SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 24, December 30, 2002

INDIA

ULFA: Shift In Strategy, or Just Trigger-happy?
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati

The police in the insurgency-ravaged State of Assam are convinced that the outlawed United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) was behind the mortar attack this Christmas, which killed a woman and a child, and injured 20 others, most of them pedestrians or people in moving vehicles, and including a former member of the Indian Parliament. Security circles in this north-east Indian State are perplexed over the choice of a 'war weapon' - a 60 mm mortar - by the rebels to launch a serial attack in a crowded civilian area in downtown Guwahati, the capital city, leading to questions whether terror was the only motive behind the operation.

The ULFA, of course, has not claimed responsibility yet for the surprise raid in a civilian area outside the security zone, but going by the modus operandi and the weapons used, security agencies are 'sure' that the group was responsible for the attack. Earlier, a 60 mm mortar was fired on October 27 at the high-security Dispur capital complex in Guwahati, close to the Chief Minister's secretariat. There were no casualties in that incident, as the missiles missed the target and fell at an open space in a residential colony. The ULFA had claimed responsibility for that attack, saying that it was meant to "awaken those in power." Forensic experts now say the mortar fired in the October 27 raid was identical to the mortars used in the five explosions during the December 25 attack, and had the same lot number. Assam Police Inspector General (Intelligence) Khagen Sarma, in a conversation with the writer, cited this evidence to assert that the ULFA was "surely behind Wednesday's attack" in Guwahati.

The key question now is, why did the ULFA launch such a random strike in a purely civilian area without any specific target. Can this be considered a shift in the separatist group's tactics, aimed at creating maximum terror? The ULFA, in course of its 'armed struggle for a sovereign, socialist Assam', since its inception in 1979, is not known to have resorted to random attacks on civilians, though their campaigns have been marked with brutality. The cold-blooded killing of more than 100 Hindi-speaking people across Assam by ULFA hit squads in year 2000 were part of a design, perhaps aimed at terrorizing traders and businessmen to comply with demands for cash. Nevertheless, it is not clear how the killing or maiming of ordinary people - who the ULFA claims to be seeking to liberate - in the Christmas attack could possibly benefit the insurgent group.

More disturbing is the choice of the weapon. Officials engaged in counter-insurgency operations in Assam say that such mortars have not even been used against civilian targets by terrorists in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) although, unlike the ULFA, groups in that State are known to carry out random strikes on civilian areas. A 60 mm mortar, or any mortar, for that matter, is an area weapon, not a specific target weapon, and is usually fired into enemy lines to inflict maximum casualties. The mortar lacks accuracy in hitting specific targets. The 60 mm mortar is designed to cause maximum fatality in an eight-yard radius, and unleashes high impact in a 'danger zone' of 200-yards radius.

The 60 mm mortars used in both the October 27 and the December 25 attacks in Guwahati were of Chinese make and, according to intelligence officials, are largely used by the Pakistani Rangers and the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR). The source of the weapons and the route through which they have been smuggled into Assam is still a matter of speculation, but it is well established that ULFA rebels have several bases in Bangladesh and are close to both Pakistani agencies, including the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), Bangladesh's key intelligence agency. Security watchers in Northeast India will also view with interest claims made by the Assam Police that the ULFA has created a trained 'artillery squad'. A top intelligence official said that such training can only be imparted at an Army facility and points the needle of suspicion at the Pakistanis and elements in Bangladesh.

