SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 33, March 3, 2003

ASSESSMENT

PAKISTAN

Footprints of Terror
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

On March 1, 2003, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, one of the prime planners of the 9/11 attacks on the US, was arrested in Rawalpindi. The US authorities had been pursuing him at least since his 1995 involvement in the abortive 'Operation Bojinka' conspiracy to simultaneously blow up 12 American civilian airliners over the Pacific, in which he collaborated with his relative, Ramzi Yousef, who is currently serving a life sentence in America for the 1993 attack on the World Trade Centre. With a US $ 25 million reward on his head, this self proclaimed 'head of Al Qaeda's Military Committee' and close associate of Osama bin Laden is certainly a major catch for the Americans. Within the context of the global war against terror, however, this is just another very small step forward.

To understand why, it is useful to look at some other incidents over the past weeks in Pakistan. On February 28, in the latest in a long series of sectarian killings, three persons from the minority Shia community were killed by unidentified attackers in Karachi. On the same day, two policemen guarding the American Consulate in Karachi were killed, when an unidentified gunman opened fire on the police picket near the consulate building. Five other police personnel and a civilian passer-by were also injured in this incident. On February 22, nine persons from the minority Shia community, including a seven year old boy, were killed, and seven others wounded by three motorcycle borne gunmen outside an Imambargah (mosque) in Karachi. On February 16, former legislator and Muttahida Quomi Mahaz - Altaf Hussain (MQM-A) central leader Khalid bin Waleed was shot dead and his associate and official gunman injured, again in Karachi.

Sheikh Mohammad's arrest has integral links with these acts of terror, and the organisations that executed them. One of the primary organisations responsible for the targeted killings of minority groups and their leaders in Karachi is the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and it was after two members of this group were arrested and interrogated on information provided by some Shias from Gilgit in the Northern Areas that another LeJ terrorist was traced out in Quetta. It was this third LeJ operative who eventually disclosed that Sheikh Mohammad had been hiding out with him, but had escaped just before the raid. It was on his information that the residence of Ahmed Abdul Qadoos was raided in Rawalpindi, and Sheikh Mohammad was arrested. Sheikh Mohammad has had an extended association with the LeJ.

Sheikh Mohammad's arrest, the succession of sectarian killings in Karachi, and the attacks on the US consulate are renewed evidence that terrorism is alive and well in Pakistan. These events need to be placed in the context of President Musharraf's rather strident denials of Al Qaeda presence in the country, and claims that terrorists were not being allowed to operate from Pakistani soil. Sheikh Mohammad's arrest, indeed, validates assertions that the Al Qaeda has substantially regrouped and relocated in Pakistan, and has been facilitated in this by a number of political and militant actors closely linked to state agencies. The arrest of Ahmed Abdul Qadoos, who is the son of a local Jamaat-e-Islami leader, and his quick defence by the Jamaat, bears this pattern out. The Jamaat is a major political force in the present establishment, and has long been an inspiration for a number of extremist militant affiliates.

President Musharraf's showcase arrests of the leaders of banned terrorist groups, their subsequent release, and the continued operation of these groups under new names needs to be immediately revaluated, and pressure must be brought to bear on Pakistan to place effective curbs on the operation of these groups and connected individuals. It should be noted here that virtually all the groups supposedly 'banned' by Pakistan as terrorist organisations are now allowed to function with impunity under new names. Thus, for example, the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) now operates as the 'Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith'; the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) is 'Al Furqan'; the Markaz-ad-Dawa-wal-Irsahd is 'Jamaat-ad-Dawa'; the Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) is the 'Tehrik-e-Islami'. Within the current circumstances in Pakistan, consequently, where the state actively tolerates, or even encourages and supports, certain patterns of terrorism, it is not possible to effectively control others. There is an ethos of terrorism, and this has enormously facilitated the relocation of the Al Qaeda in this country. It is useful to notice, also, that the footprints of virtually every major act of international terrorism in the world in recent years pass inevitably through this country, and it is precisely this 'ethos of terrorism' that makes it the crucial link in the inexorable growth of global terror.

