The geo-strategy of a region normally hinges - at least in one primal sense
- on its proximity or susceptibility to alienation. The susceptibility
to alienation, in this context, implies proximity to 'outer lands',
which, although not overtly hostile, possess a measure of, or potential
for, sustained outward subversion.
If this thesis is to count as even minimally true, then the Northeastern
States of India expressly qualify as a region of immense
strategic importance. As a result, the security considerations of
the Northeast, threatened by way of the strategic encirclement it is heir to, cannot be glossed over.
If the geography of the region mandates its strategic encirclement, history
provides the reasons for its fortification. Until 1826 and the Treaty
of Yandabo concluded between the Burmese and the British, whereby,
on 24 February 1826, the King of Burma 'renounced all claims' upon,
and agreed to 'abstain from all future interference with the principality
of Assam and its dependencies', the region, at least in a strict political sense, was itself something of an 'outland'. However,
British policy in the region (after its annexation) was an all-encompassing
attribute and its geo-strategy took into account the policies of the
encircling nations. Independent India's policies towards the bordering
nations, unfortunately, and at least during the early years, were
rather impressionistic and did not seek to consolidate the position
inherited from the British. Indeed, India engaged reluctantly in a war with China in 1962 over territorial disputes in the
region. And although recent years have witnessed lesser sabre rattles,
an amicable solution to certain disputes continues to elude these
two countries.
'The little wars' of the Northeast have also found (active) covert support
by neighbouring countries, including Pakistan and China. In addition, Myanmarese fringe outfits (primarily
the Kachins) have deepened existing historical-cultural ties further
by supporting local movements by offering training, safe havens and
outward routes. As a matter of detail, the Myanmarese connection in
the separatist campaigns of the region predates almost all other such
external aid.
According to at leas one theory, India's intervention in, and contribution to
the formation of, Bangladesh - erstwhile East Pakistan - was motivated by a desire to thwart
a Sino-Pakistani pincer formation which was thought to be gaining
in ground in the late 1960s. Discounting the convenient theory of
simply an Indo-Pakistani rivalry, which brought about the dismemberment
of Pakistan, a noted South Asia watcher and journalist writes:
A close look at the map of the
subcontinent and the growing Sino-Pakistani nexus in the late 1960s
would surely convince anyone with a sense of geopolitics and military
strategy that in the event of a total war between India on the one
hand and China and Pakistan on the other, a determined Chinese drive
through Assam or North Bengal could link up with Pakistani forces
in East Pakistan and cut off the Northeast. Two decades after the
break up of Pakistan into two countries and the relative stability
achieved by the Indian politico-military effort in the Northeast,
Pakistani talk (notably from Z.A. Bhutto) of entrusting the security
of East Pakistan to the 'China factor' might, in retrospect, seems
to have been without substance. But to an Indian decision maker in
New Delhi in the late 1960s, besieged as he was with growing overtly
pro-Chinese left radicalism in West Bengal; virulent guerrilla movements
in Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur and Tripura; language riots in Assam;
and a number of ethnic insurrections on the doorstep in North Burma,
many directly backed by China, Bhutto's threat raised India's worst
fears of a Chinese sweep through the region, an eventual link-up with
Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, and the secession of the entire
Northeast Indian states.
Quoting a senior Research
& Analysis Wing (RAW) source, the author goes on to state that
the late P.N. Banerji, the then Chief of RAW's Eastern division, in
a briefing to RAW Field Officers at Calcutta in August 1971 had insisted
that a fear of the Northeast being cut off was primarily the reason
for the Indian enthusiasm for supporting the Bengali liberation struggle
in 1971.
But three decades of independent statehood for Bangladesh and pre-liberation
Indian concern as detailed above - while achieving the absence of
a proactive Pakistani state in India's Eastern fringes - have not
prevented radical pro-Pakistani Islamic elements from emerging in
that country and providing aid and sustenance to separatist groups
waging a war against India. The reasons for this, as a former Foreign
Secretary states, are that:
a metamorphosis in the social
and political scene of Bangladesh had occurred, first because of Mujib's
own lack of conviction about transforming his country into a genuine
secular-democracy and, second, because he had consciously allowed
reinduction of pro-Pakistani and anti-liberation elements into Bangladesh's
politics, civil services and armed forces. He adopted such a strategy
in order to reduce the influence of political leaders and armed forces
personnel who were actively involved in the freedom struggle. My assessment
is that he hoped to ensure supreme power for himself by counter-balancing
and playing of these two groups against each other in the domestic
political processes. With the passage of time, Bangladesh became an
Islamic republic. It must not be forgotten that the first step in
the direction was taken by Mujib himself who attended the OIC (Organisation
of Islamic Countries) Summit conference in Lahore in 1974. Whosoever
came to power in Bangladesh had to fulfil two stipulations for surviving
in power: first, that he or she should maintain a certain amount of
distance from India and second, the person should confirm the Islamic
identity of Bangladesh.
