SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 49, June 23, 2003

ASSESSMENT

PAKISTAN	USA

The State as Suicide Bomber
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

General Pervez Musharraf's visit to the US is a crucial moment in the history of South Asia, and what transpires between him and President George W. Bush at the scheduled conclave at Camp David will substantially determine not only the direction of future events and equations in this region, but also the future of international Islamist terrorism. For it is in America's handling of what Bernard Henri Levi has described as "the most delinquent of nations" that the proximate future of Islamist terrorism will be defined. Pakistan remains, today, the primary "platform for terror", in Ambassador Nancy Powell's words, and neutralizing this platform is among the primary challenges of the global war against terrorism. In dealing with General Musharraf, it will be useful for his interlocutors to keep in mind - no doubt among other and more expedient matters - that they are dealing with the man who currently presides over the world's largest network of terrorists, and over a state that has, for over two decades, used terrorism as an integral instrument of state policy - and still continues to do so from day to day.

This terrorism is widely nuanced and exploits every possible weakness in both adversary and ally. This is why America's policies since 9/11, with their overwhelming reliance on financial sops, have failed to significantly alter the character of the Pakistani state, or to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism on its soil. Nor will provision of further financial relief change anything, beyond giving Pakistan's ruling elite another billion or two to fritter away on military adventures and their quest for strategic extension through Islamist extremism. Pakistan has been surviving on international charity for much of its existence, and this has not strengthened the country, or created a sound domestic production base and economy. Pakistan is, at best, and temporarily, a 'rich beggar', and cannot be expected to retain this status unless it radically restructures both its politics and its economy. There is little evidence, yet, of such restructuring, and any transformations that may have occurred have only tended to entrench the Islamist extremist elements even deeper in the nation's politics.

And yet, despite the growing international recognition of Pakistan's continued role in supporting and sustaining international terrorism, there is virtual acceptance of the fact that Musharraf will come away from Camp David with significant 'rewards' for 'helping America' in its war against terrorism. It is useful, within this context, to assess what it is the General will seek at Camp David, and the strategy he would employ to secure what he wants.

The first component of the General's quest is 'more of the same' - further financial aid in the form of a waiver of bilateral debt to the tune of US $ 1.8 billion. America had already written off $ 1 billion as a reward for Pakistan's 'support' in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and had also helped secure large external inflows, concessional multilateral loans and grants that have helped Pakistan build up foreign exchange reserves of US $10.5 billion form a position of near bankruptcy.

The second crucial component is to force the acceptance of a 'clear road map for resolution of the Kashmir conflict' on what is being propounded as the 'Chenab' formula, which envisages the division of Kashmir along religious lines, with Muslim-majority areas going to Pakistan. This formula would reconfirm Pakistan's underlying ideology of religious exclusion - the two nation theory -, would confer a quantifiable 'victory' on its strategy of cross border terrorism, and would further the Islamist fundamentalist enterprise within the region.

The third component - currently being actively pursued - is a renewed role in Afghanistan, as America struggles to contain the revival of the Taliban movement. Pakistan is, once again, offering to 'step in' to fill the power vacuum by 'mediating' with Taliban survivors, as well as other radical Islamist groupings such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-I-Islami. With American frustrations in Afghanistan mounting, the possibility of a revival of a surrogate Pakistani influence in that country is being actively sought, and threatens to give rise to another political travesty, if the US succumbs to the imperatives of expediency.

Musharraf will also seek to negotiate a 'free hand' for himself and his military regime in Pakistan. The rigged elections of October 2002 have not produced the compliant Parliament and State Assemblies that Musharraf had hoped for, and these bodies are now creating problems on the General's continuance as both President and Chief of Army Staff. In addition, the Talibanised Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) administration in the North West Frontier Province is proving to be a source of both domestic and international embarrassment, and there is significant speculation in Pakistan that Musharraf would seek carte blanche for the suspension or dismissal of these 'elected' bodies in case present political maneuvers fail to secure his continuance with full powers, or if the Parliament or Assemblies present him with unacceptable difficulties.

Finally, Musharraf would like to come away with a lifting of the present embargo on military supplies to Pakistan, and a substantial package of Arms, including the delivery of a batch of 40 F-16s that have been sought by Pakistan since the early 1980s.

It is in the last of these that Pakistan's strategy of negotiation is most clearly demonstrated. During his present international tour, in an interview to The Times in London, Musharraf argued that, with a rise in India's defence spending, coupled with restrictions on Pakistan's acquisition of military equipment, a 'dangerous imbalance' was emerging in the force levels between the two countries. In such circumstances, he declared, "Pakistan would have no choice but to rely on its nuclear weapons."

This pattern of continued nuclear blackmail has consistently been at the heart of Pakistan's case for concessions, aid and a heightened threshold of international tolerance for its sponsorship and support to Islamist terrorism. To understand how this works, it is useful to conceive of Pakistan as a state acting as a suicide bomber, arguing that, if it does not receive the extraordinary dispensations and indulgences that it seeks, it will, in effect 'implode', and in the process do extraordinary harm to others. Part of the threat of this 'implosion' is also the specter of the transfer of its nuclear arsenal and capabilities to more intransigent and irrational elements of the Islamist far right in Pakistan, who would not be amenable to the logic that its present rulers - whose interests in terrorism are strategic, and consequently, subject to considerations of strategic advantage - are willing to heed.

This is the bluff that the Musharraf dictatorship has confronted the Western world with, at least for the past twenty months, and it is a bluff that the world has failed to call. It has allowed the General to dismiss an elected government; to rig elections; to continue supporting the operation of terrorist groups from, and the existence of their infrastructure on, Pakistani soil; and despite all this, to secure massive financial and political rewards, instead of the natural penalties that should have attached to such criminality of conduct.

