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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 3, August 4, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Naxalite Consolidation in Orissa
Sanjay K. Jha
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
The recent
incidents of left-wing extremist - referred to as 'Naxalite'
- violence in the eastern Indian State of Orissa has once
again highlighted the expansion and consolidation of extremist
movement in the State. Ten security forces' (SF) personnel
were killed and eight others were injured in a landmine
blast triggered by the People's War Group (PWG)
near Bhijengiwada village under the Kalimela police station-limits,
Malkangiri district, on the Orissa-Andhra Pradesh border,
on July 30. The incident occurred when the SF personnel
were on a combing operation to flush out Naxalites during
the 'martyrs' week,' observed every year by the PWG between
July 28 and August 3, to commemorate Naxalites who had lost
their lives in the protracted conflict. On the same day,
alert Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and State police
personnel foiled an attempt by the Naxalites to attack the
Motu police station in the same district. On August 1, Naxalites
of the PWG killed a panchayat samiti (local body)
member of the Teleraj panchayat, Kasa Madhi, again
in the Malkangiri district.
These attacks have not only exposed the vulnerability of
inter-State border districts to Naxalite violence, but also
the lack of preparation on the part of the State Government
to fight Left Wing extremism. In fact, even before the beginning
of the 'martyrs' week', there were reports of an increase
in Naxalite activities in Malkangiri, Rayagada and Koraput
districts bordering Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. Over
the past few weeks, the Naxalites had held several meetings
in these districts to mobilize tribals and plan future strategies.
There were apprehensions that - as in the past - the Naxalites
could attack Government properties and police stations to
mark the occasion, and the Government had sounded a 'red
alert' and launched combing operations in these districts.
On July 23, the Police arrested 17 hardcore Naxalites in
Rayagada and Malkangiri districts and recovered a huge quantity
of explosives from their possession.
Over the years, Naxal groups such as the PWG and the Maoist
Communist Centre (MCC)
have established their presence in districts in Orissa that
border Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. While
the PWG is active in the Malkangiri, Rayagada, Gajapati,
Ganjam, Koraput and Nabrangpur districts bordering Andhra
Pradesh, the MCC is steadily increasing its presence in
Sundergarh, Mayurbhanj and Keonjhar districts bordering
Jharkhand and West Bengal. A careful examination of the
growth of the Naxalite movement in Orissa would demonstrate
that, apart from internal factors such as underdevelopment,
poor functioning of institutions of civil governance, the
persistence of traditional structure of exploitations in
rural and tribal areas, and an ill-equipped police force,
growing Naxalite violence in the neighbouring States has
influenced the course of events in Orissa.
The Naxalbari movement in the late 1960s had a significant
impact on the neighbouring districts of Koraput and Ganjam
on the Andhra Pradesh border and Mayurbhanj on the West
Bengal border. A State Coordination Committee had been constituted
on March 14, 1968, with D.B.M. Patnaik as its Convenor.
In 1969, the Coordination Committee was dissolved and the
different regions of the State were attached to the Naxalite
organizations of the neighbouring States. Thus, the Koraput
and Ganjam districts of South Orissa were put under the
jurisdiction of the Srikakulam regional committee in Andhra
Pradesh, while Mayurbhanj and Balasore districts of North
Orissa were linked to the West Bengal coordination committee.
The Sambhalpur and Sundergarh districts of North West Orissa
were attached to the South Bihar committee.
Over the years, as the Naxalite groups intensified their
activities in the neighbouring States, they increasingly
began using territories in Orissa for hideouts, maintenance
of training camps and the recruitment of tribals into their
cadres. For some time now, Naxalite groups have been attempting
to form a corridor of strongholds running through Chhattisgarh,
Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar and West Bengal, up to South
Nepal. The expansion of Naxalite activities in Orissa intensified
after the PWG formed the Andhra-Orissa Border Special Zonal
Committee (AOBSZC) in 2001. The AOBSZC covers the four north
coastal districts of Andhra Pradesh - East Godavari, Visakhapatnam,
Vijayanagaram and Srikakulam - and the five districts of
southern Orissa mentioned above. After the formation of
the AOBSZC, there has been a spurt in Naxalite activities
in the bordering districts. The biggest ever strike of its
kind in Orissa took place on August 9, 2001, when approximately
230 armed Naxalites of the PWG launched simultaneous attacks
on Kalimela and Motu police stations in Malkangiri district.
