SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 4, August 11, 2003

INDIA	PAKISTAN

The 'Peace' Carnival
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

From despair to euphoria to despair has been the classical cycle in India's 'search for peace' in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). It has been the season for euphoria again since Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's April 18, 2003, speech at Srinagar, where he once again offered 'a hand of friendship' to Pakistan. Since then, there has been a rising crescendo of symbolism culminating in the current and extraordinary jamboree at Lahore, where a delegation of more than 30 Indian Members of Parliament (MPs), with a veritable media circus in tow, are presently grabbing headlines.

To much international applause - within the limited circles in which these developments are noticed - various 'confidence building' measures have been initiated over the past months, and others are proclaimed, including the resumption of the infamous bus to Lahore that had ferried the Indian Prime Minister to his first deluded engagement with Pakistan - which culminated in the Kargil War in 1999. Taking advantage of the resumption of road links between the two countries, a number of Pakistani children with severe cardiac disorders have come to India and have (with one sad exception) been successfully operated on, once again, to the immense applause of the media. A young Pakistani boy who strayed across the border into Indian territory in the State of Rajasthan is currently in Delhi, preparing to be returned to his home in a 'goodwill gesture', even as both countries announce the imminent release of several hundred 'fishermen' in their custody for straying into hostile territory - traditional hostages to competitive South Asian cussedness. Official delegations have also met to discuss improved trade relations between the countries.

Shortly after Vajpayee's April 18 speech, a small delegation of Pakistani MPs had visited India, taking advantage of the absence of visa requirements for Members of Parliament from member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), though they received relatively little attention - and no one of note in Government met them.

However, when Maulana Fazlur Rahman - the leader of the six party fundamentalist combine, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), and Chief of the Jamaat-e-Ulema Islam (JUI) Pakistan; the mentor of the Taliban and of a succession of terrorist groups, including the Harkat-ul-Ansar (HuA), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) and the Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami (HUJI); a 'personal friend and advisor' to both Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden; and a notorious US baiter - came to India in mid-July, he was feted by all who mattered and welcomed and embraced by the Prime Minister himself. The Maulana has, with India's Laloo Prasad Yadav - the former Chief Minister of the Eastern State of Bihar, notorious for the anarchy into which he has led his State, for the corruption charges as a result of which he was forced to demit office, and for his inveterate clowning for the media - been among the most prominent attractions at the Lahore jamboree as well.

Rahman has become something of a poster-boy of the new 'peace process', and it is interesting to examine the logic of his unexpected transformation from a leading architect of terrorism to eminent peacenik. At both Delhi and Lahore, Rahman articulated his reasons clearly: US 'hegemony' was the more immediate threat, and a rapprochement with India was necessary to create the breathing space necessary to ensure that the 'unilateral action against the people of Afghanistan and Iraq' was not repeated against Pakistan. There is, in this tactical shift, no indication that the Maulana's strategic agenda and commitment to 'jihad' has undergone any radical transformation. The incurable optimist would do well to note that, even as he preaches a new 'tolerance' for 'Hindu India', Rahman's MMA has sought to impose a Talibanised Sharia code on the people of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) through its legislature; it is from this province that a regrouped Taliban has been organizing attacks into Afghanistan against troops loyal to the Hamid Karzai regime at Kabul, and against American Special Forces hunting the Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants in the border areas; and it is, again, in Quetta in the MMA dominated province of Baluchistan, that the Taliban is reported to be openly operating. It is significant, moreover, that when he was asked by the media in Delhi whether he considered bin Laden a terrorist, he responded evasively, "Why are you raising this issue… We have come here for a different purpose. We are talking of peace and you are raising irrelevant issues."

The point, then, is that, despite the unrestrained enthusiasm of the current 'peace process' - as was the case with past 'peace processes' between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue - there is little room for optimism, and the ground situation in J&K is the evidence that needs to be examined more carefully than the media posturing of dubious political bandwagonners.

