SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 13, October 13, 2003

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal

ASSESSMENT

PAKISTAN

Resurgent Sectarianism
Syed Saleem Shahzad
Correspondent, Asia Times

With crackdowns continuing in the Pakistani tribal belt, a plan to root out the jehadi network in Pakistan is on the cards. The recent killings of Shiites in Karachi and the high profile murder of Maulana Azam Tariq on October 6, 2003, are closely linked with likely developments in the near future. The murder of Maulana Azam Tariq, Member of National Assembly and chief of the Millat-i-Islamia party [formerly the now defunct Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)] and an ally of the country's ruling coalition, has pushed Pakistan towards deep turmoil. All the big cities of the country, especially the federal capital of Islamabad, fell into the hands of violent crowds that took to the streets on Tuesday, October 7, 2003.

Maulana Azam Tariq was killed when his car was ambushed by unidentified gunmen at the Golra Mor in the vicinity of the high security zone of the federal capital. Although the Millat-i-Islamia party has registered a First Information Report in which mostly Shiite religious leaders as well as a Director of the Iranian Cultural Centre was named, the hawkish elements in the party - the inner circle - are convinced that the murder conspiracy emanated from Pakistan's corridors of power. Maulana Azam Tariq's widow was also heard saying at the funeral that, a few days ago, Interior Minister Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat (who was also the Maulana's political rival in the Jhang area) had threatened Maulana Tariq, after which Azam Tariq always travelled in disguise. His security escort had also been recently withdrawn by the Punjab Government, another example that is being quoted by sympathizers in the context of allegations that the ruling establishment was behind the murder.

Apart from various subjective opinions, a closer analysis of the incident suggests several aspects that are inconsistent with the premise of a sectarian killing. According to reports, the assailants fired as many as 92 bullets at the car and at least 30 bullets hit Maulana Tariq. Eyewitnesses stated that, as soon as the Maulana's car crossed a toll plaza, a Pajero jeep overtook his vehicle through the second lane and stopped. Three assailants came out of the Pajero and started spraying bullets at the car from two sides. They continued firing for about 20 seconds and escaped after confirming that Azam Tariq and his colleagues were dead. The staff at the toll plaza fled to save their own lives. One eyewitness mentioned that an assailant also fired three bullets at one of the staffers at the toll plaza, but he managed to escape.

Later, the Police recovered the Pajero used in the attack from Mughal Market, Sector I-8, Islamabad. Witnesses said that the terrorists had abandoned the vehicle along the road and had driven away towards Faizabad in a white Toyota Corolla car.

Contrary to earlier patterns of terrorist attacks, this was not a sudden hit-and-run operation in which killers generally fire a few bullets in a haphazard way and flee. Three persons firing 92 bullets would be expected to have stayed on the spot for some time, probably several minutes. This clearly indicates a high level of confidence among the assassins, and suggests the use of professional shooters. In most past sectarian killings, the attacks have generally lasted a little over a minute or a minute and a half, with the killers staying in their vehicle and firing no more than 20 to 25 bullets, before they flee. In the present case, moreover, the killers travelled all through Islamabad, which is under extraordinarily high security these days, and left the car in the posh Sector I-8 area, where the private houses of top bureaucrats and businessmen are situated.

Another theory, however, is that Maulana Tariq became the victim of a revenge killing for an incident that took place in Karachi on October 3, 2003, in which seven Shia employees of the Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO) were killed.

Whatever the case, the Maulana's killing has brought the activists of the banned SSP out of hiding, and they have taken to the streets in extreme anger. Even the dissident faction of the SSP, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) group, surfaced and joined in the protests. Most of these people were trained in Afghan training camps during the Taliban period, and are wanted by the Pakistani Government.

