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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 31, February 17, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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A Reprieve for
LTTE's Child Soldiers
Guest Writer: Dr.
Rohan Gunaratna
Senior Visiting Fellow, Institute of Defence & Strategic
Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; Senior
Fellow, Centre for the Study of Terrorism & Political Violence,
University of St. Andrews, UK.
In a significant
breakthrough during the latest round at Berlin, of the Norwegian-mediated
peace talks between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE)
and the Government of Sri Lanka (February 7-8, 2003), the
Tamil rebels agreed that their child soldiers would 'return
home'. The agreement stipulated that soldiers under the
age of 18 would lay down their arms, and would be trained
for civilian jobs. Anton Balasingham, chief negotiator for
the LTTE, conceded that earlier pledges to halt the practice
had recently been violated in 'some isolated cases of child
recruitment to the army.' Earlier, on February 1, 2003,
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) head Carol Bellamy
had stated that her organization still had more than 700
complaints of child recruitment 'on its books'. Balasingham,
however, added, that 350 child soldiers had already been
united with their families over the past six months.
This number is hardly a pointer to the magnitude of the
problem. Children have featured prominently in the LTTE's
protracted guerilla and terrorist campaigns, and assessments
by the Sri Lankan Directorate of Military Intelligence estimated
that as much as 60 per cent of the LTTE's fighters were
below 18. Even if this figure is exaggerated, estimates
based on LTTE fighters who have been killed in combat reveal
that 40 per cent of its fighting forces - including both
males and females - were between 9 and 18 years of age.
The first recruitment of child soldiers into LTTE ranks
dates back over two decades, after the ethnic riots of July
1983 resulted in a massive exodus of civilians to India.
At this stage, LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran selected
Basheer Kaka, an LTTE leader from the deep harbour city
of Trincomalee, to establish a training base in the state
of Pondichery in India for recruits under 16. Initially,
the child soldiers - affectionately referred to as 'Tiger
cubs' - received non-military training, mostly primary education
and physical exercise. By early 1984, the nucleus of the
LTTE 'Baby Brigade' or 'Bakuts', was formed.
Until 1986, the LTTE had sufficient adult units in operation
and young recruits were put through the Tigers' standard
grueling four-month training course as soon as they reached
16. Many children from the Pondichery batch achieved battle
prominence, and several others served as bodyguards to Pottu
Amman, the LTTE Chief of Intelligence responsible, among
a host of other operations, for planning the assassination
of two world leaders.
The LTTE began to seriously recruit women and children to
its fighting ranks only after it declared war against the
100,000-strong Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in October
1987. Before this, the LTTE had trained only one batch of
children in Pondichery in 1984 and one batch of women in
Sirumalai, Tamil Nadu in 1985. The LTTE had to boost its
rank and file to engage an overwhelming force in the IPKF-LTTE
war that lasted for two years. Thus, for example, the Batticaloa
13th batch - trained in the jungles of Pondugalchenai, Pulipanchagal,
comprised children under 15, some as young as nine years
old. The LTTE also engaged in forcible recruitment just
before and after the withdrawal of the IPKF, both to replenish
its depleted ranks and to prepare for an impending offensive.
After the March 1990 withdrawal of the IPKF, and the resumption
of hostilities between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan forces
in June 1990, the LTTE continued to recruit women and children
in unprecedented numbers.
The child fighters were originally a part of the Baby Brigade
commanded by Justin, a Pondichery-trained fighter. However,
after 1987 the LTTE integrated children with other units
to offset heavy losses in combat. The overwhelming number
of children in fighting units in recent campaigns had generated
concern among many Tamils in Sri Lanka and overseas. Since
April 1995, some 60 per cent of LTTE personnel killed in
combat have been children. These trends are confirmed by
Olivichu, the LTTE monthly video release, which regularly
announces the list of LTTE 'martyrs'. A study by a UK-based
Sri Lankan researcher Dushy Ranatunge revealed that at least
60 per cent of the dead LTTE fighters were under 18 and
were mostly girls and boys aged 10-16. Ranatunge also revealed
that almost all of the casualties were from Batticaloa,
but after the escalation in the fighting following the LTTE
assaults on the Kilinochchi, Paranthan and Elephant Pass
defences on 1 February 1998, the dead have also included
many from Jaffna. It was considered likely that the LTTE
sought control of the Eastern Province to replenish both
its supplies as well as the 'wastage' in its fighting rank
and file.
