Formed twenty-one years ago, the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) – heir to a million
stubborn mutinies – is today experiencing a crisis of character.
Unable to sustain the growth pattern it was able to engineer during
its heyday, the outfit’s agenda of aikya
(unity), biplab (revolution), and mukti (liberation), stymied by a multitude
of anxieties, is careening out of control. Indeed, with its pursuits
now in the clutches of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence, the sole visible motivation of the banned organisation seems to be
the continuance of monetary flows into its unaccounted coffers and, of course, the consequent imperative of retaining at least a
semblance of authority in the hinterland.
If the recent subterfuge and excesses
by the ULFA are anything to go by, the outfit is also
trying its utmost to create a situation in Assam as a result of which the forthcoming elections to the State’s
Legislative Assembly would need to be held under President’s
rule. On the face of it, this strategy would appear
strange. President's rule in Assam would
only reinvigorate the already existing state mechanism and intensify
operations against the ULFA. This latest modus
operandi appears to be a desperate last-ditch attempt by the organisation
to create a situation that may prove conducive to its continued existence.
Why must the ULFA seek to create
circumstances for the imposition of President's rule? Does it feel
that, with the Prafulla Kumar Mahanta-led regime out of power during
the elections, it will not only be able to negate the 'Surrendered
ULFA (SULFA ) factor and once again play the role of a determinant, but also to take steps
(as the recent killings have indicated) to prevent an alliance shift
in the traditional vote banks? Does it also feel that the security
forces, despite the strict gubernatorial control they would be under,
would – in the wake of Mahanta’s dismissal – be confused
into submission, if not connivance? These questions, the answers to
which will require the passage of time and analysis, have an important
coordinate – the ULFA’s threatened existence in the Himalayan
kingdom of Bhutan.
This paper will examine in some
detail the ULFA’s present strength and position vis-à-vis
its continued presence in Bhutan.
It will also seek to analyse the Indian response and to put forward
a security option for the State. But first, a brief aside into certain
aspects which have characterised the organisation’s growth.
Sworn into a secret existence on
April 7, 1979 at Sibsagar’s Rang Ghar, the ULFA was midwifed by Rajiv Rajkonwar
alias Arabinda Rajkhowa (the organisation’s present Chairman),
Paban Baruah alias Paresh Baruah (the 'Chief of Army Staff'), Samiran
Gogoi alias Pradip Gogoi (the Vice Chairman) and Golap Barua alias
Anup Chetia (the General Secretary). The agitation over the influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh into Assam, spearheaded by the All Assam Student’s Union (AASU), had been
launched in the same year. Although it was the student’s movement
which went on to gain momentum in the succeeding years, the ULFA of
the early years (it remained dormant until 1984) drew attention to
itself by resorting to a heady and highly successful mix of grass
root politicking and vigilantism. As a scholar notes, “[b]y the
late 1980s, ULFA virtually assumed control of Assam, extorting
vast sums from tea plantations and businessmen, engaging in kidnappings
and assassination of key political functionaries and security personnel.”
The genesis of the ULFA can perhaps
be traced to the Asom Jatiyadabadi Yuva Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP),
a radical group, more systematic and active than the AASU. The AJYCP
shuns the limelight and, working quietly – unlike the high profile
AASU – does more for the youth of Assam than
anyone actually cares to mention. As a matter of detail, Arabinda
Rajkhowa, Pradip Gogoi and Anup Chetia had all worked for the AJYCP
at one point of time. An extended quote from a recently published work by Udayon Misra throws
significant light on the emergence of the ULFA:
Though it is commonly assumed
that the ULFA was a consequence of the Assam Movement, yet actually
the ULFA was formed on April 7, 1979, some two months before the AASU
observed its first 12-hour state-wide strike on June 8, 1979, to protest
against continued infiltration of foreign nationals into the State
and their only too easy inclusion into the voters roll…The ULFA
leaders actively participated in the anti-foreigners stir and the
first Chairman of the organisation, Bhadreswar Gohain, later on became
a Deputy Speaker of the Assam Assembly as Asom Gana Parishad nominee…The
AJYCP roots of the ULFA should help one in understanding the latter’s
emphasis on 'scientific socialism' from time to time – something
which has been picked up by social scientists and journalists to give
the ULFA a Marxist or Communist veneer, while in reality it is a militaristic
outfit. Just like the AJYCP, the ULFA too is said to be attempting
a blend of Maoism and Assamese nationalism. For instance, the CPI(ML)
leader, Vinod Misra opined that ULFA’s "faith on Mao’s
thought has led them to provide a new turn to the erstwhile Assam
Movement, a left turn indeed, doing away with its anti-communist,
anti-left communal bias of the early 80s. Thus, parties like
CPI (ML) have tried to project ULFA as a "representative organisation
of the Assamese people"
which has adopted Mao’s ideology as its prime weapon in its fight
against the all-India supra-national forces.