Well-placed sources indicate that the reaction to Maulana Tariq's murder and the subsequent street violence may cause Shia-Sunni riots in parts of the country. If this happens, the Government can be expected to conduct siege and search operations in areas such as Jhang, Chiniot, Sahiwal, Karachi, Hyderabad, Faisalabad and Sargodha, arresting persons who have any manner of linkages with the SSP. Once such an operation commences, it is expected to take other sectarian and militant outfits into its ambit as well. US and other western intelligence agencies are convinced that, of the two Lashkar-e-Jhangvi factions, one - the Asif Ramzi group (whose command is now in the hands of Qari Asad) - is behind many terrorist incidents in which Western targets were involved, including the May 8, 2002, Sheraton bomb blast in which nine French workers were killed, the Daniel Pearl killing, and attacks on various churches, among others.

Though the LeJ and SSP are now separate organisations, US intelligence believes that there are strong surviving linkages between the two. At the same time, organizations such as the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and the SSP are also linked. Both Maulana Azam Tariq and JeM chief Maulana Masood Azhar together received their education at the Binori Town Seminary in Karachi. Several workers of both formations frequently change hats and have, time and again, crossed over from the SSP to the JeM, and back. Consequently, if the Pakistani establishment takes action against the SSP, groups such as the JeM would automatically attract similar action.

Understanding intelligence agency operations in Pakistan does not require any deep investigations. Such operations are conducted on set formulas, and intelligence bosses generally apply the same rules in all comparable operations. Way back in the mid-1990s, the then Nawaz Sharief Government had decided to break the network of ethnocentric parties in Karachi, which had brought extreme lawlessness and a gun culture to the metropolis. The task was assigned to the Intelligence Bureau's (IB) Deputy Director General, retired Wing Commander Tariq Lodhi. The IB arranged special sharp shooters from its Simli Dam Training Center, who conducted random killings in selected areas. In the following days, the city turned violent, giving the law enforcers a reason to conduct their search and seizure operations that fixed on workers of ethnocentric parties, eventually breaking their networks. It now remains to be seen how much time the street violence in response to Azam Tariq's murder will last, before it traps the reactionaries in their own net.

ASSESSMENT

INDIA

Manipur: Caught In a Homeland War
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati

The 'homeland war' is once again rocking the Northeast Indian State of Manipur, as the majority Meitei community is gripped by apprehensions that New Delhi is pushing ahead with a secret plan to slice off the Naga inhabited areas of their State, and merge them with the adjoining Nagaland State as part of a possible deal with the separatist National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah faction, NSCN-IM). The Indian Government is engaged in peace negotiations with the NSCN-IM.

Stoked by this fear, there has been a fresh Meitei uprising to protect their State's territorial integrity. The trouble began early last week, resulting in renewed confrontation with the Nagas, both within Manipur, as well as in nearby Nagaland.

The immediate provocation for the renewed Meitei protest was the haste in which the Manipur Government set free 13 NSCN-IM cadres on Tuesday, October 7, 2003, after they had been detained by State Police commandos the previous day. It all started on Monday, when 13 NSCN-IM cadres, including the outfit's 'home minister' A.K. Lungalang and 'deputy information minister' K. Chawang, were intercepted by the Police near Kangpokpi, in Manipur's Senapati district, while they were on their way to the Naga dominated Tamenglong town to attend a 'political awareness camp' organized by some Naga groups. Manipur's Congress Chief Minister, Okram Ibobi Singh, is on record saying that the NSCN-IM rebels were carrying arms and ammunition with them, and that these included AK-56 rifles and M-20 pistols. The rebels were released as quickly as they were held, and escorted out of Manipur by a Deputy Inspector General of Police, obviously under intense pressure from New Delhi, where there is enormous eagerness to keep the 'peace process' on track at any cost.