A typical unit of children was trained for four months in
the jungle. Woken at 0500hrs they assembled, fell in line,
and their leader raised the LTTE flag. This was followed
by two hours of physical training, after which the recruits
engaged in weapons training, battle and field craft, and
parade drill. During the rest of the afternoon, time was
spent both reading LTTE literature and more physical training.
Lectures on communications, explosives and intelligence
techniques continued into the evening. No contact was permitted
between the camp and the children's homes during the training
period. Sleep and food were regulated during training to
build endurance. After 1990, when children were pitched
into battle against Sri Lankan forces, the LTTE made training
tougher. The military office of the LTTE headed by Wedi
Dinesh developed a training programme that would make the
child fighters even more daring than adults. This included
the screening of Rambo-style videos in which the daredevil
approach is invariably successful. The trained child fighters
were also prepared for battle by attacking unprotected or
weakly defended border villages. Several hundred men, women
and children have been killed by LTTE child combatants armed
with automatic weapons guided by experienced fighters during
such 'inoculation attacks'.
The first major operation in which the LTTE deployed child
combatants came after LTTE suicide bomber, Pork, rammed
an explosive-laden lorry into the Mankulam army camp (north)
on November 22, 1990. This pre-dawn attack was followed
by successive waves of LTTE fighters drawn from the Baby
Brigade. The intensity of the attack led the commander to
evacuate the camp at 1600hrs on November 24. Of a total
strength of 313 government troops, at least a third were
killed and a few were taken prisoner. The LTTE lost 62 of
their number, mostly child combatants.
The second major operation involving LTTE child fighters
occurred on July 10, 1991, when the LTTE attacked the Elephant
Pass Military Complex. Improvised tanks - bulldozers plated
with armour - were followed by waves of LTTE cadres drawn
from the Baby Brigade attempting to penetrate the forward
defence lines. For the first time, the child combatants
who witnessed heavy casualties became reluctant to move
along the open ground between their positions and the target
complex. LTTE commanders shot their feet and humiliated
them. At one point the camp defences were breached but the
troops within the complex repulsed the LTTE by counter-attacking.
The complex was then reinforced by a sea landing of troops.
The LTTE lost 550 personnel, most of them children.
After the attack on the Elephant Pass Complex, the LTTE
analysed their successes and failures. To gain greater stealth,
speed, surprise and impact, the LTTE mixed Black Tigers
- psychologically and physically trained-suicide units -
with the Baby Brigade. The outcome shocked the Sri Lankan
government, particularly when the LTTE overran two fortified
base complexes in 1993 and 1996, killing 1,800 troops and
removing weapons worth about US $ 100 million.
The high point of LTTE 'achievement' with child soldiers
was the formation of the elite Sirasu Puli, or Leopard Brigade.
The members of the brigade were children drawn from LTTE-managed
orphanages. Within the LTTE ranks, this brigade is considered
to be its most fierce fighting force, displaying an incomparable
loyalty to Prabhakaran. Most see him as a father figure
and equate a request from him to a directive from heaven.
On December 4, 1997, the LTTE Leopard Brigade encircled
and killed nearly 200 elite Sri Lankan forces in Kanakarankulam
in the Wanni, suffering heavy casualties themselves as well.
Till this point, the Sri Lankan infantry had relied on elite
troops - special forces and commandos - as its vanguard.
The unprecedented loss severely demoralised whole sections
of the government's frontline troops.
The LTTE has long displayed an utter contempt for international
opinion against the use of children in war. Leaders within
Sri Lanka and in the international community have often
asserted that 'an entire generation of young Tamil children
has been systematically destroyed by the LTTE'. Given the
thoroughness of their training and indoctrination, it is
not clear whether this lost childhood can be restored among
those who have survived the methodical brutalization of
their participation in orchestrated massacres and in actual
combat. In the event, however, that the LTTE can, in fact,
be held to its present promise to halt child recruitment,
it is possible that the next generation may be spared the
fate of those whose childhood has already been sacrificed
to the LTTE's political ambitions.