Attempting, therefore, to steal
the AASU’s thunder or what the then AASU President, Prafulla
Kumar Mahanta (the present Chief Minister of Assam) would call 'the
tussle between the citizens and foreigners,' one of ULFA’s major
contributions (according to a noted ULFA watcher) lies in "exposing
the futility of the tussle." The structural contradictions, so termed,
incorporate the socio-economic structure. The ULFA went on to argue
that internal colonialism – by which it meant the colonial rule
of India – is integral to the given economic structure.
However, the ULFA’s initial
emphasis on an economic interpretation of the prevailing situation
and its purported 'scientific socialism' seems unfounded. Although
the early years did witness the ULFA cadres overseeing appropriate
compliance by engineers and contractors in a public work site, as
also public punishment of corrupt officials and such other persons
involved in immoral activities – a vigilante role it took on
in order to garner public support – the veneer of a class conscious
organisation wore off quickly.
An analysis of the structure
and class character of the ULFA does not show it either as a communist
or even radical Marxist organisation, though it has been quite common
for the insurgent groups of the north eastern region of the country
to claim left credentials. The colonial thesis and the stress on an
armed struggle to achieve one’s end have quite often been factors
which have led sections of the communist left in our country to conclude
that such organisations share the Maoist-Marxist ideology. Referring
to the ULFA’s claims to scientific socialism, M.S. Prabhakara
writes: "…characterizing itself as a party committed to
'scientific socialism', ULFA maintains that its aim of liberating
Assam and making it independent is only the first stage of its two-stage
revolution, the second and final stage being the implementation of
the principles of scientific socialism. The literature that is available
from the organisation suggests that it has a fairly simple notion
of what scientific socialism is all about…"
A Marxist interpretation of the
ULFA’s programmes, therefore, can have only an academically demonstrative
effect. The organisation has, no doubt, preambled its "commitment
to put an end to anarchy" with ambitious 'socialist' clauses.
Paragraph 4 of the ULFA’s 6-point 'Code of Conduct', for instance,
deals with 'Education and Duties'. Included in the paragraph are the
necessity of plugging loopholes in the educational system, duties
that contribute to character building and training of cadres. However,
the instances of implementation even among its own cadres continue
to be a null set. Indeed in an interview with this writer, the ULFA
leader, Lohit Deury spoke of the existence of a rather accentuated
class distinction within the organisation.
Another important contradiction
in the ULFA agenda is the sudden tolerance with which it began to
view illegal migrants from Bangladesh after it had set up its camps
in the erstwhile East Pakistan. Sired as it were, by the need to rid
Assam of foreigners, it would be expected that the organisation would
throw in its lot to solve the vexed problem of illegal migration.
But quite to the contrary, it sought to explain away the problem in
a 15-page booklet which is addressed to 'The people of Assam of East
Bengal Origin’. The document makes interesting reading, as it
justifies the role of migrants in the life of the State:
When we refer to the Assamese,
instead of meaning the Assamese-speaking people we actually mean the
different inter-mixture of tribal nationalities – those who are
committed towards working for the good of Assam. The mixture of nationalities
that is the Assamese is, in reality, the result of immigration. We
consider the immigrants from East Bengal to be a major part of the
national life of the people of Assam. Our freedom struggle can never
be successful without these people…the masses who earn their
living through hard physical labour can never be our enemies. All
the labouring masses are our friends and the main motive force of
our freedom revolt.
