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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
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Pakistan National Assembly Results
Pakistan Provincial Assembly Results
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| National Conference |
28
|
| Indian National Congress |
20
|
| People's Democratic Party |
16
|
| Bharatiya Janata Party |
01
|
| Communist Party of India (Marxist) |
02
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| Bahujan Samaj Party |
01
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| J&K Panthers Party |
04
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| Others |
15
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| Total Seats |
87
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| Provisional results from media sources |
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PAKISTAN
|
Dictator's
Democracy
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management
It is not entirely
clear whether a Talibanised genie was intended to appear out
of the magic lamp of Pakistani democracy - but it has. The
six party Islamist fundamentalist alliance, the Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) has not only secured 53 seats in the national
Parliament[Table],
but a controlling representation (48/99) in the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) Assembly, and largest single party
status in Baluchistan, with 14 of 51 seats [Table].
Significantly, it has secured a fair presence in the other
two provinces that went to elections - Sindh and Punjab -
as well, both in the National and State Assemblies. The enormity
of this achievement can be measured against the fact that
no combination of religious parties has ever secured more
than 11 seats (1988) in any previous National Assembly, and
the religious parties were down to just two seats in the last
elections in 1997.
Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, Central Vice President of the MMA, and
the head of the Madrassah Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania at Akora Khattak
that spawned virtually the entire leadership of the Taliban,
interprets the mandate as proof that "the masses have rejected
the 55 year old tyrannical system of governance and want a
just system based on Islamic values." As one of the chief
architects of, and advisor to, the erstwhile Taliban regime
in Afghanistan, it is not difficult to imagine what his vision
of such a 'just system' would be. Somewhat ominously, even
as election results were trickling in, 12 men accused of fighting
alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan were released from the
Central Jail at Quetta in Baluchistan, with hundreds of jubilant
supporters from the MMA at hand to welcome them to freedom.
At least some Western commentators have spoken of a worrying
'Taliban comeback' through the Pakistani ballot box.
These concerns can only be addressed by time, but there are
reasons to believe that, while uncertainty and instability
will remain the lot of Pakistan, there is evidence that the
elections themselves may not alter prevailing conditions very
dramatically - certainly in the near term. The democratic
make-believe of elections notwithstanding, Pakistan remains
firmly and unequivocally a dictatorship under its President,
General Pervez Musharraf. As the European Community's chief
election observer in Pakistan, John Cushnahan, noted, "The
holding of a general election does not in itself guarantee
the establishment of a democracy… the Pakistan authorities
engaged in actions which resulted in serious flaws in the
electoral process." The National Human Rights Commission of
Pakistan (HRCP) has independently asserted that the elections
were "lacking both in fairness and transparency." They came,
moreover, after an extended process of 'pre-rigging', the
revision of election laws to exclude 'inconvenient' candidates,
and the Legal Framework Order that was gazetted in August
this year, which altered some 30 Articles of the Pakistan
Constituion to ensure that power was firmly retained by the
General after the formation of the new National Assembly.
Under the circumstances - within a reasonable margin of error
- it is safe to suggest that the electoral outcome is substantially
an approximation of what the General intended. He has a hung
Parliament, with the Pakistan Mulsim League-Qaid-e-Azam (PML-QA),
widely referred to as the 'King's Party' because of the explicit
support it enjoys from (and unqualified support it offers
to) President Musharraf, emerging as the single largest faction
in the National Assembly. Interestingly, the EU's observers
stated that the PML-QA had been one of the main beneficiaries
of official attempts to interfere in the election. There is
also some evidence to suggest that the results in the NWFP
and Baluchistan were not quite as surprising as they are being
made out to be, and one of the constituent members of the
MMA, the Markazi Jamiat Ahle Hadith, has declared the alliance
mandate to be 'bogus', claiming that it had been 'given' seats
to create political instability in the country through a hung
Parliament. This goes some way to confirm former Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto's claim that the frontier provinces were 'handed
over' to the MMA and that, "Strategically, the military wants
to hold a red rag up to the West and say 'Look West, you need
a military dictatorship, because if there's not, then pro-Taliban
parties are going to come to power.'" The alacrity with which
the PML-QA President, Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi declared that
the MMA was "the natural ally" of his party also suggests
a measure of understanding between the two formations.
