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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 16, November 4, 2002
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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|
J&K Elections
2002: Voting Percentages in Kashmir Valley
|
|
National
Conference
|
Congress
(I)
|
People's
Democratic
Party
|
Independents
and Other Parties
|
District
|
Votes
|
Polled
|
%
|
Votes
|
%
|
Votes
|
%
|
Votes
|
%
|
Votes
|
%
|
Kupwara
|
295756
|
156771
|
53
|
62798
|
40.1
|
16098
|
10.3
|
5658
|
3.61
|
72217
|
46.1
|
Baramulla
|
626411
|
251205
|
40.1
|
84614
|
33.7
|
55019
|
21.9
|
53783
|
21.4
|
57789
|
23.0
|
Srinagar
|
723609
|
80681
|
11.1
|
41277
|
51.2
|
4102
|
5.08
|
22430
|
27.8
|
12872
|
16.0
|
Badgam
|
315424
|
119577
|
37.9
|
48908
|
40.9
|
7732
|
6.47
|
54965
|
46
|
7972
|
6.7
|
Pulwama
|
336044
|
79568
|
23.7
|
19787
|
24.9
|
14157
|
17.8
|
31182
|
39.2
|
14442
|
18.2
|
Anantnag
|
586862
|
139212
|
23.7
|
31246
|
22.4
|
25606
|
18.4
|
45181
|
32.5
|
37179
|
26.7
|
Total:
|
2884106
|
827014
|
28.7
|
288630
|
34.9
|
122714
|
14.8
|
213199
|
25.8
|
202471
|
24.5
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Comparative
Results in the 1996 Elections: |
|
42.5
|
|
17.3
|
Did
not exist
|
|
33.6
|
Computed
from official sources and English language media.
|
A Troubled Peace
Process
Guest Writer:
G H Peiris
Senior Professor, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, and
Senior Fellow, International Centre for Ethnic Studies.
A four-day
meeting between delegates of the government of Sri Lanka and
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
commenced in Bangkok on October 31, 2002, in continuation
of the peace process that began with the December 2001 ceasefire
in Sri Lanka's secessionist war. On the eve of his departure
for Bangkok, Minister G.L. Peiris, head of the government
delegation, stated that the meeting - "the second session
of the first round of peace negotiations"- will formulate
a joint appeal for development assistance for submission to
the donor community scheduled to meet in Oslo next month.
This would entail the setting up of a 'Joint Task Force' entrusted
with the responsibility of rehabilitation and reconstruction
of the war-ravaged 'north-east'. Minister Peiris added that
the third session of the first round is to be held in December
2002, by the conclusion of which he expects the ceasefire
agreement to have been "consolidated". The second round of
negotiations will begin in January 2003 and will focus on
"interim mechanisms" - an interim administration for the 'north-east',
pending the final settlement of the ethnic conflict. The third
round, he speculated, would commence in December 2003, and
would deal with the 'core issues' of the conflict.
It is now ten months since the government and the LTTE decided
to suspend the war and usher in what has turned out to be
the longest period of peace the people of Sri Lanka have had
since the convulsions of July 1983. From mid-December last
year, there have been no mass murders; no political assassinations;
no attacks on economic targets. The overall death toll of
Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict since 1983, placed at about 65,000,
works out to a daily average that approximates 10. By contrast,
since the beginning of the current year, the total number
of conflict-related deaths has been less than 30. The innumerable
barricades and checkpoints along highways have vanished, and
people in most parts of the country move about freely. Tamils
in the north buy essential consumer goods at normal prices,
and have access to basic services comparable to those provided
elsewhere in the country. Over 800 Tamils incarcerated under
the Prevention of Terrorism Act have been discharged. About
30 'prisoners of war' have also been released by the LTTE.
Though the economic 'peace dividend' is yet to materialise,
a trickle of foreign investment has begun, and donors of aid
have been making hopeful signs. Tourists are back in fairly
large numbers. Colombo's tiny stock market is buoyant. The
city hosted the Asian Athletics Championship meet and the
ICC Champions Trophy tournament in September - unimaginable
even as recently as an year ago. It is such considerations
that provide the most persuasive rationalisation for the on-going
peace effort and the most forceful impulses to ignore or trivialise
the illusions and risks these efforts so obviously entail.
The illusions and risks are, however, far more noticeable
now than they were six weeks ago, when direct negotiations
between the government and the LTTE formally began. Basic
contradictions in the entire approach, ignored for a time
in the initial euphoria of peace, have begun to affect public
perceptions and impact upon the negotiation process. The difficulties
of converting slogans and clichés into concrete action have
become increasingly apparent. Divisions within the ranks of
each negotiating party have become more pronounced. And, the
opposition to the peace process, though still fairly muted,
has gathered momentum, acquiring the potential capacity to
disrupt the entire process.
