SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 8, September 9, 2002

Casualties of Terrorist violence in Sri Lanka from March 2000 to July 2002

SRI LANKA

Talking to Terror
Guest Writer: Brian Jeganathan
Journalist and Communications Consultant, Colombo

If all goes well, the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) will go to the peace table on September 16, 2002, for a preliminary round of talks to be held for two days in Thailand. The road to peace began more than six months ago, when the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), and worked out a cease fire agreement as a prelude to concrete peace negotiations.

The negotiations are intended to end the 19-year old civil war that has killed more than 70,000 people, (Author's estimate. Data compiled by ICM is given at Statistical Review) and to find a lasting political solution for the country's ethnic conflict. The Norwegian government is facilitating the peace process.

The LTTE's toughest demand, the lifting of the ban on the organization, has been met by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's United National Front (UNF) government, clearing the last snag on the way to the September 16 negotiations.

Earlier, on September 4, Defence Minister, Tilak Marapona, had temporarily de-proscribed the Tigers through a gazette notification. Immediately before this, President Chandrika Kumaratunga, representing the opposition Peoples Alliance (PA), - who has vigorously opposed the de-proscription - challenged the government move, saying that, as Commander-in-Chief and the Head of State, she alone had the power to lift the ban on the LTTE. Kumaratunga insists that de-proscription and the establishment of an interim administration in the North and East must be two of the core issues to be negotiated at the peace talks, and not conceded before.

The country's Attorney General, however, has said there was no legal way to block the de-proscription of the Tigers, who had been banned under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). The Tigers were banned in January 1998 through a Presidential Proclamation under the Public Security Ordinance, when the group bombed the country's holiest Buddhist shrine known as the Temple of the Tooth. At the time, the country was under a State of Emergency. The Attorney General made it clear that lifting the ban was the sole prerogative of the Defense Minister.

Despite the Attorney General's views, the main opposition Peoples Alliance is determined to explore legal avenues to revoke the government decision. The radical Marxist-Nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) has also vowed to mobilize popular support to topple the government for betraying the country, accusing the 'weak' Wickremasinghe government of 'wilting under LTTE pressure'.

It is yet to be seen whether the JVP can legitimately lead such a mass campaign against the lifting of the Tiger ban, as the party itself had once benefited from such de-proscription during its second and worst insurgency between 1988 and 1990. The then ruling United National Party (UNP) de-proscribed the JVP even while a killing spree continued from both sides.

Meanwhile, leading Buddhist prelates, who claim to be the custodians of Buddhism and the Sinhala people, have also urged the President to use everything within her power to prevent the eventual and permanent de-proscription of the LTTE.

The LTTE itself has welcomed de-proscription as a very positive step towards genuine peace. LTTE political wing leader, S.P. Thamilchelvan, told BBC television that 'the biggest impediment' to peace had been removed with the lifting of the ban. He also commended Wickremesinghe's 'strength and courage to pursue peace.'

But sitting at the negotiating table and discussing the crucial issues of power sharing will not be as easy as adhering to the terms and conditions of the cease-fire or even conceding de-proscription. This will be a decisive test especially for the LTTE, which has spent most of its life in the bush leading armed campaigns against the government, and has earned a bad reputation in the past for erratically pulling out of negotiations and reverting to violence. The LTTE counters such allegations on the grounds that Sinhalese governments have always taken peace talks lightly and sent non-significant delegations for negotiations.

This time, however, the LTTE will not be able to hide behind such excuses. The government is sending a high profile ministerial delegation to open talks in Thailand, and there is the additional pressure of the involvement of international facilitators.

Clipping the wings of the Executive President and guaranteeing what is due to each stakeholder is, however, still an enormous task. Already, in the recent weeks and months, the peace process has started to feel the travails of cohabitation between the President, who is from the main opposition party, and Wickremesinghe's ruling UNF. The conflict sharpened with the cabinet moving to introduce the 19th Amendment to the Constitution to curb Kumaratunga's powers, specifically, the power to dissolve Parliament. Currently, the Executive President can dissolve Parliament after one year of holding a general election - in the present instance, after December 5, 2002. The UNF fears that Kumaratunga and the PA will exploit these provisions to destabilize the government and derail the peace process. If the new Amendment, scheduled to be taken-up in November, goes through, Kumaratunga will not be able to dissolve Parliament, unless a majority in Parliament so requests. Interestingly, Kumaratunga came to power in 1994 promising to abolish the Executive Presidency.

