SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 36, March 22, 2004

 

PAKISTAN

Tactical Manipulations in FATA
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution

Amidst military operations against Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorists near its Afghan border, the past week saw Pakistan securing more approbation and aid for its role in the US-led global war on terror. The American Administration is expected shortly to designate Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), part of the continuing process of rehabilitation of a regime that, less than three years ago, was a pariah state allied to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the decision to grant MNNA status to Islamabad after meeting with his Pakistani counterpart Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri on March 18, 2004. Countries with MNNA status, including Australia, Israel and Japan, benefit from defence cooperation and loan guarantees to pay for arms deals. Pakistan is expected to be the fourth Muslim country after Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain to be granted MNNA status. As a MNNA, apart from securing preferential treatment in defence supplies from the US, Pakistan would also become eligible to buy depleted uranium and receive special privileges in US military training for its Armed Forces. In the long run, these may lead to an aggressive arms race in South Asia.

Pakistan's efforts towards reintegration into the international community also received a boost on March 19, when Commonwealth Secretary General Don McKinnon said in Kuala Lumpur that Pakistan has made 'significant progress towards democratic rule', clearing the way for its possible return to the Group. Nine Foreign Ministers representing countries in the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group were likely to look 'positively' at Pakistan's readmission to the 54-nation grouping of former British colonies when they meet in London in late April 2004. Pakistan was suspended from the body after General Musharraf seized power in a military coup in 1999. McKinnon said that President Musharraf had 'taken significant steps' to rebuild democratic institutions, including the holding of parliamentary elections in 2002 and the appointment of a Prime Minister.

General Musharraf had executed a volte face on his country's support to the Taliban and Al Qaeda on September 19, 2001, when he announced Pakistan's decision to join the US-led anti-terrorist campaign. Since then, the county's forces have been rendering selective support to the global war against terrorism, and have also pursued suspected Al Qaeda militants into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), located on the Pakistan side of the 2,400 kilometers long and porous border with Afghanistan.

As part of its professed intent to 'purge' Pakistan of terrorists, the military regime launched operations against Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives holed up in the tribal areas, on March 16. A day earlier, President Musharraf told a grand tribal Jirga (council), convened at the Governor's House in Peshawar, that there were at least 500-600 'foreign' militants in the Waziristan agency. The hunt for Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders in an area renowned for seclusion and Islamist radicalism will severely test Pakistan's will. Similar operations in the past have not yielded any significant successes. The current operation - launched in the Shin Warsak, Zha Ghondai and Kaloosha villages of South Waziristan Agency - is not likely to be any easier, since tribesmen have for long ideologically bonded with Al Qaeda and the Taliban and can also look for support from Pakistan's fundamentalist religious parties that rule the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).

At least 44 people, including 16 troops and 28 suspected terrorists, have been killed so far since the launch of the current operations. By March 19, with exchange of fire continuing, 7,000 regular troops of the Pakistan Army and paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) had reportedly cordoned off a 50 kilometer area in which an estimated 300 to 400 foreign and local terrorists are reportedly present at about seven targets in the Agency. The whereabouts of 19 FC personnel, who were reportedly made hostage by the terrorists near Kaloosha village, is still unclear. There were unconfirmed reports about negotiations between emissaries of the Government and terrorists for arranging a possible swap of the prisoners and of the bodies of those killed.

There has been a fair amount of speculation on the presence of Ayman al-Zawahri, the Al Qaeda's 'second-in-command', in the area, though official confirmation has remained elusive. President Musharraf did, however, confirm that, " there may be a high-value target. I can't say who… They are giving fierce resistance so we are pretty sure there is a high-value target there." Earlier, three senior Pakistani officials told The Associated Press on March 18 that they had received intelligence from the tribal areas that al-Zawahri could be among the people hiding there. Adding to the heightened global interest, a Taliban spokesperson, Abdul Samad, told Associated Press in a telephonic interview that both al-Zawahri and Osama bin Laden are alive and hiding inside Afghanistan. "Muslims of the world, don't worry about them, these two guests, they are fine," he said.

Recent Pakistani reportage has indicated that President Musharraf is facing intense pressure from Washington to help US forces capture or kill front ranking Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders holed up in the tribal areas in order to boost President George W. Bush's electoral fortunes. However, successful neutralization of Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants in the tribal areas depends significantly on the mutual co-operation obtaining between tribesmen and the Government, a goal that still remains outside the military regime's reach. The FATA Administration still has the British-era Frontier Crimes Regulations, under which tribal elders have to hand over wanted criminals at the request of the Federal Government. Thus far, tribal chiefs have remained hesitant in handing over the Mujahideen.

Adding to the Musharraf regime's problems are the protests of the Islamist alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal. "The on going operation in FATA has created unrest and fears among the people and it could engulf the entire region if it was not stopped forthwith," Senior Minister Sirajul Haq told the NWFP Assembly. He said that 'invisible forces' have created instability in tribal areas by interfering in the tribal customs and traditions and the consequences of imposing decisions on tribesmen would be detrimental. Even the granting of MNNA status has come in for sharp censure with Khurshid Ahmad, vice president of the key MMA constituent Jamaat-e-Islami, saying, "This is neither an honour, nor a step towards global security. We have to avoid becoming a mercenary and a client state." Echoing the sentiment, Hasnat Qadri, spokesperson for the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, warned "By making such an alliance, Pakistani soldiers will be made US mercenaries."

Stabilizing Afghanistan is currently America's primary foreign policy agenda within the region. South Asia, however, remains an area of manifest confusion under the Bush Administration's policy microscope. Pakistan has gambled on its 'frontline status', hoping that this would help it secure immunity from adverse action on the issue of support to cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. The spectrum of tolerance for Pakistan's delinquency, moreover, has been widened by the belief that applying greater pressure on Pakistan would have compromised the US operations in Afghanistan and driven more Muslims into the militant camp.

