SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 18, November 18, 2002

Peace Negotiations: Accommodating Muslim Fears
Guest Writer: G.H. Peiris
Senior Professor, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, and Senior Fellow, International Centre for Ethnic Studies.

Since the commencement in last December of attempts to resolve Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict through peaceful means, Sri Lankan Muslims have assumed an important 'third party' role in the related political processes, including the formal negotiations that began in September 2002 between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

Muslims account for about seven per cent of Sri Lanka's total population. About 30 per cent of their total number lives in large clusters falling within the Eastern Province. The others constitute small communities scattered throughout the country with the exception of the northern areas.

Rauff Hakeem, leader of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), was one of the main government delegates at the two negotiation sessions hitherto conducted, but political spokespersons for the Muslims, including those of the SLMC, have made it clear that their support to the peace process was conditional on adequate attention being devoted by both the government and the LTTE to the needs and aspirations of the Muslims, especially those from the northern and eastern parts of the island that are claimed by the LTTE as the 'Traditional Homeland' of the Tamils.

The stand taken by the Muslim spokespersons in the current peace process is distinctive as compared to the experiences of previous spells of negotiation (in 1985, 1989-90 and 1994-95). The earlier negotiations focused exclusively on contentious issues between the Sinhalese and the Tamils, with hardly any reference to the interests of the Muslims and with the leaders of the Muslim community opting to maintain a low profile.

The principal demand of the Eastern Province Muslims, articulated mainly through the SLMC, is that any compromise worked out to meet the LTTE claim for autonomy to the entire 'north-east' as a single unit, either in an interim administration or as a permanent constitutional reform, for devolution of government power should be accompanied by an arrangement facilitating self-government for those inhabiting the main Muslim areas in that part of the country. Since the demand is being backed by a boycott of parliament by nine Muslim Members of Parliament (MPs), all of who are members of the United National Front government, it has created an unforeseen dilemma for the government. This stems, on the one hand, from the government's existing (implicit) commitment to the principle of an LTTE-dominated interim administration for the entirety of the 'north-east'; and, on the other, from the fact that, in the event of the dissident Muslim MPs leaving the ranks of the ruling coalition on this issue, they could precipitate a major change in the parliamentary balance of power and, possibly, a collapse of the government.

Two sets of considerations stand out most prominently as explanations for the circumspection and the assertiveness displayed by the Muslim leaders in relation to the on-going negotiations. The first of these relates to the nature of Tamil-Muslim relations in the 'north-east', particularly in the Eastern Province. The second stems from cleavages within the SLMC.

The coastal lowlands of the Eastern Province have hardly ever been entirely free of localised friction between the Tamils and the Muslims constituting, in their aggregate numbers, 42 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively, of the total population of the province. These, it must be remembered, are areas of excessively high population density, in which residential loci of one community are juxtaposed with those of the other in an intricate and closely entwined micro-spatial mosaic. The eastern lowlands are also characterised by resource scarcity, agrarian unrest, and poverty, and hence, frequent interpersonal disputes with communal undertones.

This was the demographic and socio-economic setting in which several Tamil militant groups began to build a support base among those of their own community in the early 1980s. At that stage, evidently in response to harassment by the Tamil militants, the Muslims of their larger communities also attempted to form armed groups, and did achieve some success in their attempt. Thus, for example, in the Allai area (south of Trincomalee harbour), an armed group, which called itself the 'Jihad Movement', is said to have gathered a small but ardent following. Again, in coastal Ampara (southern parts of the Eastern Province), a movement referred to as 'Al Fatah' mobilised some support among Muslim youth. These, however, soon succumbed under the weight of the overwhelmingly more powerful Tamil militants.

Following the India-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987, the SLMC (which, by that time, had emerged as the foremost political party in the Eastern Province) decided to abide by the Accord and to collaborate with the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in its attempts to restore normalcy in the 'north-east'. Observers believe that it was at this point that the LTTE turned its wrath in earnest against the Muslims in this part of the country.

