Tactical Manipulations
in FATA
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant
Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution
Amidst military operations against Al
Qaeda and Taliban
terrorists near its Afghan border, the past week saw Pakistan
securing more approbation and aid for its role in the US-led
global war on terror. The American Administration is expected
shortly to designate Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA),
part of the continuing process of rehabilitation of a regime
that, less than three years ago, was a pariah state allied
to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the decision to
grant MNNA status to Islamabad after meeting with his Pakistani
counterpart Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri on March 18, 2004. Countries
with MNNA status, including Australia, Israel and Japan,
benefit from defence cooperation and loan guarantees to
pay for arms deals. Pakistan is expected to be the fourth
Muslim country after Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain to be granted
MNNA status. As a MNNA, apart from securing preferential
treatment in defence supplies from the US, Pakistan would
also become eligible to buy depleted uranium and receive
special privileges in US military training for its Armed
Forces. In the long run, these may lead to an aggressive
arms race in South Asia.
Pakistan's efforts towards reintegration into the international
community also received a boost on March 19, when Commonwealth
Secretary General Don McKinnon said in Kuala Lumpur that
Pakistan has made 'significant progress towards democratic
rule', clearing the way for its possible return to the Group.
Nine Foreign Ministers representing countries in the Commonwealth
Ministerial Action Group were likely to look 'positively'
at Pakistan's readmission to the 54-nation grouping of former
British colonies when they meet in London in late April
2004. Pakistan was suspended from the body after General
Musharraf seized power in a military coup in 1999. McKinnon
said that President Musharraf had 'taken significant steps'
to rebuild democratic institutions, including the holding
of parliamentary elections in 2002 and the appointment of
a Prime Minister.
General Musharraf had executed a volte face on his
country's support to the Taliban and Al Qaeda on September
19, 2001, when he announced Pakistan's decision to join
the US-led anti-terrorist campaign. Since then, the county's
forces have been rendering selective support to the global
war against terrorism, and have also pursued suspected Al
Qaeda militants into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), located on the Pakistan side of the 2,400 kilometers
long and porous border with Afghanistan.
As part of its professed intent to 'purge' Pakistan of terrorists,
the military regime launched operations against Al Qaeda
and Taliban fugitives holed up in the tribal areas, on March
16. A day earlier, President Musharraf told a grand tribal
Jirga (council), convened at the Governor's House
in Peshawar, that there were at least 500-600 'foreign'
militants in the Waziristan agency. The hunt for Taliban
and Al Qaeda leaders in an area renowned for seclusion and
Islamist radicalism will severely test Pakistan's will.
Similar operations in the past have not yielded any significant
successes. The current operation - launched in the Shin
Warsak, Zha Ghondai and Kaloosha villages of South Waziristan
Agency - is not likely to be any easier, since tribesmen
have for long ideologically bonded with Al Qaeda and the
Taliban and can also look for support from Pakistan's fundamentalist
religious parties that rule the North West Frontier Province
(NWFP).
At least 44 people, including 16 troops and 28 suspected
terrorists, have been killed so far since the launch of
the current operations. By March 19, with exchange of fire
continuing, 7,000 regular troops of the Pakistan Army and
paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) had reportedly cordoned
off a 50 kilometer area in which an estimated 300 to 400
foreign and local terrorists are reportedly present at about
seven targets in the Agency. The whereabouts of 19 FC personnel,
who were reportedly made hostage by the terrorists near
Kaloosha village, is still unclear. There were unconfirmed
reports about negotiations between emissaries of the Government
and terrorists for arranging a possible swap of the prisoners
and of the bodies of those killed.
There has been a fair amount of speculation on the presence
of Ayman al-Zawahri, the Al Qaeda's 'second-in-command',
in the area, though official confirmation has remained elusive.