Perhaps the most important contradiction in the on-going peace
process is that, although one of the principal negotiators
is identified as the Government of Sri Lanka', both in a statutory
sense as well as from the viewpoint of political realities,
the negotiations with the LTTE are, in fact, being conducted
by a section of the government - the section headed by Prime
Minister Wickremasinghe. One cannot ignore the fact that President
Kumaratunga - head of state, head of government, and commander-in-chief
of the armed forces - has remained outside the mainstreams
of the peace process, hardly ever consulted in the formulation
of the related strategies. The LTTE allegation that the president
is attempting to sabotage the negotiations lacks substance,
but the presidential stance vis-à-vis the negotiations has
been incoherent and non-committal, except by way of a barely
concealed propagation of an understanding among all concerned
that, as leader the People's Alliance (PA), she would not
allow her arch rival Wickremasinghe and the ruling coalition
(United National Front - UNF) to make electoral gains from
the peace process. In this context, setbacks of far-reaching
consequence suffered by the UNF in the recent weeks is the
failure of its attempt at a constitutional curtailment of
the President's discretionary power to dissolve Parliament
any time after the lapse of one year of a general parliamentary
election. Against the backdrop of on-going political changes
in the country - notably the declining cohesion in the UNF
- one can no longer rule out the possibility of the presidential
power over the parliament being exercised any time after December
5, 2002. In addition, this failure has prompted the LTTE to
raise doubt about the capacity of the UNF to convert its negotiation
pledges into necessary constitutional reforms.
Yet another basic paradox in the current peace process stems
from the unavoidable position of equality that needs to be
accorded to the LTTE in the negotiation procedures. That this
is not merely a problem of protocol has been evident all along
in matters such as the 'most wanted criminal' status of the
LTTE leader Prabhakaran in India, and the status of the LTTE
as a banned terrorist outfit in several countries. This problem
assumed sudden prominence when, on October 31, 2002, while
the negotiations were proceeding in Bangkok, Prabhakaran was
convicted and sentenced (in absentia) by the High Court of
Colombo to 200 years' imprisonment for one of his innumerable
crimes - the murder of 76 persons in the bombing of the Central
Bank at Colombo in January 1996. Neither G.L. Peiris' prompt
assurance that Prabhakaran's conviction will not affect the
peace process, nor LTTE spokesman Balasingham's polemic that
the government of Sri Lanka is guilty of more serious crime
than the mere bombing of a central bank could detract from
the fundamental dilemma stemming from two considerations -
the judiciary is an integral component of the government engaged
in the negotiations; and the very same government is committed
to upholding the Rule of Law, and judicial decisions that
flow from that principle.
Sporadic violations of the 'Memorandum of Understanding' (MOU)
- the formal agreement between the Sri Lanka government and
the LTTE, signed in February 2002 - have, all along, posed
a potential threat to the peace process, and have tended to
escalate during recent weeks. There are several possible explanations
for the resulting deterioration of the ground situation in
the 'north-east'. Perhaps the most plausible, is that the
violations of the MOU by the LTTE collectively represent a
carefully orchestrated plan by its leadership to evict government
power and authority from the north-east and make its hegemony
over that part of the country a fait accompli before any serious
negotiations could commence. A second explanation could be
drawn from the fact that the LTTE's grip on the Eastern Province
has always been more tenuous than in the North, due mainly
to the far greater ethnic heterogeneity of the East. It is
possible, despite pretences to the contrary, that the brinkmanship
displayed by the Tigers in the East is directed from their
headquarters in the Vanni. Well informed observers have also
speculated that, conforming to the well known tendency for
monolithic command structures of terrorist groups to disintegrate,
and for splinter groups to emerge during moves towards appeasement,
the LTTE leaders of the Eastern Province (notably the hardliner
Vinayagamoorthi alias Colonel Karuna) are acting in defiance
of the Vanni high-command in promoting confrontation in their
areas of control. In this context, it is of interest that
Karuna has been incorporated into the current LTTE negotiating
team at Bangkok in total disregard of the fact that he has
personally directed several civilian massacres in the east
- one as recently as 1999 in Gonagala which involved the mutilation
and murder of 46 Sinhalese villagers.
