SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
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Foreign Mercenaries killed in
J&K from 1990 to July 31, 2002
|
Country
|
1990
|
1991
|
1992
|
1993
|
1994
|
1995
|
1996
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
2001
|
2002
|
Total
|
Pak/Pok
|
10
|
9
|
10
|
38
|
34
|
31
|
15
|
29
|
79
|
125
|
271
|
425
|
256
|
1332
|
Afghan
|
4
|
2
|
4
|
50
|
49
|
14
|
13
|
12
|
7
|
10
|
13
|
9
|
5
|
192
|
Egypt
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Sudan
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
0
|
2
|
0
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
7
|
Yeman
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
Lebnan
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
Behrain
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Chechinia
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Bosnia
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Tajkistan
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
Albanian
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Others
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
35
|
40
|
105
|
156
|
229
|
168
|
152
|
191
|
42
|
1119
|
Total
|
14
|
12
|
14
|
90
|
122
|
85
|
139
|
197
|
319
|
305
|
436
|
625
|
303
|
2661
|
Computed from official sources and English language media. |
  |
Civilians
|
Security
Force
Personnel |
Terrorist
|
Total
|
January |
70
|
35
|
173
|
278
|
February |
50
|
16
|
130
|
196
|
March |
63
|
38
|
144
|
245
|
April |
81
|
33
|
175
|
289
|
May |
84
|
34
|
163
|
281
|
June |
54
|
20
|
96
|
170
|
July |
91
|
34
|
110
|
235
|
August |
76
|
38
|
155
|
269
|
Total |
569
|
248
|
1146
|
1963
|
Computed from official sources and English language media. |
|
INDIA
|
Bihar:
The Privatisation of Terror
Sanjay K. Jha
Research Associate, Institute
for Conflict Management
For over two
decades now, the State of Bihar has been home to one of the
most extraordinary social aberrations in the history of Independent
India: the 'private
armies' raised by upper caste landowners to protect
their feudal privileges. Among the most powerful of a succession
of these private armies is the Ranvir
Sena, which has terrorized large areas of the
State since its formation in September 1994 at the Belaur village
of Bhojpur district.
On August 29, 2002, however, the Ranvir Sena was effectively
'decapitated' with the arrest of its chief, Brahmeshwar Singh,
at Patna. Singh carried a reward of half a million Indian rupees
on his head, and is an accused in numerous criminal cases, including
those concerned with the killing of some 200 persons. A founding
member of the Sena, he took over the leadership of the Ranvir
Kisan Sangharsh Samiti, an organisation created to protect landowner
interests in Central Bihar in 1994, and turned it into the one
of the most lethal private armies in the State. He first came
into the limelight after the massacre of 22 persons in Bathani
Tola village of Bhojpur district on July 11, 1996.
Singh's arrest is not the first setback for the Sena in recent
times. On August 24, 2002, three of its front-ranking leaders
were killed by left-wing extremists - Naxalites
- of the People's War Group (PWG)
in Pariyari village in Arwal district, once considered to be
a bastion of the Ranvir Sena.
Reports indicate that the Ranvir Sena has been at the receiving
end for some time now, and has lost much of its earlier influence
among upper caste landowners. One of the reasons is the increasing
criminalisation of the outfit. A large number of unemployed
lumpen youth and criminals joined the Sena after the Miyapur
massacre of 34 persons on June 16, 2000, the last major massacre
executed by the Ranvir Sena. Extortion from their own caste
men, initially for the purchase of arms and ammunition, became
rampant after this point, and those who refused to pay were
subjected to reprisals. Factional rivalry also increased within
an increasingly undisciplined and criminalised cadre, as Brahmeshwar
Singh began to lose control. Violence committed by the Ranvir
Sena against its supporting caste men alienated a large number
of upper caste landlords, and, over time, intra-caste rivalry
and warring area chiefs began to dominate the Ranvir Sena's
trajectory.
Though armed gangs have been part of feudal history of rural
India, Bihar is the only State in post-independence India where
private armies of landowners exist. Most of these private armies
emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s as a feudal response to
the growth of various left-wing extremist - Naxalite - movements
in the Central and the Southern (now known as the State of Jharkhand)
parts of Bihar. Over the past two decades, an estimated 15 private
armies have existed at various points of time in the State,
including prominently: the Kuer Sena, the Bhumi Sena, Lorik
Sena, Sunlight Sena, Bramharshi Sena, Kisan Sangh, Gram Suraksha
Parishad and the Ranvir Sena. Clashes between these outfits
and various left-wing extremist groups have left hundreds dead
and many more maimed over the past two decades.
