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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 7, September 2, 2002

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal




STATISTICAL REVIEW

Foreign Mercenaries killed in J&K from 1990 to July 31, 2002

Country
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
Total
Pak/Pok
10
9
10
38
34
31
15
29
79
125
271
425
256
1332
Afghan
4
2
4
50
49
14
13
12
7
10
13
9
5
192
Egypt
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Sudan
0
0
0
0
2
0
2
0
3
0
0
0
0
7
Yeman
0
0
0
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
4
Lebnan
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Behrain
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
Chechinia
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Bosnia
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
Tajkistan
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Albanian
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
2
Others
0
1
0
0
35
40
105
156
229
168
152
191
42
1119
Total
14
12
14
90
122
85
139
197
319
305
436
625
303
2661
Computed from official sources and English language media.

Casualties of Terrorist Violence in J&K - 2002

 
Civilians
Security Force
Personnel
Terrorist
Total
January
70
35
173
278
February
50
16
130
196
March
63
38
144
245
April
81
33
175
289
May
84
34
163
281
June
54
20
96
170
July
91
34
110
235
August
76
38
155
269
Total
569
248
1146
1963
Computed from official sources and English language media.

 

ASSESSMENT

INDIA

Bihar: The Privatisation of Terror
Sanjay K. Jha
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

For over two decades now, the State of Bihar has been home to one of the most extraordinary social aberrations in the history of Independent India: the 'private armies' raised by upper caste landowners to protect their feudal privileges. Among the most powerful of a succession of these private armies is the Ranvir Sena, which has terrorized large areas of the State since its formation in September 1994 at the Belaur village of Bhojpur district.

On August 29, 2002, however, the Ranvir Sena was effectively 'decapitated' with the arrest of its chief, Brahmeshwar Singh, at Patna. Singh carried a reward of half a million Indian rupees on his head, and is an accused in numerous criminal cases, including those concerned with the killing of some 200 persons. A founding member of the Sena, he took over the leadership of the Ranvir Kisan Sangharsh Samiti, an organisation created to protect landowner interests in Central Bihar in 1994, and turned it into the one of the most lethal private armies in the State. He first came into the limelight after the massacre of 22 persons in Bathani Tola village of Bhojpur district on July 11, 1996.

Singh's arrest is not the first setback for the Sena in recent times. On August 24, 2002, three of its front-ranking leaders were killed by left-wing extremists - Naxalites - of the People's War Group (PWG) in Pariyari village in Arwal district, once considered to be a bastion of the Ranvir Sena.

Reports indicate that the Ranvir Sena has been at the receiving end for some time now, and has lost much of its earlier influence among upper caste landowners. One of the reasons is the increasing criminalisation of the outfit. A large number of unemployed lumpen youth and criminals joined the Sena after the Miyapur massacre of 34 persons on June 16, 2000, the last major massacre executed by the Ranvir Sena. Extortion from their own caste men, initially for the purchase of arms and ammunition, became rampant after this point, and those who refused to pay were subjected to reprisals. Factional rivalry also increased within an increasingly undisciplined and criminalised cadre, as Brahmeshwar Singh began to lose control. Violence committed by the Ranvir Sena against its supporting caste men alienated a large number of upper caste landlords, and, over time, intra-caste rivalry and warring area chiefs began to dominate the Ranvir Sena's trajectory.

Though armed gangs have been part of feudal history of rural India, Bihar is the only State in post-independence India where private armies of landowners exist. Most of these private armies emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s as a feudal response to the growth of various left-wing extremist - Naxalite - movements in the Central and the Southern (now known as the State of Jharkhand) parts of Bihar. Over the past two decades, an estimated 15 private armies have existed at various points of time in the State, including prominently: the Kuer Sena, the Bhumi Sena, Lorik Sena, Sunlight Sena, Bramharshi Sena, Kisan Sangh, Gram Suraksha Parishad and the Ranvir Sena. Clashes between these outfits and various left-wing extremist groups have left hundreds dead and many more maimed over the past two decades.