The Manipur Police was, in fact, well within its right to detain the armed NSCN-IM activists, since the ceasefire between the rebel group and the Indian authorities - which has been in operation since August 1, 1997 - is confined only to the State of Nagaland. However, the ambiguous nature of the ceasefire agreement between New Delhi and the NSCN-IM has been the cause of several avoidable confrontations over the past six years. In 2001, the Indian Government had announced the extension of the ceasefire jurisdiction outside Nagaland, to cover all Naga inhabited areas in the adjoining States of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. That had led to an anti-ceasefire uprising by the Meiteis who thought that this could be the first step towards their State's dismemberment. The Meitei uprising of June 2001 culminated in mobs burning down the Manipur Legislative Assembly building and a number of other Government properties. The Security Forces retaliated by opening fire on rampaging protestors, killing 18 of them in the State capital, Imphal. Under pressure, New Delhi backtracked, saying that the Naga truce would be restricted to the territory of Nagaland alone, but has totally failed to prevent NSCN-IM rebels from roaming about with weapons in areas outside Nagaland.

The issue of the jurisdiction of the ceasefire has become enormously sensitive because of the steadfastness with which the NSCN-IM has been pursuing its argument that the Nagas in the whole of the northeastern region (in the States of Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh) have the right to live under a single politico-administrative umbrella. In other words, the rebel group wants New Delhi to concede a 'greater Nagaland' as an acceptable solution to bring the curtain down on the 56-year-old Naga insurrection.

The Meiteis, consequently, see any attempt by New Delhi to extend the truce to Naga areas in Manipur as a move that would accord legitimacy to the NSCN-IM argument and demand, and fear that this would eventually lead to parts of Manipur being merged with adjoining Nagaland.

Another factor that has made the Meiteis restive once again were recent and unconfirmed reports in a section of the media that New Delhi's Naga peace envoy, K. Padmanabhiah, had proposed setting up a 'boundary committee' to include the Naga-dominated Ukhrul and Senapati districts of Manipur, and the Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh, in Nagaland, ignoring the mood among the majority Meiteis in Manipur.

New Delhi's lack of transparency on negotiations with the NSCN-IM, and its unwillingness to comment on the veracity of media reports on the Naga peace process, have only added fuel to passions that are already running high in the region. But New Delhi's biggest failure by far, since it entered into a truce with the NSCN-IM, has been its inability to confine the heavily armed rebels to their authorized and designated camps. This, despite the Government of India agreeing to hold talks in places outside the country, such as Bangkok and Amsterdam, in accordance with the wishes of the NSCN-IM, and being generally soft towards the outfit. New Delhi has also failed to send out a clear message to both the rebel group and the other States surrounding Nagaland that the ceasefire was only restricted to Nagaland, and that the rebels would not enjoy any immunity outside that State.

Predictably, the issue of detention and subsequent release under pressure of the NSCN-IM cadres has led Meitei ethnic and insurgent groups to close ranks yet again. The United Committee Manipur (UCM), a conglomeration of several pressure groups fighting for protection of the State's territorial integrity, had already enforced a general strike on October 8, leading the Manipur Government to clamp curfew in Imphal to prevent the situation from getting out of hand, as it did in 2001. The UCM has threatened to launch a series of agitations in the days to come and has raised the following demands: a clear statement from the Government of India that Manipur's territorial integrity would not be disturbed while evolving a solution to the Naga problem; a clarification from New Delhi on whether the ceasefire with the NSCN-IM was in force 'informally' in Manipur; and immediate action against those NSCN-IM cadres operating within Manipur, and engaged in extortion.

As of now, the Chief Minister Ibobi Singh's Congress Government in Manipur has come directly into the firing line of the powerful Meitei groups such as the UCM. Terming the State Government 'inefficient and incapable', UCM spokesman Yuminamcha Dilip said that his organization would be branded as 'enemies of the people' if it fails to fight for the rights of Manipur and the Manipuris. In the troubled Northeast, public sentiments and influential groups who seek to pursue sub-nationalistic aspirations have the potential to bring down elected governments. The Manipur Government, like that of Assam, is against conceding 'even an inch' of their territory to Nagaland. Now, gauging the public mood, the Ibobi Singh Government in Manipur is likely to increasingly adopt the same language as the Meitei groups, and lobby for the State's cause in New Delhi, creating a new problem for the Union Government, which has generally shown itself incapable of efficiently handling those already on its plate. The road to Naga peace remains thorny, to say the least.