Democratic processes, however flawed they may be, nevertheless
have a tendency to set the unexpected into motion, and can
never be entirely orchestrated. With their control of religious
institutions, private armies and the street power they enjoy,
the religious extremist parties could well be tempted to seek
to aggressively extend their areas of influence through a
combination of political action, religious mobilisation and
violent intimidation. Their visible success also creates the
danger of relatively moderate Islamists adopting their 'model'
of political action, a more radicalized agenda, and eventual
resort to armed force and terrorism.
As the processes of government formation are engineered, however,
it is clear that the 'King's Party' will have a controlling
function in the new administration at the Centre, and would
also form a government in the crucial State of Punjab - which
accounts for 60 per cent of the country's population and a
dominant proportion of the Pakistan Army, and that constitutes
the core of the power of the state in Pakistan. More significantly,
Musharraf's control over the Army - and over the counter-terrorism
campaign - remains entirely undiluted, though the MMA's 'electoral
victories' could provide him with an argument to dilute operations
against the Islamist terrorists. 'Democracy' in Pakistan,
for all that it is worth, will change little in the foreseeable
future.
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|
INDIA
|
J&K:
Dynasty Interrupted - but can there be peace?
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami in Kashmir
Chief of Bureau, Mumbai, Frontline
Pisr-e-Nooh
ba badaan kard nishast,
Khandaan-e-Nabuwatash gum shud
[As the son of Noah kept the company of bad people,
this prophet's family was destroyed]
Mohammad Yousuf Taing's use of Persian poetry to comment
on his party's electoral debacle did nothing to temper its
acid message. The author of a seminal biography on Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah, Taing echoed the sentiments of the many
who believe that the National Conference's (NC) decimation
in the just-concluded elections in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)
can be traced to the loss of its core character. The National
Conference's alliance with the Bharatiya Janata Party; its
failure to forge a coherent agenda for development; corruption
- all these did indeed contribute to the party's decimation.
But this 'family,' if the NC can indeed be described as
one, is far from destroyed. Its defeat needs to be read
in the context of a larger process of democratic renewal
underway in J&K, one from which the National Conference
could, like other groupings, emerge strengthened and transformed.
As things stand, it is still unclear just who will form
the next government in the State, and what their agenda
in office will be. The Congress (I), with 20 seats, and
the People's Democratic Party (PDP), with 16, are likely
to be the twin axes around which an alliance will be formed.
But their representation in the new Assembly is well short
of a majority, for which they will need the support of at
least eight legislators. These will have to be drawn from
the ranks of twelve independent legislators, or members
of small formations like the Panthers Party, or the Communist
Party of India (Marxist). The process of government formation
is complicated by a feud between the Congress (I) and the
PDP on which party will hold the coveted position of Chief
Minister.
These feuds are driven in part by political egos, but also
by complex sets of political considerations. The PDP, born
from the ranks of the Congress (I) in 1998, sees itself
as an emerging inheritor to the National Conference, a representative
of ethnic-Kashmiri identity in the Kashmir valley. Its core
postures are reminiscent of those historically held by the
National Conference, most notably in their adversarial relationship
to central power in New Delhi and to representatives of
non-Kashmiri formations in Jammu. The PDP's insistence that
the next Chief Minister be Kashmiri - thus excluding Ghulam
Nabi Azad, the Congress (I) leader who is of ethnic Kashmiri
origin but from a family resident in the Jammu district
of Doda for the past three generations - stems from its
aggressive assertion of ethnic Kashmiri identity.
Congress (I) politicians might, under other circumstances,
have been willing to concede the PDP's demands. Their core
problem is the implacable hostility of independents to the
PDP head, former Indian Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed.
