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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 41, April 26, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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A Mutiny Disintegrates
Guest Writer: G. H. Peiris
Professor Emeritus, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka
In the context of the heady display of power and self-confidence
by Vinayanamoorthi Muralitharan alias 'Colonel Karuna',
the rebellious military wing leader of the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
in the Eastern Province districts of Batticaloa and Ampara,
throughout the month of March, what appears amazing is not
so much his failure to sustain his challenge to Prabhakaran's
hegemony over the LTTE, but the speed at which he succumbed
to the military onslaught launched by the Vanni high-command.
By the first week of April 2004 there were signs of an impending
offensive against Karuna from the Vanni in the form of an
LTTE troops build-up along the northern border of Batticaloa
District, and intensified 'Sea Tiger' operations off the
east coast. In addition, there were reports of infiltration
of Batticaloa by LTTE killer squads, and the assassination
of several prominent civilian supporters of Karuna's revolt.
The offensive, when it commenced in the early hours of 9
April, came over both land and sea, and included an infiltration
of small groups of LTTE cadres - the so-called 'pistol gangs'
- into the Government-controlled areas of Batticaloa-Ampara
for the purpose of curbing any civilian support for the
rebel group. In the face of this multi-faceted offensive,
by 15 April, the meagre resistance from the rebel group
appeared to have been crushed and Prabhakaran's authority
had been fully re-established over the LTTE-controlled areas
of the east. Snippets of information from this area indicate
that well over 50% of rebel fighters (which, according to
Karuna himself, initially numbered well over 5,000) had
realigned themselves with Prabhakaran and that, of the others,
the large majority had, following their erstwhile leader's
instructions, abandoned their arms and returned to their
homes or gone into hiding. Several hundreds who had served
at the higher echelons of Karuna's forces are reported to
have fled to Government-controlled areas, many of them ending
up in Colombo. Prior to his departure Karuna is also said
to have destroyed large stockpiles of arms and ammunition
and several military installations that were under his command.
He was reported to have fled abroad - to India, according
to some, and to Malaysia, according to others. Later reports
claimed that he had entered Colombo and is in hiding in
a predominantly Tamil residential locality in the southern
part of the city.
The possible consequences of the Karuna revolt can be examined
under three distinct but interrelated aspects - its impact
on (i) the electoral politics of Sri Lanka in the context
of the parliamentary elections and the related responses
and reactions of the main political forces of the country,
(ii) the durability of the on-going ceasefire and the prospects
for a resumption of peace negotiations between the Government
of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, and (c) the strength of the LTTE.
For the Colombo Government, information on the outbreak
of the revolt posed the dilemma that anything it did or
failed to do could go wrong with regard both to preserving
the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE, as well as the electoral
prospects of the two segments of the Government in fierce
competition with each other in their respective campaigns
leading to the parliamentary elections of April 2, 2004.
For instance, while recognition of Karuna as de facto
rebel leader of Batticaloa-Ampara or even granting one
of his lesser requests would constitute a breach of terms
of the ceasefire and was likely to evoke Prabhakaran's wrath,
non-recognition of Karuna or a refusal of a request from
him could well result in violent retaliation by his loyalists
in the Eastern Province and/or the charge from the Sinhalese
ethno-nationalists of the craven subservience of the government
in its dealings with Prabhakaran. Similarly, any step taken
either by President Kumaratunga (leader of the United People's
Freedom Alliance, UPFA), or by her political rival, then
Prime Minister Wickremasinghe (leader of the United National
Front, UNF) in relation to the changed scenario in the 'north-east'
of the country could have had a decisive impact upon the
extent of support they could mobilise from the Tamil community
at the polls and, thus, the final outcome of the elections.
