Geo-Politics of South Asian Covert Action
India’s Experience and Need for Action Against Pakistan Dr Bhashyam
Kasturi and Pankaj Mehra*
Intelligence organisations
the world over require means of getting information using covert methods.
While it is possible for nations to get information, at times active
measures become necessary to achieve certain foreign policy objectives.
For this purpose, intelligence organisations undertake covert action,
which involve intervention in a variety of clandestine ways in the internal
affairs of other nations. Such operations, often called covert or special
missions, involve carrying out clandestine missions, ranging from pro-insurgency,
insurgency, sabotage and deception to, political assassination and political
subversion. Missions often encompass the whole spectrum of activity
from para-military to military operations, at times even the overthrow
of governments.
Covert action (CA)
is separate from covert intelligence gathering. The difference is that
the latter involves clandestine gathering of information in enemy territory
using human or technical means, by activity that the enemy is not aware
of. Covert action is employed to influence politics and events in another
country without revealing one’s involvement or at least while maintaining
plausible deniability.
Covert action is an
important tool for policy makers seeking an alternative between the
application of large-scale military force and sitting quiet when confronted
by a foreign policy challenge or when opportunities arise to further
national interests and goals. For this purpose, intelligence agencies
have separate units or organisations to undertake special missions.
In a way, covert political action is an extension of foreign policy.
If properly coordinated and controlled, such action can have results
out of proportion to the inputs. For instance, India’s support to the
Mukti Bahini preceding the Bangladesh war gave it an advantage in terms
of information flow and in aiding the advance of Indian troops during
actual military operations after 3 December 1971. It also provided the
base for the creation of Bangladesh.
Nations undertake covert
operations based on their peace and wartime needs. The former USSR and
US carried out such missions during the Cold War to fulfil their goals.
Both the superpowers have organisations specialising in such activity,
which pursue pro-insurgency, political assassination and subversion
to suit their national interests. The Sandinista experience, the Iran-Contra
affair, and the Bay of Pigs operations come to mind when discussing
such type of missions. In the US, the period from the 40s to 60s saw
a strong consensus concerning the need for covert action. Opposition
to covert action began during the Congressional investigations in the
mid-1970. Since then classic covert action has reduced considerably
and congressional oversight ensures the CIA does not act on its own.
CA
can be broadly found to be in five forms; Propaganda; Political action;
Para-military assistance; coup d’ etat and, secret intelligence support.
Perhaps the most telling comment on CA was made by a former chief of
the CIA, Admiral Stansfield Turner who says "Only do covertly that
which if it is exposed will cause you little political harm."1
To this end it is important that covert action be carried out with the
aim that it has certain plausible deniability.
It may well be argued
that democratic states should not exercise the CA option. But instruments
of statecraft, whether covert or overt can be used to achieve objectives
that are vital for national security. In this sense, nations can find
the way to blend strategic interest and democratic norms to protect
vital interests. In India’s case, foreign policy has the long-term vision
of living in peace with its neighbours and does not seek relations to
be held hostage on singular issues as it is with Pakistan. Which is
why India’s world vision is expansive and seeks to foster cooperation
rather than confrontation. Within this paradigm it is necessary to view
relations with Pakistan.
It is argued in this
analysis that India’s experience suggests undertaking covert action
has not always been to fulfil foreign policy goals or to serve vital
national interests. Secondly, it is perceived that inadequate covert
action has been undertaken against Pakistan, enough to dissuade it from
engaging in a proxy war with India. This is an essential part of the
politics of persuasion that India must engage in, if it is to realise
a meaningful dialogue with Pakistan.
The reason why covert
action by India in other countries has not been so effective is because
more often than not clear directives are not forthcoming for the objectives
with which covert action is to be undertaken. Also due to the autonomous
nature of agencies engaged in such activity, and changing political
equations it is not possible to sustain covert action.
In a few cases, there
has been links between foreign policy and operations undertaken to further
national security goals, like in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971.
This paper studies the role of Indian intelligence in utilising this
asset to further national goals. Its links to foreign policy and the
national executive are also examined. The Indian experience in undertaking
covert action has been mixed; this is due to the varying politico-military
objectives and level of coordination with institutions that determine
policy.