Some, like People's Conference-affiliated Ghulam Mohiuddin
Sofi, are competitors for precisely the same political space
the PDP seeks to occupy. Others, like the two Communist
Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) legislators, are wary of
the long-term political consequences of accentuating the
already-bitter relationship between the Kashmir and Jammu
regions. Similar concerns are shared by the Congress (I)
itself, with five Kashmir Valley-based legislators who do
not wish to concede space to the PDP, and remaining Jammu-based
legislators who cannot be seen to be caving in to Kashmiri-chauvinist
forces.
All of this gives some room for maneuver to the seemingly
devastated NC. The organisation has been talking to senior
leaders within the PDP who are unhappy with the stranglehold
Sayeed and his daughter Mehbooba Sayeed maintain over the
party apparatus. This could translate into the NC offering
support to a government made up of PDP dissidents as well
as independents who share an interest in marginalizing the
Sayeeds. Some within the Congress (I), angry with Sayeed
for failing to agree to a pre-election seat-sharing deal
that could have given both an absolute majority in the Assembly,
might just be tempted to go along with such an arrangement.
National Conference leaders also believe ideological fissures
between the PDP and the Congress (I) make some kind of breakdown
inevitable. The PDP, for example, has called for unconditional
dialogue with terrorist groups, the disbanding of the elite
Special Operations Group of the J&K Police, and the release
of jailed terrorists. All of these would be problematic
for the Congress (I), which cannot, for pan-Indian political
considerations, be seen to be soft on terrorists. Congress
legislators representing Hindu-majority regions in Jammu,
which have been hard hit by the terrorism of the Islamist
Right, would be particularly vulnerable to such pressures.
In the near future, the political chaos is likely to create
severe problems for India's security apparatus in J&K. It
is unclear whether the next Chief Minister would, for example,
continue formal consultations with the Army's 15 and 16
Corps on internal-security related issues. A running firefight
between the PDP and the security forces would, again, create
very obvious problems for counter-terrorist operations.
And given the history of hostility between the PDP and counter-terrorism
units of the J&K Police, it is probable that key officers
will be relieved of their commands. Worst of all, the ideological
differences between the PDP and the Congress (I) are almost
certain to make any serious political engagement with either
terrorist groups or secessionist political formations unworkable.
All of this, however, is in the near term. Some time down
the road, India is likely to reap the very real dividends
of these elections. For one, the secessionist All Parties
Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
stands divided and discredited, with centrists in the group
convinced that they have lost an historic opportunity, by
boycotting the elections, to establish their democratic
credentials. The fact that the PDP managed to secure the
support of some Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
units at the local level could, in turn, result in a larger
process of alliance building within the state, at the cost
of the Pakistan-based leadership of such groups. Most important
of all, democracy itself has emerged with real credibility,
a gain that will long outlast the government now to be formed,
and its successors.
Armed
& Dangerous: Small Arms and Explosives Trafficking in
Bangladesh
Guest
Writer: Neila Husain
Research Fellow, Bangladesh Institute of International
and Strategic Studies (BIISS)
The
problem of small arms and explosives in South Asia has
long been associated with insurgencies. While it is
true that intra and interstate conflicts are responsible
for illicit trafficking of small arms, it is also being
recognized that this is not just a military problem,
but also has socio-economic and political dimensions.
Nowhere is the problem more acute than in the case of
Bangladesh where the proliferation of small arms and
explosives have become inseparable in the political
and social lives.
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have been traditionally
identified as end users for small arms and light weapons,
while Bangladesh and Nepal were known as transit routes.
However, the scenario has changed significantly in recent
years. With the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and political
instability in Bangladesh, arms traders have found new
markets in these countries. The fact that the number
of small arms in Bangladesh has increased from an estimated
100,000 in 1990 to 250,000 in 2001 explains the rising
demand for small arms.