Over the past few months, probably in anticipation of a
national poll, the LTTE high-command had engineered the
formation of an 'Alliance' consisting of almost all Tamil
political parties in mainstream politics under the banner
of Illankai Thamil Arasi Kachchi (ITAK, also known
as the Tamil National Alliance, TNA). At the nomination
of contestants, it was the LTTE head-office that selected
the ITAK candidates for the electoral districts of the Northern
and Eastern provinces. The objective of these manoeuvres
was that, if the LTTE could ensure the victory of its handpicked
candidates, it would have at least about 20 members in the
new Parliament to serve as its puppets. In view of the fact
that, under the prevailing system of 'proportional representation',
neither the UPFA nor the UNF could obtain anything more
than a slender majority in the 225-member Parliament, the
LTTE leadership, with about 22 members at its beck and call,
could then have a significant say over the affairs of the
country's legislature. Though this strategy of the LTTE
received a setback when Karuna ordered the ITAK contestants
in the Eastern Province to sever their links with the Vanni
leadership, the volatile conditions created by the revolt
had the effect of placing the entire electoral process of
the northern province almost entirely under the control
of the LTTE high-command, making it possible for it to rig
the poll with recourse to violence, and for the ITAK to
make a clean sweep in the north. Karuna's impact on the
elections in the Eastern Province, as it turned out, was
ephemeral and, in any event, ITAK contestants elected from
the east also came under the control of Prabhakaran after
Karuna's collapse.
Soon after the polls, Prabhakaran summoned to his headquarters
all ITAK members elected to the new Parliament to dictate
to them the courses of action they should follow, and, more
specifically, order them to take up with the new Government,
as a matter of priority, the implementation of the LTTE
blueprint for an interim administration for the 'north-east'
This, referred 'proposals for Interim Self-Governing Authority
for the North-East' (ISGA), if implemented, would grant
autocratic power to the LTTE leadership over the two provinces
and, as many critics have pointed out, pave the way for
total secession. Thus, the overall impact of the Karuna
revolt on parliamentary politics of Sri Lanka is that it
has contributed to an enhancement of the direct influence
of the LTTE on the affairs of the national legislature,
virtually eliminating 'moderate' Tamil viewpoints from the
political mainstreams, and making the 'politics of consensus'
more elusive than ever before.
The parliamentary configurations that have emerged from
the elections of 2 April - the formation of a UPFA Government,
which, however, does not command an absolute majority in
the Legislature - have a vital bearing on the prospects
for peace and stability in Sri Lanka. A resumption of Government-LTTE
negotiations would now need to overcome three formidable
obstacles: the UPFA's rejection of the ISGA soon after its
formal submission by the LTTE in September 2003; the refusal
of the UPFA to accept the LTTE as the sole representative
of the Tamils of Sri Lanka; and its electoral pledge to
oppose the notion of a traditional Tamil homeland consisting
of the entire Northern and Eastern provinces.
Those of the former UNF Government who figured at the forefront
of negotiations with the LTTE (the then Prime Minister Wickremasinghe
and his close associates, ex-ministers G.L. Peiris and Milinda
Moragoda) repeatedly expressed their belief that, at the
negotiation session held at Oslo in December 2002, the LTTE
delegates, led by Anton Balasingham, accepted the idea that
a federal system ensuring internal self-government to the
'north-east' of Sri Lanka will satisfy the LTTE demands
and will induce the LTTE to abandon its secessionist struggle,
and thus pave the way for permanent peace. Indeed, their
entire negotiation strategy rested on the notion that Prabhakaran
himself had endorsed the acceptance of the 'federal option'.
In this context, Karuna's disclosures regarding the views
of the LTTE leader on what transpired at Oslo assumes crucial
significance and, in fact, corresponds closely to a clarifications
furnished by Anton Balasingham, the principal spokesmen
for the LTTE outside Sri Lanka, on his leader's stance,
according to which the form of self-determination being
pursued includes the right to secede and form an independent
state (extracted from a widely reported statement by Balasingham
at a press interview in Oslo on December 5, 2003). The fact
that Karuna's disclosures have not been refuted by the LTTE
leadership has thus afforded an opportunity for future Government
negotiators to abandon the prevailing illusion on the LTTE
standpoint, and to redefine their own negotiation stances
in the light of the continuing adherence of the LTTE leader
to the goal of secession.