They killed six police personnel and injured approximately
22 others, and took away a huge quantity of arms and ammunition.
Two Naxalite 'commanders' were also killed in the incident.
Official sources disclose that, while 30 of the Naxalites
were suspected to have come from the bordering East Godavari
district of neighbouring Andhra Pradesh, the rest were local
activists.
Since then, the Andhra-Orissa border areas have become increasingly
vulnerable. On December 5, 2002, an estimated 18 police
personnel belonging to the Orissa Special Armed Police (OSAP)
were injured in a landmine blast triggered by the PWG near
Kolnara on the Rayagada-Behrampur State highway. On November
26, 2002, Naxalites of the PWG killed the district secretary
of the Biju Janata Dal (BJD), Jajati Sahu, in Naira village
under Gunupur subdivision, Rayagada district. On September
25, 2002, Naxalites beat to death an activist of the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) at Malyamkunda village, bordering Chhattisgarh.
On August 11, 2002, seven security force personnel were
killed and another five injured in a landmine blast triggered
by the PWG in the Gunupur sub-division of Rayagada district.
Similarly, there has been a spurt in Naxalite activities
in the Orissa-Jharkhand border areas as well. In April 2003,
Naxalites of the MCC looted approximately 550 kilograms
of explosives in the Sundergarh district in Orissa and sneaked
into the dense Saranda forests in the West Singhbum district
of Jharkhand. The explosives were intended for the Steel
Authority of India's Meghahatuburu mine in West Singhbhum.
Earlier, the vulnerability of the Saranda forest area had
come to light on December 20, 2002, when Naxalites laid
an ambush on a Police convoy, killing 18 and injuring 20
at Bitkilsoya in the Manoharpur police station-limits. They
also looted an unspecified quantity of arms and ammunition
and set ablaze 11 vehicles in the convoy. On April 20, 2003,
Naxalites of the MCC set three houses on fire in Karamapada
village in Jharkhand, two and half kilometers from the Orissa
border. In the last week of March 2003, a BJP worker was
killed at Siding village in Jharkhand, about 6 km from Jareikela,
Orissa.
In most of these districts, a host of local factors such
as poverty and exploitation of the tribals, have given the
PWG an opportunity to consolidate its base. Naxalite groups
have made concerted efforts to sharpen the economic differences
in the countryside, aggravating local problems and widening
their recruitment base. In the month of December 2002, Naxalites
of the PWG conducted a series of attacks on houses of rich
farmers, Government godowns, private granaries and even
Panchayat stocks, and looted approximately 1,000 quintals
of rice. Later, the rice was reportedly redistributed among
poor tribals. On December 16, 2002, PWG cadres looted approximately
100 quintals of rice from a Government godown in Malavaram
village, Kalimela block, Malkangiri district. The PWG had
also looted food grain from a godown in Koimetla village
under the Kalimela police station limits in Malkangiri district
on December 15, 2002. The Naxalite groups had been mobilizing
local tribals against local Government officials, including
police and forest department officials as also elected representatives,
through their front organizations Chasi Mula Mukti Sangha
and the Krushak-Mulia Mukti Sanhga in areas bordering
Jharkhand as well. They had also launched a drive to recruit
youngsters in the 15-19 age group.