It is improbable that this bluff will finally be called at Camp David, but it would be worse than myopic if President Bush fails to heed the warning that came from Mike Evanoff, the chief of diplomatic security at the US Embassy in Islamabad: "This is the epicenter for terrorism. It really is. This is the only country I know in the world that has so many groups that are against the US or Western ideals."

ASSESSMENT

INDIA

ULFA: Decapitation Failure
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati

On May 27, 2003, the heavily guarded Purbanchal complex at the Uttara locality in Dhaka, provided by the Bangladesh Government as a safe-house and coordination centre to the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) 'Commander-in-Chief', Paresh Baruah, came under massive attack in what is now seen as a decapitation strike engineered by a faction within his own organization. There is also some speculation that Indian intelligence agencies had penetrated the ULFA inner circle, and that the attack may have been executed by disgruntled ULFA cadres at their behest.

Baruah has been running ULFA's terrorist campaign in the Indian State of Assam from his 'headquarters' at Dhaka for well over 12 years, though the Bangladesh Government denies the presence of any Indian terrorist leaders or cadres on its soil. India has repeatedly given Bangladesh authorities lists of Indian terrorists and terrorist camps present on Bangladeshi soil, only to be repeatedly stonewalled with blank denials.

The May 27 attack has seriously embarrassed the Bangladesh Government, particularly because some operatives of its Directorate General of Field Intelligence (DGFI), including at least one Captain, as well as an operative of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) were among the eight persons believed to have been killed, though there is no official confirmation of casualties. The attack also assumed exaggerated significance in the succeeding weeks because it was widely rumored that Baruah may, in fact, have been killed. Adding to the speculation was the fact that Baruah made no response to reports of the attack on him, as was his practice when reports of such attacks had surfaced in the past, and was completely out of contact with his associates and links in Assam [there have been at least three reported attempts on Paresh Baruah's life during his sojourn at Dhaka].

Any doubts on his survival have, however, now been dispelled, and he has revived telephonic contacts with several associates and links in Assam and outside, including some prominent journalists. Baruah has also claimed responsibility for a series of recent attacks, including an attack in Tinsukia district in which two Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) personnel were killed on June 20, a series of rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attacks in the Bijni police station area of Bongaigaon district on June 21, and the killing of an Army officer in the Darrang district on June 17. Speaking from Dhaka, Baruah asserted that his operations in Assam would continue. In fact, it is becoming increasingly clear, from the handouts released simultaneously in Manipur, Assam and Tripura, and also from a series of attacks on security forces' installations, that a region-wide 'Operation Freedom' - the 'first ever coordinated military offensive', has been launched since June 17 by the ULFA, the Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF) and the Tripura People's Democratic Front (TPDF) in these three States.

It was, nevertheless, the possibility of Baruah's willingness to enter into negotiations with the Indian Government that may have triggered the abortive attack on him. Baruah had, for some time now, been speaking to various associates about a 'confederal' arrangement with the Union Government as the basis of a possible resolution of the conflict in Assam. Trouble has been brewing on this count for some time now, though it is not entirely clear where each of the individual ULFA leaders - particularly 'Chairman' Arabinda Rajakhowa; Deputy Commander-in-Chief, chief of military operations and the head of the near-autonomous 'Enigma Force', Raju Baruah; and 'Foreign Secretary' Sashadhar Choudhary - stand on the issue. Nevertheless, trouble has been reportedly been brewing for some time between Paresh and Raju Baruah, and sources indicate that decision-making power had been taken away from Raju Baruah over more than the past month and a half. Raju Baruah is currently said to be 'under treatment' - but in fact in quasi-detention - at the Mirpur Military Hospital. Paresh Baruah is known to have consented to the possibility of talks if the 'General Body' of the ULFA approved, though he said he would not participate in such negotiations. Raju Baruah is known to have strongly opposed talks, and is believed to have been publicly chastised by Paresh Baruah.

There is also a sharp divide within ULFA cadres on the question of the organisation's subordination to the ISI and DGFI's agenda, with Paresh Baruah inclining to a relatively independent line - though, given his operational dependence on these agencies, this does not go far - and Raju Baruah and Sashadhar Choudhary greater acceptance of a subsidiary role. Finally, an extended conflict over a division of the spoils - estimated in the billions of rupees - that have accumulated with the organisation as a result of extortion and a wide range of illegal and quasi-legal operations, and over which Paresh Baruah exercises absolute control, is known to have vitiated relations at the leadership level.

Each of these conflicts will be aggravated by the abortive May 27 decapitation attempt, and factionalism within the ULFA can be expected to grow significantly as a result. It is a measure of the rising suspicion within the insurgent leadership that, for almost three weeks after the attack, Paresh Baruah's location - or even the fact of his survival - was entirely unknown to his closest associates.

Other indications of mounting pressure on ULFA have emerged from reports regarding the launching of a major military operation against the insurgents' camps in Bhutan. While both Bhutanese and Indian authorities have refused to confirm such operations for obvious reasons, the Indian Army reportedly launched a major campaign against ULFA camps across the Bhutan border on June 20, ten days before Bhutan's King Jigme Singye Wangchuk's deadline for the ULFA to vacate Bhutanese soil. Paresh Baruah's continuance at the helm of the ULFA is considered by most observers to be essential to the insurgent group's survival. No other leader commands the loyalty of cadres, or the limited popular following that still adheres to the group, and Baruah's removal from the scene would signify the beginning of the end for this rudderless movement that has afflicted the people of Assam for over two decades now.