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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 47, June 9, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Punjab: Reviving the Politics of
Communal Polarization
K.P.S. Gill
President, Institute for Conflict Management
Punjab's
political leadership - and most particularly, that on the
religious right - appears to be entirely uneducable. 15
long years of terrorism in the State have failed to root
out the perverse politics of communal manipulation that
resurfaces every time the Akali Dal - the party that claims
to represent the Sikhs in Punjab, and that ruled the State
through five deeply corrupt and inefficient years in power
before it suffered a humiliating defeat in the February
2002 State Assembly Elections - fails to secure a democratic
mandate.
Thus, on June 6, 2003, on the occasion of the annually commemorated
'Ghallughara Divas' (Martyrs Day) which marks the anniversary
of the ham handed Operation Blue Star, the Shiromani Gurdwara
Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) declared Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale
a 'martyr of Sikh history'. Bhindranwale was the man who
initiated and led the bloody terrorist movement in the State
between 1978 and June 1984, when he was killed in the Golden
Temple during Operation Blue Star. The 'declaration of martyrdom'
came from the SGPC controlled Akal Takht, the highest
seat of temporal power in the Sikh Faith. The SGPC and the
Akal Takht are themselves entirely controlled by
the Akali Dal, and have often been brought to the centerstage
of the State's communal politics, particularly during periods
of strife - as was the case during the extended violence
of the Sikh separatist terrorist movement for Khalistan.
The Akali Dal is a partner in the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP)-led ruling coalition at the Centre, and the move to
confer a martyr's status on a terrorist leader certainly
embarrassed the BJP, which sought to underplay the event,
dismissing it as an "unfortunate announcement". There is
little evidence of any of the political formations in Punjab
responding seriously to the event - and in isolation, it
is, indeed, of little significance. A decade after the virulent
Khalistani movement was decisively defeated in 1993, the
violence of that phase has been explicitly rejected by the
people of Punjab at large, and repeated efforts to revive
the Khalistani ideology and terrorism have failed, despite
vigorous support from Pakistan.
There is, however, a combination of factors that suggests
that the 'declaration of martyrdom' should not be viewed
in isolation, and that there is, in fact, a concerted pattern
indicating that mischief is afoot once more. It is significant
that the SGPC chose to associate itself with the commemoration
of the Ghallughara Divas for the first time this year. The
adoption of the Nanak Shahi calendar - which establishes
a separate 'Sikh era' commencing with the date of birth
of the first Sikh Guru, Guru Nanak, and which is regarded
by many as a move to deepen the communal divide between
Hindu and Sikh in Punjab - on April 13 this year, is another
event that points to the politics of communal polarization
being revived once again. More significantly, some of the
most vicious mass murderers of the Khalistani movement,
as well as their most prominent fundraisers and ideologues,
have taken the 'surrender route' over the past year, or
have simply returned to the Punjab, unhindered and unquestioned
by the state, from their terrorist safe havens abroad. Most
prominent among these are Jagit Singh Chohan and Wassan
Singh Zaffarwal. Chohan was the self-styled 'President'
of the Khalistan 'government in exile' who returned to his
home in Tanda in the Hoshiarpur district of Punjab in June
2001 after 25 years in London. After his return, rejected
by the democratic mainstream, Chohan established the Khalsa
Raj party, which still aims to establish a separate 'Sikh
nation'. His initial public posture was conciliatory, and
he spoke of establishing Khalistan 'through love and compassion'.
However, he is reported to have delivered an inflammatory
speech at this year's Ghallugara Divas gathering.
Zaffarwal is the former head of the Khalistan Commando Force,
one of the most vicious terrorist organizations during the
years of terror, and had moved from Pakistan to a safe haven
in Switzerland, but chose to return to his village in Gurdaspur
in April 2001, and now harbours ambitions of 'entering politics'.
The Indian state has failed to prosecute or punish these
and the hundreds of other former terrorists in currently
in Punjab, only a few of whom have been subjected to a desultory
judicial process, but with an abysmal record of convictions.