Bodo Settlement:
Accord for Discord?
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database
& Documentation Centre, Guwahati
Hagrama
Basumatary, Chairman of the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT),
emerging from the Lokapriya Gopinath Bordoloi International
Airport in Guwahati, on February 11, announced to the waiting
media, "If the BTC accord signed yesterday is executed in
letter and spirit, the Bodos will not have to go for another
accord in future to assert their rights and development.
BTC is capable of fulfilling the hopes and aspirations of
the Bodos." For obvious reasons, Basumatary was on a high.
He was returning from New Delhi along with other BLT leaders
after signing a memorandum of settlement (MoS) with the
Union Government and the Government of Assam, paving the
way for the creation of an autonomous Bodoland Territorial
Council (BTC) in Assam.
The main provisions of the MoS, apart from creating an autonomous
self-governing body under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution
of India, address various socio-cultural, economic and educational
concerns raised by the Bodos, the largest among the plains'
tribes in the State. Although the signing of the MoS and
the creation of the BTC was a foregone conclusion, the opposition
from the non-Bodo community and the tentativeness of the
Assam government over the last one year, was expected to
extend the waiting period for the Bodos who had a total
population of over 1.2 million according to the 1991 Census
[community-wise populations under the 2001 Census are yet
to be published]. The signing of the MoS has, however, put
to rest the widespread speculation on the protracted talks
between the BLT and the Government.
This latest 'settlement', currently being hailed as significant
stride towards peace in the region, was an attempt to resolve
the problems of the earlier Bodoland Autonomous Council
(BAC),
which had come into being after the February 20, 1993, agreement
between the Union government, the State Government of Assam
and Bodo representatives. That hurriedly signed accord had
faltered on various counts, the most important being the
absence of a clear-cut geographical boundary for the BAC,
which led ultimately to its denunciation by the Bodo groups
who were initially party to the agreement.
Under the latest MoS, the BLT is to be disbanded after the
formation of the BTC, but the agreement has conferred a
unique profile and prominence on this hitherto insurgent
organisation as the 'main protagonist' of the Bodo cause.
This quasi-official sanction is bound to have a profound
impact on the acceptability of its bête noire and
rival, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB),
the most lethal terrorist group in India's Northeast over
the past decade, which was responsible for the killing of
at least 1389 civilians and 175 security forces personnel
over the period 1993-2002. Official sources speculate that
the perceived 'victory' of the BLT, after a three-year old
cessation of hostilities and negotiations, will tend to
marginalize the NDFB politically. The NDFB, on the other
hand, has inclined to dismiss the BLT and its associates,
such as the All Bodo Students' Union (ABSU) as 'stooges
of the Indian Government', incapable of realizing the 'dreams
and aspirations of the Bodo people'. NDFB has also accounted
for the 'elimination' of a number of BLT, ABSU and Bodo
Sahitya Sabha (BSS) leaders and members. Clearly, the NDFB's
vision of an independent Bodo Hadat (Bodoland) through
'a liberation struggle against Indian expansionism and occupation'
is far in excess of the BLT's demand for a territorial council
spread over four districts under the provisions of the Indian
Constitution.
The NDFB has, however, suffered a series of recent setbacks
that may force it to dilute its stand in some measure. The
most significant of these were the arrests of its General
Secretary Govinda Basumatary on November 25, 2002 and Vice-President
Dhiren Boro on January 1, 2003, which may force the group
to come to terms with the emerging political realities in
the State, and among the Bodo community. Media reports do
indicate a far-too-quick 'change of heart' within the NDFB,
which put up a welcome arch at the 35th Annual Conference
of the All-Bodo Students' Union (ABSU) at Banargaon in Kokrajhar
district on February 14, 2003.
The transformation may, however, not be quite that easy.