ASSESSMENT

INDIA

Assam: Resisting Extortion - HLL Leads the Way
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati

Assam's 150-year-old and Rupees 30 billion tea industry, mostly spread over four districts of upper Assam (Tinsukia, Jorhat, Dibrugarh and Sibsagar), could be heading for another tempest. The September 26, 2003, extortion notice of Rupees 20 million served on the Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL)'s Doomdooma division in Tinsukia district by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) is yet another element in the environment of insecurity within which vital industries operate in the State today. However, the company's resolute attempt to defy the terrorist group's diktats and to rectify the tea industry's history of submission to terror, may well herald the unfolding of an entirely different saga of resistance.

The extortion notice, signed by Achintya Saikia on behalf of ULFA's Eastern Zonal Council, asked the HLL authorities to pay up the required amount by October 7. Curiously, though, the outfit refrained from adding any threats or words of caution in case their demands were not met. The demand on HLL, the first since 1990 when a similar threat led to the company closing down its operations in the State, has been rebuffed by the management, which has not only intimated the State and the Union Government, but has also brought out a public notice expressing its inability to pay extortion amounts to any terrorist group.

The character of ULFA's extortion from the tea industry has undergone significant transformations over the years. Towards the late 1980s, when the group was in need of finance to fund its expanding terrorist activities, the tea industry attracted the attention of the rebel leadership, with its glamour and much publicised investments. Any attack on the 'alien masters of the trade', always considered Assam's exploiters, also boosted ULFA's standing, both among the State's ignorant masses as well as among its not so ignorant intelligentsia.

In the earliest known cases of attack on the Tea industry, on February 15, 1989, D. Chowdhury, the Assistant Manager of Ledo Tea Estate, had been hacked to death by ULFA terrorists. On March 13, 1990, Dr P.C. Scaria of Tata Tea Limited was killed in a shootout at Nalmari. On April 9, 1990, Surendra Paul, Managing Director of Assam Frontier Tea Company, was killed by ULFA terrorists while visiting a garden. And so the list of abductions and killings went on. According to one estimate, between 1989 and 2000, 15 persons connected with the tea industry were killed by the terrorists from the ULFA and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). And in 1999 alone, 15 tea officials / workers were abducted. In the most recent case, in August 2003, suspected ULFA terrorists killed the owner of the Diasajan Tea Estate in Tinsukia district and his two sons for having failed to pay up an extortion sum of Rupees 50,000.

In the initial days of ULFA's attacks on the industry, the rebels' demands for financial contributions were sugar coated with its stated concern for the uplift and progress of Assamese society. Echoes of these pretensions persist, and, in the October 1 issue of its newsletter, Freedom - which would have been prepared at about the same time as the draft of the extortion notice to HLL - the ULFA did rake up some similar issues. In its editorial 'Resentment at Noon', the Freedom noted: "The act of establishment of tea gardens upon our land was itself an invasion upon our only means of subsistence and the present policy of depriving the community totally depended upon the tea industry from their due salary, bonus etc. is amounted to hit the social establishment of Assam (sic).'

The tea industry too, due to a combination of fear and disbelief in the State's ability to provide security to its personnel in far flung tea estates - distanced as they are from the bandobast (police arrangements) in the capital - have tended to bend backwards to appease the terrorist groups. In 1997, a major controversy erupted over Tata Tea Limited (TTL)'s cover up deal with the ULFA to treat its cultural secretary, Pranati Deka, at a Mumbai hospital. Cops blew the lid off TTL's plan, as Pranati was arrested at the Santa Cruz Airport in Mumbai along with her newborn baby. The then Assam Chief Minister, Prafulla Mahanta had declared: "It is the moral responsibility of companies to inform the government, the police or intelligence agencies about extortion by militants." This time around, the HLL has done just that.