This is not all. After nearly a decade of silence, the 'human
rights' platform is once again being activated by front
organizations of the Khalistani terrorists, giving currency
to the most audacious of falsehoods in a concerted campaign
of fabrications. Chief among such efforts was the publication
in May this year of a book by one such organization styling
itself as the 'Committee for Coordination on Disappearances
in Punjab' (CCDP). There appears to be a sudden revival
of such propaganda and other activities by terrorist front
organizations, including continuous efforts to mobilize
support abroad. Significantly, a ham-handedly propagandist
programme on alleged human rights violations in the Punjab
was recently aired on BBC radio as well. Other developments
that require attention in this context is the distribution,
earlier this month, by the London-based Punjabi Radio of
'relief' ranging between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 50,000, to ex-terrorists,
their wives and families during a function at a Gurudwara
at Jalandhar. There are also increasing reports of networking
between Narain Singh Chaura's Akal Federation and Kanwarpal
Singh Bittoo's Dal Khalsa, as well as between these organization
and like-minded groups abroad.
These loose strands are bound together by Pakistan's unrelenting
intent to do mischief in Punjab. In December last year,
Deputy Prime Minister and Union Home Minister, L.K. Advani
spoke of "a new strategy" under which "Pakistan's ISI has
again started toying with the idea of reviving militancy
in Punjab with senior officials including President Pervez
Musharraf reportedly having meetings with pro-Khalistan
leaders during the birth anniversary celebration of Baba
Guru Nanak." Significantly, Musharraf is reported to have
had a closed door meeting with UK and US-based extremist
leaders, including Pritpal Singh, convenor of the American
Sikh Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee; Gurmeet Singh Aulakh,
president of the US-based Council of Khalistan; Manmohan
Singh Khalsa, the UK based leader of the Dal Khalsa; and
Ganga Singh Dhillon, the US-based president of the Nankana
Sahib Foundation. It is important to note, moreover, that
at least five of the persons on the '20 most wanted' list
that was handed over by the Government of India to Pakistan
are Khalistani terrorists that India believes continue to
be located in Pakistan. They include Gajinder Singh, 'chairman'
of the Khalistani Commando Force; Wadhaawa Singh Babbar,
chief of the Babbar
Khalsa International; Ranjit Singh Neeta, 'president'
of the Khalistan Zindabad Force; and Bhai Lakhveer Singh
Rode, chief of the International Sikh Youth Federation.
Pakistan's plans for a revival of Sikh militancy have manifested
themselves periodically - for instance, in a brief campaign
of random bombings at soft targets in the Punjab between
March and July 1997, in which 55 civilians were killed;
and again in the appointment, in April 1999, of Lt. General
Javed Nasir, a former chief of the ISI, as the chairman
of the Pakistan Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee - an organization
established to take care of Sikh shrines in that country,
including the revered Nankana Sahib. Jathas or groups
of Sikh pilgrims who travel to these shrines each year are
regularly harangued by Sikh extremists in efforts to revive
recruitment to extremist ranks.
The lessons of the years of terrorism have not been lost
on the people of Punjab, and there is now widespread popular
revulsion against the activities of those who committed
slaughter in the name of the Sikh faith. The revival of
terrorism among those who remember that dark phase of the
State's history is improbable, if not impossible. But there
is a new generation that is now growing up without any memories
of that period. To beguile this generation to take to the
terrorist path may not be as difficult a task. A revival
of militancy in Punjab is a possibility that the Indian
state must constantly guard against with the utmost vigilance.
Bringing the guilty of those long years of terror to justice
must be one of the instruments of such a defense. A state
that fails persistently to punish even the worst of its
criminals will eventually come to be ruled by them.
The Taliban Strikes Back
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
Nine months
ago, the Pervez Musharraf dictatorship in Pakistan rigged
an election to scuttle the prospects of established political
parties - including the exiled Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) and the exiled Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan
Muslim League (PML-N) - and to give the Islamist extremist
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) an overwhelming majority in
the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), largest single
party status in Baluchistan, and an unprecedented fifth
of the seats (53/272) in the National Assembly. The elections
were widely criticized by civil society and democratic elements
within Pakistan, as well as by a range of independent international
observers - including the European Union's Group of Observers
- as being unfair and stage-managed by the military regime.