The currently jailed NDFB vice-president, Dhiren Boro, was
reported to have said on February 14 that the group would
never accept the BTC, since the new set up was no different
from the earlier BAC. He also asserted that the NDFB still
had enough steam left 'to carry forward the struggle for
self-determination'. The captive General Secretary of the
group, Govinda Basumatary, echoed these sentiments in a
separate interview on February 15, maintaining that 'there
is no difference between the BAC and the BTC'. He asserted
that the 'NDFB would continue its armed struggle' and predicted
that 'the BTC deal would become irrelevant.' To the extent
that these assertions are to be taken seriously, the creation
of the BTC cannot be expected to put a cap on continuing
Bodo violence.
As things stand today, however, the main challenge for the
BLT and the ABSU would come, not from continuing violence
by the NDFB, but from the escalating hostility of the non-Bodos.
The non-Bodo communities in the four affected districts
have rallied for the past year under the banner of the umbrella
organisation, the Sanmilita Janagosthiya Sangram Samiti
(SJSS), and have rejected the BTC agreement, expressing
their disapproval through a 36-hour bandh (shut down)
in the BTC area on February 13. The abduction of five Bodo
youth and the killing of another three on February 14 in
Barpeta district, allegedly by Bengali Hindus, may just
be a curtain raiser to impending mayhem.
Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi, on February 11, had described
the latest accord as 'one of peace and not one which is
born out of violence.' Unfortunately, it appears almost
certain that the creation of the Territorial Council would
widen the schism between Bodos and non-Bodos, somewhat on
the lines of the Meiteis and the Nagas in Manipur, and there
is significant potential of carrying tensions to the extremes
of violence. In an area where both the communities see themselves
as victims in the ongoing war of attrition, a seemingly
favourable gesture to one is not likely to be taken kindly
by the other. The non-Bodos may also react strongly to the
progressive disintegration of the already dilapidated dream
of a 'greater Assamese society', as the Bodos - the most
dynamic and mobile among plains' tribes - distance themselves
from this idea through their autonomous Territorial Councils.
Portents of things to come began to emerge a few months
ago, when a Press Release on September 11, 2002, announced
the intention of a newly created group, the Non-Bodo Security
Force (NBSF) to 'fight for rights of the non-Bodos of lower
Assam.' The statement, signed by one Bidyut Bora, found
justification for recourse to violence in the assertion
that "the government always listens to the sound of bullets.
Both the State government and the union government have
been indifferent towards the terror unleashed by the Bodo
militants on the non-Bodos."
It is far too obvious that the signing of the Accord will
not restore an immediate peace in the four districts that
fall under the proposed BTC. The Bodos themselves have to
overcome their internal differences, and rein in the more
extreme elements within their ranks before this can happen.
Apart from the NDFB, Bodo organisations such as the United
Bodo Nationalist Liberation Front (UBNLF) have rejected
the Accord as just another attempt to 'hoodwinking the Bodo
people'. These challenges are compounded by the expected
reactions of the non-Bodo people in the region. In the absence
of an exceptional and unexpected sagacity among the leadership
of various communities, there is little reason to believe
that the region will emerge from the quagmire of violence
in the proximate future.
APHC: The Nexus
with Terror
Guest Writer: Praveen
Swami
Special Correspondent, Frontline
It has been
evident, for years, that the jihad in Jammu and Kashmir
is an instrument of Pakistan's state policy. Just how well
structured the links between the institutions of the Pakistani
state and terrorism in India are, however, is only just
beginning to become clear.
India's decision to expel Pakistan's Charge d'Affaires,
Jalil Abbas Jilani has widely been read as merely an unusually
dramatic manifestation of the historically bitter relationship
between the two countries. Little attention, sadly, has
been paid to the insights the event offers into the funding
and organisation of terrorist activity in Jammu and Kashmir.
Jilani was asked to leave India on February 8, after the
Delhi Police formally filed documents charging him with
passing on Rs. 370,000 to Anjum Zamruda Habib, a key member
of the far-right women's organisation, the Khawateen Markaz.
The money, police investigators say, was to be passed on
to Abdul Gani Bhat, the head of the principal anti-India
political coalition in Kashmir, the All-Parties Hurriyat
Conference (APHC).
