-stage approach was essentially a two-pronged ploy to buy time
for the victorious completion of military operations, as well as to
hasten that victory by politically isolating the LTTE.
[21] In this regard, the Minister
explained the utility of the proposals thus: We do expect that
the military effort will have the effect of diminishing the strength
of the LTTE. But the political proposal will also have a role in that
regard because they will go a long way towards convincing the Tamil
people that the Government should be supported and that will alienate
the Tamil people from the LTTE. So there is a connection between the
two things.
[22]
The August proposals were followed by Operation Riviresa in
September. The January 1996 document was released 48 hours before
Operation Rivikirena was launched in the east of the NEP on
January 18; and the March 1977 proposals were released while feverish
preparations were going on for Operation Jayasikurui, which was launched in May.
Moreover, as the Government had entered the second half of its six-year
term of office, attention began shifting towards the next parliamentary
and presidential elections due in or before the year 2000. To win
the elections, it was necessary to formulate the political response
in such a manner so as to re-build the 'peace platform' crafted by
the SLFP, as this had ensured the PAs victory at the 1994 elections.
There were, in addition, strong rumours of an early presidential election
possibly in late 1998 to reap the electoral advantage
of military successes on the battlefield. So the PSC report also served
as the first political salvo in the imminent election campaign.
Driven primarily by the need to build a competing 'peace image'
in preparation for the forthcoming elections, the leadership of the
UNP released its Observations on the PSC Report. The first
instalment of the document was made public on February 1, 1998; [23] the second instalment was
released on March 8, 1998. [24]
The Observations (second instalment) did not pledge to repeal
Articles 2 and 76 of the Constitution. Rather they underlined the
need to maintain the Unitary State by emphasising the indivisibility
and unity of Sri Lanka as a nation (para 1.1) and envisaging
the devolution of power within the framework of an indivisible
Sri Lanka (para 2.1). On the face of it, these provisions indicated
the UNPs resolve to retain Article 2. In the Sri Lankan political
context, these phrases are also the traditional code words to whip
up chauvinist Sinhalese support by accusing the other side (the PA
in this instance) of scheming to 'divide the country' and 'surrender'
a part of it (the NEP) to the 'enemy' (Tamils). Similarly the discussion
on the elimination of the Concurrent List of subjects, to avoid conflicts
between the Centre and the Provincial Councils (PCs) (paras 2.3, 2.4
and 2.5), given the retention of Article 76, amounted to little more
than political rhetoric. At the same time, the terms of discourse
are in the traditional mode of placating Tamil and Muslim politicians
by offering the PCs a modicum of authority and some political space
to manoeuvre.
Although the PSC report implicitly rejected power-sharing at the
Centre, [25] the Observations (first
instalment) envisaged the sharing of power amongst all communities
at the Centre; and they proposed a Second Chamber where
the minorities would be adequately represented, adequate
representation of minorities in the Cabinet of Ministers and
a President and two Vice-Presidents to represent the three major
communities (Sinhalese, Tamils, Muslims) (para 7). Despite the
apparent preference for sharing of power, the UNP, in
fact, shifted attention to the sharing of representation. It did not
provide for power sharing: for instance, no provision was made for
a double majority system. [26] The rhetoric of representation of minorities disguised
the fact that the Sinhalese would continue to constitute the overwhelming
majority in both houses of Parliament. Moreover, by ensuring that
majoritarian domination remained virtually unaffected, the UNP avoided
alienating the Sinhalese electorate. On the other hand, the party
held out posts of Vice Presidents and Cabinet Minister(s) as 'political
carrots' to induce the Tamil and Muslim politicians to back the UNP
at election time.
The next major issue that dogged conflict resolution is the extent
of the territorial unit of decentralisation with respect to Ceylon
Tamils, Muslims and Up-Country Tamils. The PSC report renamed the
PCs as RCs but failed to clearly demarcate the boundaries of the proposed
Northeast RC for Ceylon Tamils and Southeast RC for Muslims
[27] (Art 127(3)). The Observations remained silent on
a territorial unit for Muslims while reiterating the relevance of
PCs (para 2).