A rare and crucial exception to this assessment, however,
was the United States, which accepted the manipulated Pakistani
mandate as valid, in part because it felt - and continues
to feel - obligated to the Musharraf dictatorship for its
apparent assistance in tracking down Al
Qaeda and Taliban
survivors, and partly because of an entirely flawed assessment
that this sham democracy could eventually create the basis
of a transition to real democracy in Pakistan.
Democracy, however, is a culture that evolves through practice,
not a system that can be imposed on a people by a dictator
and his puppets - with or without external support. The
'electoral success' of the MMA has not only placed a crucial
border province entirely at the disposal of Islamist extremists
directly linked to the Afghani Taliban, it has also given
them a central role and exaggerated presence in the national
political order - elements that the fundamentalists have
exploited to the hilt. Concomitantly, the skewed National
Assembly has resulted in the progressive marginalisation
- indeed, virtual neutralization - of legitimate democratic
forces, leaving the entire arena to the Islamist extremists
or to featureless puppets of the Musharraf dictatorship.
In all, prospects - indeed, the very possibility - of a
functioning democracy re-emerging in Pakistan have been
destroyed by the outcome of the rigged elections of October
last year.
The consequences are the more disastrous in the NWFP, where
the MMA Government, on June 2, 2003, passed a Bill enshrining
Sharia (Islamic Law) as the supreme authority in the province.
It is significant that the Bill was passed 'unanimously',
without any criticism or resistance from the Opposition
parties - including the 'liberal' PPP - in the NWFP Assembly.
The brand of 'Sharia' that is to be imposed is already visible
in the creation of a 'department of vice and virtue' on
the pattern of the Taliban's notorious Ministry for the
Promotion of Virtue and Discouragement of Vice in Afghanistan,
as well as in the fact that the MMA leadership comprises
many of the primary patrons and associates of the erstwhile
Taliban regime in that country. If any doubt remained, it
was cleared up by MMA Member of Parliament, Hamid-ul-Haq,
who declared: "MMA had been given the mandate to implement
Sharia… The blood of (the Afghan) Taliban has borne fruit
and Sharia has been implemented in NWFP." Soon after its
introduction in the provincial Assembly - and well before
the Bill had been passed - the MMA had demonstrated its
intent and power in the streets, when party thugs went on
a rampage through Peshawar (the provincial capital) defacing
or destroying hoardings that showed women, smashing satellite
cable TV equipment, and attacking commercial establishments
linked with foreign multinational companies. Musicians and
dancers have been driven out of the province and all 'women'
over the age of 12 are being forced into purdah (complete
social segregation and the head-to-toe veiling in public
places). The Chief Minister of the NWFP, Akram Khan Durrani,
has backed action with ominous rhetoric: "We are a force
now. Nobody can ignore us. We have nothing to lose."
The enormity of these developments cannot correctly be assessed
simply by focusing on the NWFP, and the MMA's visible constituency.
The fact is, no political entity in Pakistan - and this
includes the Musharraf dictatorship and the Army - can effectively
resist calls for Islamisation and imposition of Sharia in
the country, or any part of it. Indeed, the language of
the MMA's Sharia Bill is only a reflection of existing national
legislation. Article 2 of the Pakistani Constitution declares
Islam to be the 'state religion', and Article 227 and 228
mandate that no law in contravention of the Sharia can be
enforced in the country. Article 227 requires that all existing
laws be brought into conformity with the 'injunctions of
Islam', and that no law shall be enacted which is repugnant
to such injunctions. Crucially, moreover, whenever laws
in the name of Islam have impinged on political, social
and cultural freedoms - as they first began to do so in
the Zia-ul-Haq era - no government has ever been able to
reverse the consequent trends. It is in the nature of the
political discourse in Pakistan - with oppressive blasphemy
laws, enormous and armed street power in the hands of the
Islamist extremists, overwhelming illiteracy, a vast network
of social and 'educational' institutions controlled by Islamist
fundamentalists, and an entirely emasculated democratic
political constituency - that no effective opposition can
be mounted, or even voiced, to anything, however irrational
or unfounded, that is claimed to be in the 'interests of
Islam'.