Karuna's revolt could be seen as having had a mixed impact
on the LTTE. It has exposed certain fallacies in the basic
beliefs which Tiger propagandists have been publicising
the world over throughout the past few decades: first, that
there is a single, indivisible homeland exclusive to Sri
Lanka Tamils extending over the entire area covered by the
Northern and Eastern provinces; and second, that the LTTE
has a right to act as the sole political spokesman and representative
of the Tamils of Sri Lanka. The revolt, while highlighting
the weaknesses of the 'homeland' claim (which has, in fact,
been thoroughly exposed in existing works of research),
has also demonstrated the superficiality of the assertion
that the LTTE leadership in Vanni has a power monopoly over
the entire Tamil community of Sri Lanka.
Yet another negative impact of the revolt on the LTTE is
the loss of trained fighters, weaponry and military installations
that accompanied Karuna's departure from his command area.
According to journalist Iqbal Athas, the large caches of
arms and ammunition destroyed on Karuna's orders during
his retreat included mortar launchers and heavy artillery
procured by the LTTE after the declaration of the December
2001 ceasefire. Likewise, according to press estimates,
the number of deserters from the LTTE ranks following the
collapse of the revolt could be as high as 2,000. Athas
also notes that there is, in addition, the resonance of
the revolt on the Tamil diaspora, observed among the Tamil
communities especially in France, Switzerland and Canada,
which could result in an erosion of external support for
the LTTE.
Substantial gains have, however, also accrued to the LTTE
as a result of the collapse of the revolt. There has, for
instance, been a definite enhancement of Prabhakaran's image
as an invincible leader. Many journalists, including those
opposed to the Tigers, have been ecstatic in their outpourings
on the alleged brilliance of Prabhakaran as military strategist
in conducting his offensive against Karuna, ignoring the
pathetic mismatch of overall strength represented by the
revolt. At a more tangible plane, the revolt has enabled
Prabharakan to strengthen his grip on the Tamil segment
of Sri Lanka's population, and to control its politics more
firmly than ever before by converting its political leaders,
barring a very few exceptions, into a group of lackeys that
has no voice or will of its own. Even more importantly,
the revolt has increased Prabhakaran'a capacity for brinkmanship
in his dealings with the Government of Sri Lanka. He is
now aware that he could, with impunity, continue to commit
serious violations of the terms of the ceasefire, with hardly
any response from Colombo except token complaints lodged
with the Norwegian-led Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission charged
with implementing the ceasefire. It has become increasingly
evident that the Sri Lanka Government has abandoned its
duty of protecting all citizens of the country, not only
by denying the security sought by the rebels from the east
in supposedly Government-controlled areas, but also by ignoring
the LTTE killer squads that roam the streets of Colombo
in search of Karuna loyalists hiding in the city. Emboldened
by the Government's inability or unwillingness to exercise
its authority even in Colombo, the LTTE has, over the past
few days, been attempting to extend its control over several
strategically important localities in the Jaffna peninsula
and in the Eastern Province. This could be the prelude to
an LTTE attempt to re-take Jaffna. Prabhakaran has also
announced to the new Government that the establishment of
an interim administration over the 'north-east', presumably
one modelled on his ISGA proposals, would be an essential
precondition for the resumption of peace negotiations.
Tripura: Rebels
on Peace Mode?
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
Tripura's Marxist strongman and Chief Minister, Manik Sarkar,
appears relaxed of late. On April 24 and 25, 2004, he was
campaigning for his Communist comrades contesting for the
Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) in distant Tamil Nadu
and Kerala. That has been possible because separatist rebels
at home in Tripura are on a peace mode, enabling this Frontier
State, which shares an 856 kilometre porous border with
Bangladesh, to have a violence-free parliamentary election
on April 22, 2004.
On April 15, 2004, three months after they first established
contact with State Government authorities, leaders of two
factions of the dreaded National Liberation Front of Tripura
(NLFT)
had a face-to-face meeting with Deputy Prime Minister L.K.
Advani in New Delhi and agreed to put a halt to their armed
campaign and enter into peace negotiations. The factions
that are party to this decision are those led by Nayanbashi
Jamatiya (NLFT-N) and another small group within the Biswamohan
Debbarma faction (NLFT-B), led by Montu Koloi. Biswamohan,
himself, is still not ready to abandon violence and join
the peace process.
The groups had talks with Advani for about 30 minutes each.
