SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 1, July 21, 2003

INDIA	PAKISTAN

Terrorists Talk Peace
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution

"I am not representing those who talk of fighting. I am representing those who want to resolve issues through dialogue."

With this statement, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, Leader of Opposition in the Pakistan National Assembly and chief of his own faction of the Islamist fundamentalist party Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam (JuI) became the latest entrant into the India-Pakistan 'peace constituency' during his visit to India last week. While it is in the interests of the sub-continent that the space for peace be enlarged, a question that needs equal attention is whether this space is a bandwagon that can be opened up to include those who have openly sponsored and supported virulent acts of international terrorism over the past decades, and whose recent and current activities - as opposed to immediate pronouncements - give no reason to believe that they have altered their fundamental ideology or agenda?

In India at the invitation of the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Hind in Deoband, Uttar Pradesh, Rehman was accompanied by JuI vice-president Hafiz Hussain Ahmed and fellow parliamentarians Gul Naseeb and Qazi Hameedullah. The Maulana was also briefly a candidate for the Premiership of Pakistan after the October 2002 election, but lost the battle to Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali.

Fazlur Rehman is widely considered to be one of the primary backers of the Taliban, is known to have played a vital role in its creation, and remained intimately linked with both Mullah Mohammed Omar and Osama bin Laden throughout the period of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. After Benazir Bhutto won the 1993 national elections, Fazlur Rehman was appointed Chairman of the National Assembly's Standing Committee for Foreign Affairs, a position he reportedly used to lobby for the Taliban. The Pakistani Frontier Constabulary Corps reportedly trained the first batches of Taliban militia from seminaries run by the Maulana and the Sibi Scouts in training camps near the Baluch border with Afghanistan. He is also allegedly the mentor of the proscribed terrorist organization, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM, earlier called Harkat-ul-Ansar), and is reportedly closely linked with the activities of the Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami (HuJI), and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM). When the US and allied forces commenced bombing Taliban and Al Qaeda strongholds in Afghanistan, he led large anti-US, anti-Musharraf, and pro-Taliban rallies in Pakistan's major cities. While denouncing Presidents Bush and Musharraf, he also threatened to launch a Jehad against the US if the bombings continued. In October 2001, President Musharraf placed Fazlur Rehman under house arrest. He was charged with sedition for inciting the people against the armed forces and for attempting to overthrow the Government. He was, however, set free in March 2002 and all cases against him were withdrawn.

The Maulana's affection for the Taliban has never been in doubt. He said in Dera Ismail Khan on October 23, 2001, that, "Those talking of a broad-based government in Afghanistan have failed in the past…The Taliban brought peace, law and order in Afghanistan and banned poppy cultivation. They established good governance in more than 95 per cent of the country… Many Pakistanis are already taking part in Jihad and several others are ready to go to Afghanistan." According to the acclaimed Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, "The Taliban's closest links were with Pakistan where many of them had grown up and studied in madrassas [seminaries] run by the mercurial Maulana Fazlur Rehman and his Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam, a fundamentalist party which had considerable support amongst the Pashtuns in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)." Rehman now denies these charges and claims he has "nothing to do with the Taliban," maintaining, however, that "the Taliban were those who brought peace to Afghanistan…"

Rehman, who is also secretary-general of the six party Islamist fundamentalist alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), indicated that the objective of the visit was to create a 'congenial atmosphere' between India and Pakistan and to force the 'rulers' of both countries to resolve their disputes peacefully. The hollowness of his stance was clear in his complete disregard of his past position, as he now claims: "Only talks can find solutions to disputes. We have always supported this route." While opposing any third-party mediation between India and Pakistan, he added, for good measure, during a press conference in Delhi that the Kashmir issue should be resolved through dialogue as envisaged under the Shimla Agreement of 1972. He also emphasized that, "there was no room for terrorism in Islam."

The compulsions of this dramatic turnaround are still unclear, but there should be no doubt that the raison d' etre of the various Jehadi mobilisers in Pakistan - including Rehman - remains unchanged. Asked about a solution to the Kashmir issue, he said, "Let me clarify that, on this point, I am with the Pakistan government. What you call cross-border terrorism is a freedom movement in our eyes. The people of Kashmir and the mujahideen who are fighting want their right to live."

There is speculation that the Government has initiated a 'Track II' diplomatic process that seeks to use the 'good offices' of people like Fazlur Rehman to take the peace process forward. Some analysts interpret sanction for his visit as New Delhi's way of exerting pressure on President Pervez Musharraf by seeking a rapport with domestic political forces in Pakistan, howsoever inimical these may be to India.

