SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 22, December 15, 2003

INDIA	NEPAL

Maoist Incursions across Open Borders
P.G. Rajamohan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On November 20, 2003, a secret meeting is said to have taken place between some top-level Nepalese Maoist leaders and Madhav Kumar Nepal, a senior political leader and secretary of Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), at Lucknow in the Indian State of Uttar Pradesh. The meeting raises a number of issues regarding the management of the Indo-Nepal border and the extent to which the Nepalese Maoists have succeeded in establishing a base, or securing safe havens, in India. These issues had been raised earlier as well, particularly after August 17, 2001, when Maoist leader Prachanda conducted a meeting with Nepal's other Leftist parties in Siliguri in West Bengal, immediately after the declaration of the cease-fire.

There has also been reportage of the Maoist insurgents establishing linkages with a mélange of Indian left-wing extremist groups - most prominently the People's War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) - and at least two insurgent groups active in India's Northeast [the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)]. Such subversive activity has once again brought India-Nepal border management practices under scrutiny. Increasing counter-insurgency operations by Nepalese security forces since the breakdown of the cease-fire on August 27, 2003, have also led to an influx of Maoist insurgents into areas bordering the Indian Territory. Moreover, events in the past suggest that whenever the Nepalese security forces up the ante, Maoist cadres sneak across the largely unmonitored and porous border to find safe haven in India.

The Lucknow meeting between the principal leader of the CPN-UML and contending candidate for Prime Ministership, Madhav Kumar Nepal, and unidentified senior Maoist leaders, was held ostensibly to request the insurgents to resume peace talks. Even as confusion relating to the actual intent of the Lucknow rendezvous persists, there is mounting evidence of substantial movement of the Maoist leadership in India, and their close links with proscribed Indian Left-wing extremist groups, especially the PWG and MCC. An Asssociated Press report of December 13, 2003, stated that at least 128 injured Maoists from Nepal had been treated at hospitals in Uttar Pradesh, which shares a 780 kilometers-long border with Nepal. An Uttar Pradesh Home Department official, Anil Kumar Singh, confirmed, further, "The actual number must be very high, and many rebels, who operate through their local contacts, get treatment at undisclosed locations." Three suspected Maoists were arrested on December 8 while attempting to take an injured insurgent to a hospital in Lucknow. N. Ravindra, the police chief in the border district of Balarampur, where the arrests took place, disclosed that he was reportedly wounded while making explosives. The arrested suspects have been handed over to Nepal.

Earlier, on November 16, 2003, 7.5 quintals of Sulphur, reportedly meant for the Nepalese Maoists, were seized by Indian security forces in the border village of Nautanhawa in Maharajganj District, Uttar Pradesh. An urgent meeting of officials from India and Nepal was subsequently conducted to beef up security in the border areas by increasing the strength of border forces in Rupandehi, Nawalparasi and Kapilavastu in Nepal.

The India-Nepal 'open border' is unique in the sense that people of both the countries can cross it from any point, though there are specific border check posts as well, including 22 major and 143 sub-posts for bilateral trade. There are, however, six transit points for nationals of other countries, who require entry and exit visas to cross the border. The extremely porous 1,800 kilometre-long border, which has been maintained according to the Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950, offers uninterrupted passage for illegal smuggling of goods, arms, ammunition and narcotics, as well as human trafficking from either side. Indian security forces began to make some efforts to check the immigrants' identity cards, citizenship papers and work permits after the IC-814 Indian Airlines hijack from Kathmandu in December 1999. Though some efforts have continued to check the intrusion of subversive elements, they have had little impact at ground level, largely as a result of the unique border arrangements between the two countries. The problem is compounded by the fact that both countries have weak, indeed, virtually non-existent, national identity and documentation systems.

These movements constitute grave risks to security, not only for Nepal, but for India as well, as the Maoists develop linkages, not only with ideologically sympathetic groups in India, but with a number of other subversive groups on a purely opportunistic basis. Sources in the troubled Northeast Indian State of Assam indicated in November 2003 that there was increasing evidence that the proscribed ULFA was forging links with the Nepalese Maoists and may soon set up bases in the Himalayan Kingdom. ULFA and the Maoists are reported to have recently agreed to have the former operate three new bases in Nepal. Earlier reports suggest that the ULFA may already have been operating some camps in Nepal. Further, ULFA and the Maoists have also reportedly agreed to share training resources. These moves towards closer links with the Nepalese Maoists may be hastened by the ULFA's current problems in Bhutan, where there is a strong possibility of the Royal Bhutanese Army (RBA) launching an operation against Indian insurgent outfits holed up in the country's jungles.

