A Mutiny Disintegrates
Guest Writer: G. H. Peiris
Professor Emeritus, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka
In the context of the heady display of power and self-confidence
by Vinayanamoorthi Muralitharan alias 'Colonel Karuna',
the rebellious military wing leader of the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
in the Eastern Province districts of Batticaloa and Ampara,
throughout the month of March, what appears amazing is not
so much his failure to sustain his challenge to Prabhakaran's
hegemony over the LTTE, but the speed at which he succumbed
to the military onslaught launched by the Vanni high-command.
By the first week of April 2004 there were signs of an impending
offensive against Karuna from the Vanni in the form of an
LTTE troops build-up along the northern border of Batticaloa
District, and intensified 'Sea Tiger' operations off the
east coast. In addition, there were reports of infiltration
of Batticaloa by LTTE killer squads, and the assassination
of several prominent civilian supporters of Karuna's revolt.
The offensive, when it commenced in the early hours of 9
April, came over both land and sea, and included an infiltration
of small groups of LTTE cadres - the so-called 'pistol gangs'
- into the Government-controlled areas of Batticaloa-Ampara
for the purpose of curbing any civilian support for the
rebel group. In the face of this multi-faceted offensive,
by 15 April, the meagre resistance from the rebel group
appeared to have been crushed and Prabhakaran's authority
had been fully re-established over the LTTE-controlled areas
of the east. Snippets of information from this area indicate
that well over 50% of rebel fighters (which, according to
Karuna himself, initially numbered well over 5,000) had
realigned themselves with Prabhakaran and that, of the others,
the large majority had, following their erstwhile leader's
instructions, abandoned their arms and returned to their
homes or gone into hiding. Several hundreds who had served
at the higher echelons of Karuna's forces are reported to
have fled to Government-controlled areas, many of them ending
up in Colombo. Prior to his departure Karuna is also said
to have destroyed large stockpiles of arms and ammunition
and several military installations that were under his command.
He was reported to have fled abroad - to India, according
to some, and to Malaysia, according to others. Later reports
claimed that he had entered Colombo and is in hiding in
a predominantly Tamil residential locality in the southern
part of the city.
The possible consequences of the Karuna revolt can be examined
under three distinct but interrelated aspects - its impact
on (i) the electoral politics of Sri Lanka in the context
of the parliamentary elections and the related responses
and reactions of the main political forces of the country,
(ii) the durability of the on-going ceasefire and the prospects
for a resumption of peace negotiations between the Government
of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, and (c) the strength of the LTTE.
For the Colombo Government, information on the outbreak
of the revolt posed the dilemma that anything it did or
failed to do could go wrong with regard both to preserving
the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE, as well as the electoral
prospects of the two segments of the Government in fierce
competition with each other in their respective campaigns
leading to the parliamentary elections of April 2, 2004.
For instance, while recognition of Karuna as de facto
rebel leader of Batticaloa-Ampara or even granting one
of his lesser requests would constitute a breach of terms
of the ceasefire and was likely to evoke Prabhakaran's wrath,
non-recognition of Karuna or a refusal of a request from
him could well result in violent retaliation by his loyalists
in the Eastern Province and/or the charge from the Sinhalese
ethno-nationalists of the craven subservience of the government
in its dealings with Prabhakaran. Similarly, any step taken
either by President Kumaratunga (leader of the United People's
Freedom Alliance, UPFA), or by her political rival, then
Prime Minister Wickremasinghe (leader of the United National
Front, UNF) in relation to the changed scenario in the 'north-east'
of the country could have had a decisive impact upon the
extent of support they could mobilise from the Tamil community
at the polls and, thus, the final outcome of the elections.