The idea of initiating such unprincipled liaisons and 'peace processes' is fraught with grave danger. The idea that diplomacy is an absolute virtue, and that a 'peace process', irrespective of the character of its participants, or the morality of its content, is an end in itself, merely emboldens the unscrupulous adversary. Rehman's extremist organizational infrastructure in Pakistan remains intact; the various terrorist groups associated with him remain committed to their murderous agenda; the political formations he is associated with remain steadfast in a fundamentalist, pan-Islamist, and deeply violent worldview. Contacts with individuals like Rehman, and the groups they represent, confer legitimacy and create increasing public ambivalence towards their identity and activities. In permitting Rehman to visit India at this crucial juncture can only weaken India's case for firm and consistent international action against terrorists and their state and non-state sponsors.

INDIA

Arunachal Pradesh: Insurgency Spillover
Guest Writer: T. T. Tara
Itanagar-based Journalist with The Telegraph

The Indian frontier State of Arunachal Pradesh faced no problems of militancy in the decades following its creation in 1972, unlike some States in the Northeast. With the passage of time, however, insurgency has been pushed into this peaceful State, primarily by factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), which have long created havoc in the neighboring State of Nagaland. In Arunachal, the areas most affected now are the districts of Tirap and Changlang.

Traditionally, Arunachal's porous and un-administered borders with Nagaland and Myanmar have been used by several militant groups of the Northeast in their journeys to China and Myanmar. Militants found it less cumbersome to use various rivulets, especially near the Pansu Pass to transport essential items like medicines, arms and drugs through the area. Among the major objectives of these militant groups was the acquisition of military training from Myanmarese insurgent groups.

Following the vertical split in the NSCN in 1988, the Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) spread its influence to Changlang and then to Tirap in early 1990. Apart from the geographical proximity of these districts to Nagaland, their tribal composition also contributed to the onset of insurgency. The Nocte and Wangcho tribes of the Tirap district identify themselves as 'Nocte Nagas' and share a cultural affinity with the Konyak Nagas of the Mon and Tuensang districts of Nagaland bordering Arunachal Pradesh. Similarly, the Tangsa tribals, who dominate the Changlang district, claim that they are 'Tangsa Nagas'. According to official records, the Tangsas have close cultural affinities with the Tangsas living in Myanmar. Even though the NSCN-K did engage in forcible recruitment of local youth in these two districts, the organization largely remained dormant and avoided encounters with the handful of security forces' personnel present in these districts. They primarily engaged in abductions and extortion activities, maintaining a low profile as far as their political agenda was concerned.

The story of insurgency in Arunachal Pradesh is also a story of the politician-insurgent nexus in the State. Till the year 2000, the NSCN-K enjoyed dominance in Tirap and Changlang and in spite of its rivalry with the Isak-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) in Nagaland, the latter never made any forays into what was known to be a Khaplang stronghold. The credit for strengthening the NSCN-K base in Tirap goes mainly to Chipu Menon, a self-styled 'colonel' of the outfit, who also happens to be a close relative of the one of the senior ministers in the present Mukut Mithi's ministry. It is believed that it was primarily through Chipu and his mentor in State politics that the NSCN-K made its presence felt in the political arena.

Intelligence sources disclose that the NSCN-K, taking advantage of its political connections, organized a conclave at Jeduwa in Tirap district on December 15, 1998, under Chipu Menon's active leadership. All the twelve elected representatives (Members of the Legislative Assembly, MLAs) of both Tirap and Changlang districts, along with some political opponents of the then Chief Minister Gegong Apang, attended the conclave and took a decision to dislodge the Apang Government. Their attempt bore fruit in January 1999, when the Apang Government was toppled.

From such a position, the NSCN-K could only grow stronger. Subsequent to Apang's dislodging, the twelve legislators from these two districts brought a Resolution in the State Legislative Assembly in the first half of the year 1999, demanding Union Territory status for Tirap and Changlang districts. The Resolution, however, failed to be passed by the House under the leadership of the Mukut Mithi. Thereafter, in the elections held in the latter half of the year 1999, Mukut Mithi secured a thumping majority in the State and formed his ministry on October 11, 1999. It was during this election that some political leaders of the area were isolated and denied ministerial berths.

This paved way for the arrival of the IM faction of the NSCN in the State. These disgruntled leaders were instrumental in inviting the NSCN-IM to 'protect' them from the NSCN-K's onslaught. Thus, the internecine clashes between these groups in Nagaland were extended into Arunachal Pradesh as well. However, it is the common people of these districts who became the ultimate victims of the fight for supremacy and control of territories between the warring factions of the NSCN.

With the passage of time, both factions stepped up extortions, abduction and killing, besides engaging with the security forces. Payment of 'taxes' (extorted revenues) to both the factions by people from all walks of life is a commonplace. Even Government employees were made to part with a portion of their salaries towards 'developmental funds' for the insurgent groups.