There are many who believe that Sheikh Mohammad's arrest constitutes a 'major blow' to bin Laden and the Al Qaeda. At one level, this is certainly the case: the loss of a top operative inevitably inflicts some damage on the operational capabilities of an organisation. But such losses are far from crippling - as the death of Mohammad Atef and the arrests of Abu Zubaidah and Ramzi Binalshibh have already demonstrated. Indeed, with the tens of thousands who have been trained by the Taliban - Al Qaeda - Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) combine in camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border for over a decade, the 'sacrifice' of a few operatives is not only easily absorbed, it is a necessary input in the development of the organisation.

The fact is, the Al Qaeda and the Islamist terrorist Internationale has immensely evolved since 9/11. A continuing succession of terrorist strikes, including a string of incidents in Pakistan, the attacks in Bali and Mombasa, as well as continuous pre-emptive arrests across Europe and America are testimony to the crystallization of a truly decentralized, hydra-headed operation which will continue to flourish as long as it retains its seeding grounds and safe havens in nation states where the culture of violence and the ideologies of terror are supported by the state structure and a powerful social and political establishment.

ASSESSMENT

INDIA

THE NORTHEAST: DEMOCRACY IN TROUBLED TIMES

Tripura: A Vote against Violence
Guest Writer: Sekhar Datta in Agartala
Principal Correspondent, The Telegraph

The Assembly elections in Tripura did not turn out to be as 'tough' as had been predicted by none other than the ruling Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) party secretary, Baidyanath Mazumder. At one stage, the CPI-M led Left Front, appeared to losing ground in the face of a determined assault by the banned National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) militants and their political front, the Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura (INPT). The INPT brought together two separate political parties - the erstwhile Tripura Upjati Juba Samity (TUJS) and Indigenous Peoples Front of Tripura (IPFT), and claimed to represent 'tribal interests' in the State.

There was also an intensive campaign of intimidation by the militants in the hilly interiors, with the message going out that additional security arrangements for the elections would not protect the tribal electorate for long, and unless the INPT won all the seats they were contesting, a blood-bath would follow. This was why Left Front leaders, including Chief Mnister Manik Sarkar had frantically pressed the Union Home Ministry and Election Commission for additional forces to ensure that the tribals could cast their votes. As a result, more than 37,000 extra men, including Army contingents, were deployed, in addition to the force already on duty in counter-insurgency operations in Tripura, creating a ratio of one security man for every 25 voters.

The overwhelming security had a major impact, and the tribals in most of the constituencies, excluding a few booths in each, turned out in large numbers to cast their ballots and the CPI-M secured thirteen of the reserved twenty tribal seats, wresting one from the INPT, the Bagma constituency of south Tripura which had been won in five consecutive elections since 1977 by Ratimohan Jamatya, who conceded defeat this time by a small margin of 74 votes.

A profound quiet seems to have descended on Tripura, with the Congress-INPT trying to come to terms with their electoral reverses, and the ruling Left Front reviewing the realities of the retention of power for a record fifth - and a third consecutive - term. Before the election the direct threat of militant intervention had cast a deep shadow over the Left Front's prospects. It was the banned NLFT's guns which had ousted the Front from power in the controversial Autonomous District Council (ADC) elections in April-May 2000. 537 CPI-M tribal leaders and workers have been liquidated by the militants over the past five years, and another 56 persons - including security forces personnel and militants themselves - had been killed in the current year.