Equally important is the proposed 18th Amendment to the Constitution, which will allow MP's to ignore party affiliations when voting on an issue of national importance, which would strengthen the UNF in its efforts to muster the votes of several opposition members who are willing to support the government in its efforts towards a negotiated peace settlement. The Amendment would prevent any form of disciplinary action against an MP who votes contrary to the party line.

A two-thirds majority is required to pass the Amendments. However, the President has the power to refer the constitutional change to the Supreme Court to determine whether it should be put to a referendum. UNF leaders have publicly expressed confidence that a section of the opposition will vote for the Amendments. Their defeat, however, could hasten a crisis in the government, and force early elections.

On the ground, the UNF seems to have steadied its position, at least temporarily, by exploiting the infighting within the Opposition. A faction led by Kumaratunga's brother, Anura Bandaranaike, is allied to the JVP and its chauvinistic campaign against the Government-LTTE peace talks. Opposed to it is a faction led by former PA Minister A.H.M. Fowsie, who is backing the negotiations. The Fowsie group maintains close connections with UNF Ministers who defected from the PA last year. Kumaratunga has also been desperately fighting a threatened split in the party.

The Government itself is not free of factionalism and disgruntled members. Recently, there were reports of opposition PA and JVP parliamentarians holding secret talks with seven members of the Government, to explore the possibilities of defection from Government ranks. Wickremesinghe has, moreover, not received the unreserved support of one of his coalition partners - the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC). The SLMC enjoys a substantial constituency in the East, where the country's Muslim population is largely concentrated.

On an earlier occasion, SLMC leader Rauff Hakeem, who is also the Minister of Shipping, laid down nine conditions for support to Wickremesinghe's peace efforts, including the revision of the current memorandum of understanding (MOU) and inclusion of Hakeem himself in the peace negotiations. He has demanded that the government guarantee a political role for Muslims in a settlement with the LTTE. Last week, Hakeem held separate talks with chief LTTE negotiator, Anton Balasingham in London, to discuss SLMC representation in the peace talks. According to the agreement reached, Hakeem would be part of the government delegation and, in future talks, he will lead a separate Muslim delegation, which will convert the peace negotiations into a tripartite exercise.

The LTTE also has its own quota of worries. A month ago, it had to take the tough decision of demoting Karikalan, a top eastern leader, without explanation. Karikalan's statement that the north and east belonged exclusively to the Tamils irked the Muslims, who said the statement implied that there were no rights for them in the region. However, politically, the LTTE's hegemony is well defined and established. The former moderate Tamil politicians are now well within its fold, with the formation of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). The Tamil Alliance has been exerting a lot of pressure on Wickremesinghe's government to accept the LTTE as the legitimate representative of the Tamil people.

Wickremesinghe has launched a drive for economic reforms, parallel to the peace campaign. Through a fire-sale privatization and restructuring campaign, he is trying to haul the country out of a massive debt crisis, which stands at LKR 377 billion. More than 30 pieces of legislation are slated to go through Parliament to support the economic reforms, which could also be controversial. The days ahead will determine the fate of both the economy and Sri Lanka's polity. The toughest challenge for Wickremesinghe will be to keep the peace process on track until it reaches satisfactory results - working out a political arrangement that will keep the nation intact.

INDIA

Assam: ULFA's Routes of Terror
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati.

On August 21, 2002, five police personnel were killed by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) in the western Assam district of Goalpara, set off by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) militants who after the attack managed to escape into the safety of the Garo Hills through the Lakhipur area. Four days earlier, on August 17, 2002, ULFA cadres connived with the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) militants to kill five Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) members in New Jalpaiguri district in West Bengal.

