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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 52, July 14, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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J&K: Is the 'Healing Touch' Headed
for Hard Times?
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Special Correspondent, Frontline
Good news
seems to be showering down on Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) in
great big drops.
Srinagar is full of tourists. There are no houseboat rooms
to be had for love or money. The pilgrimage to the Amarnath
shrine near Pahalgam has registered record numbers. Corrupt
officials are being prosecuted, and Chief Minister Mufti
Mohammad Sayeed has been liberal in his use of the lash
against Jammu and Kashmir's notoriously recalcitrant bureaucrats.
Businesses are again investing money, and there are signs
that the administration is starting to slow down on its
favourite support-purchasing act: handing out new Government
jobs. Local schoolchildren even gathered in droves to cheer
an Indian Air Force display over the Dal Lake, an advertisement
if there was ever one for Sayeed's 'Healing Touch' programme,
which seeks to rebuild bridges between the alienated people
of Kashmir and the Indian state.
Sounds too good to be true? The sad news is that it probably
is.
'Healing Touch' optimists have a script that runs thus:
Sayeed's People's Democratic Party (PDP) succeeds in building
a mass consensus against violence, and in ending the Indian
security establishment's alleged atrocities against innocents.
He is helped in this task by the India-Pakistan dialogue,
which, aided by a little international arm-twisting, marginalizes
Pakistan-based jehadi terrorists. And this, in turn,
opens space for centrists among Kashmiri secessionist groups
to begin negotiations with India, leading to a final resolution
of the dispute.
At first glance, the Kul Jamaat Hurriyat Conference [All
Parties Freedom Conference, APHC]
decision to elect Abbas Ansari as its new head seems to
show that events are moving smoothly along at least this
part of the 'roadmap' to peace. Although the 62-year old
cleric is a pro-forma Pakistan supporter, he is also Shia
- the first person from his denomination to head the Hurriyat
Conference. Acutely aware of the violently Sunni-chauvinist
leanings of the jihadi groups operating in J&K, Ansari
has reason to adopt a centrist line. Shia leaders were also
prominent in a breakaway Hurriyat faction set up just after
the 2002 elections, which called for a dialogue with India.
Ansari's elevation came after weeks of bitter feuding among
the Hurriyat's constituents. The Jamaat-e-Islami's political
head, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, had called for the expulsion
of the People's Conference, led by Sajjad Lone, the son
of assassinated centrist leader Abdul Gani Lone. Geelani
claimed that the People's Conference had tacitly endorsed
the participation of some of its senior leaders in the 2002
State elections, although they were formally expelled from
the party. People's Conference luminaries who participated
in the 2002 elections include current J&K Minister for Forests,
Ghulam Mohiuddin Sofi.
In the fortnight before Ansari's appointment as Hurriyat
chief, the war between the centrists and the Islamist right
reached new heights. "Those who did not launch a campaign
against the polls," Geelani asserted, were "the biggest
traitors." People's Conference leader Sajjad Lone hit back,
charging Geelani with having created the conditions for
his father's murder, and claiming the Jamaat-e-Islami leader
was "a nightmare for the Kashmiri people and a dream gift
for India." And, as Geelani threatened to launch a new,
authentic secessionist platform, Ansari's predecessor G.M.
Bhat insisted that, "anyone leaving the Hurriyat will be
a traitor to the freedom struggle."
Geelani was not present at the meeting during which Ansari
was elected. He was, earlier this year, removed from his
post as the Jamaat-e-Islami's representative in the Hurriyat
for his refusal to attend meetings until the People's Conference
was expelled. Howls of outraged protest from jihadi
groups, notably the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HM),
led the Jamaat-e-Islami to reverse the decision. Now, Ansari
seems to be heading where the Jamaat-e-Islami had left off.
He condemned all talk of a break in the Hurriyat's ranks,
rejected calls to expel the People's Conference, and said
Geelani's position was the consequence of his wrong appreciation
of the situation, since he was in jail during the elections.
Recent events can be traced back at least to 1997, when
the supreme head of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Ghulam Mohammad
Bhat (not connected to former Hurriyat chairman G.M. Bhat),
gave an interview that distanced the Jamaat-e-Islami from
the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin and called for an end to the "gun
culture." Then, in the spring of 1999, APHC chairman Bhat
called for a dialogue between mainstream political parties
and secessionists. Finally, in mid-April 2002, and in the
face of loud protests by the Islamists, the elder Lone and
Mirwaiz Farooq were granted permission by the Indian Government
to travel to Sharjah for a closed-door meeting with Sardar
Abdul Qayoom Khan, the head of the Kashmir Committee set
up by Pakistan's military ruler, President Pervez Musharraf.