The NLFT (Nayanbashi) was represented by its President,
Nayanbashi Jamatiya, Ananta Debbarma, Amulya Debbarma and
the Interlocutor, Nilen Jamatia. The NLFT (B) was represented
by Mantu Koloi, D. Debbarma, Bishnu Prasad Jamatia and Sanjiv
Debbarma.
"The Central Government, the NLFT (Nayanbashi) and the State
Government of Tripura have agreed to observe mutual Suspension
of Operations with immediate effect for a period of six
months. It was also agreed that peace talks between all
the concerned parties will follow the suspension of operations,"
a statement issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs in New
Delhi, after the rebel leaders' meeting with Advani, who
is also the Home Minister, said. In effect, the NLFT (Nayanbashi
faction) and the Indian Government had agreed to a truce.
Chief Minister Manik Sarkar later told this writer that
the other faction (NLFT-B) represented by Mantu Koloi had
indicated its desire to lay down arms within the next 15
to 20 days.
Ever since its formation in 1989 to secure an independent
homeland for Tripura's minority tribes people, the NLFT
has been indulging in a series of killings, extortions and
kidnappings. Right from its inception, the group has projected
itself as a champion of the State's tribal people, who comprise
just about 28 per cent of the State's 3.2 million population.
In a bid to consolidate its hold in local politics with
a view to further its goal, the NLFT, extended support to
the Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura (INPT) when
it was formed in early 2002. The main grievance of the NLFT
and the objectives of the INPT demonstrate a substantial
commonality of interests - both groups seek to restore the
rights and privileges of the tribals in Tripura, who were
reduced to a minority in their own land by waves of migration
from then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. The INPT, and the
Congress, that was its ally until the elections to the Tripura
State Legislature in February 2003, could not unseat the
formidable Communist Party of India (Marxist) from power.
Frustration was fast creeping in within the NLFT rank and
file. In February 2001, the outfit split, with a group led
by Nayanbashi and Joshua Debbarma deserting Biswamohan.
Joshua, and his small band of supporters, have, however,
not agreed to join Nayanbashi in talking peace with New
Delhi so far. According to intelligence officials, the main
dispute that led Nayanbashi & Co to engineer the split in
the NLFT was over financial irregularities. Besides, these
officials also say that Nayanbashi was against Biswamohan's
decision not to extend support to the Bru National Liberation
Front (BNLF),
a rebel outfit representing the minority Hindu Bru or Reang
ethnic group in the neighbouring State of Mizoram. In July
2000, NLFT rebels killed nine BNLF militants inside Bangladesh,
an act that angered Nayanbashi and his loyalists all the
more. New Delhi insists that there are at least 194 camps
belonging to different Indian insurgent groups, including
the NLFT, inside Bangladesh, a claim that Dhaka has been
denying, although its stand has become untenable in the
wake of hard evidence. That the split was irreparable became
clear when intelligence agencies got hold of a letter purportedly
written by Nayanbashi in which he accused Biswamohan of
'betraying' the BNLF.
In the beginning of January 2004, Nayanbasi sent a letter
to State authorities in Tripura, apparently from a safe
house in the Comilla area of Bangladesh, indicating that
he was interested in peace talks and willing to give up
violence. The letter, though, had a few conditions included:
- A political position for
Nayanbasi Jamatiya after he surrenders.
- Amnesty for all the NLFT-N
cadres.
- A meeting with the Chief
Minister prior to the surrender.
- Amnesty for the Tripura
State Rifles (TSR) renegade Rahid Mian.
Except for
the last demand, it was not really difficult for the authorities
to concede the rest. Perhaps, the fulfillment of the first
three conditions led to the current developments, resulting
in the truce agreement. The last demand was a delicate one;
the renegade TSR man, Rahid Mian, had earlier connived with
the militants to kill three of his own colleagues on September
23, 2003, in the Shermun Tilla area in North Tripura district.