Among all these, the Ranvir Sena emerged as the most dreaded
and ruthless group as it battled the rising strength of left-wing
extremist groups, especially the Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist
(CPI-ML) (Liberation). The forerunners of the Ranvir Sena in
Bhojpur were the Bramharshi Sena, Kuer Sena, Kisan Morcha and
Ganga Sena. These groups, however, with a limited cadre strength
and area of operation, could not sustain their existence for
long and eventually withered away. Over the years, the Ranvir
Sena extended its influence to the Jehanabad, Patna, Rohtas,
Aurangabad, Gaya, Bhabhua and Buxur districts, mobilizing the
landed caste groups in these districts against the various left-wing
extremist organisations.
Proscribed by the State government since August 1995, the Ranvir
Sena is highly organised and its cadres are reportedly better
paid than any of the private armies in the past. Landowners
in Central Bihar finance the Ranvir Sena through generous subscriptions.
The Sena also runs a front organization, the Ranvir Kisan Maha
Sangh and a women's wing, whose members are trained in the use
of arms.
Over the years, the Ranvir Sena carried out a number of massacres
in central Bihar. On June 16, 2000, its cadres killed 34 persons
at Miapur village, Aurangabad district. On April 21, 1999, 12
persons were killed at Sendani village, Gaya district. On February
20, 1999, 11 persons were killed at Narayanpur village, Jehanabad
district. On January 25, 1999, 23 persons were massacred in
Sankarbigha village, Jehanabad district. On December 1, 1997,
58 persons were massacred at Lakshmanpur-Bathe village, Jehanabad
district. On April 10, 1997, 10 persons were killed at Ekbari
village, Jehanabad. And on March 23, 1997, Ranvir Sena cadres
killed 10 persons at Habispur village, Patna district. The Sena's
victims, by and large, have been landless and poor peasants
of the most backward castes.
The State government, on its part, failed to contain the activities
of the Ranvir Sena, at least in some measure, because of the
Sena's strong links with the political structure and administration.
The context of the Sena's activities has been conditioned by
an extreme polarisation of State politics and the bureaucracy
on the basis of caste. This polarisation deepened in the 1980s,
when the dalits were mobilized by the Left Wing extremists and
increasingly stereotyped as Naxalites by the upper castes who
banded together. The result was a closing of ranks, not only
among the richer and landowners, but also along caste lines
that embraced every rung of the social ladder, down to the poorest
of the castemen. It was through these alliances that the Ranvir
Sena emerged, representing the same forces that dominate State's
structures of power.
The Ranvir Sena's success was also owed in part to the degeneration
that had crept into the left-wing extremism. The 'Naxalite'
movement, which once challenged the authority of historically
entrenched classes, had also gradually become caught up in the
same vortex of caste politics, and the confrontation at the
grassroots level is now moulded by caste factors and not by
class ideology.
This pattern of politics remains intact in Bihar, and the succession
of recent shocks to the Ranvir Sena are not symptomatic of any
fundamental transformations. The forces that gave rise to the
Ranvir Sena are still in control of the socio-political and
administrative structures in Bihar, and these will reassert
themselves, either through a resurgence of the Ranvir Sena,
or the emergence and consolidation of another private army on
the already violent canvas of State politics.
|
BHUTAN
|
Nepalese Migrants:
Gone but not forgotten
Guest Writer: Palden
Tshering
Web Editor, KUENSEL online
In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, illegal migrants of Nepalese
origin committed a wide range of heinous crimes, from
armed robbery and raids on Bhutanese villages to murder
and rape. Thus, in September 1990, the Nichula Primary
School in Kalikhola was completely burnt down, and the
Powgang Primary School in Dagana blown up with explosives.