Each cycle of the 'peace process' in J&K has ordinarily been accompanied by escalating violence, and the present phase has been no exception. Despite an exceptionally harsh winter this year, the total fatalities due to terrorism in the first seven months of the current year, at 1,438, have been only marginally lower than they were in 2002 (1,694). More significantly, the trends show a sharp increase since April 2003, and in June, total fatalities this year (235) substantially exceeded last year's figure (170). There has been a succession of high profile terrorist attacks after the Prime Minister's speech, and these include the fidayeen attack on the Border Security Force sector headquarters at Madar in the Bandipore area of Baramulla district on April 25; the April 26 fidayeen attack on the All India Radio station at Srinagar; the beheading of four women and two children at village Chowkian in the Kot Dhara area of Rajouri district on May 19; the fidayeen attack at the Dogra Regiment camp in Sunjwan on the outskirts of Jammu city, in which twelve Army soldiers were killed on June 28; and the July 22 fidayeen attack at the Army camp at Bangti on the Tanda Road in Akhnoor district, in which eight soldiers, including a Brigadier, were killed, and 12 others, including four top Generals, were injured. The terrorist enterprise in J&K is manifestly alive and well.

At the same time, a number of Pakistani propagandists, including President and General Pervez Musharraf himself, have been arguing that 'peace talks' do not have to wait till the killing ends (those who follow the discourse on West Asia and Palestinian terrorism will note a familiar ring in this), and India appears now to have accepted this logic, despite the Prime Minister's earlier stand that 'cross border terrorism' and Pakistan's 'proxy war' in J&K must first end before any meaningful dialogue could commence between the two countries. Once again, Pakistan appears to have secured concessions even while it makes none - at a time when it is under enormous international pressure to shut down the terrorist infrastructure on its soil, and when it desperately needs breathing space to consolidate its increasing dominance along its Northwestern borders with Afghanistan.

A prominent Indian commentator notes that "India is the only known country in modern history to have repeatedly cried betrayal, not by friends, but by adversaries in whom it had reposed trust." The present regime has already led itself up the garden path on at least two occasions, and it appears that it is now setting the country up for another and greater deception.

INDIA

Nagaland: Disturbed State, Ceasefire Notwithstanding
Animesh Roul
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Despite the relatively calm environment and repeated appeals by both Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), Nagaland was declared a 'disturbed area' for a further period of one year, commencing July 22, 2003, under section three (3) of the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers (Amendment) Act, 1972, by the Union Government. According to the official notification, the whole state is in a dangerous condition, and the use of armed forces in aid of civil power is necessary. Opinions differ on the issue, but the declaration was certainly a setback to the Nephiu Rio led Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN) Government and the NSCN-IM leadership.

In a complete u-turn on his Government's position, addressing the Nagaland Assembly, State Home Minister T.M. Lotha justified the disturbed area notification on the grounds that, since the DAN government came to power on March 2003, and up to July 18, some 83 persons had been killed in 'insurgency related incidents or through criminal activities' in the State. There is a certain fudging of data here, and according to data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, between January and August 10 this year, the total number of insurgency related deaths stood at just 17, including 13 terrorists, three security force personnel and a lone civilian in Nagaland. It is only by clubbing 'criminal activities' with the numbers relating to insurgency that Lotha arrives at the relatively alarming figure of 83 - and criminal (as opposed to terrorist or insurgent) violence has never been basis for the imposition or extension of the 'disturbed area' status under the Special Powers Act. There is, of course, a very thin line between criminal and terrorist acts in the State, with the insurgents running widespread networks of extortion and abduction for ransom, but the fact is that insurgency related violence has substantially decreased in Nagaland since the NSCN-IM leadership's New Delhi sojourn in January 2003, followed by the State Legislative Assembly elections and subsequent confidence building measures taken up both by the Union and State Government with the rebel outfits.

Earlier, Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio had asserted, during his March 17 meeting with the Prime Minister in New Delhi immediately after his assumption of power, that the two warring factions of the - the NSCN-IM and the Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) - were strictly observing the ceasefire 'ground rules'. Rio's Government is believed to have collusive ties with the NSCN-IM and was overtly trying to engineer a reconciliation between the NSCN-IM and the NSCN-K to take the current 'peace process' forward. There was, consequently, a very significant turnaround after the Union Government's decision on the extension of the Special Powers Act, which has been continuously enforced in the State since 1995. Thus, Home Minister Lotha stated during the Budget Session of the Assembly that there had been 'many instances' of violation of the ceasefire ground rules by the underground factions, while accepting the oppositions claim that the law and order situation has deteriorated in the State.