The recent attacks are disturbing on another count. With the exception of the January 27, 2002, bomb attack near Guwahati, in which a Deputy Superintendent of Police and his driver were killed and four other policemen wounded, the ULFA has been lying low, at least in terms of violent operations, since the Congress government, led by Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, came to power after the elections of May 2001. This absence of operational strides does not, however, imply inactivity. Both extortion and recruitment by the ULFA is reported to have risen during this period, and the ULFA has also used its time to forge strategic alliances with other rebel groups like the Manipur-based United National Liberation Front (UNLF); the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO) active in North Bengal and Western Assam; and is also said to have established a 'working relationship' with the Maoist guerrillas in Nepal. Security officials were aware of these strategic alliances, but were happy over the fact that the group was not indulging in hard acts of violence. The low key posture maintained by the group was also attributed to the reverses suffered by it during the past couple of months, in which nearly 70 ULFA cadres were killed in the Western district of Nalbari alone, an area still considered an organizational stronghold. So far this year, 340 militant cadres, most of them belonging to the ULFA, have been killed by security forces across Assam. The ULFA has also lost a number of its highly effective middle-level commanders who were charged with the actual execution of operations ordered by the top brass based outside India. The ULFA was also believed to be keeping quiet because of the intense pressure mounted on Bhutan by New Delhi for action against the group, and the dismantling of its training camps on Bhutanese soil. The stepped up vigil along an otherwise porous 265 kilometre long Assam-Bhutan border, also made it increasingly difficult for the rebels based in the Himalayan kingdom to cross over and carry out strikes, and to return thereafter to their safe bases.

The timing, location and character of the two mortar attacks in quick succession needs to be analysed in some detail in this context. These attacks occurred even as the ULFA reiterated its desire to arrive at a political settlement to the insurgency problem. The group does, of course, still insist on its three pre-conditions for a possible dialogue with New Delhi: talks outside India; talks to include the issue of sovereignty; and talks under the supervision of the United Nations. Nevertheless, the repeated emphasis in recent weeks has been that there can be no military solution to the problem, and consequently, the leadership was no longer opposed to talks with the Indian Government, provided New Delhi met the set preconditions. The surprise mortar attacks could, consequently, be aimed at sending out a message that the group was very much a force to reckon with, and that it retains the power to strike at will anywhere it wanted. Assam Police officials say the ULFA could carry out more such mortar attacks. Nevertheless, given the group's operational history and political thinking, it is not likely that such attacks on civilian targets could become a pattern - unless the ULFA is, suddenly and inexplicably, willing to run the risk of being branded a pure 'terrorist' group.

BHUTAN

Dawn of a New Order
Guest Writer: Palden Tshering in Thimpu
Journalist and Commentator

If it ain't broke why fix it? That is a cliché that echoes loudly in Bhutan's constitutional debate today.

Bhutan's political system, based on a hereditary monarch without a Constitution, has proven to be politically stable and a well-respected system that works for the farmer up to the highest echelons of Bhutanese society. The country has developed and progressed from the 19th,straight into the 21st century, and the Bhutanese not only vest a high level of confidence in the Monarchy, a majority honestly do not want power to be taken away from the King, or to change what has worked quite well till now.

Yet, almost a year in the making, the Dragon Kingdom's first Draft Constitution is finally ready and will be presented to the National Assembly in the coming year, after which it will be openly debated by the people's representatives and the highest levels of the government, and be revised or amended in the light of this discourse.

The emergence of democracy in Bhutan is perhaps unique in world history. It was not preceded by any revolution, or strikes, demonstrations, and calls to arms. The new political process was, in fact, initiated by King Jigme Singye Wangchuck on his own accord. Bhutan's monarch explained his perspective: "It is important for all of us today to look into the future and to take the necessary steps to shape the destiny of our country. The political system must evolve so that the people continue to enjoy peace and prosperity, justice and fundamental rights."

On the 15th day of the 10th Bhutanese month (November 30) 2001, the King had emphasized the need to draft a Constitution that would establish a dynamic system of governance, uphold the true principals of democracy, and safeguard the sovereignty of the country and the rights of the people. Work on the Constitution began on December 31, 2001, with a 39 member Drafting Committee under the leadership of its Chairman, Lyonpo Sonam Tobgye, Chief Justice of the Bhutanese Supreme Court. A draft of the Constitution was completed by early November 2002, and a copy was handed over by the King to the Prime Minister on December 3, 2002.

The drafting of the Constitution is seen as a historic step in the process of political evolution. Looking back, the King took development planning to the district level in 1981. 10 years later development planning was further decentralized to the village level. In 1998 despite strong resistance from the people, all executive authority was devolved from the Throne to an elected Council of Ministers.