To curb Naxalites activities, the State Government has relied
more on concerted police action and joint combing operation
with the Police Forces of neighbouring Andhra Pradesh and
Jharkhand. Speaking in the State Legislative Assembly on
March 27, 2003, Chief Minister Navin Patnaik claimed that
the police had achieved 'unprecedented success' in destroying
Naxalite hideouts and training camps in the State. He disclosed
that, during the preceding year, one India Reserve (IR)
battalion and Orissa State Armed Police (OSAP) battalions
each had been raised to deal exclusively with Naxalite and
extremist activities. Moreover, the police department had
also launched a public contact campaign in the districts
of Rayagada and Malkangiri districts to counter the anti-Government
propaganda carried out by Naxalites. Surprisingly, the State
Government is still to ban the PWG. In fact, after the July
30-landmine blast, the Orissa Police Havaldar and Constable
Association had demanded the proscription of the group,
and had threatened a boycott of duties in the Naxalite-affected
belt unless the Government banned the outfit. Similarly,
the Home Guards of the States have reportedly threatened
to withdraw from anti-Naxal operations after August 15,
2003, if the Government did not provide them with adequate
facilities and benefits. Speaking to media persons in Bhubneshwar
on August 2, the President of the All Orissa Home Guards
Karmachari Mahasangha, Gangadhar Panigrahy, disclosed that
the Home Guards were not even provided boots, though they
worked in jungle terrain. "Let alone any fire arms, Home
Guards are not even given lathis (batons)", he said.
Moreover, unlike the neighbouring States, the Orissa Government
has yet to formulate a package for the surrender and rehabilitation
of Naxalites who seek to abandon violence.
Clearly, a coherent strategy to deal with the expansion
and consolidation of Naxalite groups in backward tribal
areas of Orissa is yet to be formulated. An efficient and
effective local administration, better policing at the grassroots
level, effective coordination with law enforcing agencies
of neighbouring States, and the restoration of faith in
democratic politics among the tribals will be necessary
to counter the further expansion of Naxalite violence in
one of the most underdeveloped regions of the country.
Negotiating Peace: Roadmaps and
Roadblocks
Guest Writer: Deepak Thapa
Kathmandu-based Journalist
and Editor
It was with
a collective sigh of relief that Nepalis greeted the news,
on the evening of July 31, 2003, that the Communist Party
of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M)
had agreed to continue negotiations with the Government.
The announcement by the rebels came after nearly three weeks
of an increasingly tense situation which saw contact between
the two sides limited to correspondence, the tenor of which
had worsened with each exchange.
A formal invitation for a third round of talks had been
sent on July 13 by the Government to the CPN-M negotiating
team. The last time the rebels had met the Government was
on May 9, 2003. In the meantime, the political parties,
which had been calling on King Gyanendra to reinstate Parliament
- dissolved since May 2002 - and form an all-party Government,
had begun a 'people's movement' against the King's 'retrogressive'
actions since October 2002, when the monarch had dismissed
the elected Prime Minister and assumed executive authority.
Bowing to public sentiment, the then Prime Minister, Lokendra
Bahadur Chand, had resigned and the King had appointed Surya
Bahadur Thapa in his place in June. Thapa's appointment
went against the general expectation that the King would
work with the political parties and nominate their chosen
candidate, CPN (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML) General Secretary,
Madhav Kumar Nepal, to the high office. By bypassing the
parties, the King ensured that the Government would continue
to face their non-cooperation. The Government is thus exposed
to attacks from two flanks, the political parties and the
Maoists.
The Surya Bahadur Thapa Government had taken office, promising
to maintain continuity in the peace process that had begun
with the January 2003 ceasefire. Accordingly, it had held
six rounds of informal talks with representatives of the
high-level Maoist negotiating team. The Maoist rebels continued
to insist on the Government honouring the commitments made
at the second round of talks - including the release of
three of their Central Committee leaders, revealing the
whereabouts of others in Government custody and, most importantly,
limiting the movement of the Army to within five kilometers
of their barracks. The Government denied that any agreement
had been reached on the Army's movement and insisted that
the Maoists not violate the code of conduct formulated in
March, which included ceasing fund-raising from the public
and abductions.