Nayanbashi was himself a rifleman from the TSR's 1st Battalion,
hailing from the Trishabari area under West Tripura's Teliamura
police station, and had fled his post at the Baramura Thermal
Power Plant with a rifle on March 23, 1992, following a
dispute with colleagues on the previous night. Having joined
the NLFT with the adopted name of 'Major Nakbar', Nayanbasi
rose fast in the outfit's hierarchy, mostly due to his skills
in guerrilla warfare. Apart from internal differences with
his boss, Biswamohan, which led to the split, New Delhi's
sustained pressure on Bangladesh to stop extending direct
or indirect support to the rebels operating from that country's
territory were making things difficult. Besides, with an
estimated 175 armed cadres, and an arsenal consisting of
just a few AK series and self-loading rifles, it was becoming
impossible for Nayanbashi and his men to really put up an
adequate fight with the Indian security forces. Biswamohan's
sharpshooters, moreover, were always on their trail. The
successful military assault on the Indian rebels in the
Bhutan's heavily wooded southern parts in December 2003
also had a tremendous demoralizing effect on the NLFT, as
also other Northeast Indian insurgent groups. Tripura's
poor tribals, further, were getting fed up with the insurgents,
who would routinely collect a monthly 'tax', apart from
rice and other foodstuff. Operating conditions were getting
really difficult for the rebels to carry on.
Chief Minister Manik Sarkar said during a telephone interview
with this writer on April 15, 2004, the day the NLFT factions
agreed to a truce, that the rebels had seen the writing
on the wall. "The people were craving peace and the rebels
realized that if they refused to honour the sentiments of
those who they seek to represent, they would be made irrelevant.
Moreover, we have been always telling the militants to look
for a solution by giving up violence and negotiating with
the Government," the Chief Minister said. He said efforts
were on to try and get Biswamohan and his group as well
as the State's other rebel group, the All Tripura Tiger
Force (ATTF),
to join the peace process.
The ATTF, too, is showing definite signs of softening its
position. That Tripura's tribals, as also the majority Bengali
community, are coming out in the open with their opposition
to violence and the methods used by the rebels became clear
once again when they defied the ATTF diktat to abstain from
voting. At the end of polling for the Lok Sabha elections
to the State's two parliamentary seats on April 22, 2004,
nearly 65 per cent of Tripura's 1.97 million voters exercised
their franchise. Under the circumstances, ATTF political
wing chief Ranjit Debbarma's statement to the media on April
22, 2004, giving a conditional offer for entering into peace
talks has not come as a surprise. Debbarma has put the following
conditions:
- The Indian Government
must accept 1952 as the cut-off year for determining the
citizenship status of the migrants in Tripura. Those whose
names did not figure in the 1952 voters' list should be
declared as foreigners.
- The issue of sovereignty
must be a point of discussion in any possible peace dialogue.
- The talks must be held
in the presence of a representative from the United Nations.
Authorities,
both in Agartala, the State capital, as well as in New Delhi,
are not really excited by the ATTF offer. Still, they have
taken note of the timing of the conditional offer that could
well be the rebel group's signal that it, too, wants to
be part of the peace process. The ATTF may even be marginalized
if it doesn't involve itself in the efforts for peace in
the State. As Tripura's Police chief, G.M.Srivastava, known
for his non-conventional ways of dealing with insurgency,
told this writer: "We are not taking chances and won't be
complacent until all rebel factions and groups agree to
put a halt to violence and engage in the peace talks."
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
April 19-25,
2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
2
|
0
|
3
|
5
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
1
|
4
|
3
|
8
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
17
|
3
|
9
|
29
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
5
|
1
|
12
|
18
|
Manipur
|
2
|
7
|
3
|
12
|
Tripura
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
26
|
15
|
27
|
68
|
NEPAL
|
6
|
3
|
9
|
18
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
India to take up arms seizure issue during
BSF-BDR
meeting
in
Dhaka
on
April
28:
The
Director
General
of
the
Border
Security
Force
(BSF)
and
his
Bangladesh
Rifles
(BDR)
counterpart
are
to
meet
in
Dhaka
on
April
28,
2004,
to
discuss
among
others,
the
issue
of
activities
of
India's
Northeastern
terrorists
based
in
Bangladesh
and
the
recent
seizure
of
a
huge
quantity
of
arms
and
ammunition
in
the
port
city
of
Chittagong.
At
the
biennial
six-day
meeting
in
Dhaka,the
Indian
delegation
is
expected
to
seek
closure
of
about
195
terrorist
camps
of
North-East
terrorists
by
providing
their
locations
in
Bangladesh,
deportation
of
90
prominent
terrorist
leaders
and
stoppage
to
influx
of
illegal
migrants,
official
sources
said
in
Delhi.