This paper is divided
into two parts. The first section narrates the Indian experience of
covert operations in various parts of the South Asian region. It also
provides inputs on some missions undertaken by other agencies.
Part two outlines a
strategy for India in engaging in covert action against Pakistan. It
is suggested here that India must undertake active and passive covert
operations against Pakistan with the objective of breaking the stronghold
of the army, bureaucracy and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on Pakistani
society. There is a belief that covert action against Pakistan could
lead to the break-up of an already anarchic state, but Indian aims must
be focused on breaking the stranglehold of the army, ISI and bureaucracy
in Pakistan. This could have two effects. By playing the Pak game in
their own backyard, it would keep them occupied and perhaps take attention
away from India.
Alternatively, it could
force them to re-think strategies, vis-à-vis the region, including
Afghanistan and create circumstances for a new diplomatic initiative
with India. There is always the worst-case situation where a special
forces strike by India on mujahid training camps across the LoC could
lead to a war, but this eventuality India must be prepared for.
India’s experience of
covert action
Intelligence agencies have
undertaken covert operations, independently and in cooperation with
agencies of other countries. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), Research
and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and Military Intelligence (MI) have undertaken
operations covertly with certain objectives. These have been low grade
and little has been achieved. In the present context, the focus is on
operations conducted by India’s external intelligence agency, R&AW,
termed as RAW for this paper.
India,
in the late 50s and 60s with the help of the CIA aided the Tibetan rebellion,
providing training facilities in India. The 1962 border war with China
led to the establishment of several organisations that are today under
the Cabinet Secretariat, the Special Frontier Force (Establishment 22
at Chakrata) and Special Services Bureau. Additionally, a group was
raised with the objective of carrying out aerial reconnaissance of China
and Tibet, the Aviation Research Centre (ARC). One source suggests that
at Charbatia in December 1964 a U-2 aircraft was deployed for operations
over Tibet. The Tibet operation continued till the early 60s when the
CIA, withdrew its operations on Indian soil and moved to Nepal.2
The Tibetan rebellion
against the Chinese forces and Indian help straddled an era of post-colonial
assertion of non-alignment as the major plank of foreign policy, and
yet Jawaharlal Nehru chose to engage in covert action as a foreign policy
tool knowing fully well, that India could do little for Tibet. He was
keen to have friendly relations with China, but he still believed, like
the British did, that a Tibet with an identity was important for sub-continental
India. The question may well ask if this policy did not contradict the
policy of non-alignment? Possibly yes, but in Nehru’s mind, the best
way of dealing with the Chinese was diplomatic, and towards this end
he was even willing to sponsor China’s candidature to the UN. The help
given to the Tibetans was probably a small cog in the larger worldview
and helping the US in this was a part of geo-politics of the time. This
did of course have the adverse effect of changing Chinese perceptions
about India. All this is of course based on the scanty evidence that
is available in different sources but this is important to suggest directions
of discourse in order to dilate on the foreign policy angle to covert
operations.
Then in the late sixties,
the need for an organisation tasked with gathering external intelligence
led to the formation of RAW, and the Directorate General of Security
was transferred from IB to RAW. As the Bangladesh crisis arose, RAW
was given the task of gathering intelligence and undertaking covert
missions, including pro-insurgency. This is the most successful operation
till date, publicly written about, carried out, involving the training
of the Mukti Bahini of East Pakistan and their role in helping the Indian
military intervention.
The
operation involved getting the freedom fighters in East Pakistan (now
Bangladesh) together and training and arming them. This was essentially
a Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) operation, with the Indian army
providing the training infrastructure. The Mukti Bahini was formed in
January 1971 and for the next ten months people who came across the
border were selected for training. By September-November 1971, these
forces were infiltrated into East Pakistan for covert missions, including
sabotage of lines of communication and command and control centres.3
When
war did officially break out on 3 December, the Mukti Bahini was ready,
(just like the French resistance in 1944, when Operation Overlord the
invasion at Normandy began). The Mukti Bahini helped Indian troops find
their way, harassed Pak troops and generally made itself a nuisance.