It was during the war of Independence in 1971 that the
influx of small arms and explosives commenced. Friendly
foreign governments supplied arms to the 'Mukti Bahini'
(Freedom Fighters), while the Pakistani Army provided
arms to pro-Pakistani groups. After the war, in spite
of the call for arms surrender by the then government
of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, many freedom fighters retained
their weapons. Subsequently, disgruntled and later outlawed
political parties, such as the Sharbahara, Gono Bahini,
Purbo Banglar Shamajthantrik Dal, resorted to armed
violence against the government. This was soon followed
by a protracted low intensity insurgency that started
in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in the mid-1970s,
and the Shanti Bahini, which spearheaded the movement,
was supplied with arms mostly by India, and were also
given sanctuary in that country.
The patterns of current arms seizures by enforcement
agencies reveal two major sources of small arms: crude
locally made firearms and semi-sophisticated foreign
arms. Of the locally made firearms, shotguns, pipeguns,
sawed rifles or kattas, are used in the countryside
by local thugs and gangs. In the cities, Chinese rifles,
foreign-made revolvers, pistols, stenguns and sub-machines
guns are widely available. Since these are of foreign
make, the sources are obviously external. South Asia
has long been one of the major transit routes for the
international arms trade, and the war in Afghanistan
and the insurgencies in Burma have been major causes
for the transformation of the region in this direction.
Bangladesh's entry into the league occurred much later.
Its strategic location near the high seas and bordering
major insurgencies, coupled with poorly manned borders,
provided traffickers a golden opportunity to transfer
arms to conflict areas. One of the major routes has,
for years, been the sea route, with arms originating
in South East Asia, passing through Thailand and landing
at Cox's Bazaar in South East Bangladesh.
The land route has also emerged as a favoured route
for arms trafficking, though the types and purpose of
arms are quite different. The arms that flow out of
Bangladesh over the land route are basically meant for
the insurgencies in India's Northeast, Myanmar and as
far as Sri Lanka, though this source also includes Southeast
Asia. However, the small arms that flow into Bangladesh
to meet the internal demands mainly come across the
Indo-Bangladesh border and are of Indian origin, easy
to use and relatively low in price. There are also indications
of an emerging air route for arms trafficking, though
the quantities are still small.
The recent proliferation of small arms in Bangladesh
has resulted in one of the worst forms of violence in
the history of Bangladesh. There is no specific targets,
no particular location or 'battlefield', no identified
enemy since the 1971 War and the insurgency in the CHT.
Today, both legal and illegal small arms are indiscriminately
used in cities, towns and villages, and the so-called
'terrorists' usually belong to or are backed by mainstream
political parties with close liaison with the police.
As a result, they are mostly 'above law'. Recent trend
also indicate that such groups possess sophisticated
arms that are not even available to the Bangladesh Police
or Army.
It is difficult to point out when exactly the nexus
between politics and small arms came into being in Bangladesh.
It is believed that immediately after the War of 1971,
the then ruling party provided every member of the Parliament
with an LMG for personal safety, and this was possibly
the genesis of the arms culture in politics. By the
end of the 1980s, all the mainstream political parties
were engaged in an escalating inter-party arms race.
Today, all major political parties have their own-armed
cadres whose main responsibility is to strengthen their
'political base' and to counter the cadres of rival
political parties. In the process, politics has become
more reliant on muscle power, and a new breed of 'politicians'
with money and armed support is increasingly replacing
old-fashioned politicians. Bangladesh politics today
has, consequently, become apolitical, commercial and
violent. Vote rigging and gunfire during elections,
the murder of competing candidates as well as the killing
of newly elected candidate have become the norm rather
than exception, and have had a severe impact on the
people's confidence in democracy.
Unfortunately, armed violence is not confined to politics.
Small arms have become a serious menace that is jeopardizing
every day human and societal security. Recent increases
in crime, terrorism and violence have led to rapid deterioration
of law and order. The concern is even greater where
the terrorist or criminal enjoy the protection of law
enforcements agents. While political opponents, industrialists
and businessmen are still prime targets, today's terrorist
and organized criminals also target the common man,
such as the street vendor, petty trader, women and children.
Their vulnerability and insecurity is compounded since
reporting to the police or filing a case generally proves
to be 'unwise', as it can lead to more harassment by
the police, or further violence from the criminals.