The truth is, there is a continuous record of ceasefire violations by the NSCN factions, who run extensive extortion and abduction operations, and are often involved in internecine violence. The NSCN-K, for instance, was reported on January 7, 2003, to have been providing shelter and training to at least seven terrorist groups of the Northeast at its bases in Myanmar. During the Legislative Assembly elections in February 2003, there had been repeated reports of gun-wielding NSCN-IM cadres moving freely outside their 'designated camps' in violation of the ground rules. On Election Day itself, Security Force (SF) personnel shot dead an NSCN-IM cadre and arrested another two, recovering an AK-47 rifle, a 9mm pistol and two country-made revolvers, in Kohima. Again on April 24, another major violation came to limelight when SF personnel arrested three senior NSCN-IM cadres from the insurgent group's 'town command headquarters' at Khushiabli, outside its designated camp at Seothekemia in Dimapur district, along with a huge cache of arms and ammunition. Armed cadres of both the factions are reported to be currently camping in and around Longleng subdivision in Tuensang district, creating fear among local inhabitants.

Contesting Home Minister Lotha's claims, however, the NSCN-IM leadership, on July 31, 2003, vehemently denied the accusations, claiming that the ceasefire ground rules were being followed strictly. The increasing incidence of extortion has, nevertheless, been confirmed, as the group responded to such charges by declaring that this was the collection of "legal taxes". Similarly, the group claimed that factional clashes did not come under the purview of the ceasefire ground rules. Shortly after this war of words, two NSCN-Khaplang terrorists were abducted and later killed in the outskirts of Kohima on August 2, 2003, in renewed factional clashes.

During the Bangkok meeting on July 16-18, 2003, NSCN-IM leader Thuingaleng Muivah had strongly conveyed to the Union Government's interlocutor, K. Padmanabhaiah, that Nagaland's disturbed area status should not be extended. The group has been demanding the withdrawal of the legislation ever since the Naga peace process began in 1997. This was the only remaining condition set by the NSCN-IM leadership for holding talks in India in November 2003. Though initial expectations had been optimistic, eventually, the NSCN-IM had be satisfied with no more than an extension of the ceasefire with the Security Forces in Nagaland for another year beyond July 31, 2003. NSCN-IM spokesman, Kraibo Chawang, also spoke of a 'dirty trick' played by New Delhi, and the Convener of the NSCN-IM's ceasefire monitoring group, Phungthing Shimrang, expressed doubt over the 'real intention' of the Union Government in imposing 'Martial Law', even as the ceasefire was extended.

The extension of the Disturbed Area Act has aroused widespread opposition in a wide spectrum of political opinion in the State, undermining confidence in the possibility of any dramatic success in the ongoing 'peace process'. Secretary General Chubatemjen of the Nagaland People's Front (NPF), the major constituent party of the DAN Government, issued a statement after a joint meeting of the NPF working committee, declaring that the extension of the Disturbed Areas Act would not help in solving the vexed Naga problem. Even the subdued Naga National Council (NNC) has threatened that it might be forced to 'take up arms, if the situation arises'. NNC General Secretary Vizosielhou Nagi was critical of both the ceasefire and the DAA, claiming that the Union Government was playing the factions against each other to undermine their organizational strengths. He also speculated that nothing concrete would come out of the current peace process, and the ceasefire would continue without any tangible results. The NSCN-IM's bete noir, the Khapalng faction of the NSCN, was also critical about the extension of the Disturbed Areas Act, and was skeptical about the sincerity of both the Union and the State Governments. The NSCN-K also charged the NSCN-IM of 'conniving' with the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and patronizing the United Naga Council to push for a settlement that would 'balkanize the political map or territory of the Nagas' by pressing for a South Nagaland State, comprising the four Naga dominated districts of the Manipur, within the framework of Indian Constitution.

Evidently, the presence and activities of insurgents from both the NSCN factions remain a cause of serious concern in Nagaland - as well as in some areas of neighboring States, particularly Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. It is, however, equally clear that the Disturbed Areas status has also become part of the political currency in the negotiating process between the Union Government and the NSCN-IM, and that the decisions relating to its extension can no longer be expected to be based on objective assessments of the situation on the ground.