Pakistan's intelligence chief, Ehtaz-ul-Haq, is also believed
to have been present at the sidelines of that meeting.
What really transpired in the closed-door meeting is not
known, but Lone emerged demanding that jihadi groups
"leave us alone." Meanwhile, Geelani again came under fire
from within his own party, which passed a resolution supporting
the "conciliatory stance adopted by Umar Farooq and Abdul
Gani Lone." In the months before Lone's assassination, which
came just months after the 2002 Sharjah meeting, Lone and
Geelani were engaged in a furious debate on the character
of the secessionist movement in Jammu and Kashmir. Geelani
insisted that its Islamist character be acknowledged, and
the presence of foreign jihadis thus legitimised;
Lone, who had not too many years earlier himself described
the foreign jihadis as "mehmaan Mujahideen"
(guest holy warriors), claimed it was nationalist.
Significantly, however, the centrist influence in the Hurriyat
led to no real political breakthrough. Bhat, for example,
rapidly backed down on his call for dialogue, and abandoned
it altogether after an abortive assassination attempt. Put
simply, the Hurriyat centrists were in no position to defy
the real ground-level power of the jihadi groups.
While Geelani clearly understands that dialogue is necessary,
he also believes armed struggle is necessary, until that
dialogue begins, to give the Islamist Right a favourable
bargaining position. Unless the centrists can find some
means to contain the influence of the jihadi terrorist
groups, no real forward progress is possible. Democracy
and dialogue, quite simply, cannot function with a gun held
to their head.
What, then, of the gun?
Recent Union Ministry of Home Affairs data
provides empirical tools with which the course of the 'Healing
Touch' may be plotted. It is clear that there has indeed
been some decline in violence. The data compares terrorism
during eight months of PDP rule, from November 2002 to June
2003, with terrorism during National Conference rule from
November 2001 to June 2002. It suggests that any major indicator
of terrorism levels, be it the total numbers of acts of
violence, the killings of civilians, or the deaths of security
force personnel, has shown a decline. Yet, a closer look
at the data shows this aggregate impression of improvement
is, quite simply, a myth.
First up, the decline in the numbers of violent incidents
relates only to the first four months of this year. In May
and June, terrorist attacks showed a sharp upsurge, and
registered numbers very similar to those seen in 2002. Killings
of Indian security force personnel and terrorists followed
a very similar pattern. The much commented-on lull of these
months, it is important to remember, may have been as much
the consequence of an unusually bitter winter, which made
movement difficult for terrorists and security forces alike,
as political developments. June, in a sign of what might
be yet to come, saw more civilians, terrorists and security
force personnel killings than were witnessed in the same
month last year. Reports from much of southern Kashmir,
as well as Kupwara and other mountain regions, suggest there
is a massing of terrorist groups, larger in scale than anything
seen in recent years.
More important, though, one key figure has shown no
meaningful decline at all - the killing of Muslim civilians.
Even during the winter lull, killings of Muslim civilians
remained at levels similar to those seen in 2001-2002, a
sign that terrorist groups retained their ability to strike
at those perceived to be security force informers, political
activists, or simply soft targets and those considered hostile
to jihadi control of civil society. It doesn't take
much to see why terrorist groups must sustain civilian
killings, whatever the contours of the macro-level India-Pakistan
détente within and outside J&K. "Democratic politics is
encroaching on the control the jihadis have over
their constituency," legislator Mohammad Yusuf Tarigami
recently told The Hindu, "so they use guns to keep
their flock together."
'Healing Touch' optimists refuse to concede that strong
counter-terrorist action is a necessary precondition for
meaningful democratic dialogue to begin; people's pressure
will bring about that end, they claim. If they're wrong,
the 'Healing Touch' could soon find itself trapped between
a rock and hard place.