The APHC's representative in New Delhi, Sabir Ahmad Dar,
was also arrested along with Habib.
Pakistan, perhaps unsurprisingly, denies all the charges
levelled against Jilani. Since he enjoys diplomatic immunity,
and since Indian intelligence is unlikely to ever make public
the material gathered during surveillance of the Pakistan
High Commission in New Delhi, the whole truth about the
affair will possibly never be known. The fact is, however,
that there is a long history of direct funding of the APHC
by Pakistan's intelligence establishment, often funnelled
through the High Commission. As early as 1997, an investigation
by Frontline magazine found that top APHC leaders
Abdul Gani Lone and Syed Ali Shah Geelani had received funding
to the tune of several million Indian Rupees a month from
Pakistan, often ostensibly gathered by shadowy charities,
and then sent to India through Hawala traders. In at least
one case, detected by the Indian Army in May 1997, it emerged
that Geelani had directly sent such funds to elements close
to the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HM).
By 1998, Indian officials were becoming increasingly aware
of the sheer scale of such funds transfers - as well as
of official Pakistani complicity in them. In that year the
Jammu and Kashmir Police discovered that the Pakistan Embassy
in Saudi Arabia had been passing money to the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin
through Jamaat-e-Islami affiliated charities like the Kashmir
Medicare Trust and the Muslim Welfare Society. Mohammad
Nazir, an ethnic Kashmiri employed in the Pakistan Embassy
in Jeddah moved the funds through a Dubai-based businessman
of Kashmiri origin, Mohammad Shafi Mir. The Hizb also regularly
received funds gathered in the United States and United
Kingdom by activists like Ayub Thakur and Ghulam Nabi Fai.
Understanding the impact of Pakistani, or Pakistani mediated,
cash on violence in Jammu and Kashmir is fairly simple.
The estimated 2,500 to 3,500 terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir
require funds for their day to day survival, procurement
of safehouses and operational assets. Very conservatively,
assuming the money required to sustain each terrorist to
be just Rs. 5,000 a month, the terrorist cadre in Jammu
and Kashmir would require a colossal Rs. 15,000,000 a month
for basic maintenance. This, of course, excludes regular
payments to the families of terrorists killed or arrested
by Indian forces, as well as funds for anti-India political
activities. The APHC itself files no tax returns, but runs
offices in New Delhi and Srinagar, funds the domestic and
international travel of its leaders, and pays salaries to
some 40 employees - a not inconsiderable expense. Although
terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir was in part financed through
local revenues, the inevitable alienation of potential supporters
by forced levies has led to a growing dependence on funds
from Pakistan. Organisations like the Jamaat-e-Islami, the
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
raise substantial public funds in Pakistan.
It is unlikely, however, that donations would meet the enormous
costs they incur in Jammu in Kashmir, especially in a political
terrain transfigured by the events of September 11, 2001.
Even though visible public fund raising has stopped in Pakistan
since those events, the funding of terrorism, quite obviously,
continues. Indian intelligence has identified at least fourteen
major funds transfers since December 2001 [Table
1]. The dependence of the APHC on Pakistani cash
helps explain the persistent unwillingness of key members
to engage in any kind of meaningful dialogue with India.
Supposedly 'soft' constituents of the APHC leadership are
often punished by having their funds choked off, a strategy
that was instrumental in the displacement of the pro-Independence
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
by the pro-Pakistan Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin in the early 1990s.
Some APHC leaders, interestingly, seem to have personally
benefited from these transfers. Geelani, for example, faces
income tax proceedings for having massive undisclosed income.
Although his sole legitimate source of revenue is a modest
pension - earned, ironically enough, for his tenure as an
elected Member of the Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly,
which he entered after swearing allegiance to the Constitution
of India - the ailing politician has managed to procure
a lavish house, owns several vehicles, and runs his establishment
with the aid of several well-paid personal servants. Other
APHC leaders and their immediate relatives have benefited
similarly [Table
2]. In the wake of the 1997 Frontline
exposé, former APHC member Shabbir Shah confessed to having
parked funds intended for armed activities in a series of
property acquisitions, mainly in southern Kashmir.
