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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 46, June 2, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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A Militia Against Terror
Guest Writer: Kinley Dorji
Editor, Kuensel
Bhutan is
raising a militia force, a move that was proposed by more
than 200 leaders of development committees of the districts
and blocks, who met with King Jigme Singye Wangchuck on
May 14 in the capital, Thimpu.
The move echoes a consistent call by the Bhutanese population
that has been expressing a growing anxiety over the encroachment
into Bhutan's southern jungles by the outlawed Indian groups,
the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB),
and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO).
Local government leaders and the people's elected representatives
in the country's highest legislative body, the National
Assembly, have repeatedly proposed the raising of a militia
force to strengthen Bhutan's small security force.
Reports estimate that there are about 20 camps in Bhutan,
with about 3,000 to 4,000 militants moving between the camps
and numerous bases in India's Northeast and neighbouring
countries.
Although reports in the Indian press speculate joint military
operations, the Bhutanese National Assembly members have
taken the stand that the Royal Bhutan Army will take the
responsibility of removing the militants from Bhutanese
soil if dialogue and peaceful means fail. At district meetings
over the past five years or so, the local leaders have asked
the King of Bhutan to organize militia training so that
young Bhutanese men could help "defend the security and
sovereignty" of their country.
At this month's meeting, in the presence of the King, a
senior army officer asked the rural leaders to select the
most capable men between the ages of 18 and 45 to be given
a three-month training course by the Royal Bhutan Army.
He said that they would be given the same remuneration and
facilities as regular soldiers.
The Bhutanese government has been following a four-pronged
strategy endorsed by the National Assembly about three years
back: to persuade the militant leaders to dismantle their
camps and to leave the country peacefully; to stop all food
and arms supplies being taken to the camps in the country;
to stop the local people from extending help to the militants;
and military action as a last option.
The Bhutanese Home Minister, Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho, reported
to the last two sessions of the Assembly, outlining limited
progress in the talks. While the ULFA had dismantled four
camps by December 2001, they were believed to have established
some new camps. In July 2002, the National Assembly had
decided that ULFA must remove its main headquarters from
Bhutan, or the Government would have no choice but to resort
to military action.
The Royal Bhutan Army, meanwhile, has established 10 army
camps, with about 5,000 troops, along the Kingdom's border
with Assam. Bhutanese leaders, who have tried to avoid a
military clash with the militants, are hoping to resolve
the problem through dialogue, but are preparing for the
worst.
Indian newspapers also report that Bhutan is under pressure
from the Indian government to fight the militants. The Assam
Chief Minister, Tarun Gogoi, has repeatedly urged the Centre
to push the Bhutanese Government into military action. With
the National Security Advisor and Principal Secretary to
the Prime Minister, Brajesh Mishra, making a special visit
to Bhutan to meet King Jigme Singye Wangchuck on March 17,
analysts in India felt that the Himalayan Kingdom was under
pressure to resort to military action, either on its own,
or in joint operations with Indian forces.
In past discussions of the National Assembly, Members have
been expressing their fears that the problem could escalate
and affect the country's relations with India. The dilemma
is that there will be repercussions whether they take action
against the militants or not.
Ideally, the Bhutanese parliamentarians would like to see
a solution in India, where the real problem lies. Under
the circumstances, however, Bhutan is involved, since the
militants are camped inside the country.
According to reports in the Bhutanese newspaper, Kuensel,
King Jigme Singye Wangchuck told local leaders that Bhutan
was facing a "critical situation", and that the security
and sovereignty of Bhutan was seriously threatened today.
The Government, he said, was contemplating raising its contingency
to meet emergency situations from one billion to two billion
Ngultrum (1.00 Ngultrums=1.00 Rupees; Approximately Nu 42
for one US dollar).
If Bhutan is forced to resort to military action to remove
the militants, the Government estimates that more than 66,000
people in 10 districts will be affected, and possibly displaced.
These are areas where the militants have set up their camps
and that they use as passages to India. Moreover, Bhutan
expects that its economy could be seriously affected with
all roads to India closed and trade stopped. Bhutan has
three main trade routes with India, two of them in Assam
and one in West Bengal. Without these three routes, which
provide the economic link between India and Bhutan, socio-economic
activity will come to a standstill.