Neither the PSC Report nor the Observations accommodated
the demand for an autonomous region for Up-Country Tamils. [28]
There are several other issues in dispute which are not adequately
addressed by either the PSC report or the Observations. The
national flag contains the Lion Flag of the Sinhalese, with the addition
of two stripes, Saffron and Green, to signify respectively the Ceylon
Tamils and Muslims. The stripes are placed outside the Lion Flag proper
and at the less important pole-end of the flag. [29] Most Tamil politicians have demanded a change
in the flag design and it has been a bone of contention for more than
four decades. But the PSC report effectively rejected any change in
the national flag: it categorically stated that the National
Flag of the Republic shall be the Lion Flag (Art 4). The Observations
made no reference to the national flag and, therefore, envisaged no
change.
Secularism is another issue in dispute. Article 9 of the Constitution
specified as follows: The Republic shall give to Buddhism the
foremost place. The provision privileged the Buddhists (who
are Sinhalese) to the detriment of Hindus and Muslims (who are Tamils)
and Christians (who are found among Sinhalese and Tamils). Tamils
criticised the provision as a departure from the secular tradition;
and they underlined the return to a secular political framework [30] as an essential basis
for ensuring the national rights of Tamils.
However, the Observations (second instalment) confirmed that Article 9 of the Constitution
would be retained (para 1.2). The PSC report reiterated that Buddhism
shall enjoy the foremost place and further entrenched
the trend away from secularism: it provided for the constitution of
a Supreme Council of Buddhist Clergy (Art 7).
The Language Question arose when Sinhala was legislated as the sole
official language of the country by the SLFP-led Mahajana Eksath Peramuna
(MEP) coalition Government in 1956; and Article 18 of the Constitution
as formulated in 1978 had provided: The Official Language of
Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala. Since 1956, Tamils have demanded
that Tamil must be made an official language at par with Sinhala,
to protect the linguistic rights of Tamils.
The then UNP Government appeared to accommodate the Tamil demand
when it amended Article 18, through the 1987 13th Amendment
to the Constitution, to read as follows:
1) The official language of Sri Lanka shall be Sinhala.
2) Tamil shall also be an official language.
3) English shall be a link language.
On closer reading, however, it was evident that Tamil is not at
par with Sinhala as an official language of Sri Lanka, for the provision
is worded in such a manner as to retain the primacy of the Sinhala
language. Sinhala is The official language of Sri
Lanka. In contrast, the Tamil language is accorded a subordinate
position by the use of the word also and by not
stating whether it is the official language of the whole country,
province or district. In short, Sinhala remains the sole official
language of the whole country.
The discrimination against Tamils inherent in Article 18 is demonstrated
by the alternative provision in the PSC report that proposed bilingualism;
it read: The official languages of the Republic shall be Sinhala
and Tamil (Art 32). However, it is not buttressed by the substantive
provisions, which in fact retained the primacy of Sinhala language.
They provided that Sinhala shall be the language used for the
maintenance of public records by the national and regional public
institutions and local authorities in the Capital Territory [Municipalities
of Colombo and Sri Jayawardenapura] and all the Regions other than
the [Ceylon Tamil and Muslim majority] Regions (Art 35(2)) in
the north and east of the country. Sinhala language domination was
reinforced by the provision that a Regional Administration of
local authority which maintains its public records in Sinhala shall
be entitled to receive communications from and to communicate and
transact business with any official, in his or her official capacity,
in Sinhala, and a Regional Administration of local authority which
maintains its public records in Tamil shall be entitled to receive
communications from and to communicate and transact business with
any official, in his or her official capacity, in Tamil (Art
37(2)). The apparent reciprocity offered to the Ceylon Tamils and
Muslims masks the fact the Central Government is controlled by Sinhalese
and that the Ceylon Tamil and Muslim-majority regions would, in practice,
be compelled to communicate in Sinhala with the Centre and Sinhalese-majority
provinces. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the formulation
of these articles was guided partly by electoral considerations: Article
32 was crafted to satisfy the Tamil electorate while the other provisions
in effect maintained the status quo to assure the Sinhalese voters.
The Observations (both instalments) are silent on the subject
of official language, indicating that the UNP intends to keep Article
18.