Pakistan has evidently been able to execute what Bowyer Bell has, in a different context, described as a 'tactical terrorist manipulation.' While it continues to extend qualified assistance in the US hunt for Al Qaeda and Taliban fugitives - and secures substantial approbation and economic rewards for services rendered - it perceives no overwhelming pressure to turn off the flow of terror in Kashmir. At this moment, however, it is not clear whether the US can satisfactorily manage a balance of options in South Asia, since any 'enduring alliance' with one regional player creates immediate complexities vis-à-vis the other. These factors play out even as both India and Pakistan separately believe that they have a better or higher 'confluence of interests' with the US, the basis, each believes, for an 'enduring alliance' with the USA.

Are there, Caleb Carr wonders, "ways in which terrorism is actually a progressive form of warfare?" There are evident perils and future risks involved in co-opting and rewarding nations that have been primary instruments of international Islamist terror.

BHUTAN

The Shadow of Militancy Lingers
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati

Can the Indian separatist militants that Bhutan ousted from its southern jungles in an unprecedented military offensive in December 2003 return to the Himalayan kingdom that had been their home for as long as 12 years? "There is no guarantee, so we can't sit tight," said Bhutan's Ambassador to India, Dago Tshering, in discussions with this writer last week. This single comment by the veteran Bhutanese leader - he had been the country's Home Minister for more than a decade - sums up the current concern of the Royal Government. Thimphu fears two possibilities: First, attempts at retaliation by the rebels who could attack soft targets, either inside the kingdom, or civilians passing through Indian territory in the bordering States of Assam and West Bengal. Second, the Royal Government is unwilling to rule out the chances of the rebels returning to the densely wooded southern parts of the country.

That the shadow of militancy still lingers in Bhutan is indicated by the fact that, for the past nearly three months since the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) and the Royal Body Guards (RBG) ended their operations against the Indian rebels, Thimphu has been engaged in working out a strategy to put in place a mechanism to tackle future threats. This led to the holding of the first Bhutan-India bilateral meeting on 'border management and security matters' in New Delhi on March 9 and 10, 2004. While Dago Tshering led the Bhutanese delegation, which included the country's Home Secretary, Penden Wangchuk, the Indian side was led by K.P. Singh, Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). Four main decisions were arrived during these talks:

• Both nations agreed to strengthen security along the international border along the Indian States of Assam and West Bengal
• New Delhi agreed to train the Royal Bhutan Police (RBP), besides making training facilities available to them.
• The Indian Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has been entrusted with the task of upgrading and maintaining the roads leading to the kingdom from the adjoining Indian States of West Bengal and Assam.
• The two sides agreed to establish an 'institutional mechanism' between the Home Ministries of the two countries to evolve ways to improve coordination between district authorities on either side of the border.

Bhutanese authorities have been quite cautious in commenting on whether the country is now completely free of rebels belonging to the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), who had as many as 30 camps inside the Kingdom before the December operations. "All we can say is that the rebels have been flushed out. Of course, some may still be hiding in the jungles, trying to avoid detection," a top Bhutanese official said. Thimphu could, as a matter of policy, be trying to play it safe by not declaring its territory absolutely free of the Indian rebels following the RBA-RBG assault. Bhutan would like the Indian Army and paramilitary forces to remain on the alert and stand guard along the border to prevent the rebels from re-entering the Kingdom. The Delhi meeting earlier this month, therefore, has been very important from Bhutan's point of view.

The small size of its military and police forces is a cause of the Royal Government's apprehension. The strength of the RBA is just about 6,000, and the numbers in the Royal Bhutan Police are even lower. Moreover, since the police in Bhutan has virtually no experience in handling security matters at a higher level, and has no training in dealing with militancy, Thimphu has been laying much stress on the training of its police force by the Indians. Intelligence gathering is another area that worries Bhutan, and Indian intelligence agencies are expected to provide specialized training to a small group of Bhutanese police and military officials on this aspect. "Now, there is no way for the Bhutanese to find out what the militants on the other side of the border could be planning," Ambassador Tshering conceded.

Bhutan is, once again, focused on using its entire available resource pool to push ahead with the Ninth Plan and speed up processes of development in the landlocked nation, which had slowed down due to the decade-old militancy problem. During the past few years, several donor nations and agencies were unable to implement programmes in the country's southern areas, where the Indian militants had their bases. Thimphu would like to catch up on these activities and move ahead. A peaceful situation in the kingdom, including its southern frontier with northeastern and eastern India, is an imperative if these programmes are to be successfully implemented. This explains the Royal Government's current emphasis on border security.

Thimphu has reasons to be tense, despite the success of its anti-terrorist operations. ULFA and NDFB rebels are said to be roaming in small groups on the border between the Northeast Indian State of Meghalaya and Bangladesh, looking for a safe staging area to substitute for the bases lost in Bhutan. Reports have also started trickling in that ULFA's self-styled 'commander-in-chief', Paresh Barua, holed up in Bangladesh, is desperately trying to regroup his fighters, and make the organisation's presence felt once again, and may find Bhutanese soft-targets tempting. The KLO, too, is a group that Thimphu would like to keep track of, especially in view of its linkages with the Maoist guerrillas in Nepal. Bhutan has been very slow indeed in taking notice of the so-called Communist movement that has sprouted in the kingdom's southern pockets since mid-2003. But, sections in the Bhutanese administration appear to have realized the potential these 'stray elements' have to foment trouble of a new variety in the Kingdom. All said and done, Thimphu still has little reason to be complacent.