Naval Mukti Bahini divers planted mines in the harbours around Bangladesh
and sunk many merchant and warships, playing a crucial role in blockading
the ports. Another facet of covert action was witnessed in the trans-border
attacks carried out by the Special Frontier Force (SFF) in the Chittagong
Hill Tracts. Thus a combination of para-military action in the form
of the Mukti Bahini and direct covert action using special forces, complimented
the main military action in the 1971 Bangladesh war. The benefits accruing
from coordinated covert action allowed implementation of foreign policy
to secure national interests namely liberation of East Pakistan and
creation of Bangladesh.4
Subsequently
measures taken to integrate Sikkim into the Indian Union by the RAW
proved crucial. One authority states that RAW performed the task of
counter-intelligence in Sikkim preventing foreign agencies from getting
a foothold in the sensitive Himalayan kingdom and allowing it to accede
to India.5
But soon after the successful mounting of Bangladesh and Sikkim operation,
leading to the latter’s integration as a state in the Indian union,
came the Sri Lanka operation. This pro-insurgency operation launched
by Mrs Gandhi during her second term in office, meant to train Tamil
separatists followed the same lines of the 1971 case. Equipping and
training of insurgents from across the Palk Straits took place on Indian
soil, in the state of Tamil Nadu and in places as far as, Chakrata and
Dehradun. With the active support of the state and central government,
Indian intelligence agencies took up the task with gusto. But what was
missing was the broad institutional oversight so essential for tying
up the loose ends. Foreign policy makers and defence planners were scarcely
aware of what was happening as political masters changed and priorities
shifted.6
Former
foreign secretary JN Dixit covertly has identified the reasons for India
getting involved in Sri Lanka. He says Mrs Gandhi was aware that all
political parties in Tamil Nadu were sympathetic to the aspirations
of Sri Lanka Tamils. Therefore extending support to Sri Lanka Tamil
parties and Tamil militant groups from 1980 onwards was a natural corollary.
There was also the security factor, Sri Lanka getting Israeli and US
military personnel to train its own army and para-military. And there
was the VoA station in Trincomalee. India perceived this to be an opening
for US strategic presence in South Asia. These factors created the conditions
for Indian covert intervention in Sri Lanka.7
The main point was that Mrs Gandhi did not like J Jayawardhane, for
his policies and thus began Operation Sri Lanka.
Secrecy is undoubtedly
called for in operations of this sort. But as the Iran-Contra affair
in America showed, in the Sri Lanka operations also one part of the
government did not know what the other was doing. In the Indian case,
while RAW knew what it was doing politically, neither it nor the government
was unable to fathom the potential for trouble that was generated by
this operation. This was because the mission sought to achieve too much
at one time. The number of groups being trained were one too many and
difficult to control. No accountability existed and eventually not enough
attention was paid to the risks of losing control over the insurgents.
Thus by the time Mrs Indira Gandhi was killed in 1984, and Rajiv became
prime minister the priorities changed and so did policy towards Sri
Lanka.
In politico-military
terms, covert action eventually proved to be of little use when the
Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) went into Sri Lanka in 1987. For the
simple reason that intelligence on the insurgents trained by India was
not forthcoming. Additionally, the intelligence agencies continued to
covertly continue political dealings with the insurgents to suit their
ends, even during the IPKF’s stay in Sri Lanka. This undermined the
foreign policy goal of sending a peacekeeping force to restore peace
in Sri Lanka. The problem was that too many prime ministers were involved
in the Sri Lanka episode, resulting in several conflicting decisions.
Also involvement of state leaders like MG Ramachandran created more
complications for command and control.
Intelligence agencies
have been involved in various covert acts, both within India and in
the surrounding region. Intelligence agencies often make alliances and
then forget to inform their cousins resulting in confusion. In February
1998, the Armed Forces intercepted ships at sea off the Andamans killing
six people and arresting 73 others. This was essentially a "sting"
operation carried out by MI in collaboration with their Burmese counterparts.
But the result was a big hue and cry.