While the SLFP and UNP prevaricated over the issue of Tamil rights,
the conflict between the Sinhalese-controlled Government and the LTTE-led
Tamil national movement metamorphosed into a full blown armed conflict,
which inexorably drew other communities into its vortex. By the mid-1990s,
the Government was embroiled in the struggle for territory with two
other national movements. So far the contests between the Government
and the Muslims, led by the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), as well
as that between the Government and the radicalised Up-Country Tamils,
represented by the Up-Country Peoples Front (UPF), remain largely
political. However, unconfirmed but reliable reports indicate armed
factions are emerging within the latter two national movements: a
shadowy Al Jihad in the eastern region and an underground
Up-Country Peoples Liberation Front (UPLF). The complexity of
the multiple national movements is underlined by the interplay between
the cross cutting linguistic (Sinhala-Tamil) division and religious
identities (Buddhist-Hindu-Muslim). The success of a CRP now depends
on how the SLFP and UNP would respond to the demands of the Ceylon
Tamil, Muslim and Up-Country Tamil national movements.
Sinhalese bi-partisanship and the national movements
The current phase of the conflict resolution exercise, which began
with the re-election of President Kumaratunga in December 1999, is
based on the assumption that the crass opportunism of the two Sinhalese
parties is the primary obstacle to hammering out a political solution
to the armed conflict. The electoral contest between the SLFP and
UNP to garner Sinhalese votes invariably degenerated into competitive
chauvinism, as opportunistic politicians whipped up narrow Sinhalese
nationalism. [31] A recent instance is the conflicting assertions
made about the PSC report during the 1999 presidential election campaign.
While President Kumaratunga painted a rosy future for Tamils within
a Union of Regions, which was alleged to be federalism
in everything but name, Ranil Wickremasinghe condemned it as
an insidious plot to divide the country. The President
responded by repeating the claim that, because the UNP withheld its
support in Parliament, the PA is unable to legislate the constitutional
reforms proposed in the CRP with the mandatory two-thirds majority. [32] Wickremasinghe, however, asserted the need
to first negotiate with the LTTE Leader, Prabhakaran, to secure his
agreement to the CRP; and announced that if elected President, he
would commence a 'dialogue' with him. President Kumaratunga in turn
accused Wickremasinghe of colluding with the LTTE to overthrow her
Government.
Indeed, the international community has also come to regard an SLFP-UNP
consensus as an indispensable precondition for formulating a credible
CRP. The then British Under Secretary, Liam Fox, engineered an agreement
between President Kumaratunga and Wickremasinghe in 1998 as the first
step to this end. However, both leaders signed the Liam Fox Agreement
separately in their respective offices, rather than together in one
room, which indicated that there was a long way to go before consensus
could, if at all, be reached.
Two events drastically altered the ground situation. In the first
week of November 1999, Operation Oyatha Alaigal 3 (Unceasing
Waves 3) of the LTTE clawed back most of the territory the Army had
captured since January 1996. This signalled the failure of the Presidents
war for peace strategy and underlined the virtual impossibility
of imposing a military solution upon the Tamil national movement.
In the following month, the President was re-elected with a reduced,
slender majority, pointing to a probable defeat for her PA in the
forthcoming parliamentary elections in August 2000. These changes
in the military and political conditions, combined with intense pressure
from the international community channelled through the Norwegian
Government, induced the SLFP and UNP to commence a dialogue in early
2000.