Among all these, the Ranvir Sena emerged as the most dreaded and ruthless group as it battled the rising strength of left-wing extremist groups, especially the Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) (Liberation). The forerunners of the Ranvir Sena in Bhojpur were the Bramharshi Sena, Kuer Sena, Kisan Morcha and Ganga Sena. These groups, however, with a limited cadre strength and area of operation, could not sustain their existence for long and eventually withered away. Over the years, the Ranvir Sena extended its influence to the Jehanabad, Patna, Rohtas, Aurangabad, Gaya, Bhabhua and Buxur districts, mobilizing the landed caste groups in these districts against the various left-wing extremist organisations.

Proscribed by the State government since August 1995, the Ranvir Sena is highly organised and its cadres are reportedly better paid than any of the private armies in the past. Landowners in Central Bihar finance the Ranvir Sena through generous subscriptions. The Sena also runs a front organization, the Ranvir Kisan Maha Sangh and a women's wing, whose members are trained in the use of arms.

Over the years, the Ranvir Sena carried out a number of massacres in central Bihar. On June 16, 2000, its cadres killed 34 persons at Miapur village, Aurangabad district. On April 21, 1999, 12 persons were killed at Sendani village, Gaya district. On February 20, 1999, 11 persons were killed at Narayanpur village, Jehanabad district. On January 25, 1999, 23 persons were massacred in Sankarbigha village, Jehanabad district. On December 1, 1997, 58 persons were massacred at Lakshmanpur-Bathe village, Jehanabad district. On April 10, 1997, 10 persons were killed at Ekbari village, Jehanabad. And on March 23, 1997, Ranvir Sena cadres killed 10 persons at Habispur village, Patna district. The Sena's victims, by and large, have been landless and poor peasants of the most backward castes.

The State government, on its part, failed to contain the activities of the Ranvir Sena, at least in some measure, because of the Sena's strong links with the political structure and administration. The context of the Sena's activities has been conditioned by an extreme polarisation of State politics and the bureaucracy on the basis of caste. This polarisation deepened in the 1980s, when the dalits were mobilized by the Left Wing extremists and increasingly stereotyped as Naxalites by the upper castes who banded together. The result was a closing of ranks, not only among the richer and landowners, but also along caste lines that embraced every rung of the social ladder, down to the poorest of the castemen. It was through these alliances that the Ranvir Sena emerged, representing the same forces that dominate State's structures of power.

The Ranvir Sena's success was also owed in part to the degeneration that had crept into the left-wing extremism. The 'Naxalite' movement, which once challenged the authority of historically entrenched classes, had also gradually become caught up in the same vortex of caste politics, and the confrontation at the grassroots level is now moulded by caste factors and not by class ideology.

This pattern of politics remains intact in Bihar, and the succession of recent shocks to the Ranvir Sena are not symptomatic of any fundamental transformations. The forces that gave rise to the Ranvir Sena are still in control of the socio-political and administrative structures in Bihar, and these will reassert themselves, either through a resurgence of the Ranvir Sena, or the emergence and consolidation of another private army on the already violent canvas of State politics.

ASSESSMENT

BHUTAN

Nepalese Migrants: Gone but not forgotten
Guest Writer: Palden Tshering
Web Editor, KUENSEL online

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, illegal migrants of Nepalese origin committed a wide range of heinous crimes, from armed robbery and raids on Bhutanese villages to murder and rape. Thus, in September 1990, the Nichula Primary School in Kalikhola was completely burnt down, and the Powgang Primary School in Dagana blown up with explosives. A bomb explosion at the Bank of Bhutan, Phuentsholing, killed a policeman on December 17, 1990. Earlier, another policeman was abducted in Samste on September 22, 1990, tortured and killed. His dismembered body was found the next day. These incidents are only some examples of a long succession of such actions, and in 1991 alone, for instance, there were 174 cases of kidnapping by these groups reported to the Royal Bhutan Police. The Police were also able to confirm the murder of 33 Bhutanese nationals by anti-nationals executed in camps across the border that year.

The Nepali groups destroyed schools and health facilities and other public infrastructure. Despite personal appeals by His Majesty the King of Bhutan, they sold all their belongings and left the country, and also tried to ruin the country's image with false propaganda.