Over the past few months, probably in anticipation of a
national poll, the LTTE high-command had engineered the
formation of an 'Alliance' consisting of almost all Tamil
political parties in mainstream politics under the banner
of Illankai Thamil Arasi Kachchi (ITAK, also known
as the Tamil National Alliance, TNA). At the nomination
of contestants, it was the LTTE head-office that selected
the ITAK candidates for the electoral districts of the Northern
and Eastern provinces. The objective of these manoeuvres
was that, if the LTTE could ensure the victory of its handpicked
candidates, it would have at least about 20 members in the
new Parliament to serve as its puppets. In view of the fact
that, under the prevailing system of 'proportional representation',
neither the UPFA nor the UNF could obtain anything more
than a slender majority in the 225-member Parliament, the
LTTE leadership, with about 22 members at its beck and call,
could then have a significant say over the affairs of the
country's legislature. Though this strategy of the LTTE
received a setback when Karuna ordered the ITAK contestants
in the Eastern Province to sever their links with the Vanni
leadership, the volatile conditions created by the revolt
had the effect of placing the entire electoral process of
the northern province almost entirely under the control
of the LTTE high-command, making it possible for it to rig
the poll with recourse to violence, and for the ITAK to
make a clean sweep in the north. Karuna's impact on the
elections in the Eastern Province, as it turned out, was
ephemeral and, in any event, ITAK contestants elected from
the east also came under the control of Prabhakaran after
Karuna's collapse.
Soon after the polls, Prabhakaran summoned to his headquarters
all ITAK members elected to the new Parliament to dictate
to them the courses of action they should follow, and, more
specifically, order them to take up with the new Government,
as a matter of priority, the implementation of the LTTE
blueprint for an interim administration for the 'north-east'
This, referred 'proposals for Interim Self-Governing Authority
for the North-East' (ISGA), if implemented, would grant
autocratic power to the LTTE leadership over the two provinces
and, as many critics have pointed out, pave the way for
total secession. Thus, the overall impact of the Karuna
revolt on parliamentary politics of Sri Lanka is that it
has contributed to an enhancement of the direct influence
of the LTTE on the affairs of the national legislature,
virtually eliminating 'moderate' Tamil viewpoints from the
political mainstreams, and making the 'politics of consensus'
more elusive than ever before.
The parliamentary configurations that have emerged from
the elections of 2 April - the formation of a UPFA Government,
which, however, does not command an absolute majority in
the Legislature - have a vital bearing on the prospects
for peace and stability in Sri Lanka. A resumption of Government-LTTE
negotiations would now need to overcome three formidable
obstacles: the UPFA's rejection of the ISGA soon after its
formal submission by the LTTE in September 2003; the refusal
of the UPFA to accept the LTTE as the sole representative
of the Tamils of Sri Lanka; and its electoral pledge to
oppose the notion of a traditional Tamil homeland consisting
of the entire Northern and Eastern provinces.
Those of the former UNF Government who figured at the forefront
of negotiations with the LTTE (the then Prime Minister Wickremasinghe
and his close associates, ex-ministers G.L. Peiris and Milinda
Moragoda) repeatedly expressed their belief that, at the
negotiation session held at Oslo in December 2002, the LTTE
delegates, led by Anton Balasingham, accepted the idea that
a federal system ensuring internal self-government to the
'north-east' of Sri Lanka will satisfy the LTTE demands
and will induce the LTTE to abandon its secessionist struggle,
and thus pave the way for permanent peace. Indeed, their
entire negotiation strategy rested on the notion that Prabhakaran
himself had endorsed the acceptance of the 'federal option'.
In this context, Karuna's disclosures regarding the views
of the LTTE leader on what transpired at Oslo assumes crucial
significance and, in fact, corresponds closely to a clarifications
furnished by Anton Balasingham, the principal spokesmen
for the LTTE outside Sri Lanka, on his leader's stance,
according to which the form of self-determination being
pursued includes the right to secede and form an independent
state (extracted from a widely reported statement by Balasingham
at a press interview in Oslo on December 5, 2003). The fact
that Karuna's disclosures have not been refuted by the LTTE
leadership has thus afforded an opportunity for future Government
negotiators to abandon the prevailing illusion on the LTTE
standpoint, and to redefine their own negotiation stances
in the light of the continuing adherence of the LTTE leader
to the goal of secession.