Small arms have also found their way into educational
institutions in the country. In the name of 'student
politics', armed cadres resort to extortion, campus
violence, illegal weapons accumulation, drug trade and
other anti-social activities. The major student parties
are all affiliated to one or the other mainstream political
party. An offshoot of student politics is the widespread
extortion, known as chandabaji in Bangla. There are
everyday reports of murder, abduction and fatal injury
in connection with illegal 'toll collection'. The impact
on the economy and the country's image abroad is at
significant risk here, and extortion by armed terrorists
has slowed down foreign investment over the past few
years.
Explosives are another emerging menace in Bangladesh.
Two recent bomb blasts, within minutes of each other
on September 28, in a local cinema hall and a circus
in Sathkhira town, brought the severity of the problem
into sudden focus, and police investigations indicate
that the raw materials were smuggled from neighbouring
countries.
The trafficking of small arms and explosives is neither
an inconsequential problem, nor a transient one. Unfortunately,
serious and sincere efforts to curb the menace are still
lacking. While improved internal controls to stem the
illegal flow, including checks on the movement of cross-border
insurgents, are necessary, substantial external cooperation
will also be needed. Trafficking does not take place
in isolation; rather, this trade is perhaps one of the
most organized and globalized, and bilateral, regional
and international cooperation is essential. At the bilateral
level, Bangladesh and India and Bangladesh and Myanmar
need to sit separately on the illicit trafficking of
arms, regardless of how sensitive the issue may be.
Similarly, since small arms are rapidly spreading in
South Asia, regional cooperation through South Asian
Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) would
be helpful. Regrettably, conventions such as the Anti-Terrorism
Act initiated by SAARC members, have not proved to be
effective. Cooperation with Interpol is also much needed.
Tracing these smuggling rings requires financial investment,
technology and skilled manpower, and cooperation between
the developed and developing countries is an inescapable
necessity.
|
NEWS BRIEFS
|
|
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Civilian
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
| INDIA |
32
|
16
|
51
|
99
|
| Assam |
0
|
3
|
2
|
5
|
| Bihar |
0
|
3
|
0
|
3
|
| Jammu & Kashmir |
11
|
7
|
43
|
61
|
| Manipur |
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
| Meghalaya |
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
| Tripura |
9
|
0
|
0
|
9
|
| West Bengal |
1
|
1
|
2
|
4
|
| Left-wing Extremism |
10
|
2
|
0
|
12
|
| BANGLADESH |
0
|
11
|
0
|
11
|
| NEPAL |
0
|
4
|
23
|
27
|
| SRI LANKA |
0
|
11
|
0
|
11
|
|
Provisional data compiled
from English language media sources.
|
Chief Minister
Farooq Abdullah resigns after loss in elections; State headed
for coalition government: The Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Chief
Minister Farooq Abdullah submitted his resignation to Governor
G.C. Saxena on October 11, 2002, after the Cabinet met at his
residence in Srinagar. This follows the loss of his National Conference
(NC) at the elections to the State Legislative Assembly, results
for which have been announced. A one-line resolution that the
State government should resign was unanimously adopted at the
Cabinet meeting. In the results announced, the NC secured 28 seats
followed by the Indian National Congress (INC) with 20, the People's
Democratic Party (PDP) with 16, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
with one, Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) with two,
the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) with one, the Jammu and Kashmir
National People's Party (JKNPP) with four. Independents and Others
were victorious in 15 seats. Daily
Excelsior, October 12, 2002; Indian
Express, October 12, 2002.
Seven police personnel killed in landmine blast in Jharkhand:
Seven police personnel were killed and two others injured in a
landmine blast triggered by suspected left-wing extremists - Naxalites
- of the People's War Group (PWG) at Kanda Ghati in the Palamu
district of Jharkhand on October 9, 2002. Times
of India, October 10, 2002.
NLFT kills nine SF personnel in Tripura ambush: The proscribed
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) terrorists killed
nine security force (SF) personnel in an ambush at Raishabari
in Tripura's Dhalai district on October 9, 2002. Three more SF
personnel were injured during the attack. The incident occurred
when SF personnel were escorting workers of the General Reserve
Engineering Force (GREF). Zee
News, October 10, 2002.