Members of the people's representatives in the kingdom's recent National Assembly on July 5, 2002, expressed their alarm at even the remote possibility that some illegal migrants might be allowed to return to Bhutan. "Are we going to allow these people to return so that they can sow discord within our peaceful society?" questioned one representative.

The memories of what the illegal migrants had done to their villages to the people before leaving Bhutan are not forgotten.

Maybe that's the problem.

"This is a painful memory for the people of Sombey Geog in Haa," said the representative of Sombey. "The illegal migrants inflicted indescribable humiliation and suffering on us. They looted our homes and raped our womenfolk. The idea of their return to our country has enraged the people."

The legacy they leave behind has been the violation of the faith and trust of His Majesty the King, the government, and their own friends and neighbors.

What does a country do when faced with a situation like this? Does it accept such people back and let bygones be bygones? Or leave them as they are and let them face the future shaped by the path they chose?

In January 1991, there were only 234 people who claimed to be Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. In August that year, the Nepal government formally invited the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide humanitarian assistance to these people.

When the UNHCR commenced giving food and shelter from September 1991 there were 304 people claiming to be Bhutanese. By the end of the year, the numbers had reached 6000. Today, the 'refugee population' stands at more than 100,000, around 10,700 of them born in the camps.

In the bilateral process that had been initiated to solve the problem, the first dialogue between the two countries, held in July 1993, agreed to:

  1. Categorize the people in the refugee camp
  2. Make known the positions of each country on each of the categories
  3. Harmonize the positions of the two countries on each of the categories.

By December 2000, Nepal and Bhutan agreed on the final verification procedures of the people in the camps and a joint verification process was initiated.

The verification process began on March 26, 2001. The Bhutanese team, led by Dasho Sonam Tenzin of the Home Ministry, comprised members who had in-depth knowledge of the Citizenship Act, those with technical and computer expertise, and those who were proficient in the Nepali language.

After the Nepalese government expressed their view that the process was too slow, the 11th Joint Ministerial Level Committee meeting discussed the possibility of accelerating the process of verification and decided to include one more expert from both sides into the verification team.

The two countries also decided that the verification team would be divided into two groups and carry out separate verification instead of doing it together.

But just before completion of the verification process, a problem arose.

The Nepalese team brought up the issue of identifying the next camp that should be taken up for verification.

The Foreign Minister, Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley, said, "It became evident that they were not keen on placing the people into the four categories. Contrary to what was already agreed and decided in the agreed minutes, the Nepalese side did not want to harmonize positions on the four categories to work towards a solution to the problem."

Meanwhile, on December 13, 2001, verification in the Khudanabari camp was completed. The two teams had worked for 151 days and, within this period, verified 12,804 people living in 2,082 huts.

To facilitate the process the royal government had directed its Ambassador to India and Nepal, Lyonpo Dago Tshering, to discuss the issue with his Nepalese counterpart in New Delhi.

Discussions with Nepalese leaders had also been conducted during the 11th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit at Kathmandu in January 2002. Meanwhile, on the directives of the council of ministers, the Foreign Minister had met the Nepalese Prime Minister during his recent trip to New York.

"In our efforts to find a solution to the problem we invited the former Nepalese foreign minister, Mr. Bastola, to Bhutan for unofficial consultations," Lyonpo Jigmi Thinley said. "We asked him to brief us on the expectations of the Nepalese people."

A similar invitation was extended to Madhav Kumar Nepal, the leader of the opposition party, and some members of the Nepalese Parliament.

Today, the large proportions of the 100,000 or so people in the seven camps in Nepal are not all genuine Bhutanese citizens. And there are even people who, after working in Bhutan, had gone to the camps claiming to be refugees.

The Home Minister, Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho, explained that the refugee numbers had increased because of the easy life in the camps.

With aid coming from international agencies, even local Nepalese had registered themselves as refugees. It had been reported that the World Food Programme (WFP) alone had given assistance worth about US$ 8.50 million, or Nu 425 million, to the refugees in one year.

Why was the Bhutanese government even taking part in the verification process?