The response of the Muslims to the ongoing negotiations and
to the intensifying political turbulences in the Eastern Province
(in which they constitute slightly more than a third of the
population) is yet another problem that has acquired critical
significance in the past few weeks. The apparent willingness
of the UNF leadership to grant the LTTE a position of eminence
(if not of sole authority) in the 'north-east' has made the
Muslim demand for an autonomous unit of government consisting
of the Muslim-majority areas of that part of the country far
more vehement than it has ever been in the past. The significance
of this is underscored by the fact that 6 out of the total
of 9 members of parliament belonging to the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (SLMC) - a constituent unit of the UNF - have embarked
upon a boycott of Parliament in order to press home their
demand for an assurance from Prime Minister Wickremasinghe
that the interests of the Muslims will not be placed in jeopardy
in any compromise worked out with the LTTE. This anxiety among
the Muslims needs to be understood within the context of their
past suffering at the hands of the LTTE, including several
large-scale massacres. It has been aggravated further by several
localised Sinhalese-Muslim clashes evidently instigated by
anti-government Sinhalese extremists. An SLMC withdrawal from
the UNF could eliminate Prime Minister Wickremasinghe's majority
in Parliament and bring down his government.
According to Minister Peiris', at least another year would
be required for the current negotiations to even approach
the 'core issues' of the ethnic conflict. Why? These 'core
issues' and the related negotiating stands have, for long,
been well known. That being the case, what are the changes
expected between now and December 2003 that would make mutual
compromises and concessions easier? Does the government expect
an economic miracle, brought about by an avalanche of foreign
aid, to defuse economic rivalries and tensions that impact
on ethnic relations? To reduce popular support for the LTTE
among the Tamils and/or weaken the secessionist cause? To
increase its own popularity in the Sinhalese segment of the
electorate and thus empower it to push through constitutional
reforms facilitating devolution of power to the north-east?
Alternatively, does the government expect to strengthen itself
militarily during the months ahead so that, if negotiations
on the 'core issues' fail, it would have the military capacity
to crush the LTTE? If this is the rationale that actually
underpins the existing timeframe of negotiation, then, surely,
the entire peace process could be heading towards a farce.
Border Talks: A
Forward Movement, but in Denial on Terror
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi, & Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
The chiefs
of the border forces of India and Bangladesh ended their
biennial meeting in New Delhi on November 1. The meeting
assumed greater significance coming, as it did, less than
a fortnight after Dhaka launched a military offensive against
'crime' in the country, codenamed 'Operation Clean Heart.'
Director General of the Indian Border Security Force (BSF)
Ajai Raj Sharma and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) chief Maj. Gen.
Rezaqul Haider crossed swords on several issues, including
New Delhi's oft-repeated assertion that separatist rebels
from northeastern India were operating out of Bangladesh.
But the two sides did agree to 'pool their resources' and
launch a united fight against terrorism and to institutionalize
a mechanism to tackle trans-national crime in a coordinated
manner.
India shares a 4,095 kilometres border with Bangladesh,
the longest among all its neighbours. Of this, four northeastern
states - Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Assam - account
for 1,879 kilometres, while the eastern state of West Bengal
has a border running 2,216 kilometres along Bangladesh.
An area of 6.5 kilometres has not been demarcated yet, and
two Joint Boundary Working Groups have been set up to complete
the boundary demarcation. The paramilitary BSF that is deployed
along the border is faced with a plethora of problems, including
illegal migration from Bangladesh, trans-border movement
of armed separatist rebels belonging to a number of insurgent
groups from India's northeastern states and West Bengal,
and endemic smuggling activities. The challenge is compounded
by the terrain, which spans thickly wooded hills, vast plains,
rivers, streams and marshland.
While the Indo-Bangladesh border may not be as 'live' a
border as that with Pakistan, it is far from easy to manage.
In April 2001, in the wake of a sudden spurt of tension
between the two neighbours, 16 BSF troopers were said to
have been 'snatched' by a thousand strong Bangladeshi mob
as they were patrolling the border in Assam's Mankachar
sector. The BSF men were tortured and killed in a most brutal
manner, some of them allegedly in BDR custody. Worse, an
international news agency released a gory photograph of
a slain BSF soldier being paraded by the Bangladeshis like
an animal slung on a single bamboo pole with hands and feet
tied.
With the rising dangers of terrorism in the region, the
New Delhi meeting - the second meeting of the BSF-BDR chiefs
in six months, the first being in Dhaka in March - assumed
added interest. Both sides now acknowledge that terror does
not recognize national boundaries and that it had to be
combated jointly. India has identified 99 training camps'
of Northeast rebel groups located inside Bangladesh, and
the detailed list has been handed over to Dhaka for action.