Tackling Insurgency in the Northeast:
Fickle-minded in Delhi
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute
for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The
Sentinel, Guwahati
India has
long been one of the most vocal advocates of the position
that terrorism, as a global threat, must be confronted with
coherent and cooperative responses across the world, and
has long faulted the US-led 'global war on terror' for its
selectivity and internal inconsistencies. Regrettably, the
Indian Government's own actions and positions on matters
relating to terrorism and armed separatist insurrections
within the country have remained highly ambivalent, even
contradictory. New Delhi's ambivalence on the issue of tackling
insurgencies in the country's Northeast have now been brought
into sharp focus by Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Mukut
Mithi, who contends that the Vajpayee Government has "ignored
and rejected" his persistent pleas for central paramilitary
forces to launch a special counter-insurgency operation
to flush out and neutralize heavily-armed Naga militants
wreaking havoc in his State.
In a lengthy telephone conversation from Itanagar, the capital
of the hill state of Arunachal Pradesh that borders Myanmar
and China's Tibet region, with this writer, Mithi disclosed
that Naga rebels, particularly the Isak-Muivah faction of
the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-IM),
have been indulging in rampant extortion, kidnappings and
killings in the districts of Tirap and Changlang, and have
generally created a reign of terror. He put the number of
NSCN-IM cadres operating in the two districts - strategically
located at the tri-junction of the States of Arunachal Pradesh,
Assam and Nagaland, and, of course, Myanmar - at about 500.
Rebels owing allegiance to the rival NSCN faction headed
by S.S. Khaplang are also present in the area. The Chief
Minister said it was because of the prevailing security
situation in Tirap and Changlang districts, that his Government
had to put off the panchayat (local body) elections in the
area, which were to have been held in April. An idea of
how the rebels are terrorizing the people, including political
leaders, Mithi observed, can be had from the fact that the
NSCN-IM cadres had even kidnapped his (Congress) party's
Tirap district vice-president.
It was under these circumstances that Mithi's Congress Government
convened a meeting of the State Security Coordination Committee
(SCC) at Itanagar in May and decided to launch 'Operation
Hurricane', a special offensive by the security forces to
combat the Naga rebels in Tirap and Changlang. Since the
SCC is a Committee notified by the Government of India two
years ago, it is apparent that New Delhi was, and still
is, aware of the fact that a serious insurgency situation
was developing in otherwise peaceful Arunachal Pradesh,
a State that has not been witness to a local militant movement
so far. Mithi disclosed that, at that meeting in May, apart
from the State Chief Secretary, who is the chairman of the
Committee, and representatives of federal intelligence agencies,
the Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs (Northeast),
was also present. "Although the MHA official was himself
present at that meeting, we intimated the Home Ministry
of the decision to launch Operation Hurricane and sought
three paramilitary battalions for the purpose," the Chief
Minister said. The Ministry of Home Affairs, Mithi added,
initially agreed in writing to send one battalion of the
Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) for a period of 45 days
to carry out the operation, but later went back on its promise.
Speaking to this writer for the second time in a week on
Saturday, Mithi said Operation Hurricane eventually could
not be launched "due to New Delhi's non-cooperation."
It is clear that the Union Government is not in favor of
any military offensive against the Naga rebels at the present
juncture, since there is a ceasefire agreement in place
and the Government of India is engaged in 'peace negotiations'
with the NSCN-IM, and to an extent with the rival NSCN-K.
New Delhi's reasons for not coming to Mithi's aid were let
out by the visiting Minister of State for Home, Swami Chinmayananda,
when he questioned the Arunachal Pradesh Government's urgency
in pushing for Operation Hurricane at a time when the Center
was engaged in a dialogue with 'both factions of the NSCN.'
The Minister made these remarks on Friday at a Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP)-sponsored public rally at Khonsa, in
the militant-infested Tirap district.
But a peace process can hardly be legitimate grounds to
obstruct action to expel or contain the criminal activities
of the NSCN in Arunachal Pradesh, and the Center's attitude
raises several serious questions. With a ceasefire deal
in place with the NSCN-IM, the Vajpayee Government should
have been able to prevail upon the Naga rebel group to stop
its cadres from operating in Arunachal Pradesh, and to prevent
them from indulging in violent activities there. Apart from
clearly exposing the fact that New Delhi does not, in fact,
have much of an influence over the rebels, it brings to
the fore the ticklish issue of the ceasefire jurisdiction.