The Bhutanese people received the news about their new draft Constitution with a mixture of feelings. While the full implications of this political initiative have not been completely realized, observers in Thimphu express both appreciation and uncertainty. Indeed, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee himself articulated the general apprehension: "We must know whether we are ready for multi-party democracy or not. The pros and cons have to be weighed very carefully." What could underlie such doubts? The fact is, Bhutan has neither a history of, nor experience in, the rough and tumble of a democratic system, whether bi-partisan or multi-party, and anxieties are compounded by the widespread perception that the existing system is working well. As other Committee members expressed it, after they were confronted with the initial reaction from various sections of the Bhutanese population: "We have this unique system which works. Why do we need to change it? Are you going to change it for the better or the worse?" There were also concerns about the risks of democratising the political system 'before the people were ready,' and the experience of other countries where democracy had brought corruption and instability.

It was, however, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck who reassured the Committee, arguing that Bhutan must not be deterred by the fact that democratic political systems did not appear to work in some countries. Bhutan was in a unique position, with the time and opportunity to develop a system of governance suited to its needs and circumstances. "The principals and ideals of democracy," he insisted, "are inherently good, and a democratic system is desirable for Bhutan. If the lessons of some democracies are not encouraging it is not because the concept of democracy is flawed. It is because of mismanagement and corruption by those who practice it." The King added that the Constitution would have to embody the expectations and aspirations of the people, drawing on the wisdom of the existing system, the existing laws and lessons learned through the experience of other countries around the world.

The members of the Drafting Committee were conscious of the enormity of this task as they reviewed and debated the outlines of the proposed new order. As decision-making authority was transfer from the Throne to the people, the judicial, executive and legislative arms of the government had to be aligned, with necessary checks and balances on each. The roles of the civil service, central and local governments, the royal audit authority, the functions of the attorney general's office, the anti-corruption committee and the election commissioner, of elections and political parties, the freedom of expression, fundamental rights, responsibilities and freedoms of citizens, as well as other issues related to governance, politics and national well being, were, each, hotly debated. There has been general agreement that much was to be drawn from the existing Bhutanese system, and that Bhutan's needs called for a unique Constitution.

Details of the proposed Constitution are yet to be published - they will enter the public domain only when the Draft comes up for discussion in the National Assembly. Nevertheless, speculative criticism has already been voiced in many quarters, primarily outside Bhutan. Prof. Jack Ives points to the dangers of instability in the entire region, observing that "there are many highly destructive and militant outlaw groups throughout the region of Nepal, Bhutan, northeastern India and Bangladesh." Another vocal detractor of the Bhutanese government demands, "How are the rights of the minorities going to be tackled? Will they be permitted to practise their own culture and traditions? Should there be proportional representation to provide proper representation for the minorities? Should not the Royal Council reflect truly, the ethnic diversity of the country and give due space to all?" Others have questioned the representative character of the Drafting Committee. Bhutan does, however, have an established tradition of religious tolerance, and all faiths are free to practice their religion, both publicly and privately. There is no reason to believe that the Draft Constitution would seek to change this. And while the Drafting Committee could have had a wider selection of people, it is a fact that there were no complaints when the original selection was made.

With the details of the Draft still under wraps, much of the present criticism remains conjectural, and is largely based on divergent interpretations and perceptions of the 'foreigners' issue - or the problems relating to the people of Nepali origin - in Bhutan, and the real extent of the devolution of power under the new system. The draft is currently being reviewed by the Council of Ministers, and will then be openly debated, not just in the National Assembly, but throughout the Kingdom. It is only at this stage that it will be possible to arrive at an objective assessment of its various provisions. The draft is, moreover, just that - a draft, and would be subject to revision and amendment.

The more urgent question, however, is: what lies ahead? The Constitution will have to be brought to the common man and explained to the general population; its implications will have to be widely understood. There are many areas of doubt and incertitude as Bhutan approaches a democratic future. What is certain, however, is the fact that the people will have to be more active, and will have to accept extraordinary and new responsibilities for the Constitution to truly work. However, Bhutan has some unusual advantages here: it is a small country, and is being guided through its present political metamorphosis by a perceptive and balanced leadership. This gives hope of a smoother transition than has been witnessed in some other countries that have gone astray in their quest for democracy.