SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 10, September 22, 2003

BHUTAN

King-size Problem
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati

During his five-day state visit to New Delhi last week (September 14-18, 2003), King Jigme Singye Wangchuck of Bhutan said that his Government had extended written invitations to three Indian separatist rebel groups for talks in his capital, Thimphu, to finalize the question of their peaceful withdrawal from the Himalayan kingdom after their 'forcible occupation' of parts of it, beginning the early nineties. The King's statement was not only wrongly seen as a disclosure of sorts by a section of the Indian media, but has also been superficially interpreted as a 'positive development' that could hasten the process of the Indian insurgents pulling out of Bhutan lock, stock and barrel.

By far the only real disclosure that King Wangchuck made during his interaction with the media was his admission to the fact that there are '19 or 20' camps of Indian insurgent groups inside Bhutan. Besides, prominent Bhutanese leaders accompanying him, and who are privy to official information, have gone on record saying that the outlawed United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) is now believed to have eight camps inside the kingdom with a total of 1,560 cadres. The National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB), another banned Northeast Indian separatist organization, they added, has 740 cadres spread over another eight camps. And, finally, the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO) has about 430 of its rebels in three or four camps inside Bhutan. While the ULFA and the NDFB are groups whose cadres are drawn from Assam, the KLO is active in the northern parts of West Bengal and Western Assam. All three groups are engaged in an armed struggle for independent homelands.

King Wangchuck's statement about invitations to the ULFA, NDFB and the KLO was not 'breaking news' because Bhutan's Home Minister, Thinley Gyamtsho, had told the country's National Assembly or Parliament in July 2003 that the insurgent groups had not responded to Thimphu's plea for fresh 'exit-talks' for the past two years. In fact, top Bhutanese officials like Ugyen Tshering, until recently the country's Foreign Secretary, had told this writer a few weeks ago, that Thimphu regarded as 'unfortunate' the rebels' lack of response to the Royal Government's invitation for fresh talks on their withdrawal from the kingdom. In December 2001, though, the ULFA, according to Bhutanese authorities, had 'dismantled' four of its nine camps following an earlier agreement. Evidently, the rebel group re-established or relocated some of these camps thereafter.

Even if King Wangchuck has sent out yet another invitation to the ULFA, NDFB and the KLO in recent weeks, and even if the rebels were to accept that and come over for dialogue on the pullout issue, the matter is unlikely to be easily resolved. There appears to be no simple way by which the rebels could leave the kingdom, even if they agree to the Royal Government's plea to do so. The rebels do have options in so far as alternative destinations are concerned, but intensified vigil by the Indian Army and Paramilitary Forces (PMF) along the 262-kilometer long Assam-Bhutan border and along the kingdom's border with the eastern Indian State of West Bengal, would make rebel movements into such alternative locations difficult, if not impossible. The issue, consequently, involves not just talks between the rebels and the Bhutanese Government, but between India and Bhutan as well.

At one stage in the past few years, some key officials at the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) had talked about the possibility of granting the rebels safe passage to move through Assam, if the ULFA wanted to leave Bhutan and move into another country. That view was, however, dismissed by other MHA officials as soon it appeared in the media in the Northeast. Bhutan's Home Minister Gyamtsho, too, had said in the recent past that New Delhi might grant the rebels 'amnesty' if they were to withdraw from the kingdom and return to India. That the modalities for the pullout were a key issue hindering the rebels' withdrawal from Bhutan became clear when Bhutan's then foreign secretary Ugyen Tshering recently told this writer that the ULFA leadership had stated to the Bhutanese authorities that they were unable to fulfill their commitment of withdrawing from the kingdom in totality because of the increased presence of Indian troops on the Indo-Bhutan border in the Assam sector. Bhutanese authorities had confirmed that Thimphu had taken up this issue with New Delhi, but the Indian response was not known.