According to reports, the list includes 25 National Liberation
Front of Tripura (NLFT)
training camps, 20 of the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF),
18 of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim - Isak Muivah
(NSCN-IM),
17 of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
10 camps run by the People's Liberation Army (PLA),
two by (National Democratic Front of Bodoland) NDFB,
two by the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA),
three by the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC),
one by Chakma National Liberation Front and one run by the
Dima Halim Daogah (DHD).
Maj. Gen. Haider predictably denied that Bangladesh was
providing shelter to Indian separatists or that these rebels
were using his country's territory to work against India.
The BSF side was ready to furnish proof of the rebels' camps
inside Bangladesh and their operations in different parts
of that country. Dhaka, obviously, cannot easily admit the
presence of Indian separatists working out of the country,
but Indian authorities insist that top leaders of insurgent
groups such as the outlawed ULFA, the NLFT, and the PLA,
to name a few, are based in Bangladesh.
Dhaka's claims that no Indian rebel group has camps inside
Bangladesh, and that Dhaka would not encourage any anti-India
activity from within its territory rings hollow, with increasing
reports of the consolidation of terror groups in the country.
These include increasing numbers of disclosures in the western
media (Time, Far Eastern Economic Review and the Wall Street
Journal) saying that Bangladesh has become a new theatre
of the Al Qaeda and other Islamist fundamentalist groups.
Indeed, Time asserted that ULFA representatives were among
those who attended a meeting of the jihadi groups at a secret
rendezvous in Bangladesh in May 2002. There are also suggestions
that the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government of
Prime Minister Khaleda Zia - described as a mix of 'religious
nationalists, militant fundamentalists and subdued communists'
- is either lending support or is 'soft' towards the radical
jihadi groups and their supporters.
These reports have, of course, been rejected by Bangladesh
as 'malicious and unproven.' However, former prime minister
and present leader of the Opposition, Sheikh Hasina, has
also asserted that the BNP government was aiding radical
terror groups. Speaking at Brussels, Hasina added that the
last general election results "were manipulated through
planned fraud, vote rigging and unfair practices," and that,
"If the election process is betrayed, if a fundamentalist
alliance assumes power through conspiracy, the country might
become a hotbed of terrorism, it can become a safe haven
for terrorist network as the government of fundamentalist
alliance will morally and physically help so-called fundamentalist
terrorists…" Hasina has also been quoted as saying that
the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami and Islamic Oikya Jote (IOJ) -
partners of the ruling alliance - "are open about their
support for the religious fanatics."
The Bangladesh Army offensive against 'crime' - Dhaka has
not called it an anti-terrorist operation - that was launched
on October 17 under the code name 'Operation Clean Heart'
needs to be viewed in this context. Bangladeshi news reports
indicate that, till Wednesday, October 30, around 3,500
people had been detained and 500 weapons recovered in countrywide
'anti-crime' raids under this operation. This lends greater
credence and hope to the BDR delegation's agreement with
the BSF at New Delhi, to tackle terrorism 'jointly'.
Another positive outcome of the BSF-BDR meet was the agreement
to evolve practical solution to tackle widespread criminal
networks used for arms, drug and other smuggling activities
along the border and in settlements on the zero line. For
this, sector level committees are to be created to identify
all areas of specific threat, and to define solutions in
terms of wire fencing etc., without obstructing visibility
across the international border, to check criminal activity.
Even such construction, under present norms, would violate
the ban on construction within 150 yards of the zero line.
Besides, both sides have conceded that criminal elements
are abusing the porous border and settlements on the zero
lines. The BDR chief agreed that, given advance warning
on criminal activities or movements, effective action would
be taken. Other areas of continuous cooperation and increased
institutionalized interaction between the two Forces have
also been identified, and the air of latent hostility that
marked earlier phases of relations between the BSF and the
BDR is said to have been manifestly absent in this latest
round of talks.
Deep differences do, of course, persist, particularly on
the orientation and response to terrorism and cross border
insurgent activities. There is, however, evidence of a growing
area of potential cooperation in many aspects of border
management between the two countries, and it is these 'areas
of agreement' that need to be consolidated to bring the
security situation in one of the world's most populous and
potentially volatile stretches under control.
J&K:
The Politics of Illusion
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami in Kashmir
Chief of Bureau, Mumbai, Frontline
"When
you see Tom Sawyer immediately after Mozart or you enter
the case of The Planet of the Apes after having witnessed
the Sermon on the Mount with Jesus and the Apostles",
wrote Umberto Eco after a visit to a waxworks museum in
the United States of America, "the logical distinction
between the Real World and Possible Worlds is definitely
undermined."
