SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 28, January 26, 2004

INDIA

Left Wing Extremism: Synchronized Onslaught
Nihar Nayak
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

With the general elections round the corner, Left wing Extremists - popularly termed Naxalites - of the Communist Party of India-Marxist Leninist (CPI-ML), People's War Group (PWG), and the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) have begun efforts to resolve their differences and work towards an organizational merger, potentially creating a grave threat to the electioneering process in the areas they dominate. In keeping with their ideological opposition to Parliamentary democracy in India, they have already called for a boycott of the election process, and large-scale preparations are said to be underway to ensure the success of the boycott. Vigorous efforts are in evidence for the organisation of training camps, procurement of illegal firearms, fund-raising, as well as outreach and propaganda activities to gain public sympathy.

Available reports suggest that the PWG and the MCC would merge under a new identity: the All India Maoist Communist Center (AIMCC), and would acquire a more militant 'avatar'. Intelligence sources indicate that the MCC is currently holding talks with the PWG and a few other like-minded organisations in India, as well as with Nepal's Maoist insurgents. Leaders of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) are believed to be acting as mediators to strengthen the extreme Left in the region. Given the significant increase in Naxalite activities in Central India after the August 11, 1998, merger of the PWG with Party Unity, another revolutionary group operating in Bihar, the possible union of the MCC and the PWG creates probabilities of a substantial force multiplier for Left Wing insurgencies over a vast landscape.

The MCC is distinguished by its commitment to an earlier version of the 'Charu Mazumdar line' [Mazumdar initiated the 'Naxalite' Movement in the mid-1960s], which envisions 'protracted armed struggle'. The MCC's philosophy revolves around two premises. The first is that, within the country, a revolutionary mass struggle existed and the people were fully conscious and even prepared to take part in revolution immediately. The second was that militant struggles must be carried on, not for land, crops, or other immediate goals, but for the seizure of power. These assumptions are reflected in all their views, whether on organization, on strategy or on tactics. As a result, participation in elections, propaganda, meetings, demonstrations, education of people through papers and pamphlets, are all viewed as being totally unnecessary, and all efforts and attention is firmly focused on revolutionary activities to undermine the state and seize power.

Though the PWG also held a similar view till the early 1980s, it has since shifted stance and established several political front organisations. The PWG gradually discarded its initial assessment of the people's level of preparedness for an armed struggle, and consequently revised its strategy of immediate seizure of power. Though the armed struggle is not discarded, considerable differences emerged on the issue of the appropriate modus operandi. There is now increasing emphasis on the processes of party building and the encouragement of mass political organizations. Party organisation, though, remains secret in nature. Their perspectives on strategy and tactics are also somewhat more nuanced, and there is an acknowledgement that the issues on which the struggle should be conducted necessarily depend on the level of people's consciousness and the nature of problems faced by them.

Despite these differences, both the organizations share their belief in the 'annihilation of class enemies' and in extreme violence as a means to achieve the organisation's goals. The PWG and the MCC have been responsible for the maximum number of violent attacks and fatalities in Naxalite-related violence in the nine states that are significantly affected by Left wing extremism. While the MCC operates in Jharkhand and Bihar, the PWG dominates Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Chhattisgarh. Despite a decline in the number of incidents and marginal increase in total fatalities over the past year (2003 witnessed 546 incidents and 509 deaths whereas 2002 had seen 1465 incidents and 482 deaths), Left wing extremist violence spread into new areas through 2003.

Thus, in Andhra Pradesh, a total of 280 persons were killed, including 164 Naxalites and 99 civilians, in 2003. A break-up reveals an increasing number of killings in the Andhra Pradesh State Committee (APSC) zone, which had been comparatively less violence-prone in the past, as compared to the area under the North Telengana Special Zone Committee (NTSZC) and the Andhra-Orissa Border Special Zone Committee (AOBSZC). The movement out of the areas of traditional dominance may be the consequence of a combination of factors, including:

• Massive police operations in Naxalite stronghold areas have forced the Naxalites to look for safer places of operation;
• There has been a decline in popularity in earlier stronghold areas (an indication to this effect could be the surrender of 863 cadres in 2003, the highest since 1992);
• A greater emphasis on, and success of, the Naxalite strategy to spread their ideology and influence in virgin areas or areas of peripheral influence.