Pakistan's renewed interest in the Northeast, therefore, received a boost
as a result of Bangladesh's acts of affirmation. Pakistan's Inter
Services Intelligence's (ISI) 're-entry into the game' became possible
either because of direct support of the Bangladesh authorities or
through the Bangladesh Field Intelligence or other agencies on the
old-tie net.
The roles of Bhutan and Nepal in 'the little wars' have largely been those
of accessories. The two Himalayan nations have provided safe havens
to separatist groups from the Northeast, as also transit facilities.
The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Democratic
Front of Bodoland (NDFB) have their headquarters in Bhutan, and although latest reports suggests that the Royal
Bhutan Army is planning a clamp down on the Assamese rebels, many an anti-India agency has reportedly set up
operations and bases in these countries. Recent reports have also spoken of a Nepal-based
ISI operation through which counterfeit currency, in connivance with
some local agents, is being pumped into Assam. Such reports notwithstanding, the Nepalese Ambassador
to India, B.B.Thapa, during the course of a press conference in Guwahati,
said that his country has never allowed anti-India activities to grow
on its soil and that vigilance has been stepped up along the border.
To be fair to the separatist groups of the region, however, it must be added
these foreign interventions are far from an adequate explanation of
militancy, and that a situation of discontentment and upheaval was
already prevalent in the region when foreign support was sought or
provided. Samir Kumar Das, in his political analysis of the ULFA thus
provides a strong critique of the 'foreign hand' theory:
It is sometimes believed that the
ULFA movement is the handiwork of some neighbouring foreign powers
like China, Bangladesh and Burma. The Government of India reportedly
possesses 'impeccable evidences' that can decisively prove the involvement
of the foreign hand. The erstwhile Assam movement is taken to be part
of a greater CIA sponsored project of Operation Brahmaputra with the
sole objective of curbing Soviet influence in India and in South East
Asia via India. The ULFA movement is allegedly masterminded by Bangladesh
and Burma.
The theory
of the 'foreign hand' suffers from a number of limitations, two of
which deserves mention at this point. First, to say that the movement
is sponsored and masterminded by foreign powers might imply that it
has no internal basis. It thus glosses over the economic, political
and cultural variables that are taken into consideration here. However,
there is no denying the fact that the foreign powers might have taken
advantage of large-scale unrest, violence and breakdown of law and
order, particularly in Assam and in the Northeast, in general. The
foreign powers usually fish in already troubled waters. Secondly,
it is true that the foreign powers might have a hand in keeping the
disturbances alive and destabilising the region with an eye to carve
out a separate state (sometimes, named, United States of Bengal) and
thereby inflicting a dismemberment on India to avenge that of Pakistan
in 1971. But there is no independent source to verify their role in
aiding and abetting unrest and 'insurgencies', political turmoil and
subversion, whether by financing these activities or by supplying
sophisticated arms and training to hard-core rebels. Hence, their
latent motives in most cases, remain unknown and we have nothing to
do but to rely helplessly on the assertions and counter-assertions
of the respective governments.
Nevertheless, while it is
not a matter of debate that long years of neglect and subversion have
led the region to the present state of affairs and the rise of militancy,
the aid which most separatist movements have been receiving from foreign
powers cannot be discounted.
As a matter of analysis and case study, this paper examines the role of
Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence in Assam. A cursory look at
the agency in question is, perhaps, in order in this context.
Founded in 1948 by a British army officer, Major General R. Cawthome, then
Deputy Chief of Army Staff of Pakistan, the role of the Directorate
of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) was expanded by President Ayub
Khan in order to safeguard Pakistan's national interests, monitor
opposition politicians and sustain military rule in Pakistan.
The ISI is tasked with the collection of foreign and domestic intelligence;
co-ordination of intelligence functions of the three armed services;
surveillance of its cadre, foreigners, the media, politically active
segments of Pakistani society, diplomats of other countries accredited
to Pakistan as also of Pakistani diplomats abroad; the interception
and monitoring of communications; and the execution of covert offensive
operations. Staffed by hundreds of civilian and military officers,
and thousands of other employees, the ISI has its headquarters in
Islamabad. The Agency reportedly employs a total of about 10,000 officers
and staff members, a number which does not include informants and
other assets. It is reportedly organised into between six and eight
divisions.