It is, moreover, not entirely clear that, even if this were
possible, there is any will or intent to create such an
opposition among those who currently control Pakistan's
destiny. Pakistani sources confirm that the Army and the
Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) continue to support the
MMA's political consolidation and have, as the Friday
Times notes, "worked overtime to pave their forceful
entry into the corridors of power." The Islamist parties
have, certainly since Zia's time, been seen as the 'natural
allies' of the Army, as against the democratic forces in
the country, and this is an alliance that is yet to be questioned
under the Musharraf regime.
The political scenario in Pakistan, consequently, remains
extraordinarily murky. While the military regime proclaims
its support for the US war against terrorism, and helps
'hunt' al
Qaeda and Taliban
survivors with US Forces, it is widely believed to continue
to shield the top leadership of these entities, many of
whom are known to be in Pakistan; the ISI and elements in
the Army, moreover, continue to give clandestine support
to Taliban elements still operating in Afghanistan's border
regions, and to terrorism in the India, particularly in
the province of Jammu and Kashmir; within the country, while
limited initiatives to contain sectarian strife have borne
some fruit, the gradual consolidation of Islamist extremist
forces in national politics has been continuous. There is
some speculation that the MMA's increasing belligerence
receives tacit encouragement from the Musharraf regime -
on the presumption that, at a stage when the Islamists cross
the line of international tolerance, this will give the
Army an excuse to dissolve Parliament and the State Assemblies,
and regain absolute control of the political space. Such
a projection would be consistent with the Pakistani military
leadership's past record, to the extent that the threat
of a collapse into fundamentalist anarchy has constantly
been held out to the world as justification for the continuation
of authoritarian rule by the military.
This is, however, a double-edged weapon, and the gradual
consolidation of the Islamist extremist constituency, not
only in the country's political firmament, but within the
military rank and file as well, creates the danger that
those who seek to play with this fire may, eventually, be
consumed by it.
Continuing Discord between King
and Parties
Guest Writer: Professor Lok Raj Baral
Executive Chairman, Nepal Centre for Contemporary Studies
(NCCS), Kathmandu
Political developments in Nepal appear to be occurring at
an extraordinarily rapid pace, and this impression can only
have been accentuated by the resignation of Prime Minister
Lokendra Bahadur Chand, and the appointment of another royalist,
Surya Bahadur Thapa, in his place. In actual fact, however,
politics has remained at a standstill since King Gyanendra
took over executive power and dismissed the caretaker Deuba
Government on October 4, 2002, compounding the protracted
crisis in the country. Major political parties represented
in Parliament consider the royal action retrogressive, and
have sought to resist it jointly. However, they waited for
about seven months, hoping that the King would correct his
action by bringing the Constitutional process back on track.
The King, meanwhile, took steps to open a dialogue with
the Maoists in order to find a political solution to their
seven-year old 'People's War'. The previous Deuba Government
had held the first peace talks in August-November 2001,
but these broke down suddenly in the last week of November,
following the Maoist
attack on the military barracks at Dang and other places.
By the time the King's Government and the Maoists announced
the cease-fire as a prelude to the second round of peace
talks on January 29,2003, about 8,000 people had already
lost their lives. As the cease-fire drags on, there have
been reports of violations of the code of conduct in different
parts of the country, and clashes between the Maoist insurgents
and the security forces continue to occur during the present
interregnum. Such incidents appear to suggest that simultaneous
preparations for war by both sides are underway.
The two rounds of talks held on April 27 and May 10, 2003,
have yielded no results. The first round took place only
after three months of the announcement of the cease-fire
and was characterized by mutual distrust and wrangling.
The Government and foreign donors wanted to concentrate
on reconstruction of infrastructure destroyed during the
course of the Maoist People's War, and on humanitarian aspects,
including the rehabilitation of displaced persons. But the
Maoists wanted to address their core political agenda, maintaining
that the Government's proposal was only a conspiracy to
delay the peace process. Later, retracting on some aspects
of its position, the Government agreed to address all outstanding
issues and procedures to be followed during the negotiations.