There is also some speculation that the ammunition and explosives seized in June-July 2003 from the Jogarpara village of Bogra district in Bangladesh were to be smuggled into Nepal for the Maoist insurgents, with the ATTF acting as a conduit. The police had arrested, among others, a suspected cadre of the ATTF, a tribal insurgent group operating in the North-Eastern Indian State of Tripura.

There have been many instances that establish the fact that the Nepalese Maoists have been procuring weapons and are conducting joint training camps along the Bihar-Nepal border. In the recent past, the Maoist movement along the 735 kilometre-long Bihar-Nepal border has been significant in the Sitamarhi, Sheohar and Madhubani districts. Similarly, Darjeeling and Siliguri in West Bengal have also been utilized by the Maoists to establish links with Indian extremists.

The Maoists are also in a process of strengthening their alliance with other South Asian left-wing extremist groups through the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) to create and effectively utilize the Compact Revolutionary Zone (CRZ). Along the border areas in north Bihar they have formed an 'Indo-Nepal Border Regional Committee' (INBRC) to co-ordinate their activities. The porous Bihar-Nepal border, the general breakdown of rule of law, poor governance, and lack of sincerity and incapacity of the police forces provides a context for these groups to operate with relative ease.

Meanwhile, the rebels have also started strengthening their position in the Tarai region all along Nepal's southern borders, which constitutes 23.1% of Nepal's total area and 46.7% of its population. In a meeting of top- security officials in Kathmandu on October 14, 2003, Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa candidly accepted the increasing Maoist presence in the Tarai region and the "lack of coordination among the security forces in quelling the insurgency." In the past, the mountainous terrain of the Central and West districts has proven ideal for the Maoists' hit and run guerrilla warfare, but the plains of the Tarai do not lend themselves as easily to these tactics, and the security forces have generally had an upper hand. Nevertheless, the chronic neglect of the 19 districts in the Tarai region is certainly helping the Maoists spread their tentacles all along the 15 border districts in the Tarai, as also enabling increased movement from and to India. The increasing activity of Indian Left-wing extremist groups in the districts of Northern Bihar, close to the Nepali Tarai region, especially MCC, which was earlier confined to southern Bihar, is evidence of the deepening nexus between the Nepali Maoists and Indian extremists.

In another deeply disturbing development, on December 7, 2003, Baburam Bhattarai, chief of the United People's Front, the 'political wing' of the Maoists, claimed that they were trying to 'organize' the approximately 10 million Nepalese in India. These Nepalese are primarily concentrated in Sikkim, Darjeeling, Siliguri, Shillong, Dehradun, Himachal Pradesh and the Gorakpur-Lucknow belts. It is plausible that much of this 'organizing' would be routed through the Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Ekta Samaj (ABNES), which is a proscribed group in India under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 2002. ABNES was originally founded to work for the 'unity and welfare' of Nepalese residing in India. Gradually, it evolved into a front organization for the Nepalese Maoists and is increasingly identified with the demand for a 'Greater Nepal', which includes Indian territories. Sources indicate that ABNES secretary Bamdev Chhetri had visited Jammu in September 2001 to establish contact with Kashmiri militant groups in order to set up a supply line for arms for the CPN (Maoist). Chhetri was eventually arrested by Indian authorities in September 2002 and subsequently deported to Nepal. The arrest of Chandra Prakash Gajurel, a member of the Maoist politburo, at Chennai airport in Tamil Nadu in August 2003, when he was trying to travel to Europe to lobby for external support for their cause also needs to be seen in this context.

While India has been primarily concentrating on securing its borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh, its open border system with Nepal is now evidently threatened by continuing Maoist transgressions. It is imperative that existing border management practices are reviewed in the light of the rapidly changing dynamics of insurgency within Nepal, and their overflow into India, as well as of the need to maintain a 'terror free' border between the two countries.