Such irreverent espousal is countered by the ULFA's continued attacks
against groups of migrants. Moreover, it creates a clear conflict
between the ULFA and the proponents of Assamese linguistic nationalism.
What we find, however, is that the ULFA – instead of spelling
out the details of its variegated version of Swadhin
Asom – has begun to further the thesis that Assam was never
a part of India. According to the ideologues of the organisation,
the 'Treaty of Yandaboo', by which Assam was handed over to the British
by the Burmese, 'was a fraud perpetrated on the people of Assam'.
Seeking to forward such a theory, the ULFA resorts to a selective
reading and appraisal of history, ignoring in particular any mention
of Assam’s role in the struggle for independence and the contributions
of leading personages such as Sankaradeva who spoke of 'Bharatavarsha'
and Assam’s consciousness in the Indian ideal. Such attempts
have, however, not succeeded and as Udayon Misra expresses it, "There
is no dearth of revolutionary organisations and governments tampering
with history, but this has been always at their own peril. Assam’s
participation in the national struggle is much too recent history
to be tailored to suit any particular outfit’s needs."
These ideological contradictions,
and the conflicts between the extended constituency it purports to
reflect, however, do not undermine ULFA's status as an important force
in Assam. A decade long military engagement and the thousands of lives that have been lost has succeeded in containing
the growth of the ULFA in the region. But it has not been able to
entirely marginalise the group. Indeed, the ULFA continues to strike
at will and with apparent impunity and, although reports suggest an
internal dissonance in the organisation, the command and control structure
of the ULFA seems intact as is its recruitment rate. Moreover, despite
the Royal Bhutan Assembly resolution in its 78th National
Assembly session asking the ULFA to leave Bhutanese soil and consequent developments, the organisation continues to sit pretty
in Bhutan. And as the elections to the Assam Legislative Assembly
draw near, it is expected that the ULFA will step up its activities.
Bhutan & the
ULFA: Structures and Dynamics
Bhutan’s tryst with insurgency
began in the early nineties when the Bhutanese government decided
to flush out the Ngolops (Nepalese settlers of Southern Bhutan) or
the 'economic migrants' as they were referred to. The eviction drive,
however, came under criticism and the issue was raised and debated
in international human rights groups as well as in the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) conferences. Meanwhile,
fleeing the initial surge of the Indian Army’s might, the ULFA
sought shelter in the forests on the Indo-Bhutan border. It was then
that the Royal Government of Bhutan decided to shelter the ULFA in
Southern Bhutan as a foil to the Ngolops. Contrary to the Royal Government’s
expectation, the ULFA started developing cordial relationship with
the Nepalese and began to use them as guides and porters. Eventually,
of course, the organisation also developed a good working relationship
with personnel of the Royal Bhutan Army and Police – a nexus
which ensured, among other things, a ready flow of rations, logistical
support as well as aid and references for money laundering.
The ULFA set-up in Bhutan has a
reported strength of around 2000 cadres assembled across the organisation’s
General Head Quarters, its Council Head Quarters, a Security-cum-Training
Camp and a well concealed Enigma Base. Numbering around thirty- six
in all, the major camps of the ULFA in Bhutan include:
1.
Mithundra
2.
Gobarkunda
3.
Panbang
4.
Diyajima
5.
Pemagatsel Complex
i.
Khar
ii.
Shumar
iii.
Nakar
6.
Chaibari
7.
Marthong
8.
Gerowa
9.
Sukhni ( Marungphu ): General
HQ
10.
Melange
11.
Marsala ( Dingshi Ri ): Council HQ
12.
Dalim-Koipani ( Orang )
13.
Neoli Debarli
14.
Chemari
15.
Phukatong
16.
Wangphu
Most of
the camps and such other establishment of the ULFA are in Sandrup
Jongkhar, a district in Southern Bhutan that borders Assam’s
Nalbari district. A straight road from Sandrup Jongkhar via Darranga
Mela–Tamulpur–Nalbari connects Bhutan with Assam’s
capital city Guwahati and other important towns of the State. Indeed,
the Darranga Mela–Tamulpur–Nalbari road from Sandrup Jongkhar
can easily be considered to be the most important 'revolutionary artery'
in the region. And although three crack Indian army units, a Brigade
and a Divisional HQ sit on this road, most of the ULFA’s cadres enter Assam
through this route.