Pakistan using anti-terror coalition membership as cover for
terrorism, says Premier Vajpayee: In an interview published
in the Cypriot newspaper Politis in Nicosia on October 7, 2002,
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee said that Pakistan cannot
use its membership of the international coalition against terror
as a cover for terrorist activities against India and hoped the
global community would succeed in its efforts to persuade Pakistan
to end its support to the scourge. Vajpayee said, "Pakistan claims
that it took a strategic decision to join the international coalition
against terrorism. We would endorse the wisdom of this decision.
But Pakistan should also understand that there can be no double
standard on terrorism; it cannot fight terrorism to its West and
sponsor it to its East." He added that Pakistan's "membership
of the international coalition against terrorism cannot be used
as a cover for terrorist activities directed against India. Beyond
this, we are not concerned about Pakistan's relations with any
country." Press
Trust of India, October 8, 2002.
India acquires Israeli Man-Portable radars for Line of Control:
In order to beef up surveillance of the Line of Control (LoC)
in Jammu and Kashmir, the government is importing Man-portable
radars capable of detecting movement across the border, under
a deal signed with Israel. Quoting official sources, media reports
said that under the deal worth about 70 million US dollars, the
government has begun to receive the first of these 1,022 Man-Portable
radars, which are capable of detecting human targets 10 km away.
Though government has already inducted these radars in some parts
of the LoC, the decision to go in for bulk purchase was taken
after Army reported a big spurt in detections in infiltrations
following the use of these new sensors. Press
Trust of India, October 7, 2002.
King appoints nine-member cabinet: King Gyanendra on October 11, 2002, appointed a nine-member council of ministers headed by Lokendra Bahadur Chand as Prime Minister, in place of the Sher Bahadur Deuba regime, which was dismissed by him on October 4. The King administered the oath of office and secrecy with a five-point directive that includes creating an environment of peace and security as well as holding elections to the local bodies and the House of Representatives. The choice of Chand was announced after leaders of six political parties met the King separately insisting that the new Premier should be appointed in consultation with political parties. Nepal News, October 12, 2002.
No party secures majority in elections to National Assembly: According to media reports, no political party has won a majority in the National Assembly after a reportedly low-turnout election on October 11. The Pakistan Muslim League (Qaiyyum Group) has emerged as the single largest party, securing 76 out of a total of 272 general seats contested on October 11, but fell short of a simple majority. A total of 131 seats were won by three major parties: People's Party Parliamentarians - the electoral formation of self-exiled former Premier Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) - (62), Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of six religio-political parties (53) and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) of the exiled former Premier Nawaz Sharief (16). Independents won 22 seats followed by the Muttahida Quami Movement - Altaf Hussain (13), National Alliance (13) and the rest by other smaller groups. According to media reports, MMA has dominated the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) region and the Baluchistan region. Meanwhile, Farhatullah Babar, a PPP spokesperson told Dawn, a Pakistani daily, "we are surprised that the announcement (of results) was delayed by seven hours giving rise to suspicions that already stuffed ballot boxes were also included in the count in the dead of the night… The regime's desire to have a hung parliament and its efforts in this regard have borne fruit… The victory of the religious and extremist parties has confirmed the PPP's assertion that marginalization of mainstream political parties would strengthen extremists." HeraldElections.com, October 14, 2002; Dawn, October 12, 2002.
Five persons killed in clash at Tirukkovil: At least five persons were killed and 16 others injured in a clash between security forces and suspected Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) cadres at Tirukkovil, about 230 kilometres east of Colombo in eastern Sri Lanka on October 9, 2002. Reports added that this was the most serious incident since a truce was signed between the government and LTTE eight months ago. The incident occurred when approximately 1,000 persons, including a small number of LTTE cadres, attacked a camp of the paramilitary Special Task Force in retaliation for an alleged assault on two LTTE cadres earlier in the day. Daily News, October 10, 2002.
|
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