INDIA

Nagaland: The Dynamics of Extortion
Sashinungla
Research Associate, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati

On August 29, people of Mokokchung town resolved to stop paying any 'tax' - an euphemism for extortion - to insurgent groups. Shortly afterwards, the National Socialist Council of Nagalim, Isak-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM), issued a ban on 'tax collection' by any individual or organisation within 'Nagalim' (the 'Greater Nagaland' that the NSCN-IM demands), and warned of stern action against defying the diktat. In fact, in July 2002, right after an internal reshuffle, the new 'home minister' of the outfit, A.K. Lungalong, had said: "We must give way to a more systematic method of administration and to 'streamline tax collection' and initiate steps to check 'over-taxation'."

Extortion remains a fact of life in Nagaland. In spite of the peace talks between the NSCN-IM and the Government of India, as well as the official ceasefire between the Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) and the Government, large-scale 'tax collection' continues all over the State and even in areas in other neighbouring States where these groups have considerable influence. Official information data indicates that, out of 249 cases registered under various sections of law just during July and August 2003, 138 persons were arrested. Eighteen of them were insurgents and 29 extortionists linked to either of the insurgent groups. In the month of May 2002, police in Kohima arrested at least 7 NSCN-K cadres while they were extorting money from shopkeepers. Similarly, five arrests occurred in three cases of extortion in the month of July in Mokokchung alone. And for each reported case there are dozens of others that secure silent compliance.

Both NSCN factions have been extorting money from Government employees as well as the trading community. While the IM faction has fixed 25 percent of gross salary as the amount to be contributed to the coffers of the outfit annually, the Khaplang group collects 24 percent as its share from each of the Government employees in the State, as well as in all Naga inhabited areas of neighbouring States. The arrest of two NSCN-IM cadres from North Cachar hills district of Assam, in January 2002, led to the discovery of the outfit's plan to levy a 25 percent 'tax' on the salaries of employees in the area.

The situation in Mokokchung also illustrates the modus operandi that is executed over all ten districts of Nagaland. Every household in most villages in Mokokchung district has been paying Rupees 120 to 150 to both the groups (IM & K) annually under two separate categories: 'house tax' and 'army collection'. Additionally, Rupees One per head is collected annually as 'membership fee' by each faction. The payments demands are met mechanically, as any opposition carries an inherent threat of death. On occasion, a separate collection called 'public collection' is also done in the name of 'civilians' (a sort of go-between between the armed cadres and the public).

Villagers are also obliged to provide the armed cadres food and lodging during their periodic 'area tours'. The costs are met by 'ajungben saru' (emergency collection) from every household in the village. During a recent interview a Village Council Member in Mokokchung district said: "It is not just about the amount of money we pay, but also the negotiation, threats, process of collection, 'nature and place' of payment and much more".

Another major source of such revenue consists of collections from the drivers of each truck passing through Kohima. A sum of Rupees 500 is collected from each truck as 'protection money'. The stretch of NH-39, between Kohima and Dimapur provides a perfect setting for this sort of activity. Trucks carrying onions and potatoes from Assam into Nagaland also pay a 'patriotic tax'. In August last year, a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) of the Manipur People's Party (MPP), Okram Joy, in a letter to Deputy Prime Minister, L. K. Advani pointed out that NSCN-IM militants had opened their office at Dimapur in Nagaland to collect illegal taxes from drivers of Manipur. The Manipur Chief Minister Okram Ibobi had also drawn the attention of the Prime Minister to the fact that the NSCN-IM militants were collecting Rs. 30 million per month from the Manipuri vehicles in Nagaland. Last year, the Indo-Myanmar border trade in Chandel district was severely affected due to non-plying of vehicles after the NSCN-IM served notices to all owners of vehicles operating along the Imphal-Moreh National Highway No.39 to pay a 'tax' ranging between Rupees 900 and 1700 per trip. As many as 200 such vehicles ply daily on the route.

The NSCN-IM, according to a report of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in 2001, made over Rs. 1,500 million per annum through extortion and other means.

The militant outfits in the State have other illegal and 'political' means of generating incomes. The NSCN-IM is reportedly involved in vehicle lifting activities. In May 2002, police recovered a 9mm Taiwan made pistol with 6 rounds, 29 counterfoils of demand notes/receipts of the 'Angami region of the Government of People's Republic of Nagaland' (GPRN), as well as some fake number plates and vehicle documents used in stealing vehicles, from five arrested NSCN-IM members at Dimapur. There are also allegations of flows of funds from and to politicians in the State. In August this year, Congress leaders in New Delhi accused the NSCN-IM of paying Rupees 50 million to former Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Gegong Apang to topple the Congress Government headed by Chief Minister Mukut Mithi.