In
April, the leader of the National Unity Party of Arakans (NUPA) wrote
to the Defence Minister that the men abroad the ship were in fact Arakanese
revolutionaries who were cooperating with the Indians. He wrote, "The
Indian military intelligence had okayed our voyage and that is why we
entered Indian territorial waters to avoid the Burmese Navy." The
issue is whether it was a case of military intelligence not giving the
information to its forces in the field in time or it was a case of giving
up its people. Maung wrote, "We were cooperating with each other.
The Indians asked us for help to track down gunrunners carrying weapons
to Northeast India and we helped them. So it came as a shock to us that
our ship, about which the Indians were given full information, should
be attacked."8
The point here is that at one level India is willing to help the pro-democracy
movement in Burma, but due to the insurgents buying arms from South-East
Asia and this having a direct influence on the insurgent movement in
India’s north-east it becomes necessary for the army to curb such activity.
The dichotomy in policy towards the region is a reflection of the lack
of understanding how to secure vital interests in the north-east.
It needs recalling
that in the 80s, RAW supported tribal and ethnic factions fighting the
SLORC in Myanmar. One of the factions supported by India was the Kachin
Independence Army. The Kachins, known more accurately as Jingphaws or
Marus, account for some 3 per cent of Myanmar’s ethnic population. They
inhabit the north-east of the country and have the reputation for resorting
to arms to assert what they believe are their rights.
A
senior officer in RAW deputed to Bangkok in the 80s, made contact with
Burmese underground leaders in the hope of gaining some information.
Then this officer decided that the KIA could be beneficially used to
channelise information. And RAW could aid them with money and arms.
Having made contact, the idea was to get members of KIA into India for
training and contact creation. After the controlling officer returned
from Bangkok, infiltration of KIA cadres was started. They came as students,
youths touring India and helpers, sent for training to Chakrata and
other locations in north and north-east. Arms and other material began
to filter through to camps in North Myanmar and this reached its peak
in 1991-92. Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram provided exfiltration sites,
while some material went via Bangkok. This was the post election period
when Aung Sang Suu Kyi had won but was not allowed to take power by
SLORC.9
All this was stopped by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, as part of his
"Look East" policy.
Looking back, one may
well ask what purpose did this operation serve? What national interests
or foreign policy goals did it serve? Keeping in mind the dimension
of policy in the 80s, that of coercive diplomacy there is little doubt
that the Government thought it fit to aid all rebels across the borders,
wherever it suited us. But on many an occasion it backfired, as it did
in Sri Lanka.
There
is one other aspect of covert action that requires highlighting in the
present study. Nation-states also engage in action within the territorial
confines of the country for politico-military aims, such as pro-insurgency
or counter-insurgency or counter-terrorism. Since the institutional
framework for covert action exists in most countries in the South Asian
region, indulging in domestic covert action is a continuing tool for
governments. In India for instance, it was suggested that SSB was used
to raise and train the Bodos in the late 80s in an effort to counter
other groups in the region. Their employment to fulfil political goals
has affected their organisation and performance and impinges on their
role, which is really to engage in "stay-behind" operations.10
It has been often suggested
that RAW should function as efficiently as Pakistan’s ISI. In fact both
India and Pakistan accuse each other of encouraging subversion through
their intelligence agencies. ISI’s activities in India get greater media
coverage than RAW’s activities in Pakistan. The latter seems to lack
the intensity of operations in Pakistan to counter or duplicate ISI’s
activities in India.
The
ISI has been involved in covert action in various parts of India since
the 80s. The main focus has been on Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir.
Infiltration of arms and drugs into India, along with men to stoke insurgencies
has been common. For Jammu & Kashmir, the ISI has a special cell
to fuel the insurgency. It has been responsible for the setting up and
maintenance of training camps in POK and Pakistan, the provision of
arms and equipment, infiltration and exfiltration of both recruits and
trained militants into the Valley. The entire plan to infiltrate Kashmir
and launch a covert low-intensity war there has been described in the
part fact, part fictionalised Operation Topac in 1989. The Pak strategy
has followed the lines suggested in this analysis.11
Op Topac visualised
a three-phased strategy in Kashmir. First, fuelling of a low-level insurgency
in the Valley. Next, attacks on military and infiltration of mujahids
and other special forces for strikes and attacks on soft targets. And
then finally, to liberate Kashmir.