It is the case that the increased combing operations subsequent to the attack on Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu on October 1, 2003, inflicted massive casualties on the PWG in the Telengana and Nalamala forest areas. These reverses coincide with the PWG's resolve to spread their movement in the plains by creating military formations, basic teams, village party committee, cell members and secret guerrilla squads. Their organizers have been instructed to concentrate mainly on strengthening the cadres by gaining the support of locals and not to involve themselves in any major operations.

These developments have great significance within the context of the anticipated general elections this year. The PWG and Jana Shakti in Andhra Pradesh have called upon the people to boycott the elections and intensify the fight against 'state-sponsored terrorism'. In a joint statement, PWG Central Committee (CC) member Pradeep and Jana Shakti CC member Bahujan alleged that the ruling Telegu Desam Party (TDP), 'in league with fascist forces at the Centre', had unleashed state violence targeting the Naxalites. Similarly, the PWG Orissa Committee has asked people to boycott polls and directed its cadres to target the 'anti-people government' of Navin Patnaik in Orissa and the 'pro-World Bank' TDP government in Andhra Pradesh. Sabyasachi Panda, the Secretary of the Vamshadhara Committee of the PWG, was quoted as having stated from a forest area in the Rayagada district near the Orissa-Andhra border, "Our poll strategy is being chalked out and would ensure defeat of ruling combine of the Biju Janata Dal and the BJP in Orissa and the Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh."

The newly formed Jharkhand State is the second worst affected state in the country in terms of Naxalite violence, after Andhra Pradesh. In last six months, the State has been virtually under siege due to increasing Naxalite activities, and both the State police and district administrations of the Naxalite-infested areas have accepted their failure to tackle the menace. The success of the 24-hours bandh (General Strike or Shutdown) called by both the PWG and MCC in Jharkhand on January 8, 2004, is an accurate index of the gravity of the situation, as well as of increasing popular support to the groups. The People's Guerrilla Army and the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army also supported the bandh. According to the Director General of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), S.C. Chaube, the Naxalites are virtually running a parallel government in remote parts of certain districts. During the bandh period, the rebels targeted railway establishments, mines and security forces. The railway establishments, mining and industries are generally regarded as soft targets by the Naxalites. During the bandh, Rail traffic on the Central Indian Coalfields (CIC) section of the Dhanbad Rail Division remained paralysed for several hours and five electric engines were set ablaze at different places in the State. According to railway officials, in the six months since June 11, 2003, thefts of railway properties had been reported from the McLuskiganj-Barwadih section on a regular basis, disrupting normal functioning of the railways. Rail drivers operating on the McLuskiganj-Barwadih section had refused to run the train following growing incidence of assaults by extremists.

Mining is another badly hit sector in Jharkhand. The Naxalites collect a major chunk of their funds from mining area by extortion and abduction of senior officials. The MCC had abducted 15 employees of the Hindustan Construction Company from Hazaribagh district, on July 9, 2003, because of their failure to pay their 'levy'. Other recent incidents relating to the mining sector in the State include:

• January 3, 2004, the Ranchi District police arrested a conduit of the MCC operating from the coal belt. The accused was collecting levies amounting to Rs. 800,000 each month from coal transporters on behalf of the MCC. He was close to the MCC's Rajkumar Ganju squad and other extremists.
• December 5, 2003, some 12 activists of the MCC demanded Rs. 70 million from the management of the Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL)-owned Meghahatuburu mine in Jharkhand's West Singhbhum district.
• December 11, the rebels stormed the Indian Aluminium Company facilities at Bagdu in Lohardaga district, as a result of which the loading and despatch of ore from the captive bauxite mines remained suspended for four days. The extremists had laid siege to the company's mines in the area, manhandled company officials, destroyed property and taken away Rs. 104,000 in cash.