The Real began intruding on the Possible in the hours
before Mufti Mohammad Sayeed became Jammu and Kashmir's
(J&K) new Chief Minister. A day earlier, his daughter
Rubaiya Sayeed had returned to Srinagar to witness the
swearing-in. Shaukat Bakshi, the terrorist who had kidnapped
her in 1989, also returned to his home, after being released
on bail after twelve years. Three hours before the swearing
in, members of one of the same terrorist groups with whom
he has promised negotiations fired rifle grenades at his
home. The attack came after Al Umar chief Mushtaq Zargar,
released from jail in December 1999 in return for the
safety of the hostages on board Indian Airlines flight
IC814, warned the People's Democratic Party (PDP) against
entering into an alliance with the Congress (I). A little
later, Sikandar Khan, a Congress candidate who narrowly
lost the Karnah Assembly seat, was shot dead along with
his security guards while shopping in a Srinagar market.
The new Jammu and Kashmir seems as depressingly surreal
as the old.
All this did little to puncture the curious political
reverie in Srinagar, perhaps because the circumstances
of the new government's birth have done not a little to
affirm faith that the impossible can be willed into existence.
Until October 21, the Congress' mediator with the PDP,
former Union Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, had failed
to arrive at even a minimum understanding with Sayeed.
Singh even offered Sayeed a rotating Chief Minister deal,
which, sources say, was rejected out of hand. On his return
to New Delhi, the Congress began to consider staking a
claim to power on its own. Senior Congress leaders in
Srinagar believed they would be able to manage a majority
with the aid of PDP rebels. As the prospect of a split
in the PDP accelerated, Sayeed backed down from his hardline
stand, and flew to New Delhi for talks with Congress President
Sonia Gandhi on October 25.
Sayeed was now willing to accept Manmohan Singh's rotating
Chief Minister plan, but with key caveats. First, the
PDP would have the first shot at the top job. Second,
it would hold it for all of three years, half the length
of the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly's tenure. Congress Members
of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) found both proposals unacceptable,
but Gandhi thought it best to override the state party.
Senior Congress leaders, particularly Arjun Singh, persuaded
her that a Congress-led government would end in disaster.
A fractious alliance, with only tenuous support from maverick
figures like Panther's Party leader Bhim Singh, would
be too busy fighting internal fires to actually get on
with governance. Gandhi also held broad consultations
with several intellectuals, who insisted that blocking
Sayeed's rise to power would fuel popular alienation in
Kashmir. Speaking to journalists after the deal with the
PDP was inked on October 26, Gandhi made this concern
explicit: the decision, she said, was made "in the larger
interests of the people of the Valley".
Outraged Congress and Independent MLAs responded with
unprecedented public protests, and threatened to boycott
the swearing-in. The Congress MLA from Uri, Taj Mohiuddin,
described Gandhi's decision as "a betrayal". A group of
fourteen MLAs held a series of meetings through October
27, to consider their course of action. The three-year
term given to Sayeed was unacceptable, they argued, since
there were no guarantees he would not bring the government
down after that time. In any case, the Valley-based MLAs
in the group of fourteen said, the decision to accept
Sayeed's claims to represent the Valley was political
suicide.
Sonia Gandhi's notion of the 'larger interest of the Valley'
needs examination, since it is widely shared by much of
New Delhi's intelligentsia. Effusive editorial writers
who have greeted the rise of the PDP as something of a
latter-day resurrection might have done well to spend
a little time with a calculator and a piece of paper.
The PDP share of the 2002 vote does nothing to affirm
the proposition that it is the principal voice of the
Kashmir region [Table].
Indeed, the combined vote share of the PDP and the Congress
in Kashmir only narrowly exceeds that of the defeated
National Conference. In the north Kashmir district of
Baramulla, over half of the PDP's votes were cast in a
single constituency, Gulmarg. The PDP exceeded the vote
share of the National Conference in only three of the
Valley's six districts, all in central and southern Kashmir.
Two of those districts registered below average voter
turnout, and five of the PDP's sixteen MLAs were elected
in constituencies where terrorist violence led to exceptionally
poor turnout. Indeed, three of them by less than 1,000
votes. And while the PDP's claims of 'representation'
in the Valley itself are at least dubious, without a single
seat outside the Valley, it cannot even pretend to advance
any such claim in the Jammu or Ladakh regions of the State.
This cannot, of course, undermine the decisive rejection
of the National Conference in the elections. But it does
show that the battle for oppositional space has had a
multi-dimensional outcome.