In the meeting with rural leaders, the King called on the
people to be prepared to defend the country. "When the security
and sovereignty of our country is under threat the true
sons of the soil must step forward and not wait to be called
on to serve their country," Kuensel reported him as saying.
The bottom line is that the militants have shown no sign
of dismantling their camps. As the militants obtain more
arms and equipment through their contacts - ironically transporting
these through India - their presence will become more difficult
to accommodate.
That will leave Bhutan no choice but to take up arms if
all peaceful efforts fail. As reluctant as the country may
be to risk the impact of military action against hardened
militant forces coming from the immediate neighbouring states
of Assam and West Bengal, the implications of not doing
so could be far greater.
J&K: Operation Sarp Vinash - The
Army Strikes Hard
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Special Correspondent, Frontline
Most afternoons, there is plenty of work at the Foreigners'
Graveyard in Surankote, digging graves for the bodies of
terrorists killed in the mountains. The small green field
behind the Surankote police station used to be the size
of a suburban bungalow lawn. It now sprawls over an area
of an outsize football field, and threatens to overrun adjoining
farms.
The designated burial ground for unidentified terrorists,
the graveyard houses the remains of the dozens of jihadis,
many from Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the Kashmir valley,
graves in what are known as 'martyrs' graveyards' often
have elaborately carved headstones. Here, no one seems to
care enough to take the trouble. Talk to local police and
military officials about how they find terrorists in this
area, the centre of the most bitter fighting in Jammu and
Kashmir, and it soon becomes clear it has little to do with
special tactics or high-grade intelligence. "All you do
is march into those forests", says a trainee at the Surankote
Police Station, pointing to the dark shadow, "and, soon
enough, you'll be in the middle of a war."
Over the last month, it has become clear that nowhere near
enough Indian troops were marching into the mountains of
Poonch, and up into the Pir Panjal. Operation Sarp Vinash
[Snake Destroyer], a three-division strength operation involving
three Army brigades, has thrown up evidence that terrorists
on the Poonch heights have been building up safe bases in
key areas of the district for several years. Troops discovered
a network of almost a hundred well-defended bunkers around
the Hill Kaka bowl in Surankote, built up from the high-altitude
Dhoke shelters used by Gujjar herdsmen in the summers.
So far, the Army claims to have killed upwards of 62 terrorists
in the operation, although not all the bodies of those killed
have so far been recovered.
Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami (HuJI)
terrorist Muhammad Amin Sajid's diary provides interesting
insight into how terrorists in Surankote actually functioned.
Sajid, who lived in the Madrassa Jamia Ashrafia in Pakistan's
Okara district, maintained a record of contributions from
various groups for common expenses, like guides, porters,
supplies and medicines. The Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),
Harkat-ul-Jihad-e-Islami, al-Badr
and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
all made contributions to Sajid's central fund. Other diaries
record the deaths of comrades in Afghanistan, with one entry
recording the death of a terrorist code-named Butshikan,
or idol-destroyer, in Osama bin Laden's Tora Bora complex.
Interestingly, Indian troops encountered one elaborate cave
defence at an altitude of 3,989 metres, which was eventually
destroyed with the use of helicopter-fired air-to-ground
fragmentation missiles.
Other diaries, interspersed with Islamist slogans attributed
to the Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, show the presence
of a crude counter-intelligence apparatus. It records the
execution of 10 'spies' whose throats were slit after they
allegedly 'betrayed' jihadis to Indian forces between
May 1999 and July 2002. The list includes two women and
three children. Such killings of Muslim villagers, mainly
from the Gujjar community, are common in Rajouri and Poonch,
and have continued through the Sarp Vinash period.
Five villagers were shot dead at Keri Khwas, near Rajouri,
on March 25, and another six were slaughtered at Kot Dhara,
near Darhal. Many of the killings can be traced to wholly
non-military origins, pegged around land and resource conflict
between Gujjars, Rajput Muslims, and ethnic-Kashmiri migrants.
An elaborate communications structure built around portable
satellite phones allowed terrorists to communicate on their
handlers with Sialkot, Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Islamabad, Abbotabad,
as well as sympathisers across India - calls were made to
Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Kerala. One photograph
recovered from a killed terrorist showed him posing in front
of the Parliament House in New Delhi. Since the satellite
phone systems used by the terrorists are of a type which
uses a gateway in Pune to transmit signals, it is possible
Indian intelligence knew of the signals traffic for some
length of time, and was content to allow it to be generated.