Why would Jilani have personally handed over funds to the
APHC? Two explanations are possible. First, a series
of arrests of Hawala traders and funds
recipients have made the business of transferring money
increasingly hazardous. Equally important, the Gulf Emirates
are increasingly under pressure to curb the informal movement
of cash from their countries, destabilising the trade as
a whole. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, the Pakistan
High Commission may wish to maintain a direct presence as
a sponsor and patron of secessionist politics in Jammu and
Kashmir - Jilani's cash was described as a nazrana,
or gift, to Bhat. Whatever the truth, the events of February
are just a very small part of a very large, and very sordid
affair.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts
in South Asia
February 10-16,
2003
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
5
|
INDIA
|
23
|
19
|
40
|
82
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
6
|
Bihar
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Jammu &
Kashmir
|
10
|
5
|
17
|
32
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
4
|
8
|
13
|
25
|
Manipur
|
0
|
5
|
0
|
5
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Tripura
|
8
|
0
|
2
|
10
|
PAKISTAN
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
India
reiterates demand for handing over of 88 terrorists
based in Bangladesh: During a meeting with the visiting
Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Mohammed Morshed Khan in
Delhi on February 15, 2003, Deputy Premier L.K. Advani
reiterated India's demand for handing over of 88 terrorists
based in Bangladesh. While expressing serious concern
over the existence of terrorist camps in Bangladesh
and large-scale illegal migration in to India, the Deputy
Premier urged Dhaka to take immediate steps to check
the problems. Khan, who later called on Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee, expressed Dhaka's cooperation
to India saying Bangladesh would not allow its soil
to be used by forces inimical to Indian interests. Indian
Express, February 16, 2003.
INDIA
Pakistan
continues to support terrorist groups against
India in Kashmir, says CIA: The United States
while pointing out that Pakistan was supporting
terrorist groups against India in Kashmir also
expressed concern over Al Qaeda finding refuge
in the hinterlands of Pakistan and Afghanistan.
"Pakistan continues to support groups that resist
India's presence in Kashmir in an effort to
bring India to the negotiating table," Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet
said at a Congress briefing on "Evolving Dangers
in a Complex World." Tenet said the American
intelligence community is concerned that Al
Qaeda "continues to find refuge in the hinterlands
of Pakistan and Afghanistan." He also said,
"India's recent military redeployment away from
the border reduced the danger of an imminent
war… The cycles of tension between India and
Pakistan are growing shorter." Indian
Express, February 12, 2003.
Sikh terrorist sentenced to five years imprisonment
in Canada for 1985 aircraft bombing: A city
court in Vancouver, Canada, sentenced Inderjit
Singh Reyat, a Sikh terrorist accused in the
Kanishka aircraft bombing case of 1985 to five
years imprisonment, on February 11, 2003. Reyat
had earlier pleaded guilty for 329 counts of
manslaughter on February 10. Two other suspects
in the case, Ripudaman Singh Malik and Ajaib
Singh Bagri, are in police custody in Canada
since October 2000. A total of 329 persons were
killed when the Air-India aircraft was blown
up midair over the Atlantic Ocean on June 23,
1985. Reyat has already served 10 years in a
British prison for his role in a blast at Tokyo's
Narita Airport killing two baggage handlers,
that occurred an hour before the Kanishka was
blown up. Hindustan
Times, February 11, 2003.
Five Border Security Force personnel killed
in Manipur ambush: On February 10, 2003,
the proscribed Kanglei Yawol Kunna Lup (KYKL)
terrorist group laid an ambush near Leingangtabi
along the Imphal-Moreh road in Manipur and killed
five Border Security Force (BSF) personnel.
Official sources said that the BSF personnel
who were on routine patrol were attacked with
sophisticated weapons at a spot some three kilometers
away from the Lokchao camp. Later, in a telephonic
message, the KYKL reportedly claimed responsibility
for the killings and said that the outfit's
Lalhaba Tengol-1 unit had carried out the attack.
Assam
Tribune, February 11, 2003.