Are the NSCN-IM cadres supposed to adhere to the ceasefire
ground rules only in the state of Nagaland where the truce
is actually in force? But, again, if the ceasefire is not
applicable anywhere else in the Northeast, outside Nagaland,
then how can New Delhi ignore pleas or attempts by another
State to launch counter-insurgency operations against members
of this rebel group who are engaged in a range of violent
and criminal activities in that State? Answers may not be
forthcoming from the Government, but by giving the Naga
rebels a broader playing field, New Delhi could be indirectly
conceding a measure of legitimacy to the NSCN-IM's dream
of a 'Greater Nagaland' which would bring the Nagas populated
areas in the entire region under a single political and
administrative umbrella.
The lack of a transparent policy on insurgency has created
enormous scope for confusion over the issue of how security
forces, State Governments, political leaders, the media
or even the common people are expected to conduct themselves
in an insurgency situation. In Arunachal Pradesh, Chief
Minister Mithi surprised everyone in April when he okayed
the arrest of two of his ruling Congress legislators - Tongpong
Wangham, a cabinet minister, and another legislator, T.L.Rajkumar
- on charges that they had links with the NSCN-IM. They
were booked under the State's new anti-crime legislation,
the Arunachal Pradesh Control of Organised Crime Act, 2002
(APCOCA),
but were freed on bail. Mithi indicated that the duo had
since been 'pardoned' by the Court, after they turned approvers
in the case. The Chief Minister insists that such problems
or charges of a politician-insurgent nexus have come up
in Arunachal Pradesh only because New Delhi has 'permitted'
the Naga rebels to operate freely in his State, and to threaten
and intimidate one and all. Mithi takes this position to
reject any need for a federal investigation into allegations
regarding the militant-politician links in his State, declaring,
"We are acting on this on our own under the provisions of
APCOCA." With neither the Center nor the State bound by
a clear counter-insurgency posture and policy, the shadowy
world of insurgent politics in India's Northeast can only
be expected to get murkier.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts
in South Asia
July 7-13, 2003
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
13
|
6
|
30
|
49
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
7
|
0
|
5
|
12
|
Manipur
|
1
|
1
|
8
|
10
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
21
|
7
|
48
|
76
|
PAKISTAN
|
2
|
2
|
0
|
4
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
Maulvi
Abbas Ansari elected as new chief of All
Parties Hurriyat Conference: Shia leader
Maulvi Abbas Ansari was elected unopposed
as the new chief of the secessionist All
Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
on July 12. The election took place during
an emergency meeting of the APHC at its
Rajbagh headquarters in Srinagar. Ansari
replaces Abdul Gani Bhat of the Muslim Conference
as the chairman. The Jamaat-e-Islami, a
Hurriyat constituent, reportedly boycotted
the meeting. Daily
Excelsior, July 13, 2003.
Naga insurgents active in Tirap and Changlang
districts, says Arunachal Pradesh Chief
Minister: Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister
Mukut Mithi has alleged that the Union Government
has not taken adequate steps to tackle terrorism
in the State. During a conversation from
Itanagar over telephone on July 8, 2003,
to a journalist in Guwahati, Assam, he said,
"The Centre (Union Government) is simply
letting the Naga rebels roam about freely
in Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal
Pradesh although after the ceasefire, cadres
of the NSCN-IM
(National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak
Muivah) and others are supposed to be confined
to their designated camps in Nagaland."
He further said that an estimated 400 to
500 Naga insurgents, primarily of NSCN-IM,
and armed with sophisticated weapons are
present in these two districts. He also
said, "Tirap and Changlang districts have
been in the grip of rampant extortion, killings
and kidnappings. My party's (Congress) Tirap
district vice-president too had been kidnapped."
Sentinel
Assam, July 9, 2003.
Central Reserve Police Force to raise
64 battalions by 2005 to counter terrorism
in J&K: The para-military Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF) is reportedly planning
to raise 64 battalions equipped with high-technology
arms and ammunition by year 2005 to counter
terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). A
CRPF spokesperson said that 276 companies
had currently been deployed in the State
(Kashmir Valley-199 and Jammu region-77),
performing various types of duties such
as counter-insurgency operations, maintaining
law and order and guarding vital installations.
Daily
Excelsior, July 8, 2003.
Myanmar Army destroyed NSCN-K headquarters
at Sagaing: The Hindustan Times has
reported that the Myanmar Army in an operation
against the National Socialist Council of
Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K),
a Naga terrorist outfit active in the Indian
State of Nagaland, destroyed its headquarters
located near the Chuiyang Noknu village
in the Sagaing division of that country.