The possibilities of the ULFA accepting any 'amnesty' offer by New Delhi in the present scenario are remote, nor, indeed, has the Indian Government spoken of such an option. Were the ULFA to choose to honor King Wangchuck's wish, it could shift its men and military hardware to Bangladesh via Meghalaya's Garo Hills or to the Indo-Myanmar border in another northeastern Indian State, Arunachal Pradesh, to link up with the group's ally, the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN-K), which has bases in the area. Here, again, there are serious problems. If the rebels' movement to Arunachal Pradesh is fraught with dangers due to the Indian security presence along the routes, such difficulties are compounded with regard to their possible movement into Bangladesh. It is improbable that New Delhi would formally grant the insurgents a 'safe passage' into a third country such as Bangladesh, and were it to do so, Dhaka cannot officially permit Indian insurgents to enter the country openly, though it has long extended covert support to these groups.

The only other option available to Thimphu and New Delhi is, consequently, a joint pincer attack by Bhutanese and Indian security forces to flush out and neutralize the rebels. That would necessarily mean killing, capturing and disarming the rebels. While New Delhi may not be averse to the idea (Indian security agencies are said to have exact details of the location, strength and other details of the rebel camps), Thimphu still appears to be wary of pursuing such a course of action for fear of possible retaliation by the insurgents on innocent Bhutanese citizens who have to pass through Assam and West Bengal territory to reach some remote parts of the land-locked kingdom.

This fear may influence Thimphu to keep on trying to buy time, even while it fine-tunes its contingency plans. Fear of retaliation aside, Bhutan has concluded that a possible military action could result in massive loss of property, involving the lives of an estimated 66,000 people in 304 villages that are located in the areas around the insurgent camps. This is a sizeable figure, considering that the country's total population is just about 700,000. The National Assembly's latest directive to the Royal Government to try and have 'one last attempt' to persuade the rebels to dismantle their camps and leave the kingdom in a peaceful manner needs to be seen in this context. Unless New Delhi manages to prevail upon Thimphu to act tough, King Wangchuck and his Government leaders can be expected to continue to give out threats of using 'military force' to oust the Indian insurgents from the pristine nation in the Himalayas well into an indefinite future.

INDIA

Jharkhand: Vigilantes in a Cycle of Violence
Nihar Nayak
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

• On August 7, 2003, a local Village Resistance Group known as the Nagrik Suraksha Samiti (Citizens Protection Council) in Lango village under Dumaria police station in the east Singhbhum district of Jharkhand killed nine Left Wing extremists (called Naxalites) of the People's War Group (PWG), including two women and an 'area commander'. Two other Naxalites were maimed in the incident. The slain Naxalites included hardcore cadres of the PWG from Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa. The encounter was triggered by a feud between the extremists and the villagers over the formation of the citizens protection group, which had been set up by the Jharkhand Police to check the Naxalites. Villagers also resented the PWG's efforts to stop them from farming their land. The PWG had also instructed villagers not to accept seeds and other facilities from the Government. The victims of the lynching reportedly came to the village to warn the villagers against tying up with the local administration against the Naxalites.
• On August 8, an irate mob of villagers lynched a PWG rebel in Chirugoda village under Potka police station in the East Singhbhum district of Jharkhand. The Naxalite killed was among the 14-member armed squad that had raided Lango on the previous day. The militant was caught when tribal men maintaining a night vigil got information that a PWG activist had taken refuge at the home of one of his relatives in Chirugoda.
• On August 22, immediately after the Chief Minister's announcement of a Rs. 150 million development package for Naxalite-affected Dumaria block, the residents of Asthakuwale village of East Singhbhum district lynched one Naxalite when a group of 20 extremists, including women, arrived at the village under Ghorabandha police station and opened two rounds of fire when the residents refused to give in to their demand for food.

The lynching of 11 proscribed left-wing extremists last month by local Village Resistance Groups in three different incidents in East Singhbhum district in Jharkhand has been projected in official circles as a popular upheaval against the Naxalites. It is, however, far from the case that these incidents represent a decisive reversal of fortunes for the Naxalites. Retribution itself has been swift, though still limited. According to unconfirmed reports, a village watchman went missing after the killing of the PWG activists. The PWG killed two watchmen in Dumaria for passing on information to the police. Fear of retaliatory attacks continues to haunt the locals and villagers, as youth armed with bows and arrows guard strategic places in the villages in this hilly region.