The media glare of the recent incident has forced the State to announce visibly augmented signs of crisis management. These include the provision of personal security officers to senior HLL executives; the deployment of two companies of the Assam Police at Samdang and Bisakopi tea gardens in Tinsukia district; and the announcement by the State Police chief that there has been no security lapse for the tea major in the State. The officiating Chief Minister in the State Bhumidhar Barman (acting on behalf of Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi who is in the United States') is seen to be doing his best to live up to the expectations of his absent leader.

Regrettably, payment of large sums of money to the terrorist groups under duress by various companies in the State, most notably the tea majors, remains a fact, and has, indeed, been transformed into a smooth institutionalised mode of money transfer. According to a senior police official, "Each of the tea companies, small or big, continue paying extortion amounts to the outfit." During an interview to a weekly newsmagazine in April 2000, the ULFA Chief, Paresh Baruah, had asserted, "Everybody who does business in Assam has paid up." Media reports, a year ago, quoting intelligence officials suggested a well regulated mode of 'tax' payment to the outfit by the companies: since it is otherwise difficult for public limited companies to account for money paid to militants, the books of accounts usually show such sums as 'security expenses.' The terrorist groups in the State have also used small and medium-sized businessmen as bankers and custodians of funds.

A significant aspect of ULFA's demand note to HLL is its sheer timing. The tea industry in the State is not only facing a crisis over the payment of bonus to its vast labour force, but is at a critical stage of politicisation of the issue. The traditional Assam Chah Majdoor Sangh (ACMS), an old union of the Tea labourers affiliated to the Congress Party in the State, is of late being challenged by unions formed at the behest of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) and the Left parties. As a result, the latest incident is being viewed by some analysts as an attempt by the HLL 'only to escape the bonus burden'.

This is the first prominent case in which a tea company has made such an extortion demand public and categorically refused to pay up. Given the same company's earlier decision to close down its operations in the State in 1990 following a similar demand, its new-found confidence appears indicative of the improved security situation in the State. Despite its abilities to execute occasional and significant terrorist strikes, the ULFA is in disarray and the present attempt at extortion could be a move to augment depleting resources, so essential to meet its huge operational costs. In the month of May 2003, extortion notices bearing the signatures of one Prabal Neog were circulated in upper Assam district of Sibasagar. Media reports had then suggested that the group had a target of Rupees 2 billion from the Sibasagar, Tinsukia, Dibrugarh and Golaghat Districts. This enterprise, however, appears to have failed. It now remains to be seen whether the HLL example will have any followers.

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
October 6-12, 2003

	Civilian	Security Force Personnel	Terrorist	Total
BANGLADESH	0	0	1	1
INDIA
Arunachal Pradesh	0	1	0	1
Assam	3	0	2	5
Jammu & Kashmir	6	8	45	59
Left-wing Extremism	1	1	1	3
Manipur	0	0	2	2
Total (INDIA)	10	10	50	70
NEPAL	2	9	147	158
PAKISTAN	2	0	0	2

* Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.

BANGLADESH

Outlawed left-wing extremists active in five northern districts: According to The Independent, outlawed left-wing extremist groups have become active in the 19 sub-districts of five northern districts of the Chalan Beel area. These groups have called for a guerilla war through distributing posters and leaflets in the markets of those sub-districts. Quoting an unnamed official source, the report said that the extremists are active particularly in Sherpur of Bogra district, Atrai of Naogaon district, Singra and Gurudaspur of Natore district, Chatmohor, Bhangura and Faridpur of Pabna district and Shahjadpur, Ullapara, Raygonj and Tarash of Sirajganj district. Independent Bangladesh, October 8, 2003.