Karuna's revolt could be seen as having had a mixed impact
on the LTTE. It has exposed certain fallacies in the basic
beliefs which Tiger propagandists have been publicising
the world over throughout the past few decades: first, that
there is a single, indivisible homeland exclusive to Sri
Lanka Tamils extending over the entire area covered by the
Northern and Eastern provinces; and second, that the LTTE
has a right to act as the sole political spokesman and representative
of the Tamils of Sri Lanka. The revolt, while highlighting
the weaknesses of the 'homeland' claim (which has, in fact,
been thoroughly exposed in existing works of research),
has also demonstrated the superficiality of the assertion
that the LTTE leadership in Vanni has a power monopoly over
the entire Tamil community of Sri Lanka.
Yet another negative impact of the revolt on the LTTE is
the loss of trained fighters, weaponry and military installations
that accompanied Karuna's departure from his command area.
According to journalist Iqbal Athas, the large caches of
arms and ammunition destroyed on Karuna's orders during
his retreat included mortar launchers and heavy artillery
procured by the LTTE after the declaration of the December
2001 ceasefire. Likewise, according to press estimates,
the number of deserters from the LTTE ranks following the
collapse of the revolt could be as high as 2,000. Athas
also notes that there is, in addition, the resonance of
the revolt on the Tamil diaspora, observed among the Tamil
communities especially in France, Switzerland and Canada,
which could result in an erosion of external support for
the LTTE.
Substantial gains have, however, also accrued to the LTTE
as a result of the collapse of the revolt. There has, for
instance, been a definite enhancement of Prabhakaran's image
as an invincible leader. Many journalists, including those
opposed to the Tigers, have been ecstatic in their outpourings
on the alleged brilliance of Prabhakaran as military strategist
in conducting his offensive against Karuna, ignoring the
pathetic mismatch of overall strength represented by the
revolt. At a more tangible plane, the revolt has enabled
Prabharakan to strengthen his grip on the Tamil segment
of Sri Lanka's population, and to control its politics more
firmly than ever before by converting its political leaders,
barring a very few exceptions, into a group of lackeys that
has no voice or will of its own. Even more importantly,
the revolt has increased Prabhakaran'a capacity for brinkmanship
in his dealings with the Government of Sri Lanka. He is
now aware that he could, with impunity, continue to commit
serious violations of the terms of the ceasefire, with hardly
any response from Colombo except token complaints lodged
with the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission charged
with implementing the ceasefire. It has become increasingly
evident that the Sri Lanka Government has abandoned its
duty of protecting all citizens of the country, not only
by denying the security sought by the rebels from the east
in supposedly Government-controlled areas, but also by ignoring
the LTTE killer squads that roam the streets of Colombo
in search of Karuna loyalists hiding in the city. Emboldened
by the Government's inability or unwillingness to exercise
its authority even in Colombo, the LTTE has, over the past
few days, been attempting to extend its control over several
strategically important localities in the Jaffna peninsula
and in the Eastern Province. This could be the prelude to
an LTTE attempt to re-take Jaffna. Prabhakaran has also
announced to the new Government that the establishment of
an interim administration over the 'north-east', presumably
one modelled on his ISGA proposals, would be an essential
precondition for the resumption of peace negotiations.
Tripura: Rebels
on Peace Mode?
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
Tripura's Marxist strongman and Chief Minister, Manik Sarkar,
appears relaxed of late. On April 24 and 25, 2004, he was
campaigning for his Communist comrades contesting for the
Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) in distant Tamil Nadu
and Kerala. That has been possible because separatist rebels
at home in Tripura are on a peace mode, enabling this Frontier
State, which shares an 856 kilometre porous border with
Bangladesh, to have a violence-free parliamentary election
on April 22, 2004.