Delhi tripartite meeting approves formation
of Bodoland Territorial Council in Assam:
At a tripartite meeting in New Delhi, the formation
of Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) in the
Bodo dominated areas of Assam was approved on
February 10, 2003. This was announced after
a meeting of the representatives of the Union
and State governments along with a Bodo Liberation
Tigers (BLT) delegation. Among those present
at the meeting were the Assam Chief Minister
Tarun Gogoi and Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani.
The BLT delegation included its 'chairman' Hagrama
Basumatary who signed the agreement on behalf
of the outfit, 'vice chairman' Kamal Mushahary,
'secretary general' Derhasat Basumatary and
'publicity secretary' Mainao Daimary. The BLT
had declared a unilateral ceasefire in July
1999 in response to the Union government's appeal
for talks. The BTC would comprise 40 elected
representatives and six more are to be nominated
by the Assam government. Of the elected representatives,
30 seats would be reserved for tribals, five
for non-tribals and five more would remain open
for contest. Assam
Tribune, February 11, 2003.
Six SF personnel among 10 persons killed
during MCC sponsored strike in Jharkhand: Six
security force (SF) personnel and four left-wing
extremists - Naxalites - of the Maoist Communist
Centre (MCC) were killed on February 10, 2003,
during the 48-hour bandh (general strike) called
by the MCC in Jharkhand. Speaking to the media
in Ranchi, the State police Chief R.R. Prasad
said four Naxalites of the MCC and one SF personnel
were killed during an ambush near Chiro village
in Latehar district. In another incident, the
Naxalites attacked a SF convoy rushing to the
spot where the first ambush had occurred. The
Naxalites killed five SF personnel and reportedly
managed to escape. The MCC had called the strike
to protest against the Prevention of Terrorism
Act (POTA) and alleged police atrocities. Hindustan
Times, February 11, 2003.
NEPAL
Maoists
resume extortions and kidnapping, says Defence
Ministry: The Maoist insurgents have resumed
taking hostages and forcibly extracting donations
from individuals and institutions, the Defence
Ministry said in a statement on February 14,
2003. The Ministry has reportedly asked the
Maoists to stop such activities that may have
a negative impact on the forthcoming peace talks.
Meanwhile, the Home Ministry, in a simultaneous
announcement, ordered local administration and
security force personnel to take action against
all extortionists. Separately, a media report
said that the Government has sent a draft code
of conduct for the approval of the Maoists that
includes a ban on such extortions. Nepal
News, February 15, 2003.
PAKISTAN
US defence
official warns of coup in Pakistan: Chief of the US Defence
Intelligence Agency Vice-Admiral Lowell Jacoby has warned that
a coup against President Pervez Musharraf could result in an
"extremist Pakistan". Testifying on global threats before the
Senate Armed Services Committee earlier in the week, Jacoby
said Musharraf's Islamist opponents were not happy with his
policies and they could attempt to instigate a political crisis
through violent means. "This could result in an extremist Pakistan,"
he warned. Dawn,
February 15, 2003.
Pakistan harbouring several terrorist outfits, says Russian
Defence Minister: Russia has accused Pakistan of continuing
to harbour various extremist and terrorist outfits who are involved
in terrorist activities in foreign countries, despite having
joined the US-led global war against terrorism. While naming
Pakistan, specially its North West Frontier Province region,
where the "Taliban hold sway", Russian Defence Minister Sergei
Ivanov said at the Munich security meet that, "it is not a secret
that a number of Asian states are still harbouring the representative
offices for the extremist organisations on their territories,
operating unfettered and unimpeded under the guise of humanitarian
relief, clerical and any other centres." Ivanov added, "For
instance, the Pakistan-based Al-Rashid Trust Foundation, set
up in 1996 for the purpose of rendering humanitarian relief
to Afghan refugees in Pakistan, has subsequently spread its
operations further afield covering the Republic of Chechnya
and Kosovo." According to him, "There is a proven linkage" between
the madrassas - Pakistani Islamist schools belonging to religious
parties Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat-ul-Ulema, and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan
- and different militant training centres and camps." Tribune
India, February 11, 2003.