The Naxalites had suffered a reverse in Jharkhand after the lynching of nine PWG activists by villagers at Longo in East Singhbhum district on August 8, 2003. The Longo incident deeply demoralized the rebels and led to a temporary suspension of the training camps they were organising. However, the killing of a newly recruited tribal policeman in Ghurabandha on January 1, 2004, indicates a resurgence of the group in the area.

Jharkhand has been suffering as a result of the Naxalite extremism since the creation of this new State on November 15, 2000, when the tribal dominated areas were carved out of Bihar. Maoist Guerrillas are currently active in 18 of the 22 districts in the State. Nearly 430 people, including 153 policemen, have been killed since the creation of the State. The year 2003 saw 90 persons - the highest in three years - including 45 civilians, killed in the State.

The infant State of Chhattisgarh, which was created by separating the tribal areas of Madhya Pradesh on November 1, 2000, is another badly affected area in terms of the intensity and scale of Left wing extremist violence. According to the Annual Report of the Chhattisgarh Police, a total of 78 people, including 31 police personnel and 38 civilians were killed in 103 incidents in the State in Naxalite related violence in 2003. The People's War Group and the MCC were active in 96 police station areas in the State spread over some seven of its 16 districts. The report also confirmed that there had been a dramatic increase in Naxalite activities in 2003 as compared to the previous year.

The high intensity of Naxalite activity and its recent spread to new areas, or increase in areas of marginal activity, has created fresh challenges for enforcement agencies in the concerned States. State Police forces in many of these States (Andhra Pradesh is an exception) are poorly equipped to handle the challenge and are enormously demoralized. As a measure of some relief, the Union Government recently announced that the Centre would not demand any charge for deployment of Central Para-Military Forces (CPMFs) in the Naxalism affected States. The Centre would also deploy an additional 11 CRPF battalions in the affected districts. These limited measures, however, will have very limited prophylactic or therapeutic value, given the absence of a coherent counter-insurgency strategy across the affected States in the face of what is evidently and increasingly a well coordinated strategy on the part of the Naxalite groups.

NEPAL

Insurgency, Development and Destruction
Guest Writer: Dr. Lok Raj Baral
Executive Chairman, Nepal Centre for Contemporary Studies (NCCS), Kathmandu

Amidst the serious concerns raised by the multilateral and bilateral donor agencies and the Government regarding the declining capacity of the Nepali state to utilize funds for meeting planned targets, some economic indicators continue to demonstrate favourable trends. Total expenditure is stated to have increased by 10 per cent to NR 20.7 billion, compared to the marginal growth of 0.5 per cent last year. Developmental expenditure increased by 22 per cent, along with an increase in tourist flow by 25 per cent. The foreign trade sector also recorded some positive trends, with an 8 per cent increase over the preceding year. Nevertheless, the World Bank has warned Nepal that it might have a 'failed state' tag in case it continued to suffer from its incapacity to solve the current Maoist insurgency and related political crises in the country.

The continued Maoist insurgency has had multiple effects in the country. The governing elites remains preoccupied with a military solution, and is consequently bent on 'beefing up' its armed forces and augmenting the Royal Nepal Army's anti-insurgency operations. The RNA's demand to increase its size to 70,000 recently received the Cabinet's assent, allowing it to recruit 6,400 army men immediately. It is estimated that about 25 percent of the total national budget is now allocated to security, and an estimated NR 14 billion is to be spent under this head in 2003-04.

The RNA claims that the Maoist People's War has been 'considerably blunted' as a result of counter-insurgency operations, particularly following the supply of sophisticated weapons and helicopters to Nepal by the US, UK and India. During 2002-03, $ 17 million had been committed by the US for defence equipment, while the UK and India provided 6.5 million pound sterling, and INR two billion for military related materials and INR one billion 'additional assistance', respectively. The per capita cost on 50,000 Army personnel has been estimated at US $ 1,853, and on 40,000 policemen, at US $ 2,020. Since the Government is on the look out for more imports of defence-related materials and grants from other countries, the economic burden for the country is heavy, and expected to increase. Little relief can be expected from this trend in the foreseeable future, in view of the diminishing prospects of a political solution to the Maoist insurgency.