The Kashmir operation
was an offshoot of the US-Pakistan fight against Soviet Union. The CIA
backed the Mujahadeen, via the ISI. The latter siphoned off money and
weapons meant for Afghanistan to stoke the insurgency in Kashmir. But
infiltration into the Valley has been taking place on a low key since
the early eighties, first of Kashmiris who were alienated from India
and currently of Pak mercenaries, including criminals and foreign soldiers
of fortune from Afghanistan and further afield. This occurred through
training camps in POK and Pakistan proper.
The
enormous powers enjoyed by ISI were brought to the notice of Robert
Gates in May 1990 on a visit to India and Pakistan. Benazir Bhutto apparently
expressed her helplessness to Gates, in controlling the training camps
run by ISI in POK and Afghanistan used for anti-India operations. Even
accounting for an element of exaggeration, the illustration speaks much
for the ISI’s independence. Being a military controlled organisation,
covert operations are tightly controlled. A more recent statement by
Benazir Bhutto portrays an intelligence operation that has run amok
and that one wields enormous power within Pakistan.12
The
Indian case is slightly different in terms of the methods of control.
In theory there are levels of civilian control, but in practice agencies
like RAW function in their own spheres of influence. If proper command
and control had been established with clear political objectives the
Sri Lanka operations would have been better tasked. All covert operations,
both domestic and foreign require political clearance, but covert intelligence
activity can be decided upon by the chief of RAW. Here too, the authority
of the Prime Minister is needed if the intelligence gathering is done
in a friendly country.13
The chain of command in the case of RAW is Special Services Bureau/Special
Frontier Force through to the Directorate General of Security and Secretary
(R), in the Cabinet Secretariat, who reports to the Prime Minister.
Most intelligence organisations
the world over have a department or section for active measures. Recruitment
and training is often based on special operations lines involving, parachuting,
electronics, weapons and languages. Area orientation and mobility along
with, light but powerful weaponry for fire fighting is essential for
covert operations teams. The use of covert action to support national
foreign and security policy has been commonplace amongst intelligence
agencies round the world. Their success or failure has often depended
on the command and control, and the level of involvement of political
controllers. India’s experience shows that results have often been positive
when proper attention was paid to proper control and coordination. When
this has not been possible misuse of covert assets has taken place.
This combined with the duplication of covert efforts has reduced the
impact of such action on national security.
Covert operations
against Pakistan
India
has limited experience of covert operations against its western neighbour.
Clandestine electronic intelligence gathering and aerial reconnaissance
gives it some part of the picture. Additionally, it has gained experience
in exfiltrating agents into POK into the training camps and this has
helped in keeping tabs on activity in the POK region. But India’s ability
to influence events in Pakistan itself is limited. Small-scale moral
and material support does go out to ethnic groups in Pakistan and some
effort is made to infiltrate ‘spies’ by Military Intelligence in the
border regions. But the larger picture is still dependent on Technical/electronic
intelligence and even here capability to tap landlines in Pakistan is
limited. Human intelligence from within Pakistan is much less than required.14
It is however suggested by one source on the Internet that RAW has over
35,000 agents in Pakistan.15
Therefore, plans have
to be made to covertly gather intelligence from inside Pakistan to help
in foreign policy objective of breaking the monopoly of the ISI and
army over Pakistan. India has to have a plan of action to destabilise
Pakistan, its economy and society, to the extent that it gives us leverage
in foreign policy terms. It must however, be clear that it is not in
India’s interests to have a disintegrated Pakistan. The aim is to break
the stranglehold of the intelligence agencies, the bureaucracy and the
military in Pakistan.
The proposed strategy
is to undertake covert passive and active measures against Pakistan
including, psy. ops, disinformation, strikes in rear areas, border
raids and so on. The last may include strikes by special forces against
training camps in POK and Northern Areas. Such operations require a
clear national will and motivation. They also require sustained funding
from the political leadership and it requires highly trained and motivated
manpower to execute this task. The objectives of such operations
are to first, penetrate Pakistani society and its institutions of power.