The division of the Joint Intelligence Bureau which is responsible for political
intelligence consists of three sections, one of which is devoted to
operations against India. The Joint Intelligence/North is responsible
for operations in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) including propaganda,
infiltration, exfiltration and other clandestine operations. The Joint
Signal Intelligence Bureau operates a chain of signals to militants
operating in Kashmir.
The ISI is of paramount importance at the joint services level. Its importance
stems from the fact that it is in complete charge of all covert operations
outside Pakistan. Democratic governments of the past have had only
very loose control over the Agency. The Agency also reportedly supplies
weaponry, advice, training and other forms of assistance to separatist
groups in the Indian Punjab and Kashmir, as also to the ones waging
a war against the Indian state in the Northeast.
The 1965 Indo-Pak War provoked a major crisis of intelligence in Pakistan.
The War revealed the inefficiency of the intelligence agencies, which
had, until then, been committed primarily to domestic investigative
work. Ayub Khan set up a committee headed by Yahya Khan (who was later
to succeed him) to examine the working of the agencies.
The ISI has been deeply involved in domestic politics and has kept track
of the opponents of various incumbent regimes. Before 1958 and the
imposition of Martial Law, the ISI reported to the Commander-in-Chief
of the Army. When Martial Law was promulgated in 1958, all intelligence
agencies fell under the direct control of the President and Chief
Martial Law Administrator.
It was the late President Zia-ul-Haq who initiated the present pattern of
the ISI's interventions in India after the failure of 'Operation Gibraltar'
in 1988. 'Operation Topac', a realistic representation of the Pakistani
strategy, envisaged a three-part action plan for the 'liberation'
of Kashmir. Phase I of this strategy envisaged a low-level
insurgency in J&K, a subversion of all major state, administrative,
financial and political institutions, mass mobilisation on religious
issues, the training of subversive elements and the development of
means to cut off lines of communication between Jammu and Kashmir,
and within Kashmir and Ladakh. The road upto Kargil and the road over
Khardungla were to receive 'special attention'. The Phase also envisaged
collaboration with the then very active Sikh extremists in neighbouring
Punjab. The primary Phase II objective was to "Exert maximum
pressure on the Siachen, Kargil and Rajouri-Punch sectors to force
the Indian Army to deploy reserve formations outside the main Kashmir
Valley." This was to be backed up by a campaign of co-ordinated
attacks against a wide range of military and infrastructure targets,
including airfields, the Banihal Tunnel and the Kargil-Leh highway.
Infiltration by 'Afghan Mujahideen' was integral to this stage. Phase
III conceived of the liberation of the Kashmir Valley and the establishment
of an "independent
Islamic State".
According to a report compiled by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC)
of India in 1995, the ISI spent roughly Rs. 24 million every month
to sponsor its activities in J&K. Although all militant groups
receive arms and training from Pakistan, the pro-Pakistan groups -
who advocate the merger of Kashmir with Pakistan - are reported to
be favoured by the ISI. At least six major militant organisations,
and several smaller ones, are presently operating in J&K. Their
strengths are variously estimated at between 5,000 and 10,000. They
are roughly divided between those who seek azaadi (independence) and those who support accession to Pakistan.
The oldest militant organisation, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF), had spearheaded the movement for an independent Kashmir.
The JKLF has, however, fallen from the ISI's grace, and is now largely
an overground political organisation with secessionist aims. Its thunder
has been stolen by the powerful pro-Pakistani group, the Hizbul-Mujaheddeen.
The other major groups are Harakat-ul Ansar (which absorbed the Afghan
veterans of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Harkat-ul-jihad-ul-Islami),
a group which reportedly has a large number of non-Kashmiris in it;
the Al Umar; the Al Barq; the Muslim Janbaz Force; and the Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT), which is also made up largely of Mujahideen from Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and includes a suicide cadre, the fidayeen.
An emerging group is the Jaish-e-Mohammad-Mujahideen-e-Tanzeem, established
by Maulana Masood Azhar, who was released by the Indian Government
after the hijack of the Kathmandu-Delhi Indian Airlines Flight IC
814 to Kandahar in Afghanistan. Several thousand fighters from Afghanistan
and other Muslim countries (estimated variously at strengths upto
5,000 men) have also joined some of the militant groups or have formed
their own tanzeems (groups).