While the war of words went on in public, the five members
of the Maoist dialogue team slowly disappeared from public
view. The Government had then sent the July 13 invitation
in alarm.
As a response was awaited from the Maoists, their leadership
was believed to be meeting somewhere in West Nepal. The
had closed down their contact office set up in the capital
in April two days after the office secretary was picked
up and grilled on whether the rebels were backing out of
talks. The Army and the police were placed on high alert
and the road checkposts that had been gradually phased out
over the months, reappeared. Soldiers and policemen on leave
were asked to report back to duty, and a breakdown of negotiations
seemed all but inevitable.
The Maoists replied 10 days later insisting that the earlier
agreements be complied with and also demanding that the
King be either directly involved in talks, or else that
he should publicly state that he would abide by any political
resolution the Government may reach with the Maoists. They
also wanted any future talks to start dealing with substantive
political issues and not remain bogged down with procedural
matters. On July 25, the Government responded with an undertaking
to honour the earlier agreements although it reserved rights
on the Army's movements.
Two days later, the Maoists issued an ultimatum in the form
of a letter signed by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, the Convenor
of the Maoist negotiation team, calling on the 'old regime'
to prove its sincerity by fulfilling five demands and creating
'an appropriate environment for talks by 31 July'. "If these
conditions are met we are ready to sit down for a third
round of talks, but if that does not happen we will be forced
to conclude that the old regime has unilaterally ended the
ceasefire," Bhattarai warned.
The 'conditions' were a reiteration of the demands enumerated
as well as a public declaration by the Army that it will
adhere to the code of conduct and also honour any agreement
arising from talks. The Maoists also wanted the five-year
counter-terrorism agreement signed with the US earlier this
year annulled, and all US military advisers and experts
expelled from the country.
The ball was now in the Government's court and it showed
a measure of flexibility by releasing three CPN-M Central
Committee members. The Government also dealt with the issues
raised in Bhattarai's letter and provided an item-wise reply,
which proved sufficient as a demonstration of good faith
for the Maoists and the CPN-M Chairman, Prachanda, announced,
on July 31, that he had instructed his negotiating team
to proceed with the talks. He also asked the Government
to include the political parties in the dialogue process
in future.
There are expectations that the next round of talks will
be held within a week or so. But problems persist, since
the political parties, which have boycotted the Government,
have already made it clear that there will be no cooperation
with 'the two armies' unless their demands - including the
restoration of Parliament - are first fulfilled. And without
their participation, any settlement reached will be sorely
lacking in legitimacy. Therein lies the challenge for Nepal.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts
in South Asia
July 28-August 3,
2003
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
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BANGLADESH
|
5
|
0
|
3
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8
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INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
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0
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4
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4
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Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
8
|
6
|
28
|
42
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Left-wing
Extremism
|
1
|
10
|
6
|
17
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Maharashtra
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
Manipur
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Nagaland
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Tripura
|
7
|
1
|
0
|
8
|
Total (INDIA)
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19
|
18
|
40
|
77
|
NEPAL
|
0
|
4
|
0
|
4
|
PAKISTAN
|
5
|
0
|
0
|
5
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* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BANGLADESH
Government
rejects Indian proposal of joint patrol
along the border: The Dhaka-based Daily
Star quoted Bangladesh Foreign Minister
Morshed Khan as saying that Bangladesh was
unable to concede to India's proposal that
both countries should jointly patrol the
International Border between them. He reportedly
said that it was "not feasible". India had
proposed in April 2003 that the Border Security
Force (BSF) and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR)
could work out a modality for joint patrol
to prevent smuggling, illegal immigration
and movement of terrorists along the border.
The
Hindu, August 2, 2003.
INDIA
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
not to honour any cease-fire call
given by Hurriyat in J&K: The
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM) announced
on August 1, 2003, that it would
not honour any cease-fire call given
by the secessionist All Parties
Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). The
group indicated that it was for
the terrorist leadership to decide
on the timing of laying down arms.