Obtaining intelligence from within the establishments of power is the
main aim. Associated with this is the second, long-term aim of breaking
the stranglehold of the main power brokers in Pakistan.
For the above mission,
there is a need to create, to start with two sets of teams. First, a
plans section and second, an operations section. The first will draw
up the plans and stages for operations against Pakistan. Also recruiting
agents for the task and training them should be completed in about six
months. Planning from conception to actual operations should take 8-12
months, depending on the resources and manpower available. Once this
is achieved the operations begin.
The operation can be
politically cleared by RAW and then a separate section can be raised
under the Director RAW, drawing the best talent from within and other
agencies including the army, all volunteers of course. Known as Plans
Directorate (PD), this will mastermind the operation. Personnel for
Strike Directorate (SD) should be picked from SSB, Army para-commandos
and NSG. For the agents and sleepers recruitment has to be from outside.
The need to know principle has to be strictly followed. Accountability
should be from Prime Minister, National Security Advisor, to Director
RAW and to PD head.
The entire operation
can be divided into three phases. First phase is penetration and setting
up of networks. Second phase is to begin operations in rear areas. Strikes
against soft targets in Sind, Baluchistan and Northern Areas. These
will make the enemy react and make them sensitive.
The main aim is to
infiltrate and subvert Pak institutions, the police, communication network
and other important organisations. To this end, it makes sense to penetrate
Pakistan from two sides, from outside the sub-continent and from POK.
Then, in the next stage, focus moves to organising and training subversive
elements. These groups would target communication and logistic lines
inside POK. Threatening the Mangla dam or Kahuta for instance, would
be a major psychological factor. Third phase is hitting hard targets.
First, to carry out disinformation campaign carried out by agent provocateurs
and others. A few expendable agents are used to plant false information
on police and intelligence agencies. At this stage, the strike teams
begin hitting hard targets like economic centres, financial markets
(like Karachi), ports and the like. Military installations like ammunition
dumps, communication centres, airfields can be targeted in case a war
breaks out. Otherwise the aim is to penetrate and gather intelligence
with the intention of breaking the stranglehold of the military over
Pakistan society.
The mission entails
sending two teams of men (and women) into Pakistan for two separate
missions. This first team will consist of sleepers, and agent provocateurs,
and the second team will be the strike force. The sleepers and agents
will consist of network builders and specialists who will recruit local
people for both disinformation and strikes in the rear areas of Pakistan.
The agent provocateurs will be placed such that they can engage in disinformation
and activate sources within who can be expendable when required. The
second team is for strikes against key targets of economic and military
importance.
Both
teams will have to be infiltrated on the basis of genuine documents
and placements in Pakistan. Identities can range from middle level social
workers, journalists and political workers. Crucially, the persons selected
for this job will have to be extensively trained for operations in living
off the land in Pakistan. One may at this stage refer to the operation
conducted by the Israeli Mossad in Syria aimed at the KHAD party. The
agent was an Israeli but was trained to behave and live like a Muslim.16
Therefore it should not be difficult to train an Indian, Hindu or Muslim
to live in Pakistan. The key lies in creating excellent and plausible
identities. Training has to be rigorous and thorough. Training will
also be common initially and then separate and compartmentalised for
the two teams - one, sleepers and agent provocateurs and two, demolition
teams that will serve as strike teams in the rear.
While both teams need
training in explosives, weapons and communications, each has a specific
role, which calls for intensive training. For the sleeper the aim is
to penetrate Pakistani society and build a local network for further
infiltration. The important thing is therefore for these members to
be ‘Islamised.’ For the strike teams it is going further afield, into
Sind, Baluchistan and Northern Areas. This means differing identities
and covers; identities are important. The first team has to consist
of "Pakistani nationals." Punjabi or Sindhis, who are from
abroad, can be targeted. Some thought can be given to recruiting people
from the Asian community in UK. Some members can be selected from Uzbekistan
or Turkmenistan. For those coming in from the west, penetration point
is obviously the United Kingdom, USA or Europe. Even the Middle East
can be used. In other words, the potential areas for recruitment are
large and this needs to be analysed carefully.