INDIA

Al Qaeda active in Jammu and Kashmir, says Army Chief: Chief of Army Staff General Nirmal Chandra Vij said on October 11, 2003, that operatives of the Al Qaeda were active in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). ''There is a presence of Al-Qaeda militants in Kashmir,'' Vij told reporters during a visit to Jammu. He also said that 70 to 80 percent of terrorists in the State were "coming from across the border and were foreigners." The Army Chief added that "There were 85 rebel training camps in Pakistani territory, many of which were merged with training centres for the Pakistani army." Times of India, October 12, 2003.

PWG reiterates threat to kill Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister: According to media reports of October 10, 2003, the proscribed left-wing extremists-Naxalites-of the People's War Group (PWG) has reiterated its threat to kill the Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N Chandrababu Naidu. In a letter to the Chittoor district police chief, the PWG said that it would once again attack Naidu within a month. "He might have escaped in October 1 attack at Tirumala but there is no question of leaving him," the letter read. Some PWG posters carrying a similar message were also found in the Chandampet area of Nalgonda district. The Hindu, October 10, 2003.

Unrest in Manipur over the arrest and subsequent release of 13 NSCN-IM cadres: At least 13 National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) cadres, including its 'home minister' (kilo kilonser) A. K. Lungalang, were arrested by the Manipur Police near Kangpokpi, in the Senapati district on October 6, 2003. They were reportedly heading towards the Tamenglong district for a 'political awareness workshop', which was to be held on October 8. Meanwhile, an indefinite curfew was clamped on October 8 in and around Imphal, capital city of Manipur, following a general strike called by the United Committee of Manipur (UCM) over the release of the arrested cadres by the State authorities on October 7. Rediff, October 7, 2003.

NEPAL

125 Maoist insurgents killed in Dang district: At least 125 Maoist insurgents and four soldiers were reportedly killed in a clash that ensued after the Maoists attacked the army base camp at Kusum in the Dang district on October 11, 2003. Nepal News, October 12, 2003.

PAKISTAN

Over 100 sectarian terrorists still at large, indicates report: The News quoting an official report has indicated that over 100 sectarian terrorists wanted in hundreds of killings during the last one decade in Pakistan remained untraced by the security agencies thus far. Profiles of 133 terrorists from the proscribed sectarian outfits - the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Mohammed (SMP) - wanted in sectarian killings were prepared by the security agencies. Official sources have indicated that thus far an estimated 33 have either been arrested or killed in encounters with the police. Further, many of these wanted sectarian terrorists were regrouping after a brief lull in sectarian violence since the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These terrorists are allegedly responsible for the fresh wave of sectarian violence in Quetta, Karachi and Islamabad. An official report has reportedly revealed that majority of these wanted terrorists had been living in the President Palace in Kabul during the Taliban regime. Jang, October 9, 2003.

Leader of outlawed Sipah-e-Sahaba Maulana Azam Tariq assassinated in Islamabad: Maulana Azam Tariq, leader of the outlawed Sunni group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Member of National Assembly, was assassinated along with four others in Islamabad on October 6, 2003. Their car was reportedly ambushed by three unidentified gunmen in the Golra Mor area of the national capital. Besides Maulana Azam Tariq, those who died in the attack were his driver and three security guards, said official sources. Inspector General of Police, Islamabad, Major (retd) Muhammad Akram reportedly confirmed the death after three close associates of the Maulana and some party colleagues identified his body. No one has claimed responsibility for the assassination thus far. Azam Tariq won the October 2002 National Assembly elections from Jhang as an independent candidate. He is reported to have formed the Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan after the Federal Government proscribed the SSP on January 12, 2002. Meanwhile, one person was reportedly killed as angry mourners indulged in violence in Islamabad on October 7 after the funeral of Maulana Azam Tariq. The mob is reported to have set ablaze a cinema hall and ransacked a mosque, food market, a bank and a petrol pump in the national capital. Jang, October 8, 2003; Daily Times, October 7, 2003.

The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

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Dr. Ajai Sahni

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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Weekly Assessments & Briefings Volume 2, No. 13, October 13, 2003

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia October 6-12, 2003

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 13, October 13, 2003

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
October 6-12, 2003