While the PDP's Kashmiri-chauvinist position has allowed
it to gain the office of the Chief Minister, the victory
is not cost-free. It has, most important, given a new
lease of life to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)
backed Jammu State Morcha, which has been demanding the
creation of a separate state for the southern region.
The Morcha succeeded in winning just one seat - which
went, not to an RSS activist but a long-time Congress
dissident who jumped ship after being denied a ticket.
But on October 28, RSS activists were able to shut down
much of Jammu in a protest strike. The Bharatiya Janata
Party, which won only a single seat in the elections,
has now started demanding that local body elections be
held in the State, hoping to cash in on regional anger.
Similar regional aggression is also evident in Kashmir.
On November 1, for example, the Kashmir Bar Association
threatened to boycott court, claiming that Muslims from
the Valley were under-represented in the High Court, and
demanding that Kashmiri Muslim judges posted outside the
State be brought back.
At least one potential flashpoint is already visible in
the horizon. Jammu has for long been under-represented
in the Assembly, because of constitutional provisions
that had suspended the delimitation of constituencies
until after the completion of the 2001 census. In the
last Assembly elections, approximately 78,000 registered
voters in Jammu and Ladakh were represented by each of
37 MLAs; in Kashmir, each block of approximately 55,000
voters was represented by each of 46 MLAs. Now that a
Commission has been charged with redrawing constituency
boundaries to ensure equitable representation, struggle
seems inevitable. Sayeed's demands for a Kashmiri Chief
Minister, said Bhim Singh a day before he accepted his
leadership, "substantiated the claim of the people of
Jammu that the future growth of their identity, culture
and language is possible only when they are accorded statehood."
Unless the new government handles Jammu's legitimate concerns
with care, its historic contribution might just be the
tearing apart of Jammu and Kashmir along ethnic-communal
lines.
Few in the new government, sadly, are likely to have time
to address long-term problems. With the caucus of twelve
independent MLAs on whose support the government depends
having decided to offer only 'issue-based' support, survival
itself will be time-consuming business. Then, the alliance
will have to find acceptable ways of implementing its
31-point Common Minimum Programme (CMP). The CMP rests
on three major pillars, all intended to bring what Mehbooba
Mufti tirelessly refers to as a "healing touch". First,
the CMP mandates the assimilation of the Special Operations
Group (SOG), alleged to be responsible for a welter of
human rights abuses, into the Jammu and Kashmir Police.
Second, the alliance has said it will terminate the use
of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA),
and release alleged terrorists held for long period of
time facing trial for minor offences. Along with this,
compensation to the families of victims of terrorism is
to be doubled, while the children of terrorists who have
been killed will receive State support for their education.
Finally, the CMP calls for unconditional dialogue with
terrorist groups.
At least some of these promises mean very little. The
SOG is and always has been part of the 60,000-strong Jammu
and Kashmir Police, and constitutes less than five percent
of its overall strength. Its troops and officers are drawn
from the same ranks, wear the same uniforms, earn the
same pay, and report to the same superiors. As such, its
'assimilation' seems little other than a re-branding of
the product. The end to the use of POTA and the release
of prisoners will also have marginal impact. Only an estimated
190 people are currently charged under the Act, eight
of them of Pakistani origin, including those released
on bail. Hard figures on the precise numbers of people
held on terrorism-related charges are unavailable, but
data published in October 2001 suggested the number who
had not by then secured bail was just 366. Interestingly,
all of thirteen individuals have actually been convicted
of terrorist crimes since 1989 - an index both of the
efficiency of the criminal justice system, and of the
kinds of redress available to victims of terrorism in
a State where 33,288 people have lost their life to terrorism
over 13 years.
The PDP-led coalition's promise to initiate dialogue with
terrorist groups is another case in point. Each Indian
Prime Minister since P.V. Narasimha Rao has offered to
initiate such a dialogue; Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee
actually began negotiations with the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
(HM)
faction of Abdul Majid Dar during the Ramzan Ceasefire
of 2000-2001. The reason such dialogue went nowhere is
a matter of record: groups ranging from the mainstream
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen to the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
have made it clear they will not engage in a dialogue
until India commits itself to final status negotiations
with Pakistan. Pakistan's military establishment sees
continued violence as an instrument to secure concessions
from India - concessions of a scale no government in India
can make. Sayeed may succeed, as others have done in the
past, in beginning a dialogue with secondary terrorist
groups, but such initiatives have had little concrete
impact before. Nor has the PDP made clear just what it
intends to negotiate, since India-Pakistan issues are
well outside its remit.