Terming
the
arms
seizure
as
a
matter
of
concern,
sources
said
the
Indian
delegation
will
urge
Bangladesh
to
ensure
that
"there
is
no
spill
over
of
the
weaponry
to
our
side."
The
Bangladesh
police
and
coastguard
had
on
April
2,
2004,
seized
690
7.62
mm
T-56-I
Sub-Machine
Guns
(SMGs);
600
7.62
mm
T-56-2
SMGs;
150
40mm
T-69
Rocket
launchers;
840
40mm
rockets;
400
9mm
semi-automatic
spot
rifles;
100
'Tommy
Guns';
150
rocket
launchers;
2000
launching
grenades;
25,020
hand
grenades;
6,392
magazines
of
SMG
and
other
arms;
700,000
rounds
of
SMG
bullets;
and
739,680
rounds
of
7.62
mm
calibre;
and
400,000
bullets
of
other
weapons.
The
Hindu,
April
26,
2004.
11-party
alliance
accuses
Jamaat-e-Islami
of
developing
Islamic
militant
network:
According
to
a
report
in
Independent,
the
left-wing
11-party
alliance
has
alleged
that
the
Jamaat-e-Islami
and
Islami
Chhatra
Shibir
(ICS)
is
developing
an
'Islamic
militant
network'
across
the
country
by
taking
advantage
of
their
partnership
in
the
alliance
Government.
It
has
accused
the
armed
militant
groups
of
the
Jamaat
and
its
students'
front,
ICS,
referred
to
as
Mujahideen,
of
creating
panic
in
different
parts
of
Bangladesh,
especially
in
the
northern
districts.
They
have
demanded
action
against
all
those,
including
a
Deputy
Minister
and
the
police,
involved
in
creating
a
reign
of
terror
in
Natore,
Naogaon
and
Rajshahi.
In
a
written
statement,
Morshed
Ali
Khan,
Coordinator
of
the
11-party
alliance,
alleged
that
armed
fundamentalist
groups
are
being
patronised
by
Deputy
Minister
Ruhul
Quddus
Talukder
Dulu,
other
influential
BNP
leaders
of
Rajshahi
and
the
local
police.
Independent
Bangladesh,
April
23,
2004.
INDIA
Three
persons
killed
on
the
eve
of
second
phase
of
polling
in
J&K:
On
the
eve
of
phase-II
of
the
Lok
Sabha
(Lower
House
of
Parliament)
polling
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir
(J&K)
today,
among
various
incidents
of
terrorist
violence,
at
least
three
persons
were
killed
and
30
sustained
injuries
during
an
election
rally
of
the
Chief
Minister's
daughter
and
People's
Democratic
Party
(PDP)
chief,
Mehbooba
Mufti,
at
Khull
Ahmedabad
in
the
Kulgam
district
on
April
25,
2004.
Terrorists
also
left
12
persons,
including
nine
troops,
wounded
in
a
grenade
attack
at
Lal
Bazaar
in
the
capital
Srinagar
while
three
Border
Security
Force
personnel
(BSF)
were
injured
in
grenade
attacks
on
three
Polling
Stations
in
Budgam.
Separately,
unidentified
terrorists
opened
gunfire
on
the
motorcade
of
PDP
Legislator
from
Pampore,
Zahoor
Ahmed
Mir,
at
Poshboni
Crossing
in
Pampore.
His
escort
personnel
retaliated
and
there
was
no
damage
on
either
side.
Zahoor's
father,
Abdul
Aziz
Mir,
who
had
been
elected
as
the
PDP
Legislator
from
Pampore
in
October
2002,
was
killed
by
terrorists
in
December
2002.
In
another
pre-election
incident,
terrorists
fired
five
rifle
grenades
towards
a
complex
at
Sonpah
in
the
Beerwah
area
of
Budgam,
which
has
been
occupied
by
the
Central
Reserve
Police
Force
(CRPF)
and
BSF
units
deployed
for
election
duty.
However,
there
was
no
damage
on
either
side.