The strike teams could
penetrate from Afghanistan or Tajikistan. The NWFP is full of Afghan
refugees and the Northern Areas have Turks, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Finding
these persons who are reliable and capable is going to be the tough
part, but not impossible.
Another option is to
exfiltrate these teams from Indian soil. Therefore, the strike teams
could penetrate from northern Kashmir. The northern areas of Jammu &
Kashmir bordering Gilgit and Baltistan, mainly Kargil is a Shia dominated
region, this could also serve as a recruiting base. There are also traditional
routes that could be used for exfiltration into POK. Additionally, India
can find local recruits from amongst the Turks and Tajiks in these regions
who could act as couriers and informants. Similarly, in POK the Gujjars
and Bakkarwals can be recruited for the same purpose. Seasonal migrants
and sheepherders come from the Northern Areas, Chitral and Koistan areas.
They can also be recruited. The aim of penetrating the strike teams
is to get them to strike in the rear areas of Pakistan. The entire infiltration
process of both teams, will take at least one year. Then it is a slow
task of making inroads into Pak society.
So it is clear that
mission objectives of both teams are different and require different
infiltration and exfiltration routes. As suggested above, the first
team cannot jump off from India; the second might, given the right circumstances.
The sleepers and agent provocateurs are always in danger of exposure.
Thus their exfiltration will depend on their own resources and on the
overall command and control of the mission. If mission control did want
to abandon the task, then alternative exfilitration routes will require
to be planned. The strike teams consisting of individuals, usually two
to four must have routes of escape, and this is possible in those areas
bordering India. It is thought best, diplomatically, at some stage to
use Tajikistan as the exfilitration route for those employed in the
Northern Areas and surrounding regions. Those in Baluchistan, Sind and
NWFP will have to use Afghanistan or get to the Arabian Sea for exfiltration.
The first team should
consist of 10-20 persons, both men and women who will be sent to Islamabad,
Karachi, Rawalpindi and Lahore. The second team, consisting of only
men will go to towns in Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP, as also the areas
of Gilgit and Chitral. Numbers will depend on how much rear area attack
is envisaged, perhaps initial numbers may be 8-10 in groups of two,
to each region. The entire operation has to be planned keeping in mind
that the initial period of infiltration and consolidation should be
about four-six months. And then once the strike teams have got into
place, situations can be created.
The aim of the first
team is to settle in Pakistan, infiltrate society, make inroads and
build networks for information gathering and find niches in high places.
The agent provocateurs will be expendable and need to be locally recruited,
though for the sake of authenticity, one or two sleepers need to be
expendable also. Key areas of penetration are the bureaucracy, the army,
ISI, elite middle class and media. After a lull of a year, information
should be leaked, through available means of the existence of these
agent provocateurs, who will have in their possession, propaganda material,
disinformation material and generally stories that lull Pakistani intelligence
into a sense of complacency that they have achieved a coup. Further,
as the Russians so successfully did with the CIA and MI-6, the agent
provocateurs should talk of moles and other sleepers in the Pak military
and intelligence establishment to create internal dissension.
Once this leads to
internal turmoil, it is time to activate the strike teams who will launch
rear area attacks on installations of economic and military value. This
will lead to further conspiracy theories being floated, leading to political
uncertainty. The risk that this entails is that it will weaken the democratic
process and possibly lead to military rule in Pakistan, but that is
a contingency that India has to prepare for. The aim of strikes is to
create a situation where the establishment is caught in an over-reach
situation. The rear areas, which are under the administrative control
of Pakistan, but given its tribal and ethnic composition are quite independent,
can be suitably engaged by India for its own purposes. Strikes will
mean deploying more police and para-military troops to these regions
and will stretch the Pak establishment.
Surprise and timing
are an important element in these missions and those in the strike formations
should be constantly on the move, working from small towns, crowded
market places and religious places. Rear area operations are to succeed
by strikes in a few important cities and installations of economic value
such as oil fields and tankers. Karachi city and its port is an example.
Period of operations will depend on the nature of Pakistani response;
if they do according to plan then teams can be exfiltrated. If they
need to be in for some more time, then further deception plans need
to be put into operation.