The relative success of the banned
organisation in Nalbari (a district termed collectively in the Press
as 'the last bastion of the ULFA’) and thereabouts is, in some
measure, due to the support the ULFA enjoys among the local population.
As a matter of detail, most of ULFA’s cadres (including the organisation’s
'Operations Commander', Raju Barua, whose influence in the ULFA and
its operations in Bhutan is considerable) hail from this area. It
is, therefore, not surprising that the ULFA, whose fortunes in other
parts of the State seem to be on the wane, continues to receive support
from the people of Nalbari.
Southern Bhutan, however, is not
the most hospitable of places. The onset of monsoon each year tells
heavily on the separatists, and although Lohit Deury informed this
writer that until date not a single ULFA cadre has actually succumbed
to malaria in the camps, intelligence reports have indicated that hospitals of Assam receive
a host of ULFA cadres suffering from the disease every year. Indeed,
it is important to note that most 'sympathisers' of the ULFA are,
in reality, drawn from sections of the Assamese society that have
benefited from the ULFA, and not necessarily people who swear by the
secessionist outfit’s ideology. Confessional statements of Lohit
Deury have indicated that many a business has been sponsored by the
organisation, as was a system of providing loans to people.
To return to Southern Bhutan, however,
the terrain in the area is anything but hospitable. As described by
the author earlier:
This analyst
has followed foot patrols conducted by the Indian army’s 10 Bihar
Regiment stationed in the area, and still recollects the extremely
hostile terrain which ascends once Aranaga (a river on the Indo-Bhutan
border) and Guabari are left behind. The security forces, therefore,
have an ally in the natural process which demarcates the two countries.
And as one erstwhile Commander of the operating Indian army Brigade
in the area informed this analyst, the security forces have 'the insurgents
confined to an area where their activities can easily be monitored.'
The analyst, moreover, has seen the preparedness and the degree of
intelligence which the security forces have about the area. Any dislocation
(of the ULFA) from Bhutan – either by way of diplomacy, bilateral
pressure or hot pursuit – would only result in a scenario where
the advantages (as aforesaid) would be frittered away…
But the Indian army’s advantages
notwithstanding, the ULFA has established a particularly well-honed
network in Druk Yul, the 'land of the thunder dragon'. Lohit Deury
has opined
On money
laundering and related issues:
I was in complete charge. I
could exchange thousands of US dollars in a week. Money from Assam
and elsewhere was brought by various groups. Many Marwari businessmen
also brought money. ULFA used to give loans to various people in Assam.
It has set up a lot of businesses too in Assam under various names.
On the ULFA communication set-up:
We have three means of communication.
One through telephone, fax and e-mail, the other wireless and walkie
talkie, the third by messenger. The ULFA has two communications centre,
Joymoti and Agnitora. I was in charge of Joymoti, which was mobile,
but mostly along the border in places such as Rajabari, Goreswar (Naokata)
and Guabari. I used to receive daily reports including after action
reports. Agnitora deals with monetary aspects and operations. It is
located at Paikarkuchi and Gobindapur. Raju Barua is in charge.