Daily
Excelsior,
April
26,
2004.
Four
persons
killed
and
17
injured
during
election-day
violence
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir:
Four
persons
were
killed
and
at
least
17
others
sustained
injured
in
election-related
violence
even
as
Jammu
and
Kashmir
reportedly
witnessed
a
moderate
turnout
in
the
two
constituencies
of
Jammu
and
Baramulla
which
went
to
polls
in
the
first
phase
of
elections
to
the
Lok
Sabha
(Lower
House
of
Parliament)
on
April
20,
2004.
According
to
preliminary
estimates,
Baramulla
witnessed
36
percent
polling
while
in
Jammu-Poonch
constituency
it
was
45
percent.
All
separatist
outfits,
including
the
two
factions
of
All
Parties
Hurriyat
Conference
(APHC),
and
terrorist
groups
had
asked
the
Kashmiri
voters
to
boycott
the
elections.
Terrorists
caused
Improvised
Explosive
Device
(IED)
and
grenade
explosions
in
close
vicinity
of
polling
stations
at
Pattan,
Sumlar
Bandipore,
Pazalpora
Rafiabad,
Baramulla,
Sopore,
Rangat
Langet,
Wayil
Kralpora
and
Hathlangoo
Sopore.
While
at
Sumlar,
two
polling
officials
and
four
police
personnel
sustained
injuries,
unidentified
terrorists
targeted
the
vehicle
of
an
NGO,
namely
Coalition
of
Civil
Societies,
with
a
powerful
IED
blast
at
Chandigam
in
the
Lolab
segment
of
Kupwara
district.
Two
persons,
including
a
journalist,
were
killed
and
four
others
were
wounded
in
this
blast.
Further,
one
soldier
was
killed
and
seven
persons
were
injured
when
terrorists
hurled
a
grenade
towards
a
polling
booth
at
Arampora-Sopore.
Terrorists
also
opened
fire
at
a
polling
booth
in
Pazalpora-Rafiabad
killing
one
soldier.
Separately,
National
Conference
President
and
the
party's
candidate
from
Srinagar-Budgam
Lok
Sabha
seat,
Omar
Abdullah,
escaped
unhurt
when
terrorists
targeted
him
with
an
IED
at
Hayyatpora
on
the
Budgam-Beerwah
road.
Daily
Excelsior,
April
21,
2004.
PAKISTAN
Tribesmen
accused
of
sheltering
Al
Qaeda
terrorists
surrender
in
Waziristan:
Five
tribesmen
accused
of
sheltering
Al
Qaeda
terrorists
surrendered
to
the
Pakistan
army
at
a
tribal
council
on
April
24,
2004.
The
five
men
from
the
Zalikhel
tribe
turned
themselves
in
before
a
council
and
also
reportedly
pledged
loyalty
to
Pakistan
in
return
for
clemency.
The
ceremony
took
place
at
a
Madrassa
(seminary)
in
Shakai,
20
kilometers
north
of
Wana,
in
South
Waziristan.
"We
give
amnesty
to
these
people
in
return
for
their
pledge
of
brotherhood
and
loyalty,"
said
Peshawar
Corps
Commander
Lt.
Gen.
Safdar
Hussain.
"I
congratulate
Nek
and
his
colleagues
on
their
courageous
decision.
You
are
our
brothers
and
your
allegiance
pledge
is
exemplary,"
Gen
Hussain
added
after
the
wanted
men
joined
him
in
the
ceremony.
The
General
also
said
that
foreign
terrorists
had
until
April
30
to
surrender
and
receive
a
pardon.
He
also
announced
the
release
of
50
tribesmen
arrested
last
month
and
a
grant
of
Rupees
90.1
million
for
development
in
Waziristan.
Daily
Times,
April
25,
2004.
Suspected
Pakistani
terrorist
planned
Sydney
blackout
bombing:
A
suspected
Pakistani
terrorist,
arrested
in
Australia,
was
reportedly
plotting
to
black
out
the
nation's
largest
city,
Sydney,
with
a
bomb
attack
on
power
supplies.