The duration of operations
in most cases is stretchable. The first phase may take anything between
one and three years, while the second phase will be carried out in synchronised
fashion for a month or two in one place and then move on to another
target. After a respite of a few months it will be time to carry out
operations again. The long-term objective is to build information networks
in Pakistan that will provide a human intelligence source for India
and additionally it will help us make inroads into the military establishment
and bureaucracy.
Along with the strike
missions carried out by the second team, plans may be made to carry
out heliborne operations and SF strikes in the border regions against
militant training camps and other suitable targets. Forces for this
are already available in the form of the National Security Guards and
Indian Army para-commandos. These can be configured and trained for
operations in a near-war like situation or simultaneously with the covert
strike missions outlined above. All this of course requires a national
security policy that seeks to engage and contain Pakistan in foreign
policy terms.
To aid this process
and to improve intelligence gathering on Pakistan the above covert action
plan is commended to the Indian decision-maker and political leadership.
The Indian diplomatic and security response to Pakistan sponsored terrorism
has often been to fight fires within after the incidents have taken
place. Additionally, there is a dialogue track, which seeks to engage
Pakistan in a meaningful bilateral exchange. But little thought is given
to the possibility of engaging in covert operations on a scale suggested
above and its usefulness as a tool of diplomacy. The intention as stated
above is not to help the disintegration of Pakistan but to engage Pakistan
in a battle in which the key players, the army, ISI and bureaucracy
will get embroiled to an extent that it creates conditions for, first
Pakistan’s disengagement from the sub-continent and second, may help
the process of bilateral dialogue.
NOTES
*
Dr Bhashyam Kasturi, an international security affairs specialist focuses
on Indian national security issues relating to intelligence and special
operations. Pankaj Mehra, a security analyst specialises in matters
relating to intelligence. While Dr. Kasturi is currently Chief Correspondent
with the Deccan Herald newspaper, Mr. Mehra is a free-lance writer with
special interest in intelligence. The authors would like to express
their appreciation to B. Raman, former additional secretary in the Cabinet
Secretariat, who read an earlier draft of this paper and offered his
critical comments on several aspects of covert action.
1. Roy Godson. Intelligence
Requirements for the 1990s. (California 1994). quoting Admiral Stansfield
Turner from his work "Secrecy and Democracy". pp.167.
2. American Covert Operations
in Tibet. Micheal Janson. available on www-personal.umich.edu/~mjanson/tibet.html.
3. Asoka Raina. Inside
RAW: The Story of India’s Secret Service. Vikas Publishing House
Pvt. Ltd. (New Delhi 1981). pp.48-64.
4. Ken Conboy and Paul
Hannon. Elite Forces of India and Pakistan. Osprey Publishing
Ltd. (London 1992) pp.27.
5. Raina. op.cit. pp.
65-74.
6. Rohan Gunaratna.
Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. The Role of India’s Intelligence
Agencies. South Asian Network on Conflict Research. Colombo (Colombo
1993). pp.33-35.
7. JN Dixit. Assignment
Colombo. Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd. (New Delhi 1998). pp.13-14.
8. Soumen Datta, Anish
Gupta and Sourabh Sen. Sunday Special. Blood and Sand. Sunday
31 May - 6 June 1998. pp. 32.
9. Information from
source.
10. Bhashyam Kasturi.
Intelligence Services: Analysis, Organisation and Functions.
(Lancer paper 6) Lancer Publishers and Distributors. 1995. Pg. 72.
11. IDR Research Team.
Op Topac: The Kashmir Imbroglio. Indian Defence Review. July
1989. pp. 35-48.
12. Herald Annual.
Interview with Benazir Bhutto, January 2000.
13. Point made by B
Raman former additional secretary in the cabinet secretariat who read
a draft of this paper.
14. B Raman. Was there
an intelligence failure. Frontline, 30 July 1999. pp.117-119.
15. The Federation
of American Scientists. site can be accessed at www.fas.org\irp\world\index.html.
This site on world intelligence organisations cites Pakistani sources
as saying that RAW has 35,000 agents operating in Pakistan.
16.
Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman. Every Spy a Prince.The Complete History
of Israel’s Intelligence Community. Houghton Mifflin Company. (Boston,
Massachusetts 1990). pp.144.
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