The second round, held on May 9, was overshadowed by remarks
made by the spokesman of the Royal Nepal Army, who said
that the laying down of arms by the Maoist insurgents should
be a precondition for the peace talks. Among many other
issues agreed upon by both the negotiating teams, the confinement
of the Army to a radius of five kilometers from their barracks
was objected to by the Army as well as by some prominent
political leaders.
Unfortunately, the Government team demonstrated that it
had come to the negotiating table without any serious homework.
Conflicting opinions were expressed by two members of the
official team, with one of the ministers stating that there
was no understanding on restricting the movement of the
Army, while other Government members dithered on the issue,
lacking confidence in their own capacity as negotiators.
The Maoist leaders threatened that they would pull out from
future talks if such decisions, supposedly agreed upon by
the two teams, were changed due to the pressure from the
Army. Issues relating to disarming the guerillas and their
future management are likely to dominate upcoming negotiations,
while the other core political demands - an interim government,
a round table conference and a new constituent assembly
- are yet to be addressed.
The triangular conflict between the King, political parties
and the Maoists has added complexity to Nepali politics.
On the one hand, while the Maoists deal with the King, who
is at the centre of power in the present royal dispensation,
they also want to rope in other major parties represented
in the dissolved Parliament in order to secure a greater
legitimacy in the negotiation process. Moreover, any final
agreement between the Maoists and the King will have to
be acceptable to major political parties, as their popular
base cannot be denied despite their marginalization since
King Gyanendra's October 4, 2002, decision to take over
power. The political parties, however, feel themselves betrayed
by the King, as the latter has preferred to be an active
monarch rather than to conform to the spirit of the country's
Constitutional Monarchy. The gap between the King and the
political parties has widened further since the King has
twice rejected the collective demand of the parties to constitute
an all-party government in order to put the Parliamentary
system back on track. On the contrary, the King picked up
both the former Prime Minister, Lokendra Bahadur Chand,
as well as the present incumbent, Surya Bahadur Thapa, out
of the ranks of those who had served the Royal (partyless)
regime prior to the restoration of the multiparty system
in 1990. The Maoists and the Parliamentary Parties have,
consequently, not accepted the appointments made by the
King in contravention of the spirit of the country's constitutional
monarchy.
Both the Maoists and the Parliamentary Parties have thus
criticized Thapa's appointment on June 4, 2003, as yet another
royal ploy to consolidate the monarchy. Political parties
feel betrayed by the King, since the demand of the six major
parties to appoint Madhav Kumar Nepal - the leader of the
Opposition in the dissolved Parliament, and one of the key
members of the five-party coalition formed against the King's
action - was rejected. Instead, Thapa, whose party had only
eleven members in a House of 205 representatives, was appointed
Prime Minister, once again provoking all the parties to
oppose the King's move.
King Gyanendra's choice of Thapa can be assumed to have
been prompted by certain considerations. First, Thapa like
his predecessor (Chand) was non-committal on reducing the
powers and privileges of the King. He is considered a thoroughbred
royalist, despite his liberal image during the 'partyless'
regime. The King might have thought that his experience,
his past image of a liberal and a manipulator would protect
various royal interests from both the Maoists and Political
Parties who are bent on bringing about radical transformations
in the existing power structure. Thus, while the Maoists
want to replace the present Constitution with a new one
to be prepared by a Constituent Assembly; the Political
Parties want to restore the dissolved Parliament and then
carry forward an agenda of qualitative reforms that would
reduce the King's role. The crucial and shared agenda today,
consequently, is to deal with an ambitious monarch from
whom the new Prime Minister derives his orders to function.
Tokyo Donor Conference
- LTTE Rethinks Aid for Reconstruction
Guest Writer: Saman Kelegama
Executive Director, Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo
The much-awaited Tokyo Conference will take place on June
9-10, 2003. The Conference is supposed to bring a US $ 3
billion aid package, which has been pledged by various donors
to Sri Lanka, over a three-year period - US $ 1 billion
per year. It will give Sri Lanka an opportunity to place
on the table an assessment of national priorities for the
country for the next four to six years. The objective of
the Conference is to mobilize donor support to 'regain'
Sri Lanka through peace, rehabilitation, and growth generating
reform.