Below the surface peace imposed by the heavy and unprecedented deployment of security forces, it is evident that the militants did influence polling in many of the reserved tribal seats. Nothing illustrates this better than the defeat of senior CPI-M leader and Tribal Welfare Minister Aghore Debbarma in the Pramodnagar reserved Assembly constituency in Khowai subdivision by a margin of less than 400 votes. Debbarma had won in 1998 by 4,993 votes, and the Marxists have lost this seat for the first time since 1952, allegedly because of irregularities in two booths where tribal people were forced by the militants to cast their votes in favour of Animesh Debbarma, who is said to have close connections with the NLFT rebels. A drastic reduction of the CPI-M's victory margins in the tribal reserved constituencies in Ramchandraghat, Asharambari and Krishanpur in Khowai subdivision, the Simna constituency in the Sadar subdivision, and the Charilam reserve constituency in the Bishalgarh subdivision, were all eloquent commentary on the influence of guns. The NLFT rebels saw to it that a large number of tribal workers and supporters of the ruling front did not turn up to cast ballots. In another traditional bastion of CPI-M, Kanchanpur, the party candidate Rajendra Reang won by a single vote against an NLFT collaborator of the same name, simply because at least five booths in remote interiors bordering Bangladesh had been inaccessible to the CPI-M nominee, who had lost his father and a cousin to NLFT's bullets before the election.

Yet, for all its efforts, the INPT could add only one more seat to their tally of five in the outgoing Assembly. In south Tripura, which has been relatively free from the militant menace over the past three years, the Left Front has made a near clean sweep, winning 13 out of 14 seats including, three of the four reserved tribal seats.

The overriding issue in the elections was militancy, and the Congress alliance with a party backed by militants polarised the voting. Even in its strongholds, the Congress party's margin of victory - as in the plains areas, dominated by the majority non-tribal voters - was dramatically reduced in most constituencies, including the four seats in Agartala town. The adoption, virtually in toto, of the INPT-NLFT line by the Congress was the main reason for this loss of support. INPT leader and ex-militant, Bijay Kumar Hrangkhawal's speech in Geneva in July last year, where he had spoken in favour of the banned militants by describing their genocidal politics as a 'struggle for self-determination' and his questioning of the erstwhile princely Tripura's merger with the Indian Union had a very adverse impact on the non-tribal voters. To worsen matters Hrangkhawal appeared to be dictating terms to the Congress in a public rally held at Agartala in September last. But the state Congress leadership never protested or even appeared to have a voice against Hrangkahwal and his henchmen. All through the campaign, the Congress leadership, dependent for political survival on the majority non-tribal voters, kept on echoing the INPT line. At the election rally addressed by Party President Sonia Gandhi at Agartala on February 23, she shared the dais with Bijay Hrangkhawal and PCC president Birajit Sinha (who belongs to the minuscule minority Manipuri community), with former chief ministers and veteran Congress leaders standing below the dais. As could be expected, this did not impact well on voters, who voted the Left Front back to power despite a state-wide anti-incumbency wave as a result of the earlier regimes failure to curb insurgency and rising unemployment. The Left Front has, thus, rightly characterised the electoral outcome as a 'vote against militancy and terrorism'. The tribals, who have been the worst victims of militancy in recent years, have given a mandate for peace by coming out to vote despite intimidation. If militant intervention could have been totally checked, it is clear that the INPT would have been hard put event to hold on to their strength of five in the sixty-member Assembly.


Nagaland: Advantage Insurgency?
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati

When the 74 years-old veteran politician and former Chief Minister S.C. Jamir returns to the 10th State Assembly in Kohima, he will not be sitting at his familiar chair. Indeed, it is clear that it will require a great deal of conscious political efforts before the fractured verdict of the people can be translated into a stable arrangement for governance, though it is now apparent that a non-Congress regime is set to take the seat of power in the State after an interregnum of 20 years.

The sidelining of the Congress party will not only delight its rivals - the Nagaland People's Front (NPF), a new political entity which took shape few months before the elections, and the the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) which put up an 'impressive show' by winning seven seats in the State - but also the dominant insurgent group in the State - the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM). The NSCN-IM, in the 13th year of its present avatar, is currently engaged in negotiations with the Union government.