President Musharraf did, however, confirm that, " there
may be a high-value target. I can't say who… They are giving
fierce resistance so we are pretty sure there is a high-value
target there." Earlier, three senior Pakistani officials
told The Associated Press on March 18 that they had
received intelligence from the tribal areas that al-Zawahri
could be among the people hiding there. Adding to the heightened
global interest, a Taliban spokesperson, Abdul Samad, told
Associated Press in a telephonic interview that both
al-Zawahri and Osama bin Laden are alive and hiding inside
Afghanistan. "Muslims of the world, don't worry about them,
these two guests, they are fine," he said.
Recent Pakistani reportage has indicated that President
Musharraf is facing intense pressure from Washington to
help US forces capture or kill front ranking Al Qaeda and
Taliban leaders holed up in the tribal areas in order to
boost President George W. Bush's electoral fortunes. However,
successful neutralization of Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants
in the tribal areas depends significantly on the mutual
co-operation obtaining between tribesmen and the Government,
a goal that still remains outside the military regime's
reach. The FATA Administration still has the British-era
Frontier Crimes Regulations, under which tribal elders have
to hand over wanted criminals at the request of the Federal
Government. Thus far, tribal chiefs have remained hesitant
in handing over the Mujahideen.
Adding to the Musharraf regime's problems are the protests
of the Islamist alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal. "The
on going operation in FATA has created unrest and fears
among the people and it could engulf the entire region if
it was not stopped forthwith," Senior Minister Sirajul Haq
told the NWFP Assembly. He said that 'invisible forces'
have created instability in tribal areas by interfering
in the tribal customs and traditions and the consequences
of imposing decisions on tribesmen would be detrimental.
Even the granting of MNNA status has come in for sharp censure
with Khurshid Ahmad, vice president of the key MMA constituent
Jamaat-e-Islami, saying, "This is neither an honour, nor
a step towards global security. We have to avoid becoming
a mercenary and a client state." Echoing the sentiment,
Hasnat Qadri, spokesperson for the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan,
warned "By making such an alliance, Pakistani soldiers will
be made US mercenaries."
Stabilizing Afghanistan is currently America's primary foreign
policy agenda within the region. South Asia, however, remains
an area of manifest confusion under the Bush Administration's
policy microscope. Pakistan has gambled on its 'frontline
status', hoping that this would help it secure immunity
from adverse action on the issue of support to cross-border
terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The spectrum of tolerance
for Pakistan's delinquency, moreover, has been widened by
the belief that applying greater pressure on Pakistan would
have compromised the US operations in Afghanistan and driven
more Muslims into the militant camp.
Pakistan has evidently been able to execute what Bowyer
Bell has, in a different context, described as a 'tactical
terrorist manipulation.' While it continues to extend qualified
assistance in the US hunt for Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives
- and secures substantial approbation and economic rewards
for services rendered - it perceives no overwhelming pressure
to turn off the flow of terror in Kashmir. At this moment,
however, it is not clear whether the US can satisfactorily
manage a balance of options in South Asia, since any 'enduring
alliance' with one regional player creates immediate complexities
vis-à-vis the other. These factors play out even
as both India and Pakistan separately believe that they
have a better or higher 'confluence of interests' with the
US, the basis, each believes, for an 'enduring alliance'
with the USA.
Are there, Caleb Carr wonders, "ways in which terrorism
is actually a progressive form of warfare?" There are evident
perils and future risks involved in co-opting and rewarding
nations that have been primary instruments of international
Islamist terror.
The Shadow of Militancy
Lingers
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
Can the Indian separatist militants that Bhutan ousted from
its southern jungles in an unprecedented military offensive
in December 2003 return to the Himalayan kingdom that had
been their home for as long as 12 years? "There is no guarantee,
so we can't sit tight," said Bhutan's Ambassador to India,
Dago Tshering, in discussions with this writer last week.
This single comment by the veteran Bhutanese leader - he
had been the country's Home Minister for more than a decade
- sums up the current concern of the Royal Government. Thimphu
fears two possibilities: First, attempts at retaliation
by the rebels who could attack soft targets, either inside
the kingdom, or civilians passing through Indian territory
in the bordering States of Assam and West Bengal. Second,
the Royal Government is unwilling to rule out the chances
of the rebels returning to the densely wooded southern parts
of the country.