A bomb explosion at the Bank of Bhutan, Phuentsholing,
killed a policeman on December 17, 1990. Earlier, another
policeman was abducted in Samste on September 22, 1990,
tortured and killed. His dismembered body was found
the next day. These incidents are only some examples
of a long succession of such actions, and in 1991 alone,
for instance, there were 174 cases of kidnapping by
these groups reported to the Royal Bhutan Police. The
Police were also able to confirm the murder of 33 Bhutanese
nationals by anti-nationals executed in camps across
the border that year.
The Nepali groups destroyed schools and health facilities
and other public infrastructure. Despite personal appeals
by His Majesty the King of Bhutan, they sold all their
belongings and left the country, and also tried to ruin
the country's image with false propaganda.
Members of the people's representatives in the kingdom's
recent National Assembly on July 5, 2002, expressed
their alarm at even the remote possibility that some
illegal migrants might be allowed to return to Bhutan.
"Are we going to allow these people to return so that
they can sow discord within our peaceful society?" questioned
one representative.
The memories of what the illegal migrants had done to
their villages to the people before leaving Bhutan are
not forgotten.
Maybe that's the problem.
"This is a painful memory for the people of Sombey Geog
in Haa," said the representative of Sombey. "The illegal
migrants inflicted indescribable humiliation and suffering
on us. They looted our homes and raped our womenfolk.
The idea of their return to our country has enraged
the people."
The legacy they leave behind has been the violation
of the faith and trust of His Majesty the King, the
government, and their own friends and neighbors.
What does a country do when faced with a situation like
this? Does it accept such people back and let bygones
be bygones? Or leave them as they are and let them face
the future shaped by the path they chose?
In January 1991, there were only 234 people who claimed
to be Bhutanese refugees in Nepal. In August that year,
the Nepal government formally invited the United Nations
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide humanitarian
assistance to these people.
When the UNHCR commenced giving food and shelter from
September 1991 there were 304 people claiming to be
Bhutanese. By the end of the year, the numbers had reached
6000. Today, the 'refugee population' stands at more
than 100,000, around 10,700 of them born in the camps.
In the bilateral process that had been initiated to
solve the problem, the first dialogue between the two
countries, held in July 1993, agreed to:
By December 2000, Nepal and Bhutan agreed on the
final verification procedures of the people in the
camps and a joint verification process was initiated.
The verification process began on March 26, 2001.
The Bhutanese team, led by Dasho Sonam Tenzin of
the Home Ministry, comprised members who had in-depth
knowledge of the Citizenship Act, those with technical
and computer expertise, and those who were proficient
in the Nepali language.
After the Nepalese government expressed their view
that the process was too slow, the 11th Joint Ministerial
Level Committee meeting discussed the possibility
of accelerating the process of verification and
decided to include one more expert from both sides
into the verification team.
The two countries also decided that the verification
team would be divided into two groups and carry
out separate verification instead of doing it together.
But just before completion of the verification process,
a problem arose.
The Nepalese team brought up the issue of identifying
the next camp that should be taken up for verification.
The Foreign Minister, Lyonpo Jigmi Y. Thinley, said,
"It became evident that they were not keen on placing
the people into the four categories. Contrary to
what was already agreed and decided in the agreed
minutes, the Nepalese side did not want to harmonize
positions on the four categories to work towards
a solution to the problem."
Meanwhile, on December 13, 2001, verification in
the Khudanabari camp was completed. The two teams
had worked for 151 days and, within this period,
verified 12,804 people living in 2,082 huts.
To facilitate the process the royal government had
directed its Ambassador to India and Nepal, Lyonpo
Dago Tshering, to discuss the issue with his Nepalese
counterpart in New Delhi.
Discussions with Nepalese leaders had also been
conducted during the 11th South Asian Association
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit at Kathmandu
in January 2002. Meanwhile, on the directives of
the council of ministers, the Foreign Minister had
met the Nepalese Prime Minister during his recent
trip to New York.
"In our efforts to find a solution to the problem
we invited the former Nepalese foreign minister,
Mr. Bastola, to Bhutan for unofficial consultations,"
Lyonpo Jigmi Thinley said. "We asked him to brief
us on the expectations of the Nepalese people."
A similar invitation was extended to Madhav Kumar
Nepal, the leader of the opposition party, and some
members of the Nepalese Parliament.
Today, the large proportions of the 100,000 or so
people in the seven camps in Nepal are not all genuine
Bhutanese citizens. And there are even people who,
after working in Bhutan, had gone to the camps claiming
to be refugees.