Available statistics suggest a pattern of escalating insurgency over the last three years. Twenty-seven incidents were reported in 1999, increasing to fifty-one in the subsequent year. In 2001, the number of fatalities declined to forty-seven reported incidents. These numbers may appear insignificant, particularly within the context of the widespread troubles of India's Northeast, but in a State with a population of just 1.1 million, this incidence is a matter of serious concern.

A senior police official, talking to this writer, put the number of NSCN-IM militants stationed at Tirap and Changlang at about 250. Neither of the groups, however, has any designated camp in the districts and both find it convenient to operate from villages which provide them adequate opportunities to mingle with civilian populations. The NSCN-K directly monitors its operations from Myanmar, while the NSCN-IM controls its cadres from the Tuensang district of Nagaland.

Gradually, both the groups are extending their activities into other parts of the State, with occasional forays into the capital, Itanagar, where cadres have been arrested on a few occasions, a good 673 kilometers from Changlang. The response of successive Governments in the State, however, has been that they want their territory free from influence of the NSCN factions. The Central Government, however, remains ambivalent in its orientation.

The Mithi Government, in a bid to control the situation, passed the Arunachal Pradesh Control of Organized Crime Act (APCOCA) in September 2002. Annoyed with the enactment of this anti terror law, the NSCN-IM initiated an unsuccessful yet disturbing move to topple the State Government with the help of legislators from the areas under its control. The State Government had recently conceived a counter-insurgency operation in the two districts on the pattern of Operation Rhino and Operation Bajrang in Assam in the early 1990s, with the intention of flushing out rebels from the insurgency infested districts. Planned to be executed jointly by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), India Reserve Battalion (IRBN) and Arunachal Pradesh Police (APP), 'Operation Hurricane' was initially scheduled for June 20. But New Delhi refused to give the green signal and to allocate the necessary Central forces. Citing 'logistical problems', the Centre turned down the Chief Minister's request for additional central forces. It appears that New Delhi has its own difficulties and does not wish to jeopardize the ongoing talks with the NSCN-IM. Clearly, any concerted move against the NSCN-IM would never be acceptable to its leadership, which has been engaged in a dialogue process with the Centre since 1997.

The presence of the Naga militants in parts of Arunachal Pradesh is a serious problem not only for this strategic frontier State but for the nation as a whole. The NSCN's 'extra-territorial activities' can only be contained if the Central and the State Governments come together, and take concerted action to put stop to the anti-national activities of the militants.

INDIA

Naxalite Arsenal: Growing Concern
Sanjay K Jha
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The massive influx of sophisticated small arms and ammunition into various theatres of violence in India is a serious problem. While cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and insurgencies in the Northeast remain the focus of the most urgent concern, the areas afflicted by various left-wing extremists groups - called Naxalites - remain relatively neglected. The easy availability of arms and explosives is one of the major factors contributing to the survival, consolidation and expansion of these various movements in India.

An escalation in Naxalite violence has been witnessed in the States of Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Maharashtra in recent times. According to data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management, a total of 311 persons, including 57 security force (SF) personnel, 133 civilians and 121 Naxalites have already been killed during the current year, till July 15. The year 2002 saw a total of 1,465 incidents and 482 deaths, as compared to 1,208 incidents and 564 deaths in the year 2001. Some 40 Naxalite groups are active in India, of which the People's War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) constitute the most formidable security challenge.

Even a cursory glance at the trajectory of Naxalite movements in India demonstrates the increasing sophistication of their arsenal. During the initial years of the movement, Naxalite groups used traditional weapons like lathis (staffs), spears, sickles and other sharp edge weapons and single and double barrel guns, mostly stolen from village landlords and the police arsenal. The groups now have access to the AK series of rifles, landmines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) among others. Groups like the PWG and the MCC also have dedicated underground arms production units. In addition, snatchings during attacks on the security forces, a complex network of criminals, arms smugglers, gun dealers and networking with other militant groups provide a complex and varied source of arms for the Naxalites.

