ForewordIn a situation of widespread disorder and violence, there is often a tendency to believe that change - any and all change - is necessarily for the better; the despairing conviction that "things can't get any worse." One of the recurrent and catastrophic lessons of human history, however, is that things can always get worse, irrespective of how bad they already are. It is essential, consequently, that policy-makers resist the counsels of despair and desperation in situations of extreme pressure, and act with deliberation, with a clear understanding not only of the immediate ground situation and the proximate alignment of forces, but of the larger context of the crisis, of their own ideological and strategic perspectives, and of the imperatives of history. This is evidently not happening
in The wider perspective is
not easy to come by. Contemporary habits of thought and analysis tend
towards 'compartmentalisation', the dissection of problems into their
component parts, and an increasing and isolated focus by specialised
groups on the specifics of each of these. In The fact, however, is that
the conflict in To believe, consequently, that we can wish away terrorism by talking to one section of the terrorists, or by securing some sort of political arrangement with their overground representatives, or through negotiations with a military regime in Pakistan that is itself captive to and intimidated by the forces of Islamic extremism within that country, is to succumb to illusion. The reality is, a vast and co-ordinated effort - comprehending diplomacy, governance, an ideological, political and strategic re-orientation, and strong security initiatives - is required. This must, however, be preceded by a great leap in our understanding of the complexity and inter-dependencies of the forces and conflicts arrayed across Central and South Asia. The simple formulae and historical perspectives that have evidently defined our responses in the past are far too inadequate to yield a coherent and effective strategy. As for terrorism itself, and the forces that support it throughout this region, as well as across the expanding arc of malignancy beyond, the cold truth is, these will have to be systematically isolated and defeated. To seek a negotiated peace with the successful terrorist is suicidal. The dominant terrorist does not negotiate the terms of peace, he extracts a price that no state can legitimately offer, and once this is paid, raises the stakes again. This is not just true for Kashmir, but for every theatre of terrorist violence in the world. There is a deeper danger in appeasement. To offer even a qualified victory to terrorism is to endorse its efficacy as a method, and the inability or failure of governments to confront it. Each such success will spawn a thousand imitators - and in the general milieu of weakness, of conciliation, or, quite simply, of a loss of nerves, at least some of these will also succeed. If the entire 21st Century is not to be lost to terror, this scourge must unequivocally be vanquished, this method must be seen, everywhere and by everyone, to have failed. There is, consequently, a clear military imperative in the war against terror. To repeat the obvious, however, the military does not, and cannot, exhaust the range of necessary responses. The present volume of Faultlines explores many of the deeper linkages, the less obvious implications of a variety of conflicts in the region. K.P.S. Gill August 20, 2000, New Delhi. |
|||||
|
|||||
|
|||||
|