Wickremasinghe made the first substantive move. He wrote to President
Kumaratunga in early February, offering conditional support in Parliament
for the 1997 PSC Report. [33]
President Kumaratunga replied on February 18, to invite Wickremasinghe
for discussions on February 22. I wish to emphasise, she
added, that what we expect to discuss is none other than the
Draft that was prepared by the Government in August 1995; and
that the Draft has now been finalised incorporating the views
of the Peoples Alliance and the Tamil parties. [34]
Wickremasinghe adroitly side-stepped the trap of discussing the defunct
1995 proposals; he pleaded insufficient notice, reiterated his willingness
to discuss the current CRP, [35] but raised objection to the transitional
provisions introduced to permit President Kumaratunga to hold the
posts of President and Prime Minister for a few years. [36]
Meanwhile, Minister Peiris had once again outlined a four-staged
process leading up to constitutional reform. President Kumaratunga
would first consult the constituent parties of the PA, then discuss
the CRP with Tamil parties represented in Parliament [37]
and thereafter seek the concurrence of the UNP in order to present
the Tigers with a consensus of all the other parties including the
Tamil parties so that the prospects of implementation are significantly
enhanced. In the final stage, the PA would hold talks with the
LTTE. [38] The aim, he said, is to
place before the LTTE proposals which are implementable. [39]
Before the first meeting took place between President Kumaratunga
and Wickremasinghe, the CRP ran into rough weather. Two constituent
parties of the PA, the Communist Party (CP) and the Lanka Sama Samaja
Party (LSSP), contradicted the Presidents claim that the PSC
report is endorsed by all parties in the PA; and they demanded the
immediate abolition of the Executive Presidency. Indeed, even within
the Presidents own party, the SLFP, there arose irreconcilable
differences. Sinhalese hard-liners demanded the de-merger of the NEP.
Muslim members opposed the provision for a South East Provincial Council,
which had been included to placate the SLMC. [40] The Tamil parties denied
approving either the CRP or the modifications unilaterally introduced
by the President. The PSC report had provided that the President shall
appoint the Governor of a Region on the advice of the Chief
Minister of the Region (Art 129(2)); and that each RC could
raise foreign funds (Art 210(1)). But the amendments required the
President merely to give due consideration to the Chief
Ministers advice, and removed the power of international borrowing.
Tamil parties rejected them. [41]
If President Kumaratungas cavalier shifting of the goal posts
cast serious doubt on her intention to construct a bi-partisan consensus
between the SLFP and the UNP, her professed eagerness to negotiate
with the LTTE appeared disingenuous, as she continued to publicly
lash out at that organisation. [42]
The LTTE, for its part, pursued its military advance in the NEP and
began laying siege to the army garrison at Elephant Pass, south of
the Jaffna peninsula. [43]
By the time the third meeting between President Kumaratunga and
Wickremasinghe took place on March 21, 2000, [44] the prospects for a bi-partisan
approach dimmed considerably. The President repeated the allegation
that the UNP and the LTTE were colluding against her:
it
now appears, for the last one-and-half years, the UNP and LTTE have
been working together. And the UNP was counting very much on the LTTE
assassinating me. There is no doubt about that. [45]
Indeed, the credibility of an SLFP-UNP consensus around the PSC
report declined drastically. Commenting on the sought-after consensus,
political advisor to the LTTE, Anton Balasingam, emphasised that what
is crucial to the Tamils is not the achievement of a broader consensus
in the south, but whether such a consensus will bring a radical framework
that would satisfy the national aspirations of the Tamils as articulated
in the Thimpu Principles. [46]
Not only had the CRP ignored the 1985 Thimpu Principles (see below),
no attempt was made to include provisions that would recognise, let
alone satisfy, the national aspirations espoused by the UPF. Despite
the modified version being rejected by 'moderate' Tamil politicians, the President further diluted
it by replacing the phrase 'Union of Regions' with the words comprising
of provinces [47] to satisfy Sinhalese hard-liners within the
PA, as also Wickremasinghe. The latter reiterated his insistence on
retaining the Unitary State and offer of the sop of two Vice Presidencies
for Tamil and Muslim politicians. The latter brusquely dismissed the
diluted CRP as well as the proposed Vice Presidencies. [48]
The LTTE has, in fact, for long insisted that a viable CRP must
be based on the 1985 Thimpu Principles put forward by representatives
of the TULF and the LTTE and four other Tamil militant organisations. [49] They are as follows:
1. Recognition of the Tamils of Sri Lanka as a distinct nationality;
2. Recognition of an identified Tamil homeland and the guarantee
of its territorial integrity;
3. Based on the above, recognition of the inalienable right of
self-determination of the Tamil nation;
4. Recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental
rights of all Tamils, who look upon the Island as their country. [50]
The 1987 Indo-Lanka Agreement partially conceded the second
principle by constituting the temporary NEP and identifying it as
areas of historical habitation of Tamils (Clause 1.4).