The NSCN-IM claims a traditional right over 'tax collection'. "Collection of taxes could not be termed as an extortion or looting as the organization had been collecting 'legal taxes'" to run the organization, the NSCN-IM declared in a statement on August 1, 2003. To persons acquainted with the dynamics of the group's operations, it is not difficult to understand the rationale behind such collections, even when peace parleys continue with the Government of India. As one commentator notes:

There have also been allegations over the NSCN-IM's reported collection of huge sums of money from the business community for foreign trips. "When a battalion of NGOs' representatives goes to Bangkok, it involves a huge expenditure. We have received complaints of such forcible collection of money at Dimapur. It is a terrible burden on the business community," former Nagaland Chief Minister S. C. Jamir had stated in May 2002.

There are also instances that a significant portion of the collected amount is channelled for private business enterprises of the insurgent outfits. In a startling revelation, a Home Ministry report on Northeast militants in 2001 stated, "Muivah has bought 12,450 shares worth US$1,25,000 (equivalent to about INR six million) listed to an Irish multinational company, well known for the production of consumer goods". The report also noted that the NSCN-IM had prepared a 'balance sheet' showing an expenditure of Rs. 200 million, but that actually amounted to US $500 million, as its chief had invested in real estate, shares, hotels and the proprietorship of several companies.

The impact of such 'tax collection' has been significant on the personal lives of civilians, as also on the economy of the State. "In every developmental project or any business transaction, after NSCN-IM cut off their lion's share, other groups; NSCN-K and NNC, will also cut their share. When so little amount is left for the people, development is difficult", rued a senior Naga Mothers' Association (NMA) leader in Kohima on condition of anonymity. "Government employees in the State can hardly take home a fraction of their month's salary; shops close down by mid-day and by 3 pm the streets wear a deserted look; demanding free meals from hotels and essential commodities from shops is part of the militants' 'style'; vehicles are taken forcibly without paying money; list of medicines are demanded from pharmacy owners; free use is made of commercial printing presses; officers and public leaders are constantly subjected to threats and demands by way of calls, chits and messengers. As a result, many business establishments in the towns have closed down, and prices of all commodities are the highest in this State."

After the NSCN-IM served an extortion note of Rs. 6 million on Oil India Limited (OIL), work at the Khumsai oil-well in the Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh has been suspended, resulting in a loss of Rupees 200 to300 million annually. Recently, the Border Road Task Force (BRTF) in Nagaland decided to indefinitely suspend work in Wokha-Bokajan sector of the State following extortion and threats from 'armed miscreants'. Rs. 43,900 and material were robbed at gunpoint in the night of September 7 from the BRTF, who are deployed in the State for construction and maintenance works on various roads.

There are also cases when civilians have been targeted by rival outfits. Just a few days before the 'National Day of Prayer' organised by the NCF [Nagaland Christian Forum] and Naga Hoho for the settlement of the Naga political problem in August 2002, gun-toting members of the Naga National Council (NNC) abducted the village chairmen of three villages near the Nagaland-Manipur interstate border in Manipur and demanded a huge ransom.

The widespread extortion machinery has also given rise to fake cadres who collect money in the name of the established insurgent groups. In August this year, reports suggested the presence of a gang of unidentified extortionists who had been extracting money from small traders and businessman at gunpoint, and who had injured one person near the High School area at Kohima.

Even in the prevailing environment of enveloping fear and anxiety, where refusal to pay brings death, occasional voices of protest do emerge in the State. Thus, the people of Tuensang made a submission to the Nagaland Baptist Church Council (NBCC) Peace Committee, which toured the Shamator, Noklak and Tuensang towns between April 11 and 17, 2003, stating, "Independence cannot come by killing the innocent public by the Nagas. Illiterate villagers and village council members are treated as second-class citizens. Villagers dying because of their beating. Poor villagers cannot longer feed them."

Even though the NSCN-IM has proclaimed a public ban on 'taxation' with effect from August 28, 2003, and no instances of extortion have been reported in the media since, such a situation is likely to be short-lived. There were already complaints about an NSCN-IM 'double extortion' spree in the neighbouring State of Manipur. Evidently, in a situation where hardly any militant group exists without some sort of 'taxation' or extortion base, either within or outside their own State, effectively ending such coercive resource mobilization could undermine the very foundations of such organisations, leading to their marginalisation and possible collapse.