Recent evidence suggests that the ISI is now executing a much wider strategy
of encirclement, exploiting every potential area of conflict, and
the extensive, sensitive and poorly managed land borders all along
the East and Northeast of India. It is under this larger programme
that the ISI now operates training camps near the border in Bangladesh
where separatist groups of the Northeast, collectively known as the
'United Liberation Front of Seven Sisters', are trained in terrorist
activities. These groups include the National Socialist Council of
Nagaland (NSCN), People's Liberation Army (PLA), the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA) and the Northeast Student's Organisation (NESO).
The situation in Assam is of special significance in this context, primarily
because of the demography of the State, and of the historical movement
of populations. Long years of a tryst with separatism and a continuous
stream of illegal immigration from Bangladesh accords the State a
unique place in the examination of the ISI's activities in the Northeast.
The State has a sizeable Muslim population and has, in fact, had two
Muslim Chief Executives in the past. The demographic mosaic also includes a tribal population
as well as a smattering of people from other parts of India, mainly
from Bengal, Bihar and Rajasthan. A tea workers community, largely
comprising Santhal tribals, transferred into the region by the British in the
nineteenth century in order to quell a Central Indian rebellion, has
also become an inalienable part of the Assamese soil. In this scenario,
there has been a mushroom growth of separatist groups in the State
whose search for newer, elusive identities occasioned an outward look
for external assistance. The most significant groups operating in
the State include the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), though there are a myriad
of others, swearing allegiance to almost every identifiable ethnic
sub-group. There has, moreover, been a recent and sudden proliferation
of Muslim militant organisations in the State.
The ULFA, which had initially looked to the Myanmarese fringe outfits for
help and an outward conduit, came under some pressure during the early
nineties. As B.G. Verghese mentioned in his seminal work
on the Northeast, pressures in Myanmar led the ULFA a couple of years
later to establish contacts with the ISI and the Afghan Mujahideen
in Pakistan, and still later with the Bangladesh Field Intelligence
in Dhaka, and less successfully with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE). Indeed, the Assam Assembly was told in March 1994
that some 200 ULFA militants had reportedly received training with
the help of Pakistan's ISI, many of them in Afghanistan, over the
preceding two years. It is interesting to note that a newspaper report
attributes a statement by the present Assam Chief Minister, Prafulla
Kumar Mahanta, where he accused his predecessor, the late Hiteswar
Saikia, of inaction even after being informed about ISI activities
way back in 1994. A senior officer of the Barak Valley district administration
had reportedly informed the then Chief Secretary, H.N. Das, through
a letter about a group comprising the ISI, the Hijbulla Mujahid of
Iran, ULFA and other Islamic fundamentalist groups planning to carry
out violence, particularly in Hindu villages.
The first comprehensive report on the subject was placed before the Assam
State Assembly on April 6, 2000 by Chief Minister Prafulla Kumar Mahanta,
after almost a year-long engagement with the ISI's activities throughout
the State. The Report followed the penetration and eventual
dismantling of one of the Pakistani intelligence Agency's network
in the State. On August 7, 1999, the Assam Police achieved a major
breakthrough and arrested two officers of the ISI as well as two other
agents of the same Agency from a hotel in Guwahati. The police also
arrested twenty seven other persons belonging to different Islamic
militant groups. The four ISI operatives arrested were identified
as Mohammad Fasih Ullah Hussaini alias Mamid Mehmood alias Khalid
Mehmood of Hyderabad (Sind), Pakistan' Mohammad Javed Waqar alias
Mohammad Mustaffa alias Mohammad Mehraj alias Abdul Rahman of Karachi,
Pakistan; Maulana Hafiz Mohammad Akram Mallik alias Muzaffar Hussain
alias Atabullah alias Bhaijan alias Abdul Awal of Mukam Shahwali village
of Jammu and Kashmir; and Kari Salim Ahmad alias Abdul Aziz alias
Sadat of Mehilki village of Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh.
The Chief Minister's Report to the State Assembly - while seeking to establish
the scale, nature and degree of the ISI threat - was mainly a glossary
of the events which had occurred in the period following the August
arrests of 31 persons. In the interregnum, according to the Report,
the State police had exposed the modus
operandi of the foreign Agency. The 16-page Report (which included
photographs and profiles of the main accused) identified the activities
of the ISI mainly in the following areas:
1.
Promoting indiscriminate
violence in the State by providing active support to local militant
outfits.
2.
Creating new militant
outfits along ethnic and communal lines by instigating ethnic and
religious groups.