The present hierarchy of the ULFA’s
top leadership, as revealed by Deury, is represented in the chart
below:
Chairman
: Arabinda Rajkhowa
Vice Chairman : Pradip Gogoi (under arrest since 8
April, 1998)
Political Wing
Military Wing
|
Gen Secy
|
Anup Chetia
(under arrest)
|
Chief of
Staff
|
Paresh
Baruah
|
|
Paresh
Baruah
|
Rekhiraj
Singha
|
SO to COS
|
Bening
Rabha
|
|
Org Secy
|
Ashanta
Bagh Phukan
|
SO to COS
|
Robin Neog
|
|
Asstt Gen
Secy
|
Bobon Hazarika
|
Chief Trg
Offr
|
Kamal Bora
|
|
Finance
Secy
|
Chitraban
Hazarika
|
QM GHQ/Dir
|
Samarjit
Chaliha
|
|
Asstt Fin
Secy
|
Ramu Mech
|
OIC Arms
|
Chakra
Gohain
|
|
Foreign
Secy
|
Sasadhar
Choudhury
|
Action
Gp Cdr
|
Amal Narzary
|
|
Cultural
Secy
|
Pranati
Deka
|
Ops Cdr
|
Raju Barua
|
|
Adviser
|
Bhimkanta
Borgohain (Father of ULFA)
|
Central
auditor
|
Chintamani
Hazarika
|
|
Asst Foreign
Relations Offr
|
Navajyoti
Hazarika
|
Office
Secy
|
Neelu Chakraborty
|
|
Adviser
Pol Wing
|
Bishnujyoti
Buragohain
|
Action
Gp Cdr
|
Tapan Baruah
|
|
Publicity
Secy
|
Mithinga
Daimary
|
Medical
Offr
|
Manik Sarma
|
|
Exec member
|
Probin
Deka
|
Pol Affairs
Offr
|
Bhaskar
Dutta
|
|
|
|
RT IC
|
Bhaskar
Choudhury
|
|
|
|
Camp Adjt
|
Prahlad
Saikia
|
|
|
|
WT IC
|
Manas Gogoi
|
|
|
|
Asst WT
IC
|
Drishti
Rajkhowa
|
The ULFA is divided into four zones.
The zones and their areas of influence are enumerated below:
|
East
(Purb Mandal)
Districts
|
West
(Paschim Mandal) Districts
|
Central
(Madhya Mandal)
Districts
|
South
(Dakshin Mandal)
Districts
|
|
Lakhimpur
|
Dhubri
|
Darrang
|
Hailakandi
|
|
Jorhat
|
Kokrajhar
|
Karbi Anglong
|
NC Hills
|
|
Sibsagar
|
Bongaigaon
|
Nagaon
|
Cachar Hills
|
|
Tinsukia
|
Goalpara
|
Morigaon
|
Karimganj
|
|
Dibrugarh
|
Barpeta
|
Dhemaji
|
|
|
Bokajan div of Karbi Anglong
|
Nalbari
|
Part of Sonitpur
|
|
|
Golaghat
|
South Kamrup
|
North Kamrup
|
|
|
Part of Sonitpur
|
|
|
|
Zones are
further divided into sub-zones or anchals,
which are further divided into sakhas.
Each sakha has one political
and one military wing:
East
West
Central
|
Dhansiri
Anchal
|
Manas
Anchal
(7
sakhas)
|
Agnigarh
Anchal
(5 sakhas)
|
|
Dihing
Anchal
(8
sakhas)
|
Birjora
Anchal
|
Kolong
Kopili Anchal
(9
sakhas)
|
|
Rangpur
Anchal
(8
sakhas)
|
Pancharatna
Anchal
|
Kazalikut
Anchal
(5
sakhas)
|
|
Subansiri
Anchal
(6
sakhas)
|
Sankosh
Anchal
(4
sakhas)
|
Saraighat
Anchal
(10
Sakhas)
|
A proper
military wing of the ULFA, the Sanjukta Mukti Fouj was formed on March
16 , 1996. The organisation has three full fledged battalions: the
7th , 28th and 709th. The remaining
battalions exist only on paper – at best they have strengths
of a company or so.
Sanjukta Mukti Fouj (United
Liberation Army)
Military Organisation of
ULFA
|
7
Bn
|
(HQ- Sukhni) Responsible for
defence of GHQ
|
|
8
Bn
|
Nagaon, Morigaon, Karbi Anglong
|
|
9
Bn
|
Golaghat, Jorhat, Sibsagar
|
|
11
Bn
|
Kamrup, Nalbari
|
|
27
Bn
|
Barpeta, Bongaigaon, Kokrajhar
|
|
28
Bn
|
Tinsukia, Dibrugarh
|
|
709
Bn
|
Kalikhola
|
Note: 1,4,23 &
709 Bn currently being raised
1,4,23 & 79 Bn (under
raising) | |