Following the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka in the early months of 1990 and the concurrent emergence of the LTTE as the most powerful among the separatist groups, Muslim communities in the Eastern Province became the target of large-scale LTTE attacks. These evidently represented an attempt at 'ethnic cleansing' of the 'Traditional Tamil Homeland'. Several gruesome massacres of Muslim civilians, each involving death tolls exceeding a hundred, were carried out by LTTE cadres, resulting in mass evacuation of certain localities by the Muslims. By January 1991, about 350,000 Muslims had been displaced from their villages and towns of the Eastern Province. In October 1990, the LTTE also evicted en masse all Muslims (total number estimated at about 70,000) from the Northern Province. Though the policy of 'ethnic cleansing' appears to have been abandoned since that time, LTTE attacks sporadically targeted the Muslims, mainly for their suspected collaboration with armed forces of the government, throughout the 1990s.

The experience in the Eastern Province, since the commencement of current negotiations, has not allayed Muslim fears. Throughout, there have been clashes between the LTTE cadres and Muslim civilians, triggered off mainly by Muslim resistance to extortion. Among the major confrontations this year, each of which lasted over several days, were those at Muttur in February; Valachennai in June; and Akkaraipatu in October. In the Northern Province, the LTTE has continued to resist the return of Muslims who were evicted in 1990. Current media reports indicate that LTTE extortion (now being referred to as 'taxation') in the east has acquired an increased intensity, and that the LTTE network of 'police stations', initiated in early 2002, has now been extended to the east in the face of Muslim protests.

In the longer term, Muslim fears of becoming a beleaguered minority in the entire country have been reinforced by several brief localised Sinhalese-Muslim clashes of the recent past - in the township of Mawanella in May 2001; and in northern Colombo in October 2002. There is, in addition, the long-standing dispute in the interior of the Eastern Province concerning an alleged encroachment by the Muslims of land belonging to an ancient Buddhist temple.

The boycott of Parliament by nine Muslim members from the east ended on November 14, 2002, following a formal assurance by Prime Minister Wickremasinghe to accord priority to their main demands. On the eve of their return to Parliament, however, their spokesperson Anwer Ismail, ruled out any possibility of cohabitation between the Muslims and the Tamils under an LTTE-led interim administration in the 'north-east'.

The vehemence of the Muslim agitation for self-government in their main population clusters of the Eastern Province could also be attributed in part to the factional cleavages within the SLMC. Rauff Hakeem's grip on his party, it should be noted, is much weaker than that of his predecessor, the late M.H.M. Ashraff. In this context it is necessary to recapitulate that:

1. the origin of the SLMC in 1981 represented the fruition of an idea that had gained currency among Muslims of the Eastern Province that their interests have tended to be neglected by the leaders of their community (drawn from an affluent elite in the urban areas elsewhere in the country);
2. SLMC's main support base has continued to remain in the east; and
3. Hakeem, being a Muslim from the highlands, does not command extensive personal support among the Eastern Province Muslims. Though, as Ashraff's deputy, this suave and astute politician did perform an invaluable role in extending the SLMC electoral base to the Muslim communities in certain Sinhalese-majority areas outside the east, it seems that he is no longer of much use to his party stalwarts in the Eastern Province. Indeed, at a press interview during the parliamentary boycott by his nine colleagues, Hakeem himself admitted that ever since he took over the leadership of the SLMC, there have been moves (within the party) to portray him as " ... an outsider who does not understand the dynamics of Muslims in the Eastern Province".
4. In addition to the dissidents within the party, there is Ashraff's widow, Ferial, presently a member of the parliamentary opposition, waiting to step in daintily into Hakeem's shoes in the event of his being dislodged.

Under the circumstances, it is not clear how the clashing aspirations and apprehensions of Sri Lanka's Muslims will be reconciled within the present negotiation process that seeks to bring peace to the fractured island nation.