The Home Minister, Lyonpo Thinley Gyamtsho, explained
that the refugee numbers had increased because of
the easy life in the camps.
With aid coming from international agencies, even
local Nepalese had registered themselves as refugees.
It had been reported that the World Food Programme
(WFP) alone had given assistance worth about US$
8.50 million, or Nu 425 million, to the refugees
in one year.
Why was the Bhutanese government even taking part
in the verification process?
The illegal migrants have made it clear enough what
they want:
Cul de
Sac
in the War Against Terror?
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
After months
of rationalization, America has now been forced to a reluctant
admission that, as Richard Armitage put it, "incidents of
violence are on the upswing" in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), and
that "cross border incursions are up from the end of June."
The statement is accurate - but only in the most quibbling
sense. The month of June had seen a dip in killings in the
State, and July re-established the preceding trend, which
has been at a fairly consistent high since the beginning
of the current year [Table].
Infiltration has also been high since March this year (SAIR
1.1). Clearly, US perceptions are related, not
to facts, but to the convenience or otherwise of recognizing
these, or to transient policy positions adopted by the US
administration. This, unfortunately, has been the pattern
of discourse since 9/11. By and large, the US has preferred
to wink at, or underplay, Pakistan's role in the terrorist
violence in J&K.
The truth, however, is that the leadership of the entire
movement of Islamist terror that manifests itself in violence,
not only in J&K, but also, from time to time, in other places
right across India, is located firmly in Pakistan. This
has been the case since 1994, when the dominant indigenous
terrorist grouping - the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front
(JKLF)
- was progressively marginalized by Pakistan's proxies and
chose to abandon violence and come overground. Its place
was taken, first by the Pakistan backed Hizb-ul-Mujahideen,
and later by a succession of groups, including the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen,
the Lashkar-e-Toiba,
the Jaish-e-Mohammad,
and the 15 member Muttahida
(United) Jehad Council. With rare exception,
this entire leadership comprises non-Kashmiri Pakistanis.
The domination of foreigners - largely Islamist extremists
and mercenaries drawn out of the Afghanistan campaigns -
is reflected in their rising number among those killed in
encounters with Security Forces in J&K [Table].
While such terrorists have been drawn from a wide range
of nationalities, their overwhelming numbers have come from
Pakistan, with Afghanistan also contributing a significant
proportion.
Despite a handful of cosmetic measures, essentially formal
bans on some of these organizations, the delayed 'freezing'
of their bank accounts after most of their money had been
withdrawn, and a relocation of some of their cadres and
camps into Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), the Musharraf
regime has done nothing to curb their activities. There
is, moreover, little evidence that Musharraf has any intentions
of permanently diluting the fundamentals that have dictated
Pakistan's foreign policy for over the past two decades.
During this period, Pakistan has been by far the most active
and aggressive player in the South Asian region, defining
for itself a role that has substantially shaped the foreign
policy priorities and security concerns of all its neighbours
to an extent immensely in excess of what could be thought
of as 'natural' in terms of its size and strategic strengths.
Islamist extremism and terror have been the primary instruments
of motivation, mobilisation and execution of its policies
in this context. Afghanistan and Kashmir were the cornerstones
- though not the limits - of this politics of violent disruption.
It is clear that, though the strategies of the past have
been entirely discredited and reluctantly (though not necessarily
permanently) relinquished in Afghanistan, the covert terrorist
war in India remains central to the Pakistani vision.
It is Western, and primarily American, support to a deeply
criminalized state structure in Pakistan that has allowed,
indeed, encouraged, the persistence of terrorist violence
in South Asia. Fitful policies forcing accommodation or
negotiations with terrorists and with their front organizations
in J&K, or turning a blind eye to terrorism in one part
of the world while condemning it in another, have only helped
entrench these groups, creating an alternative sphere of
a violent, murderous politics that is fundamentally a negation
of democracy. The war against terror cannot be won in the
absence of an internal coherence of vision, objectives and
action.