On April 15, 2004, three months after they first established
contact with State Government authorities, leaders of two
factions of the dreaded National Liberation Front of Tripura
(NLFT)
had a face-to-face meeting with Deputy Prime Minister L.K.
Advani in New Delhi and agreed to put a halt to their armed
campaign and enter into peace negotiations. The factions
that are party to this decision are those led by Nayanbashi
Jamatiya (NLFT-N) and another small group within the Biswamohan
Debbarma faction (NLFT-B), led by Montu Koloi. Biswamohan,
himself, is still not ready to abandon violence and join
the peace process.
The groups had talks with Advani for about 30 minutes each.
The NLFT (Nayanbashi) was represented by its President,
Nayanbashi Jamatiya, Ananta Debbarma, Amulya Debbarma and
the Interlocutor, Nilen Jamatia. The NLFT (B) was represented
by Mantu Koloi, D. Debbarma, Bishnu Prasad Jamatia and Sanjiv
Debbarma.
"The Central Government, the NLFT (Nayanbashi) and the State
Government of Tripura have agreed to observe mutual Suspension
of Operations with immediate effect for a period of six
months. It was also agreed that peace talks between all
the concerned parties will follow the suspension of operations,"
a statement issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs in New
Delhi, after the rebel leaders' meeting with Advani, who
is also the Home Minister, said. In effect, the NLFT (Nayanbashi
faction) and the Indian Government had agreed to a truce.
Chief Minister Manik Sarkar later told this writer that
the other faction (NLFT-B) represented by Mantu Koloi had
indicated its desire to lay down arms within the next 15
to 20 days.
Ever since its formation in 1989 to secure an independent
homeland for Tripura's minority tribes people, the NLFT
has been indulging in a series of killings, extortions and
kidnappings. Right from its inception, the group has projected
itself as a champion of the State's tribal people, who comprise
just about 28 per cent of the State's 3.2 million population.
In a bid to consolidate its hold in local politics with
a view to further its goal, the NLFT, extended support to
the Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura (INPT) when
it was formed in early 2002. The main grievance of the NLFT
and the objectives of the INPT demonstrate a substantial
commonality of interests - both groups seek to restore the
rights and privileges of the tribals in Tripura, who were
reduced to a minority in their own land by waves of migration
from then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. The INPT, and the
Congress, that was its ally until the elections to the Tripura
State Legislature in February 2003, could not unseat the
formidable Communist Party of India (Marxist) from power.
Frustration was fast creeping in within the NLFT rank and
file. In February 2001, the outfit split, with a group led
by Nayanbashi and Joshua Debbarma deserting Biswamohan.
Joshua, and his small band of supporters, have, however,
not agreed to join Nayanbashi in talking peace with New
Delhi so far. According to intelligence officials, the main
dispute that led Nayanbashi & Co to engineer the split in
the NLFT was over financial irregularities. Besides, these
officials also say that Nayanbashi was against Biswamohan's
decision not to extend support to the Bru National Liberation
Front (BNLF),
a rebel outfit representing the minority Hindu Bru or Reang
ethnic group in the neighbouring State of Mizoram. In July
2000, NLFT rebels killed nine BNLF militants inside Bangladesh,
an act that angered Nayanbashi and his loyalists all the
more. New Delhi insists that there are at least 194 camps
belonging to different Indian insurgent groups, including
the NLFT, inside Bangladesh, a claim that Dhaka has been
denying, although its stand has become untenable in the
wake of hard evidence. That the split was irreparable became
clear when intelligence agencies got hold of a letter purportedly
written by Nayanbashi in which he accused Biswamohan of
'betraying' the BNLF.
In the beginning of January 2004, Nayanbasi sent a letter
to State authorities in Tripura, apparently from a safe
house in the Comilla area of Bangladesh, indicating that
he was interested in peace talks and willing to give up
violence. The letter, though, had a few conditions included:
- A political position for
Nayanbasi Jamatiya after he surrenders.
- Amnesty for all the NLFT-N
cadres.
- A meeting with the Chief
Minister prior to the surrender.