3.
Supply of explosives
and sophisticated arms to various terrorist groups.
4.
Causing sabotage of oil
pipelines and other installations, communication lines, railways and
roads.
5.
Promoting fundamentalism
and militancy among local Muslim youths by misleading them in the
name of Jehad.
6.
Promoting communal tension
between Hindu and Muslim citizens by way of false and highly inflammatory
propaganda.
The Report goes on to state that the Assam Police has adequate evidence
in its possession to show that the top ULFA leadership is in close
touch with certain officials of the Pakistani High Commission in Dhaka.
ULFA leaders have also been travelling to Pakistan regularly, and
Pakistani agencies have already imparted arms training to hundreds
of ULFA cadres. According to the Report, the confessional statements
of many ULFA leaders, including its Vice Chairman, Pradip Gogoi, have
revealed that the Pakistani officials in their High Commission at
Dhaka make arrangements for their passports under various fake identities.
The Chief Minister's Report further speaks of the ISI being involved in
the provision of different passports for the ULFA Commander-in-Chief,
Paresh Barua. Providing a facsimile of Paresh Barua's passport, the
report also reveals that the ULFA leader has been travelling to Karachi
under the name of Kamaruddin Zaman Khan. The ULFA-ISI nexus had, in fact, begun way back
in the early nineties. An enumeration of a list of some of the early
events and meetings which had taken place between the two is perhaps
necessary at this juncture.
Ø
In the month of November
1990, ULFA decides to send Munin Nabis and Partha Pratim Bora alias
Jabed to Bangladesh to contact the ISI at Dhaka, to arrange the supply
of arms and ammunition. They were instructed to set up a base camp
in Bangladesh.
Ø
Munin Nabis sets up a
base camp in Dhaka in 1990 with the help of a certain Colonel (Retired)
Faruque of the Bangladesh Freedom Party and Gani Shapan of the Jatiya
Party. Nabis rents a house at Mogbazar in Dhaka.
Ø
Munin Nabis assumes the
name 'Iqbal' and contacts Samsul Siddique, the Second Secretary in
the Pakistan High Commission at Dhaka. Contacts with the ISI are established
through Siddique.
Ø
Munin Nabis visits Pakistan
to negotiate with a terrorist group headed by Mustafa Ali Jubardo
to negotiate training for ULFA cadres on payment.
Ø
The Vice Chairman of
ULFA, Pradip Gogoi visits Dhaka in January 1991 and contacts an ISI
officer called Haque and signs an agreement for the training to ULFA
cadres. He also meets another ISI officer, Jalal, there.
Ø
After the agreement with
the ISI, Munin Nabis calls a group of ULFA members for training in
Pakistan in April 1991. Pradip Gogoi accompanies a six-member group
to Islamabad for training with the ISI.
Ø
Hari Mohan Roy alias
Rustar Choudhury of ULFA, along with ten other ULFA cadres, undergoes
training in camps organised by the ISI in Pakistan in 1993. Hari Mohan
Roy obtains a passport under the name of Jamul Akhtar son of Akhtar
Hussain of Bangladesh.
The ISI had also organised training for ULFA cadres in association with
the Directorate General of Field Intelligence of Bangladesh, at a
camp located 35 kilometres west of the Karnaphulli Hydro-electric
project in the Chittagong Hill Tracts in 1993. The training was supervised
by Brigadier Joimullah Khan Choudhury. The ISI had reportedly also
imparted specialised training to 48 ULFA cadres in Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (PoK) along with Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam (MULFA)
cadres. There is also evidence to suggest that the ISI is activating
the border areas in Nepal for relocation of some separatist groups.
ULFA and the NDFB have reportedly already set up camps in Jhapa, Tapegunj
and Panchthar in eastern Nepal.
The Pakistani misadventure in Kargil brought the ULFA-ISI nexus into the
open. According to the army operating in Assam, the ULFA was involved
in the passing of information of troop movements to and from Assam
to the ISI. The ULFA was also allegedly pressured by the ISI to make
anti-Indian statements - primarily supporting the liberation of Kashmir.
Informed intelligence sources also spoke of the Muslim Liberation
Tigers of Assam (MULTA) meeting the ISI backed Sipah-e-Sahiba
at the Hathajari Jamait Ul Ulum Ali Madarsa
in Chittagong. The Sipah-e-Sahiba,
whose links with the Taliban are well known, was represented by a
Didar Bakth.
The ULFA has, of course, in a statement to the Press, denied any links with
the ISI.