Faheem
Khalid
Lodhi,
arrested
on
April
22,
2004,
planned
to
use
a
home-made
bomb
made
of
ammonium
nitrate
fertiliser
to
attack
the
electricity
grid
and
was
ordering
the
required
chemicals
under
bogus
company
names.
Lodhi
is
the
second
member
of
a
suspected
terrorist
cell
arrested
in
a
week
after
21-year-old
Pakistani-born
medical
student
Izhar-ul-Haq.
Both
Lodhi
and
Haq
were
arrested
as
a
result
of
investigations
into
terrorist
suspect
Willie
Brigitte,
a
French
national
who
was
deported
from
Australia
late
last
year,
and
is
being
detained
by
authorities
in
France
who
believe
that
he
was
setting
up
a
terrorist
cell
in
Sydney.
Both
Brigitte
and
Haq
allegedly
have
links
to
the
Pakistan-based
Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT),
which
was
designated
as
a
terrorist
organisation
in
Australia
during
November
2003.
Jang,
April
24,
2004.
Embassy
in
Thailand
receives
letter
threatening
terrorist
attacks
against
eight
US
allies:
The
Pakistan
embassy
in
Thailand's
capital
Bangkok
has
received
a
letter
from
a
mysterious
group
threatening
terrorist
attacks
against
countries
supporting
the
US-led
operations
in
Iraq.
The
letter,
similar
to
an
earlier
warning
sent
to
the
South
Korean
embassy,
from
a
group
calling
itself
"Yellow-Red
Overseas
Organisation,"
was
reportedly
received
at
the
Pakistan
mission
on
April
19,
2004.
It
threatened
attacks
on
major
facilities
in
Australia,
Japan,
Kuwait,
Pakistan,
Philippines,
Singapore,
South
Korea
and
Thailand
between
April
20
and
30.
Prime
Minister
Mir
Zafarullah
Khan
Jamali
is
due
to
visit
Thailand
from
April
28
to
hold
talks
with
his
Thai
counterpart
Thaksin
Shinawatra
in
Bangkok.
Jang,
April
21,
2004.
Joint
Pakistan-China
team
to
investigate
arms
smuggling
from
Northern
Areas:
A
joint
team
of
Pakistan
and
China
will
investigate
the
alleged
arms
smuggling
into
Chinese
territories
last
week.
Northern
Areas
(NA)
official
spokesperson
Saeed
Ahmed
Khan,
also
the
Home
Secretary
in
NA,
said
that
over
seven
Kalashnikov
assault
rifles
and
30
bore
pistols
along
with
boxes
of
rounds
were
allegedly
smuggled
into
China
on
Chinese
trucks.
The
arms
and
ammunition
were
reportedly
purchased
from
Peshawar
and
smuggled
into
China
by
hiding
them
in
secret
cavities
of
the
trucks
which
were
returning
to
China
after
off-loading
the
imported
goods
at
Sust
customs
check
point,
he
said.
Khan
also
said
that
the
weapons,
recovered
in
China,
were
reportedly
being
supplied
to
Islamist
extremists
in
Kashgher
territory,
which
borders
Pakistan.
Dawn,
April
22,
2004.
SRI
LANKA
President
Chandrika
Kumaratunga
invites
Norway
for
mediation:
The
Norwegian
Prime
Minister
Kjell
Magne
Bondevik
has
reportedly
agreed
to
a
request
made
by
Sri
Lankan
President
Chandrika
Bandaranaike
Kumaratunga
for
Oslo
to
resume
its
facilitator
role
in
the
peace
process
between
the
Sri
Lankan
Government
and
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tami
Eelam
(LTTE).
"I
said
that
Norway
was
willing
to
comply,
on
condition
that
the
LTTE
(Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam)
also
ask
us
to
play
a
role,"
Bondevik
said
in
a
statement
after
President
Kumaratunga
telephoned
him
late
on
April
22,
2004.
"We
must
first
get
a
request
from
the
Tigers.
If
that
comes,
and
we
hope
it
will,
we
will
consult
both
sides
about
how
the
process
can
be
brought
forward,"
Bondevik
later
told
the
Norwegian
NRK
public
radio.
Norway
had
temporarily
withdrawn
from
the
peace
process
in
November
2003.
Daily
News,
April
24,
2004.
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the South Asian region.
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and the
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