|
Major funds transfers
detected: December 2001 - August 2002
Date
|
Incident
|
December
6, 2001 |
The
arrest of Abdul Rashid Lone, 'Group Commander' of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen,
at Baramulla leads to the recovery of Rs. 4 million. |
December
6, 2001 |
Abdul
Rehman Sofi and Mohammed Shabban Khan are arrested in
Delhi while on their way back after meeting Syed Salahuddin,
HM chief, in Pakistan. Their confessions led to the recovery
of Rs. 1.5 million received through hawala for
HM, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. |
December
13, 2001 |
The
killing of Shakir Ghaznavi, 'Divisional Commander of HM,
(who was also looking after distribution of finances)
was followed by the recovery of Rs. 3.2 million. |
December
2001 |
JeM
terrorists involved in the planning of Parliament attack
were arrested along with Rs. one million and a laptop. |
December
15, 2001 |
The
arrest of Haji Abdul Rashid led to the recovery of Rs.
two million. |
January
14, 2002 |
The
arrest of four Kashmiris linked to the LeT in Delhi led
to the recovery of Rs. 3.49 million, which they had received
through hawala channels on behalf of the South
Kashmir Valley 'Commander' of the LeT. A further amount
of Rs. 460, 000 was recovered from the Delhi-based hawala
operator who had provided the money to the Lashkar cadres.
|
March
24, 2002 |
The
arrest of Shamima Khan of Srinagar was followed by the
recovery of Rs. 4.8 million meant for Yasin Malik, JKLF
Chairman. |
May
2002 |
A
Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen cadre who had come to collect money
from a hawala dealer in Delhi is arrested and Rs.
800, 000 is recovered. |
May
22, 2002 |
Imtiyaz
Ahmed Bazaz upon his arrest confesses to having worked
as a conduit for flow of finances from London-based Dr.
Ayub Thokar, President World Kashmir Freedom Movement,
to Ayesha Andrabi of the Dukhtaraan-e-Millat and Syed
Ali Shah Gilani of the APHC. |
June
19, 2002 |
The
arrest of Mohammed Ramzan Butt in Doda leads to the recovery
of Rs. 835, 000. |
June
20, 2002 |
Yaqoob
Vakil upon his arrest confesses to having provided finances
(Rs. 1.5 million during 2001 and Rs. 2 million in 2002)
to Valley based Al Umar Mujahideen cadres at the behest
of its chief Mushtaq Ahmed Zargar. |
June
29, 2002 |
A
Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen channel operating through Bashir
Ahmed Sofi, Inayat Ali and Mehraj-ud-Din Bhat, through
which Rs. 10 million had flowed is neutralised. |
July
22, 2002 |
Shaukat
Ahmed Shah, Chief of Jamaat-Ahle-Hadis, J&K, is arrested
on charges of channeling funds to the tune of Rs. 4 million
to the Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen. |
August
2, 2002 |
Abdul
Rashid Bhat is arrested along with a consignment of Rs.
one million while passing on funds to the Al Badr outfit.
He had earlier carried out two transactions worth Rs.
800, 000. |
Proceedings
launched under Income Tax (IT) Act
Name
|
Undisclosed
Income (Rs.)
|
Recovery
(Rs.)
|
Syed Ali Shah Gilani |
31,
719, 070
|
19,
031, 442
|
Altaf Ahmed Shah, son-in-law
of Gilani |
5, 794,
700
|
3, 476,
820
|
Ghulam Mohammed Baba (Political
assistant of Gilani, a non-IT payee) |
527,
598
|
316,
558
|
Baba Abdul Qayoom (Brother
of Ghulam Mohammed Baba, a non-IT payee) |
1, 940,
736
|
1, 164,
441
|
Nazir Ahmed Baba (Brother-in-law
of Ghulam Mohammed Baba, a non-IT payee) |
2, 092,
150
|
1, 255,
290
|
Abdul Karim Bhat (Linked
to Ayesha Andrabi of the Dukhtaraan-e-Millat) |
4, 230,
000
|
2, 538,
000
|
Abdul Rashid Saraf (A
conduit linked to Abdul Ghani Bhat, Hurriyat Chairman)
|
37,
828, 755
|
22,
397, 253
|
Source:
Computed from official sources and reportage in the English
language press of India. |
|
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