That the shadow of militancy still lingers in Bhutan is
indicated by the fact that, for the past nearly three months
since the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) and the Royal Body Guards
(RBG) ended their operations against the Indian rebels,
Thimphu has been engaged in working out a strategy to put
in place a mechanism to tackle future threats. This led
to the holding of the first Bhutan-India bilateral meeting
on 'border management and security matters' in New Delhi
on March 9 and 10, 2004. While Dago Tshering led the Bhutanese
delegation, which included the country's Home Secretary,
Penden Wangchuk, the Indian side was led by K.P. Singh,
Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
Four main decisions were arrived during these talks:
-
Both
nations agreed to strengthen security along the international
border along the Indian States of Assam and West Bengal
-
New
Delhi agreed to train the Royal Bhutan Police (RBP),
besides making training facilities available to them.
-
The
Indian Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has been entrusted
with the task of upgrading and maintaining the roads
leading to the kingdom from the adjoining Indian States
of West Bengal and Assam.
-
The
two sides agreed to establish an 'institutional mechanism'
between the Home Ministries of the two countries to
evolve ways to improve coordination between district
authorities on either side of the border.
Bhutanese
authorities have been quite cautious in commenting on whether
the country is now completely free of rebels belonging to
the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), who had
as many as 30 camps inside the Kingdom before the December
operations. "All we can say is that the rebels have been
flushed out. Of course, some may still be hiding in the
jungles, trying to avoid detection," a top Bhutanese official
said. Thimphu could, as a matter of policy, be trying to
play it safe by not declaring its territory absolutely free
of the Indian rebels following the RBA-RBG assault. Bhutan
would like the Indian Army and paramilitary forces to remain
on the alert and stand guard along the border to prevent
the rebels from re-entering the Kingdom. The Delhi meeting
earlier this month, therefore, has been very important from
Bhutan's point of view.
The small size of its military and police forces is a cause
of the Royal Government's apprehension. The strength of
the RBA is just about 6,000, and the numbers in the Royal
Bhutan Police are even lower. Moreover, since the police
in Bhutan has virtually no experience in handling security
matters at a higher level, and has no training in dealing
with militancy, Thimphu has been laying much stress on the
training of its police force by the Indians. Intelligence
gathering is another area that worries Bhutan, and Indian
intelligence agencies are expected to provide specialized
training to a small group of Bhutanese police and military
officials on this aspect. "Now, there is no way for the
Bhutanese to find out what the militants on the other side
of the border could be planning," Ambassador Tshering conceded.
Bhutan is, once again, focused on using its entire available
resource pool to push ahead with the Ninth Plan and speed
up processes of development in the landlocked nation, which
had slowed down due to the decade-old militancy problem.
During the past few years, several donor nations and agencies
were unable to implement programmes in the country's southern
areas, where the Indian militants had their bases. Thimphu
would like to catch up on these activities and move ahead.
A peaceful situation in the kingdom, including its southern
frontier with northeastern and eastern India, is an imperative
if these programmes are to be successfully implemented.
This explains the Royal Government's current emphasis on
border security.
Thimphu has reasons to be tense, despite the success of
its anti-terrorist operations. ULFA and NDFB rebels are
said to be roaming in small groups on the border between
the Northeast Indian State of Meghalaya and Bangladesh,
looking for a safe staging area to substitute for the bases
lost in Bhutan. Reports have also started trickling in that
ULFA's self-styled 'commander-in-chief', Paresh Barua, holed
up in Bangladesh, is desperately trying to regroup his fighters,
and make the organisation's presence felt once again, and
may find Bhutanese soft-targets tempting. The KLO, too,
is a group that Thimphu would like to keep track of, especially
in view of its linkages with the Maoist guerrillas in Nepal.
Bhutan has been very slow indeed in taking notice of the
so-called Communist movement that has sprouted in the kingdom's
southern pockets since mid-2003. But, sections in the Bhutanese
administration appear to have realized the potential these
'stray elements' have to foment trouble of a new variety
in the Kingdom. All said and done, Thimphu still has little
reason to be complacent.