However, the PSC report did not confirm this provision; on the contrary,
it sought to divide the NEP into two or three Regions. [51] Neither did it address the first and third
principles, nor did it remedy the legislative shortcomings relating
to the fourth. [52] The more 'radical' LTTE is
likely to contemptuously disregard the grossly mutilated CRP, which
even in its original formulation, fell far short of the basic demands
of the Tamil national movement.
Sinhalese polity and the CRP
Vocal support for the CRP emanates from small, multi-ethnic groups
of 'peace activists'. They are organised principally within the National
Peace Council (NPC), Movement for Inter-racial Justice and Equality
(MIRJE) and the Centre for Society and Religion (CSR). They sought
to mobilise a broader, popular base cutting across ethnic boundaries
through protest actions, public meetings and regular publications;
but have met with little success. Among the Sinhalese political parties,
the Nava Sama Samaja Party (NSSP) has the unique distinction of explicitly
endorsing the right of self determination of Tamils; [53]
though Tamils have yet to be convinced sufficiently to reciprocate
by way of electoral backing.
However, these minuscule pockets of support are eclipsed by the
opposition from two critical centres of power: the Buddhist clergy
and the army. The Heads of all four Chapters of the Buddhist Sangha
defined the challenge posed by the LTTE-led Tamil national movement
as Tamil racist terrorism and exhorted President Kumaratunga
to stop talks with the LTTE through a foreign facilitator and
take all steps to crush terrorism. [54]
Sections within the Buddhist clergy have for more than four decades
opposed all attempts to reach a political solution. [55] These elements grew larger
and more powerful over time, and today encompass the vast majority
of the clergy. Most 'peace activists' draw comfort from the perceived
lack of political support for the clergy among the Sinhalese population.
However, the Buddhist monks exercise enormous negative street power,
sufficient to bring any Government to its knees. Successive Governments
have been mindful of this fact and took great care to placate them;
and the PA is no exception. [56]
The Army was largely a ceremonial institution, about 12,000 strong,
in the early 1970s. By the late 1990s, it matured into a professional
force of about 120,000 regulars. Moreover, to militarily overcome
the Tamil national movement, it was rapidly expanded, equipped with
state-of-the-art weaponry and armed with sweeping repressive powers
under the Emergency Regulations and the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(PTA). The Army convincingly demonstrated awesome destructive power
when it employed a scorched-earth strategy between September 1988
and January 1990 to decimate the Sinhalese militant group, the Jathika
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). The unprecedented scale of extra-judicial
killings and the impunity with which they were executed underlined
the virtual immunity from prosecution enjoyed by the armed forces.
Today the NEP is under direct military rule while civilian life in
most other regions is regulated by the Army in the guise of ensuring
'national security'. The Defence Ministry decides on such diverse
matters as the height of buildings to be constructed in 'sensitive'
areas to traffic flows. [57]
While President Kumaratunga is engaged in firming up the CRP and
working with the Norwegian Government to open talks with the LTTE,
the Army commander, Maj. Gen. Sri Lal Weerasuriya, publicly declared
that there would not be peace without crushing the LTTEs
military power; and unidentified senior officers
were openly critical of the negative impact the conflict resolution
activities have on everything we are trying to achieve. [58] These are breathtaking acts
of insubordination, of challenging the actions of the supreme civilian
authority and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, President Kumaratunga.
In a democracy, such officers would at the very least be removed from
their posts. But no disciplinary action was taken, which confirmed
once again that the 'national security' syndrome has legitimised the
virtual subordination of civilian authority to the Army, resulting
in a shift in the balance of power in favour of the Army; a perception
expressed in the widely-held opinion that a 'creeping coup' is well
underway.
The rebellious Buddhist clergy and mutinous Army expose the lacunae
that are most damaging to the credibility of President Kumaratungas
stated commitment to a negotiated settlement with the LTTE, for she
has comprehensively failed to contain the opposition. Perhaps, it
is not wrong to say that matters are well beyond her control now.
Her blow-hot-blow-cold approach to the Tamil national movement has
served to strengthen both the Buddhist clergy and the Army: two major
obstacles to the peaceful resolution of the conflicts around the multiple
national movements in Sri Lanka.