The Government's own Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, better
known, as 'Regaining Sri Lanka' is a detailed strategy for
the way in which the Government will deal with national
priorities across the whole country. A separate study was
however commissioned to look at the needs of the North and
the East, where the war has resulted in destruction of houses,
schools, hospitals, roads, and other infrastructure. The
assessment was undertaken by the Sub-Committee on Immediate
Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN) under the
auspices of the United Nations, along with the World Bank
and the Asian Development Bank. Based on the assessment,
two 'Needs Assessment' reports - one for the conflict affected
areas and the other for the identified specific areas -
were produced. Besides, 'Regaining Sri Lanka' and the two
'Needs Assessment' reports, an additional report called
the "Bridging Document" will also be submitted to the Tokyo
conference.
The twenty year war has left the Sri Lankan economy in crisis
with large budget deficits, public debt exceeding the GDP,
debt servicing exceeding government revenue, high unemployment,
low productivity, etc. The United National Front (UNF) Government
that came to office 15 months ago decided that peace was
essential to rebuild the economy. After signing a Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) on a ceasefire with the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
in February 2002, the Government and the LTTE had five rounds
of peace talks (the first three rounds, September, October
and December 2002 - in Thailand; the 4th round in February
2003, in Berlin; and the March 2003, 5th round in Tokyo).
Peace talks were combined with efforts to mobilize donor
funds to rebuild the country, in particular, the North and
East. The first donor meeting was held in Oslo in December
2002, followed by the second donor meeting in Washington
in mid-April 2003, both of which were preparatory meetings
for Tokyo. The LTTE did not participate in the Washington
meeting, inter alia, due to its ban in the USA.
Meanwhile, the Government embarked on implementing a number
of reforms as agreed in the Stand-By-Package (SBP) with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) signed in March 2001,
and concerted efforts were made to bring down the fiscal
deficit. Based on reform implementation evaluations, the
IMF approved a Poverty Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF)
and an Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in April 2003, that
run until 2006, combined with facilities that total US $
567 million. The focus of the IMF programme is two fold:
(1) fiscal consolidation to reduce public debt, and (2)
structural reforms to reduce the role of the public sector.
The World Bank is also stepping up its activities in Sri
Lanka, supporting the Government's economic programme -
the key target of which is to halve the number under the
poverty line by 2015. To date, the Bank has committed US
$ 2.7 billion in loans, credits, and grants to support 98
different projects, while the ADB loans total US $ 2.7 billion.
The base case for the World Bank lending programme through
2006 consists of about four projects per year, amounting
to a total of US $ 800 million. The European Commission
has also adopted a €3.27 million decision under its Rapid
Reaction Mechanism in support of the peace process in Sri
Lanka. The World Bank and the European Commission will formally
announce their commitments in Tokyo.
Economists are concerned about the low rate of aid utilization
in the country - 11 per cent compared to the international
average of 20 per cent. Given some of the cumbersome procedures
governing aid disbursement, the Government of Sri Lanka
has appointed a special team to look into the matter and
improve aid utilization. This is all the more important
to accommodate the new aid inflows of which 20 per cent
has been ear-marked for the North/East. Concerns have also
been expressed on the 'loans' component in the aid package,
which will contribute to long-term indebtedness.
The LTTE decision to suspend participation in peace talks
on 21 April 2003, due to its exclusion from the meeting
in Washington, has become a major interruption in the peace
process. The LTTE holds that their participation in the
peace process is based on the notion of partnership with
the Government. Partnership entails equality and mutual
respect and, thus, consultation and joint decision-making.
The LTTE claims that there was inadequate discussion on
critical issues before the Washington meeting. In a nutshell,
the LTTE position before Tokyo is as follows:
- Will not participate
in the Tokyo Conference.
- Withdrawal from the
peace talks is a suspension of participation for the time
being. But emphasizes that it is committed to the peace
process.
- Points out to some conceptual
flaws and gaps in the 'Regaining Sri Lanka' document -
highlights the different nature and scale of poverty and
devastation in the North/East from the rest of the country
and criticizes that the document takes no account of it.
- States that there is
lack of demonstrable progress in the North/East due to
the ineffective government administration system and thus
demands an Interim Administration.