NEWS BRIEFS
|
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Civilian
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
INDIA |
8
|
23
|
60
|
91
|
Assam |
0
|
0
|
12
|
12
|
Jammu & Kashmir |
6
|
18
|
46
|
70
|
Nagaland |
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Left-wing extremism |
2
|
5
|
0
|
7
|
NEPAL |
2
|
1
|
53
|
56
|
Provisional data compiled
from English language media sources.
|
Former Premier Sheikh Hasina escapes attack: The motorcade of Leader of the Opposition and former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina came under attack by armed cadres allegedly belonging to the ruling Bangladesh National Party (BNP), at Kolaroa, approximately 18 kilometers off Satkhira district headquarters on August 30, 2002. However, no loss of life or damage was reported. Her political secretary, Saber Hossain Chowdhury, later claimed that the attackers were cadres of BNP and the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami. Daily Star News, August 31, 2002.
Shabir Shah
rules out participation in J&K Assembly elections: Jammu and
Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party (JKDFP) chief Shabir Shah, on
August 30, 2002, ruled out his party's participation in the forthcoming
Legislative Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Reports
indicated that, consequent to a meeting with Kashmir Committee
headed by former Union Law Minister Ram Jethmalani, Shah had "in
principle agreed to participate in the elections". He later made
it clear that there was no question of JKDFP participating in
the elections. The
Hindu, August 31, 2002.
Ranvir Sena chief arrested in Bihar: The Special Task Force
(STF) of Bihar police arrested Brahmeshwar Singh, head of the
Ranvir Sena, a private army of landowners, from a hotel in Patna,
on August 29, 2002. Four other persons accompanying Singh were
also detained. Official sources said that Singh was the main accused
in several criminal cases, including approximately 20 cases of
massacres perpetrated by the Ranvir Sena in central Bihar. Times
of India, August 30, 2002.
Top KLO terrorist killed in West Bengal: A front-ranking
terrorist of the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), Rohini
Adhikari, was killed in an encounter in Kamuktala, Jalpaiguri
district in West Bengal on August 28, 2002. Police sources said
the plans for the Dhuppuri massacre of August 17, 2002, in which
five activists of the ruling Communist Party of India-Marxist
(CPI-M) were killed, had been hatched at Rohini's residence and
he was also present during the massacre. Times
of India, August 29, 2002.
Five ULFA terrorists killed in Barpeta, Assam: Five United
Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) terrorists were killed during
an encounter with security forces in Kachkuripathar, Barpeta district
of Assam on August 28, 2002. Indiainfo.com,
August 28, 2002.
Seven infiltrators killed near Line of Control (LoC): Security
forces (SFs) on August 27, 2002, foiled two infiltration attempts
in Mendhar and Keri sectors killing seven Pakistan-based terrorists
after exchange of gunfire on the Line of Control (LoC). Infiltrators
were reportedly being pushed into the twin border districts of
Poonch and Rajouri by the Pakistan Army to intensify violence
on the eve of Legislative Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir.
Daily
Excelsior, August 28, 2002.
Military hard-liners
helping terrorist groups, says former Premier Benazir Bhutto:
Former Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said, on August
30, 2002, in London, that the Pakistani government has close links
with terrorist groups such as the Al Qaeda. According to her,
"I think General (Pervez) Musharraf's regime has strong links
with terrorist groups like al-Qaeda… In one year al-Qaeda have
regrouped in Pakistan with the backing of military hard-liners."
Benazir added, "Musharraf has successfully convinced London and
Washington that he is the best person to combat terrorism." Jang,
August 31, 2002.
President Musharraf supports Hurriyat stand on J&K elections-boycott:
President Pervez Musharraf, on August 30, 2002, is reported to
have expressed Pakistan's solidarity with the separatist All Parties
Hurriyat Conference (APHC) in boycotting the forthcoming Legislative
Assembly elections in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. He
was talking to former Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) Premier
and National Kashmir Committee chairman Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan,
who called on him at his office in Islamabad. Dawn,
August 31, 2002.
LTTE announces four-member team for peace talks: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) announced on August 27, 2002, that ideologue Anton Balasingham would lead a four-member team at the peace talks with the Sri Lankan government, beginning September 16, 2002, at Sattahip in Thailand. The other members of the LTTE delegation are legal advisor V. Rudrakumar, development expert Jay Maheswaran and Adele Balasingham. Tamilnet, August 27, 2002, Daily News, August 29, 2002.
The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that will bring you regular data, assessments and news brief on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region. SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal. |
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