There were several allegations, mostly from the Congress Party in Nagaland, regarding the interference of the militant group in the electoral process. The NSCN-IM Chairman, Isak Swu, had, after a round of negotiations with the Union Government at Delhi in January 2003, asserted that his organisation would not involve itself or interfere in the election process. Nevertheless, the shadow of the group loomed large over the voting process, as armed-cadres threatened candidates and voters, abducted supporters and workers of political parties, and generally to ensure that the Jamir Government did not come back to power.

There were also cases of NSCN-IM cadres campaigning openly in favour of the BJP candidate - as in the Longkhim-Chare constituency in Tuensang, the largest among Nagaland's seven districts - and also threatened villagers not to vote for the Congress candidate. The BJP candidate, A. Imtilemba went on to record a handsome victory. Similarly in the Meluri constituency under Phek district, NSCN-IM cadres abducted four youth and threatened to kill them if the villagers dared to vote for the Congress. The NPF candidate Yitachu won handsomely over his Congress rival. In Phek constituency, gun-toting NSCN-IM cadres moved from house to house, warning people not to vote for the Congress party. The NPF candidate Kuzholuzo won with a victory margin of 9,084 votes. All these seats had been won by candidates of the Congress party in the last elections in 1998.

The NSCN-IM's objective of preventing a Congress win coincided not only with the aspirations of political parties and the individual leaders (most notably the NPF leader Neiphiu Rio) who had left the Congress a few months ago to fulfil their personal ambitions, but also with those of civil society organisations such as the Church, the Naga Hoho (the apex tribal council), the Naga Students' Federation (NSF) and some 'human rights' organisations in the State. All these groups, overtly sympathetic with the NSCN-IM's objectives, shared Swu's perception that the Jamir government was 'a stumbling block' on the path of a solution to the Naga conflict. Most of these organisations issued 'election guidelines' urging people to 'vote for candidates who would take the peace process forward'. On the ground, the message was understood to mean: 'Do not vote for the Congress'.

The verdict, consequently, appears to hand out a raw deal for the Congress, though the party continues to be a potent force in the State, as the single largest party with 21 seats in the 60-member Legislative Assembly. It is the case, however, that few expected the Congress to repeat its 1998 performance of winning 53 seats in the Assembly when all major political parties, with the exception of the Congress, had responded to a general call for boycott of the electoral process by the Naga Hoho. The manner in which the party has been removed from power, however, is a pointer to the drift that has been allowed to take effect. This will have larger implications for a possible solution to the Naga conflict in the foreseeable future. The installation of a non-Congress regime places the NSCN-IM in the boots of its bete noire, the Khaplang faction (NSCN-K). The NSCN-K was seen to be close to the Jamir government, and was once described by the NSCN-IM as a 'security provider to the Chief Minister' - a position it now finds itself stripped of. This is certain to affect the sporadic utterances for unity and reconciliation between the factions, and would create conditions for an increase in internecine clashes. The election results will also embolden the Isak-Muivah faction, which will incline further to buoy up its dream of a larger and independent Naga homeland. Handicapped by ambivalent mandate in the Assembly, the new regime is, consequently, bound to find itself in the unenviable position of trying to live up to the expectations of many and conflicting players, in the jungle and the streets alike.

Meghalaya: Fractured Mandate
Animesh Roul
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The issues of political stability and development dominated the 7th Legislative Assembly elections in the State of Meghalaya ahead of the polls on February 26, 2003, after years of political chaos, instability and violence. Meghalaya has had four Chief Ministers and six governments over the preceding five years, since the elections of 1998. With constant political uncertainty and a growing menace of terrorism, the overall security situation in the State had become increasingly volatile.

The election results have hardly improved the situation, and the people's verdict in Meghalaya has created conditions for another bout of coalition politics and horse-trading. The fractured mandate has made the Indian National Congress (INC) the single largest party with 22 seats, followed by the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) with 14, in a 60-seat Assembly. Various State and regional parties fared poorly, with the United Democratic Party (UDP) managing to win nine seats; the Meghalaya Democratic Party (MDP) four seats and the Hill State People's Democratic Party (HSPDP) two seats. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Khun Hynniewtrep National Awakening Movement (KHNAM), the political wing of the Khasi Student's Union (KSU), have also won two seats each, with Independents cornering the remaining five. Virtually all the winning parties have been part of the outgoing ruling coalition, the Meghalaya People's Forum (MPF). There is, however, a catch in the new arrangement, since there were no pre-poll alliances this time between the INC and the NCP, or among the State parties.