Such incidents, apart from providing fresh insight into the ULFA's capabilities to execute terrorist attacks, warrant urgent focus on the group's operational dynamics. The ease with which ULFA indulges in these hit and run actions points to the existence of a medley of convenient routes of access and egress, most of them in the minimum surveillance category. These multiple entry and exit points constitute a vital ingredient in the ULFA's continuing survival. Crucial to their identification and development is the building up of alliances with other subversive groups in territories where its own influence is low. ULFA's routes into Bhutan, Bangladesh and Myanmar reflect the organisation's inventiveness and manoeuvrability.

The North-Bengal corridor is fast emerging as the most significant strategic route for the ULFA to move into Bangladesh - home to many of ULFA's top leaders. Incidentally the discovery of this route has opened up a vista of choices for the outfit, making the long and torturous journey from Assam through Tripura and also through the Karimganj border redundant. The minimal presence of security forces and an alliance with the KLO facilitates easy movement through the North Bengal corridor. While this route is used primarily for movement of ULFA cadres, the State of Meghalaya provides several routes, both for ULFA's operations as well as for the ferrying of arms and ammunition, especially from Bangladesh, into Assam and even beyond.

ULFA's hit and run operations, especially in the lower Assam districts, are managed by cadres based in temporary camps in the Western Garo Hills. ULFA's alliance with the Garo outfit, the Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC), facilitates the establishment of such safe havens and the undertaking of joint operations. Thus, in a recent incident, on May 12, 2002, a joint team of the ULFA and the ANVC killed two persons and injured four others in Dhubri district in Assam, after which the militants were reported to have fled towards the Garo Hills. In addition to the Western Garo Hills, pockets of the Jaintia Hils and of the Khasi Hills are also used by the group to move in and out of Bangladesh.

Mankachar, a small sub-divisional border town in the Dhubri district is yet another focal point for the ULFA's traffic to Bangladesh.

The river route is also not to be underestimated. Intelligence sources admit that ULFA's cadres take the help of the fishing boats as well as the regular ferries to enter the State from Bangladesh, as also to move between districts in Assam. The rivers, mainly the mighty Brahmaputra, provide for easy mobility of the ULFA cadres inside Assam. The Assam Police and the Army do not patrol the rivers, and patrolling by the Border Security Force (BSF) remains at a low intensity. Contrary to perceptions that the annual floods curtail the outfit's movement, ULFA cadres move freely along the river routes throughout the year. ULFA cadres have been arrested with arms and ammunitions from fishing boats on numerous occasions.

Bhutan houses two of ULFA's headquarters - the General HQ and the Council HQ - two of its three 'battalions' (the 7th and the 709th), as well as a number of 'training camps'. A substantial number of its estimated 3,000 cadres are based in several camps in that country. While a process of identification of new routes into Bangladesh is a continuous affair, traditional routes in and out of Bhutan have remained through four districts of Assam: Darrang, Nalbari, Barpeta, and Kokrajhar: each sharing a border with the Royal Kingdom. The Pagladia River in Nalbari, the Tamarhat area of Kokrajhar and the Manas Wild Life Sanctuary in Barpeta remain the ULFA's key entry and exit routes. Proximity of each of these districts to their multiple camps in Bhutan makes them viable paths for movement, even with substantial security force presence.

It is imperative for the outfit to keep their passage 'incident-free' for safe movement. Between January and August 2002, as many as 50 ULFA cadres were killed in Nalbari district alone and reports indicate that there has been a dramatic decline in ULFA's movement into Bhutan through this particular district.

Gradually, however, these traditional routes into Bhutan are being replaced as a result of the greater safety of the North Bengal corridor. The alliance with the KLO has also facilitated movement from Bangladesh into Bhutan and vice versa. There have been instances of ULFA cadres using the route starting from Agamoni in Dhubri district through the Tufanganj and Borovisa area in North Bengal to visit two camps located at Kalikhola in Bhutan.