- Amnesty for the Tripura
State Rifles (TSR) renegade Rahid Mian.
Except for
the last demand, it was not really difficult for the authorities
to concede the rest. Perhaps, the fulfillment of the first
three conditions led to the current developments, resulting
in the truce agreement. The last demand was a delicate one;
the renegade TSR man, Rahid Mian, had earlier connived with
the militants to kill three of his own colleagues on September
23, 2003, in the Shermun Tilla area in North Tripura district.
Nayanbashi was himself a rifleman from the TSR's 1st Battalion,
hailing from the Trishabari area under West Tripura's Teliamura
police station, and had fled his post at the Baramura Thermal
Power Plant with a rifle on March 23, 1992, following a
dispute with colleagues on the previous night. Having joined
the NLFT with the adopted name of 'Major Nakbar', Nayanbasi
rose fast in the outfit's hierarchy, mostly due to his skills
in guerrilla warfare. Apart from internal differences with
his boss, Biswamohan, which led to the split, New Delhi's
sustained pressure on Bangladesh to stop extending direct
or indirect support to the rebels operating from that country's
territory were making things difficult. Besides, with an
estimated 175 armed cadres, and an arsenal consisting of
just a few AK series and self-loading rifles, it was becoming
impossible for Nayanbashi and his men to really put up an
adequate fight with the Indian security forces. Biswamohan's
sharpshooters, moreover, were always on their trail. The
successful military assault on the Indian rebels in the
Bhutan's heavily wooded southern parts in December 2003
also had a tremendous demoralizing effect on the NLFT, as
also other Northeast Indian insurgent groups. Tripura's
poor tribals, further, were getting fed up with the insurgents,
who would routinely collect a monthly 'tax', apart from
rice and other foodstuff. Operating conditions were getting
really difficult for the rebels to carry on.
Chief Minister Manik Sarkar said during a telephone interview
with this writer on April 15, 2004, the day the NLFT factions
agreed to a truce, that the rebels had seen the writing
on the wall. "The people were craving peace and the rebels
realized that if they refused to honour the sentiments of
those who they seek to represent, they would be made irrelevant.
Moreover, we have been always telling the militants to look
for a solution by giving up violence and negotiating with
the Government," the Chief Minister said. He said efforts
were on to try and get Biswamohan and his group as well
as the State's other rebel group, the All Tripura Tiger
Force (ATTF),
to join the peace process.
The ATTF, too, is showing definite signs of softening its
position. That Tripura's tribals, as also the majority Bengali
community, are coming out in the open with their opposition
to violence and the methods used by the rebels became clear
once again when they defied the ATTF diktat to abstain from
voting. At the end of polling for the Lok Sabha elections
to the State's two parliamentary seats on April 22, 2004,
nearly 65 per cent of Tripura's 1.97 million voters exercised
their franchise. Under the circumstances, ATTF political
wing chief Ranjit Debbarma's statement to the media on April
22, 2004, giving a conditional offer for entering into peace
talks has not come as a surprise. Debbarma has put the following
conditions:
- The Indian Government
must accept 1952 as the cut-off year for determining the
citizenship status of the migrants in Tripura. Those whose
names did not figure in the 1952 voters' list should be
declared as foreigners.
- The issue of sovereignty
must be a point of discussion in any possible peace dialogue.
- The talks must be held
in the presence of a representative from the United Nations.
Authorities,
both in Agartala, the State capital, as well as in New Delhi,
are not really excited by the ATTF offer. Still, they have
taken note of the timing of the conditional offer that could
well be the rebel group's signal that it, too, wants to
be part of the peace process. The ATTF may even be marginalized
if it doesn't involve itself in the efforts for peace in
the State. As Tripura's Police chief, G.M.Srivastava, known
for his non-conventional ways of dealing with insurgency,
told this writer: "We are not taking chances and won't be
complacent until all rebel factions and groups agree to
put a halt to violence and engage in the peace talks."