There has been a great deal of activity in the days following the foiling
of 'Mission Assam'. Newer insights into the ISI threat are now available.
The refrain that is heard the most relates to the ISI blueprint to
form an Islamic State in the Northeast, and there are widespread reports
of Muslim social institutions such as madarsas (religious schools and seminaries), and in certain
cases, mosques, aiding the cause of the ISI.
The present situation is one of continued confrontation. The Barak Valley
of Assam has reportedly emerged as a hotbed for anti-India activities
by the ISI. The arrest of Bilal alias Nanoo Mian, the ISI courier
implicated in the Indian Airlines hijacking episode, has further revealed
the extent to which the Pakistani intelligence Agency has spread its
tentacles. Interrogation of the courier revealed that he had helped
40 Muslim youth from Assam to cross over to Bangladesh for training
under the Harkat-Ul-Mujahideen.
The immediate emphasis of the ISI, it would appear, is of breaking
into the Assamese Muslim psyche. However, reports have suggested that
it has not been very successful in its efforts in this direction.
Indeed, many an Assamese Muslim intellectual has condemned the activities
of the ISI.
There are, nevertheless, critical danger signals, the most important being
the success of Pakistan's strategy of encirclement. In Bangladesh
an Islamic resurgence is reportedly taking place, and a number of extremist groups are now operating
openly in that country. The Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), led
by Shawkat Osman alias Sheikh Farid, was established in 1992, and
is estimated to have a strength of about 15,000. The HuJI maintains
six camps in the hilly areas of Chittagong, where the cadres are imparted
arms training. Several hundred recruits have also been trained in
Afghanistan. The cadres are recruited mainly from among students of
various madarsas and style themselves as the 'Bangladeshi
Taliban'. HuJI activists regularly cross over into several Indian
States and maintain contact with 'sources' there. Reports indicate
that the ISI has an open hand in the activities of the HuJI. The ISI
has intensified subversive activities in Bangladesh since the Awami
League came to power in June 1996. A party called the Freedom Party, formed by
the convicted killers of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, has also raised the
slogan "Amra hobo Taliban,Bangla
hobe Afghan" (We will be the Taliban; Bangladesh will be
Afghanistan) and it seems that this sloganeering has been carried
into rural Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami and its students'
wing, the Islamic Chattra Shibir, have also escalated their activities,
and recently killed five pro-Government students of the Bangladesh
Chattra League (BCL). The BCL is the student wing of the ruling Awami
League, and the Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, condemned the
Razakars for having "crossed
the limit." The Jamaat is currently led by Golam Azam, who is
widely held responsible for the activities of the Razakars
whom he led, and who collaborated with Pakistan's Army in the genocide
in Bangladesh during the 1971 War that resulted in the country's independence.
After the War, Golam Azam fled to Pakistan, but was allowed to return
to Bangladesh during the predecessor regime of Prime Minister Begum
Khalida Zia. The present Home Minister, Mohammad Nasim, at a condolence
meeting for the murdered students stated, "I am deeply shocked
that the defeated forces of Golam Azam, who led a genocide throughout
the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971, are now again craving for
blood to take revenge." The Jamaat has close and continuous links with
Pakistan.
There is now also incontrovertible evidence of the ISI's increasing success
in consolidating its hold in Nepal, and in engineering critical demographic
changes along the Indo-Nepal border. There has been an 'alarming'
increase in Islamic institutions (madarsas
and mosques) on both sides of the Indo-Nepal border, including the
no-man's land that lies between. A study conducted by the Nepalese Government has
revealed that about 225 madarsas have come up in the border districts
during the past few years. An Indian intelligence report lists as
many of 26 active Islamic organisations in Nepal, and identifies as
many as 66 madarsas on the Indo-Nepal border that
are known to be linked with and backed by the ISI.
With India's tenuous land link with the Northeast along the Chiken's Neck
located between Nepal and Bangladesh, these demographic shifts and
subversive activities clearly have a critical and sinister significance.
Moreover, with an active ISI network at work in Dhaka, there appears
to be no foreseeable end to the assistance extended to separatist
groups in the Northeast (primarily Assam). Moreover, recent developments
in Bhutan will probably see at least one faction of the ULFA returning
to Bangladesh. And for all its denials, it is quite clear that the
separatist group is controlled by the ISI. An invigorated ULFA presence
in Bangladesh could, consequently, significantly further an ISI agenda
of abetment to and facilitation of the continuing illegal immigration
into, and destabilisation of, India's troubled Northeast.