At present Jharkhand is the worst Naxalite-affected State in India. Left Wing extremists, mostly the PWG and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) run virtual parallel governments in many areas, holding Jan Adalats (People's Courts) to settle both civil and criminal disputes, and imposing penalties that range from simple fines to mutilation and death. The Naxalites are active in 16 out of 22 districts of Jharkhand, of which the worst off include: Chatra, Palamu, Garhwa, Giridih, Latehar, Gumla, Ranchi, Hazaribagh, Lohardaga and Bokaro. Nearly 400 people, including 144 policemen, have been killed since November 2000, when Jharkhand was created after the bifurcation of the State of Bihar. Of late, the MCC is trying to expand and consolidate its presence in areas bordering Orissa as well. As a result, there has been a spurt in Naxalite activities in the Sardna forest areas in West Singhbhum district bordering Orissa. These rebels are also active in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh.

The increasing lethality of Naxalite groups is, to a considerable extent, due to the deepening understanding and coordination between the MCC and the PWG. In November 2002, a joint Statement issued by the two groups at Patna (Bihar) stated that the indiscriminate use of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) against the activists and sympathizers of Naxalite groups by the Jharkhand Government had "compelled them to iron out differences" and fight jointly against the State machinery. The cementing over of differences between the two most powerful Naxalite groups in India is part of a larger strategy aimed at the unification of Maoist movements across South Asia.

Since the creation of the new State in November 2000, the authorities pursued a vigorous anti-Naxalite policy. The State has relied heavily on police operations to neutralize the armed groups. A team of civil society activists, which toured six districts of Jharkhand between January 29 and February 3, 2003, concluded that, "all the laws of the land are replaced by POTA". According to their findings, a total of 654 persons in Jharkhand had cases filed against them under POTA, 202 persons, including some 10 minors, had been arrested, and the total number of persons named under POTA stood at 3,200. The social profile of most of the arrested persons showed that a majority of them were either farmers, students or daily wagers. A majority of them were booked just because they gave the Naxalites food or were in possession of Naxalite literature. In contrast, the study noted, only 100 persons had been arrested and 400 accused under POTA in Jammu and Kashmir, a State far worse affected by terrorist violence. In Andhra Pradesh, another State significantly affected by persistent left-wing violence, an estimated 40 persons had been booked under POTA.

Little attention has been paid by State authorities to other critical issues that sustain Naxalite groups, such as the social roots and support structures of the Naxalite groups, their financial operations and empire, the relative unpreparedness of the police force, and the abysmal performance of the institutions of civil governance in Naxalite-affected areas. The result is that the Government's anti-Naxalite drive, despite the large scale use of the police and paramilitary forces, has failed to yield desired results. Rather, the Naxalite groups appear not only to have expanded their influence, but are increasingly using Jharkhand as an important base to secure their larger goal of the unification of Maoist movements in the country and across South Asia.

There have been allegations that the State is increasingly taking recourse to or promoting extra-judicial means to deal with the menace of Naxalism. The People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) Jharkhand Unit questioned the role of the police in the lynching incidents and said: "No section of the community can be authorized / allowed for (sic) extra judicial execution and killing." The PUCL has also petitioned the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), accusing the police of persistent dereliction of duty in maintaining law and order in Dumaria block of the east Singhbhum district.

Isolated incidents of mob fury against the Naxalites, while they do reflect increasing popular frustrations with the 'revolutionaries', can hardly suffice to contain the menace of Left Wing extremism in the State. The Naxalites are evidently aware of this and continue to respond poorly to the repeated announcements of a 'surrender and rehabilitation' policy by the State Government. The recent offer by Chief Minister Arjun Munda to hold talks with the extremist groups active in the State has also received scant attention. Under the circumstances, incidents of random violence by civil protection groups or vigilantes can only result in an escalating cycle of violence in the State.