Elaborate codebooks for radio-frequency communications were
also found.
There are lessons to be learned from the fighting on the
Pir Panjal. First up, it is necessary to remember that,
the Army's own public relations enthusiasm notwithstanding,
this is not the first time large-scale operations have been
carried out in the region. In July 2001, twenty-one Jaish-e-Mohammad
cadre were eliminated in a bunker-busting operation above
Surankote. Many, as investigation later disclosed, were
teenagers, tragically press-ganged into the service of jihad.
Again, in mid-2002, joint operations by the Jammu and Kashmir
Police and Rashtriya Rifles claimed eighteen terrorists
in Doda's Wadwan area, in some of the most remote and difficult
terrain in all of Jammu and Kashmir. Regular encounters
have taken place even in Hill Kaka, where the Army has found
such success.
The problem has been that offensives in the high mountains
have rarely been well thought through or sustained. Helicopter-borne
operations were attempted in Wadwan during the winter of
2000, but the lack of an infantry presence meant that all
troops eventually found was one empty Kalashnikov magazine.
In 1999, the entire 8 Mountain Division was pumped into
Kupwara's Rajwar forests. Again, lacking intelligence support
and planning, the grandiose operation, code-named Operation
Kaziranga, succeeded in finding just one dead body in its
first two weeks. In the summer of 2000, company-strength
pickets were put up in Wadwan, and on the Margan pass into
Kishtwar. The mainly defensive positions killed no terrorists,
and were burned down when troops withdrew at the onset of
winter - sending a clear message to local residents about
who was boss.
It is silly to blame small Army units in the mountains for
failing to operate aggressively, as the media often does.
Consider, for example, the case of Kishtwar. The district
of Doda sprawls across 11,678 square kilometres, only a
few hundred square kilometres less than the entire Kashmir
valley. Over 60 per cent of this area is made up of the
single tehsil of Kishtwar, which, in turn, divides
equally into four major valley systems. The northern valley
systems of Wadwan and Marwah were protected by just one
battalion, and a single company traditionally sent to Wadwan
in the summer was pulled out in 2001, enabling a massive
escalation in terrorist violence. The offensive operations
carried out that year have had no subsequent follow-up -
and now, the Nagrota-based 16 Corps is considering a series
of Sarp Vinash-style operations in this part of its
domain.
Much of the credit for the success in Poonch goes to the
new commander of the Romeo Force, Major-General Hardev Lidder.
Lidder, sources disclose, was appalled to find that the
Romeo Force, charged with counter-terrorist operations in
Rajouri and Poonch, just wasn't spending enough time on
the heights. Helicopter pads to supply troops in the mountains,
as well as minor roads, were constructed in the winter to
improve mobility. Then, without fanfare, troops of the 9
Para-Commando Regiment were tasked to take on a major bunker
on Peak 3689-metres in Hill Kaka, after helicopter surveillance
flights picked up large numbers of footprints through the
snow leading to a single complex. Thirteen terrorists were
shot dead in the operation, the largest single success recorded
in the course of the ongoing operations.
As terrorists groups scattered into the Pir Panjal, more
troops were called in to saturate the ground, and disrupt
their movement routes. The 6 Rashtriya Rifles was joined
by the 163 Brigade and the 100 Brigade, pulled off duties
on a new second counter-infiltration ring along the Line
of Control. The major offensive axis, as the operation evolved,
were Thanamandi on the Rajouri-Poonch border, where a welter
of killings of civilians had recently taken place, Hari
Buddha, Marhot, Hill Kaka, and the Bufliaz forests near
Surankote. Troops from the 15 Corps were also pulled in
to block routes from Saujian and Loran in northern Poonch,
across the Pir Panjal into Tangmarg and Shopian in the Kashmir
Valley. It is unclear just how successful these efforts,
unlike the initial strike, have been, but large scale terrorists
groups have clearly been dislocated and their logistics
routes disrupted.
Lidder's most important contribution, perhaps, was to breach
the unstated ban the Army has placed on the use of air power
in counter-terrorist operations. Apart from the use of air-to-ground
missiles, Cheetah helicopters fitted with heavy machine
guns were used on several occasions. The use of such weapons
was made possible by restrictions on Gujjar herdsmen, which
barred them from using traditional high-altitude summer
pastures, thus excluding the possibility of civilian casualties.