Meanwhile, taking into account the criticism of excesses committed by the Army, the Military Spokesman has said recently that the RNA was fighting for democracy. This clarification substantially fails to clarify issues at a time when various Human Rights groups and others have criticized the Army for human rights violations. The Army Spokesman also rejected charges of 'militarization' of the country under the newly constituted 'unified command', which brought all counter-insurgency forces under the supervision of the Army, saying that this measure was only intended to 'streamline the security system'.

Nepal's unclear roadmap now appears to have been blurred even further as a result of the impasse that has established itself between King Gyanendra and the Parliamentary political parties, on the one hand, and the King, the Maoists and the Political parties, on the other. King Gyanendra has articulated a seven-point-agenda, comprehending the development of a 'national consensus', the maintenance of peace and security, the control of corruption, a 'people-oriented' administration, national unity, the formation of the Government through general election, and an All Party Government, but this has been termed vague and 'nothing new' by the political parties. Instead, they have demanded the restoration of the Parliamentary process and the immediate installation of an all-party government that would address these various issues.

Meanwhile, sensing that the King may undermine them, the youth and student wings of these parties have started raising anti-monarchical slogans in the streets. A political discourse on the relevance of the monarchy in Nepal has also begun, broadly alleging that the monarchy has always played an anti-democratic role whenever the opportunity arose. This position contradicts the general position of the Parliamentary political parties, and has indirectly given a boost to the Maoist demand for a 'republican system'. Nevertheless, the Parliamentary parties have refrained from formally accepting the republican agenda, using the uncertainty of the situation to exert pressure on the King, who they still believe holds the key to any initiatives to end the present impasse.

The King, clearly, remains embattled from all sides. The Maoist menace continues to constitute a very serious threat to the security and stability of the state, despite intensive counter-insurgency operations by the RNA and the Armed Police since the breakdown of the ceasefire on August 27, 2003. No resolution of the political and constitutional crisis in the country appears to be in sight either and, even though the Parliamentary political parties denounce the violent methods adopted by the Maoists, a convergence of views on the monarchy and the country's multiparty system appears to be emerging between the Maoists and these parties, as they array themselves against the Palace. King Gyanendra's take-over of executive power on October 4, 2002, and his inflexible attitude towards the demand for the restoration of the Parliamentary process has created an apparently unbridgeable gap between the Palace and democratic forces in the country, inadvertently aligning the latter with the Maoist agenda on several critical political issues. Nevertheless, the country's democratic parties continue to reiterate their faith in constitutional monarchy and the multiparty system, leaving an avenue open for a dialogue with the King.

The King has also come under some external pressure from countries including the US, UK and India, as well as other democratic countries, who have consistently supported the restoration of the constitutional monarchy, the multiparty system and human rights, demands that have attracted the displeasure of the King who is seeking a "constructive role" in the country's governance - an euphemism for political activism. Articulating the Government's annoyance over the alleged 'meddling' in Nepal's internal affairs by 'some foreign powers', the Minister for Communications, Kamal Thapa, recently openly criticized such interventions, stating that "some of the diplomats have crossed the limits and have gone to the extent of participating in processions" organized by political parties. The withdrawal of economic assistance by some Western countries and the disappointment expressed by others regarding the credibility of the Royal Government has caused further embarrassment. Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa's failure to muster the support of other political parties, including sections within his own Rashtriya Prajatantra Party, is another aspect of the multiple crises that confront the regime.

Even if the King does decide to continue to rule with an iron hand, he is likely to be the eventual loser. The people of Nepal have had extended experience with an absolute monarchy, and have little to expect from its revival. This puts them squarely behind the democratic forces in the country, despite transient disappointments over their failure to arrive at a consensus and to deliver on governance in the past. The Maoists, moreover, may be down, but they are far from 'out'. Given their countrywide presence and mobilization skills, they will remain a strong force in the country's future. Sooner or later, the King will have to yield to the dictates of time and circumstance. A resolution to the present crisis is not possible without the accommodation, both of the Parliamentary parties and the Maoists, in a new political arrangement.