The illegal migrants have made it clear enough what they want:

  1. A multi party system in Bhutan.
  2. Grant of amnesty to all those who have criminal charges against them.
  3. Change in citizenship laws to enable people of Nepali origin to obtain Bhutanese citizenship.
These are high demands for a people who illegally migrated from their own country to another that were more beneficial to them. Why leave Nepal in the first place?

Now they sit at camps in their own country claiming to be refugees, spread false propaganda and accept the handouts made available from international agencies.

What do you do? What can anyone do?

Strong feelings exist on both sides of the coin but where can the line be drawn?

The collective effort of both governments needs to continue this ongoing process until that line can be agreed on.

In the end, we will have to live with the decisions taken in the interest of both countries by our policy makers. And that will take time.

 

ASSESSMENT

INDIA
PAKISTAN

Cul de Sac in the War Against Terror?
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

After months of rationalization, America has now been forced to a reluctant admission that, as Richard Armitage put it, "incidents of violence are on the upswing" in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), and that "cross border incursions are up from the end of June."

The statement is accurate - but only in the most quibbling sense. The month of June had seen a dip in killings in the State, and July re-established the preceding trend, which has been at a fairly consistent high since the beginning of the current year [Table]. Infiltration has also been high since March this year (SAIR 1.1). Clearly, US perceptions are related, not to facts, but to the convenience or otherwise of recognizing these, or to transient policy positions adopted by the US administration. This, unfortunately, has been the pattern of discourse since 9/11. By and large, the US has preferred to wink at, or underplay, Pakistan's role in the terrorist violence in J&K.

The truth, however, is that the leadership of the entire movement of Islamist terror that manifests itself in violence, not only in J&K, but also, from time to time, in other places right across India, is located firmly in Pakistan. This has been the case since 1994, when the dominant indigenous terrorist grouping - the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) - was progressively marginalized by Pakistan's proxies and chose to abandon violence and come overground. Its place was taken, first by the Pakistan backed Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, and later by a succession of groups, including the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, the Jaish-e-Mohammad, and the 15 member Muttahida (United) Jehad Council. With rare exception, this entire leadership comprises non-Kashmiri Pakistanis. The domination of foreigners - largely Islamist extremists and mercenaries drawn out of the Afghanistan campaigns - is reflected in their rising number among those killed in encounters with Security Forces in J&K [Table]. While such terrorists have been drawn from a wide range of nationalities, their overwhelming numbers have come from Pakistan, with Afghanistan also contributing a significant proportion.

Despite a handful of cosmetic measures, essentially formal bans on some of these organizations, the delayed 'freezing' of their bank accounts after most of their money had been withdrawn, and a relocation of some of their cadres and camps into Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), the Musharraf regime has done nothing to curb their activities. There is, moreover, little evidence that Musharraf has any intentions of permanently diluting the fundamentals that have dictated Pakistan's foreign policy for over the past two decades. During this period, Pakistan has been by far the most active and aggressive player in the South Asian region, defining for itself a role that has substantially shaped the foreign policy priorities and security concerns of all its neighbours to an extent immensely in excess of what could be thought of as 'natural' in terms of its size and strategic strengths. Islamist extremism and terror have been the primary instruments of motivation, mobilisation and execution of its policies in this context. Afghanistan and Kashmir were the cornerstones - though not the limits - of this politics of violent disruption. It is clear that, though the strategies of the past have been entirely discredited and reluctantly (though not necessarily permanently) relinquished in Afghanistan, the covert terrorist war in India remains central to the Pakistani vision.

It is Western, and primarily American, support to a deeply criminalized state structure in Pakistan that has allowed, indeed, encouraged, the persistence of terrorist violence in South Asia. Fitful policies forcing accommodation or negotiations with terrorists and with their front organizations in J&K, or turning a blind eye to terrorism in one part of the world while condemning it in another, have only helped entrench these groups, creating an alternative sphere of a violent, murderous politics that is fundamentally a negation of democracy. The war against terror cannot be won in the absence of an internal coherence of vision, objectives and action.