What is perhaps most disturbing about the CMP is that
it appears to have no real vision of what political perspective
its authors have for J&K. As the Communist Party of India
- Marxist (CPI-M) recently pointed out, the document contains
not a single reference to greater federal autonomy for
the State. Nor is there evidence that the new government
has any real conceptual framework for addressing violence.
Speaking in New Delhi after the PDP-Congress alliance
was formalised, Arjun Singh said the alliance drew on
his experience in Punjab, where terrorism was solved by
dealing with "each and every small thing". He perhaps
forgets the record. Singh's own signal contribution to
Punjab was installing the S.S. Barnala-led ministry, whose
indiscriminate release of jailed terrorists and winding-down
of police operations laid the foundations for five more
years of bloodshed. Six months on, Governor Siddharth
Shankar Ray and Director-General of Police Julio Ribeiro
were brought in and assigned the impossible task of fighting
terrorism without the cooperation of the State government.
When terrorism was finally stamped out, not one of the
issues Singh had privileged, from the status of Chandigarh
to the sharing of river waters, had been resolved.
Back in J&K, in May 1990, three young men walked into
the home of Srinagar religious leader Mirwaiz Mohammad
Farooq, and shot him dead in his study. The leader of
the hit squad, Mohammad Abdullah Bangroo, was shot dead
in an encounter less than a month later. Both their bodies
rest today in a graveyard near the Idgah in downtown Srinagar,
separated by just a few dozen metres. Both victim and
assassin are revered as martyrs; martyrs, moreover, for
the very same cause. The People's Democratic Party is
now in power having marketed itself as a representative
of the same cause. Now, it needs to work out just what
the cause might be.
|
Weekly Fatalities:
Major conflicts in South Asia
October 28-November
3, 2002
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Civilian
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
INDIA |
11
|
22
|
36
|
69
|
Assam |
0
|
1
|
4
|
5
|
Bihar |
0
|
2
|
0
|
2
|
Delhi |
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Jammu &
Kashmir |
11
|
14
|
30
|
55
|
Left-wing Extremism |
0
|
3
|
0
|
3
|
Tripura |
0
|
2
|
0
|
2
|
PAKISTAN |
2
|
1
|
2
|
5
|
NEPAL |
10
|
2
|
107
|
119
|
Provisional data compiled
from English language media sources.
|
INDIA
Grenade attack
precedes Mufti Mohammed Sayeed's swearing- in as J&K Chief Minister:
People's Democratic Party (PDP) leader Mufti Mohammed Sayeed was
sworn in as Chief Minister of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) on November 2, 2002. J&K Governor Girish Chandra Saxena
administered the oath of office and secrecy to him and eight other
Ministers of his cabinet at the Sher-i-Kashmir International Convention
Complex (SKICC) in Srinagar. Mangat Ram Sharma from the Jammu
region has been appointed Deputy Chief Minister. Meanwhile, a
few hours ahead of the swearing-in, a grenade attack was launched
on Sayeed's Nowgam residence, on the outskirts of the State capital
Srinagar. Two grenades were fired from a rocket launcher at the
house, injuring a security force officer and causing some damage
to the house. Sayeed was present in the house at the time of the
attack. A hitherto unknown terrorist outfit Al Nasreen has claimed
responsibility for the attack. Daily
Excelsior, November 3, 2002.
12 terrorists killed in Poonch, J&K: 12 terrorists were
killed in an encounter at the Chaprian village of Poonch district
in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on November 2, 2002. The slain terrorists
included fresh recruits and were reportedly being taken to Pakistan
for arms training by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). Two SF personnel
also sustained injuries during the encounter. Daily
Excelsior, November 3, 2002.
BSF, BDR disagree on existence of terrorist camps in Bangladesh:
The bi-annual talks between Border Security Force (BSF) and the
Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) to discuss border problems between India
and Bangladesh concluded in New Delhi on November 1, 2002, with
both the sides maintaining disagreement on the existence of training
camps of terrorists operating in India's Northeast in Bangladesh.
According to official sources, both the sides decided to set up
a Joint Coordination Committee to "look into border problems".
The two sides also re-affirmed the intention to pool resources
and carry out a determined fight against terrorism. Outlook
India, November 2, 2002.