It seems probable that terrorists will now seek to bring
down helicopters, and it will be interesting to see how
Indian forces respond to such an escalatory move. Operation
Sarp Vinash also used technologies just starting
to disperse through the ranks of Indian infantry formations,
like portable ground radar and night-vision devices, to
considerable effect.
And the problems? For one, large-scale operations like Sarp
Vinash can't, very obviously, make up the bread-and-butter
of counter-terrorist work. There is no sign, yet, that its
lessons about the importance of rapid mobility and technology
have adequately dispersed through the Army. In fact, there
is a very real danger that operations that secure media
coverage may now be privileged over less flamboyant but
equally necessary work. There is also little sign that much-talked-about
civilian-military synergies are even being considered. Jammu
and Kashmir, for example, has the highest livestock-to-human
ratio in India, but is also an importer of milk and meat.
A sensible programme of livestock improvement and procurement
might do more to keep Gujjars off the high pastures than
the arbitrary handouts now being given. Sadly, no one is
even talking about such reform.
Sarp Vinash has shown that innovation, intelligence
and enterprise do work. The problem is that this has been
repeatedly demonstrated over the past decade: only to be
forgotten the morning after.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts
in South Asia
May 26-June 1, 2003
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
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Terrorist
|
Total
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BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
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INDIA
|
Assam
|
3
|
0
|
3
|
6
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Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
28
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2
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34
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64
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Left-wing
Extremism
|
4
|
2
|
2
|
8
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Manipur
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
2
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Meghalaya
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Tripura
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
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39
|
4
|
40
|
83
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* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
US starts
verifying Pakistani claims on closure of
terrorist camps: Hours after the US
President George W. Bush met with Indian
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in St.
Petersburg on June 1, 2003, Washington has
reportedly placed in motion a process to
verify claims made by Pakistan that all
terrorist camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir
(PoK) had been wound up by May 31, 2003.
India disputes this claim and has reportedly
provided intelligence inputs to say that
several of these camps still existed. Reports
indicate that US sources have noted the
statements made by Pakistani officials in
the last two days that there were no longer
any camps in PoK. "It is now a process of
audit and verification," an unnamed US official
was quoted as saying. The US administration
is equally keen, according to sources, that
before the arrival of President Pervez Musharraf
in the US to meet President Bush, all such
camps are totally removed and that the process
of dialogue with India moves in a positive
manner from Pakistan's side. Times
of India, June 2, 2003.
Infiltration continues into Jammu and
Kashmir, says Army Chief: While talking
to the media on May 28, 2003, in Hyderabad,
Andhra Pradesh, Chief of Army Staff General
N.C. Vij said that there was no "let up"
in infiltration from across the border by
Pakistan into the Indian State of Jammu
and Kashmir. He said, "On their (Pakistan's)
part, intent and efforts (to push through
infiltrators) are continuing. The rate of
success may have dropped." Meanwhile, in
Srinagar, General Officer Commanding 15
Corps, Lt. Gen. V.G. Patankar, said that
Pakistan's move to restrict activities of
the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
had no bearing on the ground situation in
the State, as infiltration from across the
border was continuing. The
Hindu, May 28, 2003.
Terrorist violence on the rise in Tripura,
indicates report: A media report quoting
State Home Department sources has indicated
that outlawed terrorist groups of Tripura
have intensified violence, which has shown
a sharp rise in the State compared to the
past two years. Sources said that terrorism-related
incidents have led to the death of 123 civilians
after the Manik Sarkar-led fifth Left Front
Government assumed office for the second
time in February 2003. According to official
statistics, 123 civilians were killed in
Tripura during the first five months of
this year; only 65 civilians were killed
during the corresponding period in year
2002, and 144 during the whole of 2002.
The current year has also witnessed three
major massacres in which 38 persons have
been killed. Incidents of abductions have
also increased in a similar proportion.
86 persons were abducted during the first
five months of this year, as against 56
during the corresponding period last year
and 201 during the whole of 2002. The number
of terrorist incidents also increased similarly.
The first five months of the current year
have registered 166 incidents, as against
85 during the corresponding period last
year, and 201 during the whole of 2002.
Furthermore, the report added that, despite
repeated calls, none of the terrorist groups
have shown any interest to come for negotiations
with the State or the Central Government.