What is encouraging, however, is that, in spite of general apprehensions, Meghalaya had a relatively peaceful election, unlike Tripura and Nagaland. Four persons were injured in different parts of the State in poll-related violence, and re-polling had to be ordered in three polling stations - Madanrting in East Khasi Hills, Nongtalang in Jaintia Hills and Capasipara in the Garo Hills due to technical snags in Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) and incidents of vandalism on February 28, 2003. It would, however, be incorrect to conclude that the voters in the State were free from fear. Although the influential Achik Baptist Dalgipa Krima (ABDK), head of all Baptist churches in the Garo Hills, issued its poll guidelines for peaceful and focused franchise in the State and urged all members of society to pray for a peaceful and successful election, the terrorism-related death toll touched 15 (including 13 civilians) between the date of the announcement of the polling schedule and the elections. This trend demonstrates the situation on the ground and the alarming deterioration of the law and order machinery in the State.

Despite repeated threats from underground organizations and sporadic incidents of violence before and during election, the total voter turnout was encouraging at 70.38 percent, though lower than the 74.52 per cent in 1998. The War-Jaintia Assembly Constituency (AC) topped the list with an 83 percent voter turnout, while Malki-Nongthymmai AC of East Khasi Hills district recorded the lowest turnout, at 44.90 percent. Even the seven ACs of the Jaintia Hills district witnessed high turnouts in the face of threats issued by the Assam-based Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) and United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), who have been fighting for greater autonomy for the Karbi tribe in eastern Assam. On February 8, in one of the macabre incidents of pre-poll violence, KNV terrorists killed six villagers in Jaintia Hill district after severely torturing them. The KNV had earlier warned the villagers of the area bordering Assam not to participate in the poll process.

Although both the homegrown terrorist outfits, Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC) and Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), maintained a low profile during the polls, the Election Commission had declared some 500-odd polling stations (out of a total 1,543 booths) 'sensitive' and stepped up security measures accordingly. While the HNLC rejected the electoral process under the 'Indian administration', the ANVC is believed to have collusive ties with some political parties in the State. However, instead of any large-scale violence or interference during the elections, the ANVC continued with its abduction-for-ransom activities relentlessly. On Election Day itself, security forces rescued four abducted persons, including one Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau (SIB) officer, from Damalgiri near Tura.

The general perception in Meghalaya is that the fractured mandate will fuel instability and could also give a fillip to terrorist groups operating in the State. While some sort of coalition will, eventually, be cobbled together, the possibility of a stable alliance committed to peace and development remains remote.

Party Position in Meghalaya, Nagaland and Tripura in Assembly Elections held on February 26, 2003

Party Name	Meghalaya		Nagaland*		Tripura**
	CON	WON	CON	WON	CON	WON
Indian National Congress (INC)	60	22	60	21	42	13
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)	28	2	38	7	21	0
Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)	54	14	7	0	12	0
Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM)	0	0	0	0	55	37
United Democratic Party (UDP)	45	9	0	0	0	0
Indigenous Nationalist Party of Twipra (INPT)	0	0	0	0	18	6
Janata Dal (United) (JD-U)	0	0	13	2	4	0
Samata Party (SAP)	3	0	4	1	0	0
Nagaland Peoples Front (NPF)	0	0	54	19	0	0
Meghalaya Democratic Party (MDP)	18	4	0	0	0	0
Independent (IND)	58	5	17	4	50	0
Others	67	4	32	4	52	3
Total	333	60	225	58	254	59

Source: Computed from reportage in the English language press of India. NOTE: Three states have 60 seats each in the Assembly CON = Seats Contested *           Results for the two seats are awaited. **         Result of a constitutency was withheld.