 

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts in South Asia
August 26-September 1, 2002

 
Security Force Personnel
Civilian
Terrorist
Total
INDIA
8
23
60
91
Assam
0
0
12
12
Jammu & Kashmir
6
18
46
70
Nagaland
0
0
2
2
Left-wing extremism
2
5
0
7
NEPAL
2
1
53
56
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.

 


BANGLADESH

Former Premier Sheikh Hasina escapes attack: The motorcade of Leader of the Opposition and former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina came under attack by armed cadres allegedly belonging to the ruling Bangladesh National Party (BNP), at Kolaroa, approximately 18 kilometers off Satkhira district headquarters on August 30, 2002. However, no loss of life or damage was reported. Her political secretary, Saber Hossain Chowdhury, later claimed that the attackers were cadres of BNP and the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami. Daily Star News, August 31, 2002.


INDIA

Shabir Shah rules out participation in J&K Assembly elections: Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party (JKDFP) chief Shabir Shah, on August 30, 2002, ruled out his party's participation in the forthcoming Legislative Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Reports indicated that, consequent to a meeting with Kashmir Committee headed by former Union Law Minister Ram Jethmalani, Shah had "in principle agreed to participate in the elections". He later made it clear that there was no question of JKDFP participating in the elections. The Hindu, August 31, 2002.

Ranvir Sena chief arrested in Bihar: The Special Task Force (STF) of Bihar police arrested Brahmeshwar Singh, head of the Ranvir Sena, a private army of landowners, from a hotel in Patna, on August 29, 2002. Four other persons accompanying Singh were also detained. Official sources said that Singh was the main accused in several criminal cases, including approximately 20 cases of massacres perpetrated by the Ranvir Sena in central Bihar. Times of India, August 30, 2002.

Top KLO terrorist killed in West Bengal: A front-ranking terrorist of the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), Rohini Adhikari, was killed in an encounter in Kamuktala, Jalpaiguri district in West Bengal on August 28, 2002. Police sources said the plans for the Dhuppuri massacre of August 17, 2002, in which five activists of the ruling Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) were killed, had been hatched at Rohini's residence and he was also present during the massacre. Times of India, August 29, 2002.

Five ULFA terrorists killed in Barpeta, Assam: Five United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) terrorists were killed during an encounter with security forces in Kachkuripathar, Barpeta district of Assam on August 28, 2002. Indiainfo.com, August 28, 2002.

Seven infiltrators killed near Line of Control (LoC): Security forces (SFs) on August 27, 2002, foiled two infiltration attempts in Mendhar and Keri sectors killing seven Pakistan-based terrorists after exchange of gunfire on the Line of Control (LoC). Infiltrators were reportedly being pushed into the twin border districts of Poonch and Rajouri by the Pakistan Army to intensify violence on the eve of Legislative Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir. Daily Excelsior, August 28, 2002.


PAKISTAN

Military hard-liners helping terrorist groups, says former Premier Benazir Bhutto: Former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said, on August 30, 2002, in London, that the Pakistani government has close links with terrorist groups such as the Al Qaeda. According to her, "I think General (Pervez) Musharraf's regime has strong links with terrorist groups like al-Qaeda… In one year al-Qaeda have regrouped in Pakistan with the backing of military hard-liners." Benazir added, "Musharraf has successfully convinced London and Washington that he is the best person to combat terrorism." Jang, August 31, 2002.

President Musharraf supports Hurriyat stand on J&K elections-boycott: President Pervez Musharraf, on August 30, 2002, is reported to have expressed Pakistan's solidarity with the separatist All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) in boycotting the forthcoming Legislative Assembly elections in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. He was talking to former Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) Premier and National Kashmir Committee chairman Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, who called on him at his office in Islamabad. Dawn, August 31, 2002.


SRI LANKA

LTTE announces four-member team for peace talks: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) announced on August 27, 2002, that ideologue Anton Balasingham would lead a four-member team at the peace talks with the Sri Lankan government, beginning September 16, 2002, at Sattahip in Thailand. The other members of the LTTE delegation are legal advisor V. Rudrakumar, development expert Jay Maheswaran and Adele Balasingham. Tamilnet, August 27, 2002, Daily News, August 29, 2002.

 

The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that will bring you regular data, assessments and news brief on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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