Assam
Tribune, May 27, 2003.
NEPAL
Premier
Lokendra Bahadur Chand resigns: Nepalese
Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand submitted
his resignation to King Gyanendra on May 30,
2003, reportedly amidst a joint agitation by
major political parties that have been demanding
the formation of an all-party Government. King
Gyanendra later accepted his resignation and
has called on political parties to propose a
common name for the Premiership within three
days. Meanwhile, Chand has said that any change
in the Government would not adversely affect
the ongoing peace talks with the Maoist
insurgents. Besides, Maoist leader
Krishna Bahadur Mahara also reportedly said
that the talks would not be affected as they
were negotiating with the 'representative of
the King'. However, he alleged that the new
political development and the exercise underway
to form a new government were a dilatory tactics
on the part of the Government. Nepal
News, May 31, 2003.
PAKISTAN
Jaish-e-Mohammed
chief Masood Azhar barred from rendering speech in Peshawar:
The local administration in Peshawar on May 30, 2003, stopped
Maulana Masood Azhar, chief of the outlawed Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM),
from addressing a "Deefa-e-Islam" conference at the Peshawar
Press Club. The conference was reportedly organised by the Khudamul
Islam, Jaish's new name. However, Azhar was reportedly allowed
to lay the foundation stone of Hanan bin Salma Centre at Chamkani
and address the people at Speen Jamaat. An unnamed police official
was quoted as saying in Daily Times that there was no ban on
Azhar to address gatherings in the city, but as the conference
was organised by a proscribed outfit, he was not allowed to
address the conference. Later, addressing a Friday congregation
at Speen Jamaat at the University Town in Peshawar, Azhar hailed
Osama bin Laden and the Taliban supremo Mullah Mohammed Omar
as heroes. "Both leaders have demonstrated supreme courage and
tenacity by not bowing down before America," he said. Jang,
May 31, 2003.
Acting chief of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi arrested in Muzaffargarh
district: Qari Abdul Hayee, acting chief of the proscribed
Sunni group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ),
was reportedly arrested during a surprise raid conducted at
Basti Allah Buksh in Sher Sultan, Muzaffargarh district, on
May 29, 2003. An unnamed senior official was quoted as saying
in a media report that Qari Hayee was the mastermind of US journalist
Daniel Pearl's murder as he was the involved group chief in
Karachi. Carrying a head money of Rupees two million on his
arrest, Hayee was reportedly planning suicide attacks in the
country following a recent crackdown against the LeJ. He has
been accused of involvement in various sectarian killings across
Pakistan. Jang,
May 30, 2003.
Jamaat-e-Islami asks Hizb-ul-Mujahideen to vacate its offices:
According to the Daily Times, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) has
asked the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
to shift its offices from the premises of the Jamaat offices.
Hizb sources were quoted as saying that the group had been operating
from the premises of JeI offices since 1990. They said the central
JeI leadership had also asked the Hizb to remove all hoardings
and signboards from Jamaat offices across Pakistan. On May 25,
2003, Jamaat chief Qazi Hussein Ahmad reportedly said that Hizb
sympathisers and not the JeI established such offices. Meanwhile,
Hizb spokesperson Abdul Saleem while denying that the group
had any offices, said "We have only one office in Rawalpindi
and that too for media purposes only. Since we have no offices
in Pakistan, the question of shifting or removing them doesn't
arise." He also denied that the Hizb was the JeI's armed wing.
Daily
Times, May 27, 2003.
SRI LANKA
LTTE rejects
Government's new proposal on North East province: The Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
on May 30, 2003, rejected an alternate proposal on development,
rehabilitation and reconstruction of the North East Province
(NEP) by the Government and also criticised it for not specifying
the participatory role of the LTTE. The message was conveyed
in a letter by the outfit's chief negotiator, Anton Balasingham,
to the Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. It said, "you have
conveniently ignored the stark reality that the LTTE runs a
de facto administration of its own in vast tracts of territories
under its control in the northeast". As reported earlier, on
May 21, the LTTE had sought an autonomous and Interim Administration
with a dominant role for itself in both policy-making and implementation
of development and rehabilitation projects in the NEP. It also
demanded that the structure should be outside the Constitution
of Sri Lanka. Daily
News,, May 31, 2003.
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The South
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