The place is located near India's International
Border with Myanmar. The report further
said that NSCN-K chief S.S. Khaplang had
escaped from the area. Hindustan
Times, July 8, 2003.
PAKISTAN
Germany suspends
financial aid to NWFP after adoption of Sharia Bill: The
Daily Times has reported that the German Government has decided
to suspend all financial assistance to the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) due to changes in the province after the adoption
of the Sharia Bill by the NWFP Assembly. The North West Frontier
Province (NWFP) Provincial Assembly (PA) on June 2, 2003, had
passed the Sharia Bill that would make the province the first
in Pakistan to be run according to the teachings of the Holy
Quraan. The report said that a decision to suspend aid was taken
after the NWFP Government imposed restrictions on a shelter
home being constructed by the German Government for homeless
women in the province. German Non-Governmental Organisation
(NGO) GTZ and Pakistan-based Aurat Foundation had launched a
Rupees 10 million 'Mera Ghar' project for destitute women in
Peshawar. However, the NGO reportedly developed differences
with the MMA Government and suspended all contact with the provincial
government in June 2003. Daily
Times, July 14, 2003.
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen splits with splinter group joining Hizb-e-Islami:
The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
has reportedly spilt with the faction owing allegiance to slain
leader Abdul Majid Dar (who was killed on March 23, 2003, at
the Sopore town in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir) joining
the Hizb-e-Islami. "After the meetings during the last one month
failed to reunite the Hizb, the splinter group decided to join
the Hizb-e-Islami led by Masood Sarfraz," Hizb sources told
Daily Times. They said efforts for reunification by the two
factions, front ranking Kashmiri leadership and the Jamaat-e-Islami
had reportedly failed to unite the group. "All top commanders
of the Dar group and majority of its mujahideen joined the Hizb-e-Islami
but some mujahideen refused to work under the new flag and leadership
and they returned to their parent organisation," sources said.
"Hizb Supreme Commander Syed Salahuddin made it clear that the
organisation would not welcome back in its folds the commanders
from the Dar group but the mujahideen wanting to rejoin the
Hizb were welcome to do so," sources added. Meanwhile, HM spokesperson
Salim Hashmi refused to comment on the issue. Daily
Times, July 10, 2003.
SRI LANKA
LTTE has killed
112 persons since signing of Memorandum of Understanding: The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
has reportedly killed 112 persons, including intelligence operatives
attached to the security forces, police personnel and also members
of Tamil parties opposed to it, since the signing of the Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) with the Sri Lankan Government on February
22, 2002. Island.lk,
July 10, 2003.
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Comparison of Terrorist Violence
in Jammu and Kashmir
November to June
2001-2003
Month |
Year |
Incidents
of Violence
|
Security
Force Personnel Killed
|
Muslim
Civilians Killed
|
Hindu
or Sikh Civilians Killed
|
Terrorists
Killed
|
Others
Killed
|
November |
2001 |
258
|
60
|
58
|
8
|
259
|
7
|
2002 |
220
|
50
|
76
|
6
|
124
|
6
|
December |
2001 |
240
|
31
|
62
|
18
|
165
|
12
|
2002 |
216
|
31
|
50
|
3
|
121
|
0
|
January |
2002 |
236
|
27
|
55
|
11
|
166
|
5
|
2003 |
199
|
20
|
53
|
4
|
103
|
0
|
February |
2002 |
169
|
9
|
38
|
8
|
115
|
5
|
2003 |
119
|
8
|
39
|
5
|
71
|
3
|
March |
2002 |
262
|
33
|
76
|
5
|
161
|
8
|
2003 |
168
|
16
|
61
|
29
|
108
|
17
|
April |
2002 |
260
|
32
|
71
|
15
|
159
|
10
|
2003 |
222
|
24
|
52
|
4
|
148
|
5
|
May |
2002 |
233
|
35
|
75
|
31
|
165
|
4
|
2003 |
237
|
25
|
92
|
6
|
138
|
5
|
June |
2002 |
234
|
24
|
66
|
9
|
119
|
7
|
2003 |
215
|
32
|
67
|
6
|
125
|
7
|
Total |
|
1892
|
251
|
501
|
105
|
1309
|
58
|
|
1596
|
206
|
490
|
63
|
938
|
43
|
Source: Union
Ministry of Home Affairs. |
|
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare,
on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as
on related economic, political, and social issues, in
the South Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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