Another set of routes take the ULFA cadres from upper Assam districts of Sibasagar, Tinsukia, and Dibrugarh to their transit as well as base camps in Myanmar located in areas such as Nania-Niasha, Chunumu, Tamlu, Kachin, etc. In addition, ULFA's East Zone headquarter and the regional headquarters are located in Myanmar. The mobile '28th battalion' also shuttles between the upper Assam districts and Myanmar. ULFA however, coordinates its activities in Myanmar along with the '2nd battalion' of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K), with whom the outfit shares a close relationship. Routes are usually chosen from many available options, either through the State of Arunachal Pradesh or Nagaland, through areas that are hardly monitored and that pass through the strongholds of ULFA's alliance partners. The NSCN-K's stronghold in the Konyak tribe-dominated Mon district in Nagaland serves as the safest transit route into Myanmar. Passages through the Patkai hill range lead to camps at Lunglung. Another route starts from Sonari in Sibsagar district via Nyasa in Mon district and passes through Hoyet in Myanmar to reach the camps located at Kachintala. In Kachintala, both the ULFA and NSCN-K maintain six training camps with assistance from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). On July 17, 2002, six ULFA terrorists, including a woman cadre, were arrested by an Army patrol in Mon district while carrying clothes, shoes and medicines to their training camps in Myanmar.

Alternate routes to Myanmar through the Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh, are comparatively less frequented by the ULFA cadres due to their extended road length. However, the length of the roads would be less prohibitive if the chances of avoiding the security forces were greater than those on the shorter routes - but at the present stage, the risk even on short routes is minimal.

Naturally, routes are often altered, or even abandoned when they attract sufficient publicity, warranting an increase in the scale of security force deployment. One intelligence report suggests that, while the ULFA was believed to have started avoiding the Tripura route to Bangladesh due to its prohibitive length, in fact, in July 2002, ULFA and the NDFB conducted surveys to identify routes to sneak into Bangladesh across the Tripura border.

There are reasons to believe that even though most of these routes are known to the intelligence agencies, many continue to be minimally monitored. While hostile geography of the region prevents a total surveillance of the porous borders, a lack of coordinated action between the various States in the Northeast is also part of the problem. There is also a need to modernise the police force of the region and improve the intelligence network in order to establish an efficient system of border management.

ASSESSMENT

INDIA

West Bengal: The KLO Strikes, with a Little Help
Guest Writer: Pinaki Bhattacharya
Special Correspondent, Kolkata, Mathrubhumi

On August 17, 2002, when local leaders of the ruling Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) in West Bengal were meeting at their party office in Dhoopguri, Jalpaiguri district, six youth rode up on bicycles and sprayed them with bullets, killing five. This incident focused the State's, and indeed the nation's, attention on the simmering discontent that has kept north Bengal boiling for the last couple of years. The raiding group, according to the police, consisted of cadres belonging to the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) and their mentors, ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam).

Sources indicate that the Dhoopguri slayings are a reaction to botched government initiatives to secure the negotiated surrender of a woman KLO cadre, Bharati Roy, who had agreed to come 'overground' on the conditions that she would not be picked up and harassed. However, when she appeared in public, the police went back on their words. This is said to have inflamed passions among the KLO cadres, who were already under pressure due to a malaria outbreak in their joint camps with the ULFA and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). Their problems were exacerbated by a shortage of medicines and supplies caused by the successful blockade of their supply routes by the security forces. The cumulative impact was the decision to launch this 'revenge killing' at Dhoopguri.

Police estimates indicate that KLO activities had been on a decline over the past two years. After peaking at seven incidents in 2000, there were just three operations in 2001. However, this year till August 17, seven incidents had already been reported. The police claims that the urgings of ULFA mentors and a severe cash crunch have contributed to the KLO's new found activism. They are also reports of 'talent spotting' and recruitment of new cadres in north Bengal.

There is, however, an obvious decline in the enthusiasm of Rajbongshi youth to join their ranks. Sources in the administration claim that this waning influence is the result of increased police action and vigilance. Moreover, the Bhutanese government, which had earlier expressed inability to act on the ground that they lacked adequate security infrastructure to dismantle the terrorist/militant training camps located on their territory, have now come around to accept the option of joint raids in conjunction with Indian security forces.