The
Government's offer of a new institutional structure for
an Interim Administration was rejected by the LTTE a few
days prior to the Conference. The Government has made it
clear that any institutional structure has to be within
the Constitution of Sri Lanka, and that this could be worked
out via discussions and not by exchanging letters. Attempts
have been made to persuade the LTTE to participate in Tokyo
without any success. The LTTE is apparently beset by fears
of marginalization. It felt that the previous Government
was trying to marginalize it by the devolution proposals,
while the current UNF Government is trying to do the same
via the rehabilitation exercise and economic development.
Some say that the LTTE is not yet prepared for responsibilities
that will arise from the Tokyo Conference in terms of meeting
donor requirements for disbursement of assistance. Others
have expressed the view that the current impasse is a reflection
of 'over internationalization' of the peace and post-conflict
reconstruction process that is increasingly driven by donors.
Discussion among donors and pressure from civil society
groups to ensure that funds pledged would, in some way,
be linked to progress towards a political settlement and
towards full protection of human rights, imposes problems
on the LTTE, given its continuing abuse of human rights.
The LTTE strategy seems to be to de-link its participation
in the peace talks and donor conference from progress towards
a political settlement and human rights protection.
Given LTTE's track record, most of the donors are well aware
of LTTE's strategy at times when crucial decisions are taken.
It appears that the LTTE's non-participation has not made
much of a difference to the agenda and pledges of the Tokyo
Conference. Since the sums to be pledged are already known,
questions have been raised by some commentators as to the
relevance of the Tokyo meeting, after Oslo and Washington
- particularly as Japan is Sri Lanka's largest donor.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts
in South Asia
June 2-8, 2003
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
3
|
0
|
1
|
4
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
3
|
0
|
4
|
7
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
19
|
5
|
27
|
51
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
4
|
3
|
0
|
7
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
26
|
8
|
33
|
67
|
PAKISTAN
|
0
|
13
|
0
|
13
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* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BANGLADESH
No terrorist
camps in Bangladesh, claims Foreign Minister:
Bangladesh Foreign Minister Morshed Khan
reportedly said in Dhaka on June 3 that
no camps of Indian terrorist groups exist
on its soil as claimed by India. He said,
"India's list of Indian insurgency camps
in Bangladesh has been investigated but
nothing has been found." Earlier, on several
occasions, India had given lists of terrorist
camps of various northeast outfits pinpointing
their locations. The
Indian Express, June 3, 2003.
INDIA
Jammu
and Kashmir Government not to invoke POTA
in the State: The Jammu and Kashmir
Government indicated on June 4 that it would
not invoke the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(POTA)
in the State. "The Government will not invoke
POTA in any case. The Government will not
sanction or allow prosecution of any person
in the state under POTA," State Housing
Minister Ghulam Hassan Mir told the Legislative
Council during Question Hour. He also said
that the Government is considering releasing
those persons who have been booked under
the Act but are not involved in serious
crimes. Earlier, Minister of State for Parliamentary
Affairs Abdul Rehman Veeri said that no
person has been booked under POTA in the
State during the past six months. Outlook
India, June 4, 2003.
Talks on Kashmir can commence with PoK
issue, says Premier Vajpayee: Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee said on June
3 that if talks were to resume with Pakistan
on the Kashmir issue, it has to be on the
one-third portion of Kashmir, which was
under Pakistani occupation (Pakistan occupied
Kashmir [PoK]). "We have had talks on Kashmir
earlier also. If we were to start with Kashmir,
then we have to start with that part of
Kashmir which is under Pakistani occupation,"
Vajpayee told reporters on his return to
Delhi after a weeklong tour of Germany,
France and Russia. These remarks came in
response to a question whether taking up
the Kashmir issue would place a hurdle in
the talks with Pakistan as was witnessed
at the Agra summit of July 2001. Daily
Excelsior, June 4, 2003.
NEPAL
Surya
Bahadur Thapa sworn in as new Prime Minster:
King Gyanendra administered the oath of office
to newly appointed Prime Minister Surya Bahadur
Thapa at the Narayanhiti Royal Palace in Kathmandu
on June 5. Later, the Premier said that his
Government would further the peace process with
the Maoist
insurgents through the representatives
of Government and political parties. Media reports
have also indicated that Thapa would let the
old Government's negotiating team under former
Minister and Government negotiating team member
Narayan Singh Pun to carry on the peace process.