Intercepts not admissible evidence under POTA, rules Delhi
High Court: The Delhi High Court, on October 30, 2002, held
that intercepted telephonic conversation between accused persons
would not constitute as admissible evidence under the Prevention
of Terrorism Act (POTA), as it had not been procured as per the
procedure laid down under the Act. Setting aside an order of a
Delhi Special Court which held that intercepted conversation between
the accused in the December 13, 2001, Parliament Attack case,
S.A.R. Geelani, terrorist Shaukat Hussain alias Guru and his wife
Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan, was admissible under POTA, the Court
said, "the admissibility of intercepted evidence for proving charges
under POTA is specifically barred by Chapter-V of the Act," if
not procured as per the laid down procedure. The
Hindu, October 31, 2002.
15 Corps GOC not for disbanding Special Operations Group in
J&K: The proposed decision of the Congress-People's Democratic
Party coalition to merge the Special Operations Group (SOG) of
Jammu and Kashmir Police would be a disadvantage, though not a
setback to anti-terrorism operations in the State, a senior Army
officer said on October 29, 2002. "Disbanding the SOG of the State
police will be a disadvantage but not a setback to the security
operations against the terrorists," General Officer Commanding
15 Corps Lt Gen V G Patankar told reporters in Srinagar. He said
the SOG, also known as the Special Task Force, is a motivated
force that works very hard work to fight terrorism. Daily
Excelsior, October 30, 2002.
US Ambassador Blackwill says India is a victim of terrorism:
Addressing a Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry
(FICCI) meeting in New Delhi on October 29, 2002, US Ambassador
in India Robert Blackwill said India was a victim of terrorism
which was "entirely external driven" Times
of India, October 30, 2002.
PAKISTAN
Lashkar-e-Toiba
chief set free, put under house arrest in Lahore: The Federal
government on October 31, 2002, released Hafiz Saeed, chief of
the proscribed Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), and later put him under
house arrest after holding him for five months in detention. His
residence at Johar Town has been declared a sub-jail. In a press
statement, a LeT spokesperson said Hafiz Saeed was placed under
house arrest after being held without charge for months and added
that he was released from custody at an unknown location and then
placed under house arrest at his Lahore residence. Daily
Times, November 1, 2002.
Three top-Al Qaeda terrorists in country: According to
a media report, of the six new Al Qaeda leaders, who the United
States believes are currently in active command of the group,
one is said to be residing in Pakistan and two in the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border region. The three terrorists are Saif al-Adel alias Makkawi,
an Egyptian, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah alias Abu Mohammed al Masri,
Al Qaeda's 'financial officer' and Tawfiq bin Atash alias Khallad,
Al Qaeda's 'senior operational planner'. While the first two are
believed to be in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, the
last is reportedly in Pakistan. Daily
Times, October 31, 2002.
Sipah-e-Sahaba chief released after 11 months in detention:
Maulana Azam Tariq, chief of the outlawed Sunni group Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan (SSP), was released on October 30, 2002, after 11 months
in detention at a prison at Rawalpindi. Tariq, who was elected
member to the National Assembly in the October 10 elections, was
imprisoned in November 2001 under provisions of the Maintenance
of Public Order. He was accused of more than a dozen murders of
activists from the rival Shia community, but has never been convicted.
He was released following a Lahore High Court instruction. Jang,
October 31, 2002.
SRI LANKA
LTTE to shelve
demand for interim administration in North East: At the end
of the second round of peace talks between Sri Lanka government
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on November 3,
2002, the latter shelved its demand for an interim administration
for the North-East, while looking at 'models' that would satisfy
its concept of self-governance. Speaking to media persons in Bangkok,
LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham said, "We may or may not
go for an interim administration. What is important is a solution
that would immediately address the humanitarian issues in the
North." He said though the LTTE demanded an Interim Administration
as a transitional measure, they would also like to address core
issues. This is widely seen as a major breakthrough in the peace
process. Daily
News, November 4, 2002.
200-year sentence for LTTE chief Prabhakaran and intelligence
head Pottu Amman: The Colombo High Court, on October 31, 2002,
convicted and sentenced Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
chief Velupillai Prabhakaran to 200 years in prison for conspiring
to and carrying out the bombing of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka
in 1996. Five more LTTE cadres, including intelligence chief Pottu
Amman, have also have been sentenced along with Prabhakaran. On
January 31,1996, in the massive explosion at the Central Bank
in the Fort area, Colombo, over 78 persons were killed. Daily
News, November 1, 2002.
Two persons killed and 13 injured in Muslims-Sinhalese clash
in Colombo: On the eve of the second round of peace talks
between the government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
clashes occurred between the Sinhalese and Muslims in the capital
Colombo on October 30, 2002, leaving a Muslim dead and 12 more
injured. The following day, an angry mob of mourners attacked
a Buddhist monk and as security forces opened fire to control
the mob a Muslim was injured. Daily
News, November 1, 2002.
|
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