In an interview to a Kashmiri daily,
The Rehmat, HM spokesperson
Junaid-ul-Islam reportedly said
that the Hizb was not carrying out
any Fidayeen (suicide squad)
attacks but added that it was capable
of carrying out such attacks. Daily
Excelsior, August
2, 2003.
10 security force personnel killed
in landmine blast in Orissa: Five
personnel of the Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF) and five of
the Orissa State police were killed
and eight others injured in a landmine
blast triggered by left-wing extremists
- referred to as 'Naxalites' - of
the People's War Group (PWG)
near Bhijengiwada village in the
Malkangiri district on July 30,
2003. Speaking to the media, Inspector
General of Police (Operations),
M.M. Praharaj, said the incident
occurred when the security force
personnel were on their way to conduct
a combing operation near the Vejingiwada
area. Times
of India, July 31,
2003.
NEPAL
Third
round of peace talks likely
in August, says Government:
Speaking at a Rashtriya Prajatantra
Party (RPP) meeting on August
2, 2003, Government spokesperson
Kamal Thapa reportedly proposed
August 12 as the date for the
third round of peace talks with
the Maoist
insurgents. Separately,
peace talks' facilitator Shailendra
Kumar Upadhyay said that the
Government would make public
its agenda by August 7. Nepal
News, August
3, 2003.
Government releases three
Maoist Central Committee members:
Reports on July 29, 2003, said
that the Government had released
three Maoist central committee
members - Rabindra Shrestha,
Bamdev Chhetri and Mumaram Khanal
- from prison to fulfill one
of the Maoist
insurgents' preconditions
to return to the negotiating
table. 34 others from among
the 322 persons whom the Maoists
had declared missing, were also
released. Nepal
News, July 30,
2003.
PAKISTAN
ISI relocates
underworld don Dawood Ibrahim to Pakistan-Afghanistan border:
Pakistan-based underworld don Dawood Ibrahim, a prime accused
in the March 1993 Mumbai serial blasts case, and eight of his
associates have reportedly been shifted from their hideout in
Karachi to an undisclosed location on the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border. He has been given protection by Pakistan's external
intelligence agency, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Dawood
Ibrahim and those relocated are on the Indian 'list of 20' given
to the Pakistan Government for priority extradition. The eight
associates who have been shifted along with Dawood are Chhota
Shakeel, Tiger Memon, another prime accused in the serial blasts,
Yeda Yakub, Tahir Takla, Aftab Batki, Javed Chikna, Anwar Theba
and Fahim Machmach. Times
of India, August 4, 2003.
US investigators trace 9/11 funding to Al Qaeda accounts
in Pakistan: US investigators have reportedly traced the
funding for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to Al
Qaeda accounts in Pakistan. John S Pistole, Deputy
Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
(FBI) counter-terrorism division, revealed this during his testimony
to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee in Washington on
July 31, 2003. Pistole said that they have "traced the origin
of the funding of 9/11 to financial accounts in Pakistan, where
high-ranking and well-known Al-Qaeda operatives played a major
role in moving the money forward, eventually into the hands
of the hijackers located in the US". However, Pistole did not
specify how those accounts in Pakistan were funded. The FBI
has estimated that the 9/11 attacks cost between $175,000 and
$250,000, which paid for flight training, travel and other expenses.
This money reportedly flowed to the hijackers through associates
in Germany and the United Arab Emirates. Those associates reported
to top Al Qaeda terrorist Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who managed
much of the 9/11 planning from Pakistan, US officials said.
Hindustan
Times, August 1, 2003.
Taliban using Pakistani soil as sanctuary for terrorist activity,
says Afghan President: Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai
said during an interview to a private television channel that
Taliban
operatives are continuing to use Pakistan as a sanctuary to
stage terrorist activities in his country. "Definitely there
are Taliban coming from across the border (to) conduct operations
in Afghanistan… A lot of people in Afghanistan believe that
the Taliban are coming from across the border, together with
al-Qaeda,"
alleged Karzai. Jang,
July 31, 2003.
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The South
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