The KLO seeks the establishment of a separate 'Kamtapur', a homeland demanded by the Rajbongshi community in the north Bengal districts of Coochbehar, Jalpaiguri and Darjeeling, as also parts of Assam. The roots of this demand lie in perceptions of cultural and ethnic identity and the progressive decline of land rights of this community.

The Rajbongshis draw inspiration from the history of King Bishwa Singha who founded Cooch dynasty in 1498 and continued to rule till 1510. Even prior to this, the Khen king, Niladhwaj had founded Kamtapur in Coochbehar, which Bishwa Singha later amalgamated into his kingdom. The Rajbongshis adopted a derivative Aryan language, Magadhi Apabhramsa, in the seventeenth century. Though the Rajbongshi language shared its roots with Bengali, it failed to evolve into a more modern variant on the lines of Bengali.

The community had obviously suffered from degeneration by the early 20th century. In 1915, Thakur Panchanan Barma, the first post-graduate of the community, had led a social reform movement, central to which was the assertion of Rajbongshis as Kshatriyas (the privileged Hindu warrior caste). The same Barma later changed his mind after the promulgation of the Government of India Act, 1935, and got the community included as a Scheduled Caste (the castes listed under Articles 341 and 342 of the Indian Constitution for special protection, recognizing the extreme discrimination and oppression they have historically suffered within the Hindu caste system). The belief was that the community could the gain the fruits of development only if it embraced the identity of the 'socially oppressed'.

Evidently, that did not solve the problem. By 1969, a group called Uttar Khanda Dal (UKD) had demanded the formation of the Kamtapuri State as a solution to their long held sense of deprivation. They even had a historical rationale: according to them, the Rajbongshis had resented the transformation of Coochbehar, a princely State within British India, into a mere district. But UKD was unable to make much political headway and was first replaced by the Kamtapur Gana Parishad in 1987, to be followed by Kamtapur Peoples' Party (KPP) in 1997.

The urge towards violence came from a militant section of the All Kamtapur Students' Union (AKSU) formed in 1991. In 1993, some of its members approached ULFA leaders of the Kokrajhar district of Assam for help in arms training. The first batch of 12 Rajbongshi boys were trained by the ULFA at a camp in the jungles of Bhutan on the trijunction of Bhutan-West Bengal-Assam. The training remained incomplete as the camp had to be disbanded under severe pressure of the Indian security forces.

But AKSU was insistent. They soon established contact with the central leadership of ULFA, and received an assurance of help to form a separatist organisation. As a result, the KLO was formed on December 28, 1995, with 60 activists. They were taken to camps in the border Samdrup Jhankar district of Bhutan for intensive training during 1996-97.

This fledgling relationship has concretized over the past years, with the ULFA not only providing training but also arms, and even its own cadres for KLO operations. Security forces estimate that the active strength of the KLO comprises some 300 cadres.

Interestingly, the KPP disavows any links with the KLO. During this correspondent's travels in north Bengal in search of the KLO in 2001, the KPP chief, Atul Roy, had even refused to accept the existence of the militant organization, dubbing it a creation of the security apparatus of the Left Front government in the State. He insisted that the KPP was a purely political organisation pushing its demand through democratic and political methods. Ironically, however, during the 2001 State legislature elections, the KPP failed to win even a single seat, though they contested 23 of 49 State Assembly segments in the North Bengal region.

There are many in the State who believe that the ruling CPI (M) uses the KLO as an ideological tactic to politically isolate those who demand a separate Kamtapur. This view gains some credence from the fact that, though the State government claims to confront the demand 'politically', its primary response has been to unleash its security forces to stamp out the movement by force. Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattacharya has even refused to sit across the table for talks with the KPP leaders.

In an intensification of the state response to the KLO, Chief Minister Bhattacharya recently held discussions with the Union Home Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani, to assess the security situation and secure additional central force requirements of the State. He also issued a statement that he would meet the Bhutanese King on the issue of terrorist training camps and safe havens in Bhutan. The State Government has also launched an intensive programme of accelerated development for the North Bengal region, overseen by the four ministers in the State's council of ministers who hail from the region. It remains to be seen how this multi-pronged strategy bears fruit, and whether it will prove sufficient to contain the militant menace.