Meanwhile, Maoists rebel leader Pushpa Kamal
Dahal alias Prachanda said, "The new Government
formed with the blessings of the Palace is no
different from the Chand Government… Our attitude
to the Government remains the same." Prachanda
has reportedly asked the new Government to implement
previous agreements (concluded) with the Chand
Government and implement the cease-fire and
the code of conduct between the two sides. Nepal
News, June 6, 2003.
PAKISTAN
13 Police
trainees shot dead in sectarian attack in Quetta: In a sectarian
attack, 13 trainee police personnel belonging to the local Hazara
community of the Shia sect were killed and eight others injured
at Sariab Road in Quetta on June 8. According to media reports,
approximately 20 trainee police personnel were on their way
to the Police Training School located at Sariab Road from Alamdar
Road when two unidentified assailants ambushed them near Villagate
at Sariab Road and opened indiscriminate firing with automatic
weapons killing 13 of them. The assailants escaped after the
killing and no arrests have been made thus far. "It was sectarian
terrorism," Quetta Senior Superintendent of Police Rehmatullah
Khan Niazi was quoted as saying. There was no immediate claim
of responsibility for the attack. Daily
Times, June 9, 2003.
US diplomat says Pakistan is epicenter of terrorism:
A US Embassy official in Islamabad has reportedly termed Pakistan
as "the epicenter of terrorism". The remark, quoted in the Christian
Science Monitor on June 4, came from the Embassy's Regional
Security Officer, Michael Evanoff, who told the newspaper, "This
is now the epicenter of terrorism. It really is. This is the
only country I know in the world that has so many groups that
are against the US or Western ideals. Last year alone, these
groups pulled off seven strikes against the US community here,
including a March church bombing in Islamabad that killed five
- among them an American woman from the embassy and her daughter
- and a June truck bomb at the Karachi consulate that killed
14 Pakistanis." The report says, "the routine attacks and constant
threats have turned the US installations here into virtual fortresses.
The sprawling compound in Islamabad is surrounded by thick brick
ramparts, topped with razor wire, and reinforced by steel pillars
to keep a vehicle from smashing through." Daily
Times, June 5, 2003.
NWFP Provincial Assembly passes Shariat Bill: The North
West Frontier Province (NWFP) Provincial Assembly (PA) on June
2, 2003, passed the Shariat Bill that would make the province
the first in Pakistan to be run according to the teachings of
the Holy Quraan. The six-party Islamist fundamentalist alliance,
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), leads the Government in NWFP.
The bill was adopted unanimously after the opposition parties
withdrew amendments they had proposed earlier. The Shariat Bill,
introduced in the PA last week, proposes to make Islamic law
the supreme law in NWFP courts and to Islamise education, the
economy and judiciary. Chief Minister Akram Durrani while thanking
the opposition parties for lending support to the bill said,
"We will now mould all laws under the purview of the provincial
Government in accordance with the Islamic teachings." The MMA-led
provincial Government has already banned men from training or
watching women athletes, ordered civil servants to regularly
offer Namaz (prayers) five-times a day, and also decided to
establish a department for promoting virtues and suppressing
vice in the region. Jang,
June 3, 2003.
SRI LANKA
Premier Wickremesinghe
rejects LTTE demand for Interim Administration: On June
2, 2003, the Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe
reportedly rejected the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE)
demand for an Interim Administration outside the law and the
Constitution of the land in the Tamil-speaking North Eastern
Province (NEP). He has also written to the Norwegian Foreign
Minister, Jan Petersen, requesting the facilitators to arrange
a dialogue with the LTTE, which would enable the Government
to explain and clarify its proposals for an administrative mechanism
for the NEP. Meanwhile, Japan has warned the LTTE that it would
go ahead and hold the "Aid Lanka" meet in Tokyo as planned on
June 9 and 10, whether the LTTE agreed to attend it or not.
Daily
News, June 3, 2003.
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