The looting of weapons from police personnel, civilians and private companies has always been a source of arms. Thus, on April 15, 2003, Naxalites of the MCC killed eight police personnel and looted six Self Loading Rifles, two other rifles, a revolver and several rounds of ammunition from them after setting off a landmine in the forests of the Cherki Valley in the Nawada district of Bihar. On April 14, 2003, MCC cadres attacked a Government Railway Police (GRP) post at Chandrapura railway station in the Bokaro district of Jharkhand and looted 23 rifles and several hundred cartridges. On March 18, 2003, Naxalites of the MCC injured three police personnel and looted 15 rifles and 1,000 bullets in an attack on a police post in the Lodhipur village of Gaya district in Bihar. The Naxalites also loot explosives from private companies. On October 6, 2002, for instance, PWG cadres looted approximately nine tons of explosives being transported in a truck from Uttar Pradesh's Lalitpur to a copper project in Malajkhand near Laungur Udghati in the Balaghat district of Madhya Pradesh. Most of the explosives were, however, later recovered by the police. In Andhra Pradesh, Naxalites receive ammunition, explosive materials and arms pilfered from ordnance factories. Empty cartridges, parts of rifles, and explosives manufactured just six months earlier at an ordnance factory was seized from a Naxalite dump in August 2000 in the Warangal district of Andhra Pradesh.

Purchases from arms smugglers and gunrunners - particularly from Bihar - constitute another important source of arms. Some of these smugglers also supply weapons to militant groups operating in India's Northeast. On July 2, 2002, security forces arrested a gang of four arms smugglers in Guwahati, capital city of Assam. The gang was procuring country-made guns from Bihar and selling these to militants based in the Barpeta and Nalbari districts of Assam. In the last week of April 2003, police in West Bengal busted an inter-State racket in arms smuggling at Uttarpara. Two traders involved in smuggling arms from Siwan and Munger districts of Bihar were arrested and a cache of arms was recovered. There are over 1,500 illegal arms manufacturing units in Bihar and most of them are located in the Nalanda, Nawada, Gaya and Munger districts. The general breakdown of law and order, the proliferation of criminal gangs, the presence of Naxalites and private armies of landowners including the Ranvir Sena, the criminalisation of politics, an ill-equipped police force and the existence of a collusive network between criminals, extremists, and a section of politicians have all contributed to the massive growth of Bihar's illegal gun industry. Bihar, moreover, has many ordnance factories and workers smuggle out blueprints, creating a cottage industry in arms manufacture in many homes.

The nexus between legal segments of society, including sections of the administration, and Naxalite groups continues to flourish. On November 4, 2002, Police in Patiala, Punjab, exposed links between licensed gun dealers in Punjab and Haryana and the PWG operating in Bihar. Apart from a huge quantity of arms and ammunition, police seized 12 fake arms licenses issued by different authorities, including the Home Secretary of Bihar and several Deputy Commissioners of Bihar, Assam and Jharkhand. The gang used to procure fake arms licenses from different authorities and then approach gun houses in Punjab and Haryana, and the latter knowingly supplied them with guns against these fake licenses for a heavy amount.

Networking with other insurgent groups has also produced a steady flow of weapons into the Naxalite armory. There have been reports of PWG's links with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of Sri Lanka, and the PWG is also believed to have picked up landmine manufacturing techniques from the LTTE. A Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorist, Azam Ghouri, is also reported to have met some important PWG leaders in the Warangal and Nizamabad districts of Andhra Pradesh in September 1999. The supply of arms and explosives to the Naxalite groups figured during this meeting.

The Indo-Nepal border areas are also emerging as a route for arms smuggling. In January 2002, the Uttar Pradesh (UP) Police seized a truck carrying weapons in Maharajganj on the Indo-Nepal border. The arms, procured from Naxalites in eastern Uttar Pradesh, were intended for the Maoist insurgents in Nepal. Reports in March 2002 said the Maoists in Nepal had obtained a large number of sophisticated weapons valued at Rupees 55 million from the PWG. In April 2002, again, the UP Police seized a huge cache of arms in Siddharthnagar near the border. The captured couriers confessed that the arms were being sent to the Maoists and that they had already successfully delivered three earlier consignments.

The problem is complicated further by the fact that the porous India-Nepal border has become a hub of activities of the Pakistani external intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). There are apprehensions that the ISI may catalyze further destabilization in the region by pumping arms into the projected area of the 'Compact Revolutionary Zone' (CRZ). Drug trafficking and the circulation of fake currency through the border are already in evidence. The Andhra Pradesh unit of the PWG has also established a direct link with procurers who bring in arms from Bangladesh-based ISI agents via the riverine Sunderbans route. At least two arms consignments have found their way to Andhra Pradesh since April 2003. Taking advantage of the road and rail links between East Midnapore and Orissa the consignments traveled to Koraput in Orissa before reaching the Dandakaranya forest belt, from where the cache moved to Adilabad in Andhra Pradesh. Reports also indicate that the PWG had acquired shoulder-fired weapons that could target vehicles.

There is evidently an urgent need for a continuous monitoring of the arms profile of various Left-wing extremist groups, the identification of sources and networks, coordinated intelligence gathering, and a well equipped police force in the Naxalite affected areas if this grave security threat is to be contained and neutralized.