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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 42, May 3, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Uneasy Dialogue
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati.
Yet another round of border talks between India and Bangladesh
ended in Dhaka on May 3, 2004, amid charges and counter-charges
by both sides that share a blow-hot-blow-cold relationship.
The five-day Director General (DG)-level talks, beginning
April 29, 2004 between the Border Security Force (BSF) and
the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), were held less than a month
after the Bangladesh Coast Guard seized as much as 10 truckloads
of sophisticated military hardware from the Chittagong Port,
estimated at a value of more than Rs 10 billion, that was
apparently heading for India's insurgency-wracked Northeast.
BSF Director General Ajay Raj Sharma, heading the 15-member
Indian delegation, and his BDR counterpart Major General
Jahangir Alam Chowdhury, leading the 19-member home team,
discussed the usual border irritants between the two highly
populous neighbours. BDR officials bombarded the media in
Dhaka with charges that included killing of 15 'innocent'
Bangladeshi nationals by the BSF and Indian civilians between
January and March 2004, push-in attempt of 'Bengali speaking
Indian nationals' by the BSF, setting up of 'illegal structures'
by India within 150-yard of the zero point in violation
of international rules and regulations, and trafficking
of women and children. Besides, the BDR officials, according
to Bangladeshi media reports, also raised the issue of drug
and illegal arms smuggling from India.
The Indian side, on its part, sought the strengthening of
BDR-BSF coordination to prevent border crimes, ensuring
border security, and environmental conservation. The Indian
delegation also sought details regarding the latest position
on the implementation of the 1974 Indira-Mujib Accord between
the two countries.
New Delhi and Dhaka have, at fairly regular intervals, been
discussing issues that are actually 'borderless' in the
sense that terrorism and crime recognize no national borders.
However, evidences, again coming up at regular intervals,
suggest that sections within the Bangladeshi power structure
could well be aiding and abetting separatist insurgencies
in India's Northeast, by way of providing shelter to top
militant leaders and cadres, besides extending transit facilities
for illegal weapons shipments to India's troubled Northeastern
frontier. When these facts are taken into account, the stark
reality of a border that exists, and which needs to be demarcated
and protected, becomes impossible to ignore.
Take, for instance, the April 2, 2004, arms seizure near
the Chittagong Port in southern Bangladesh. Well placed
Indian intelligence sources disclose that the cache comprised
1,790 rifles, that included Uzi sub-machine guns and those
of the AK series, 150 rocket launchers, 840 rockets, 2,700
grenades and more than one million rounds of ammunition.
These weapons were being put onto ten trucks after being
unloaded in the eastern bank of the Karnafully river from
two trawlers that originated in Malaysia. According to local
media reports in Guwahati, capital of Northeastern India's
Assam state, the trawlers are owned by the brother of a
ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader. The ships
he owns often use the Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Limited
(CUFL) jetty, near Chittagong, to unload consignments. It
was at this jetty that Bangladeshi paramilitary troopers
carried out the raid that was to lead to the biggest ever
illegal arms haul in the country's history. The local police
would have let the trucks roll - and there are reports that
they were actually overseeing the unloading operation -
but for the arrival of Bangladesh Coast Guard personnel
who seized the cache and informed the higher authorities.
When this issue was raised at the just-concluded border
talks at Dhaka, Bangladesh had already assured India that
it would share the findings of the probe into the huge arms
haul with New Delhi. The seized weapons are currently in
the custody of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), a new security
outfit created to tackle law and order in Bangladesh. Prime
Minister Khaleda Zia's ruling BNP and the opposition Awami
League headed by former Premier Sheikh Hasina are accusing
each other of complicity in the arms shipment. However,
the probe team, according to reports from Dhaka, has apparently
already 'ruled out' any political links in the murky affair.
The seizure of such a large consignment of illegal arms
is itself a highly disturbing development, and when such
a huge quantity of lethal military hardware is destined
for a foreign location, the issue becomes all the more serious.
Reports indicate that at least 16 Indian insurgents have
been arrested by the Bangladesh security forces in this
connection. Dhaka has refused to confirm these arrests,
as that would go against its stated position that no Indian
insurgents were operating from the country's territory.
Those arrested belong to outlawed rebel groups such as the
United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
People's Liberation Army (PLA)
of Manipur, the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL),
also from Manipur, and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF).
Former Bangladesh Army generals and security analysts were
as shocked as security watchers in India over the weapons
haul. Some former Bangladesh Army generals observed that
the weapons recovered and the quantity involved are normally
used in conventional warfare against a regular army. One
former Army top gun in Dhaka went to the extent of commenting
that the weapons seized were almost equivalent to those
possessed by the Comilla Division of the Bangladesh Army.
They felt that 'well-organized syndicates' in Bangladesh
could have used the country only as a transit route and
that the arms may have been heading for the Maoist rebels
in Nepal or the separatists in India's northeast. An English
daily from Dhaka, The Daily Star, quoted 'intelligence
agents' as stating that the weapons could have been headed
for Assam. Indian authorities insist that the topmost military
commander of the outlawed ULFA was operating his anti-India
insurgency from his base in Dhaka and elsewhere in Bangladesh.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising to find the
BSF chief justifying India's move to erect a fence along
the entire 4,500 kilometer-long border with Bangladesh.
Dhaka, however, has sought to impose a condition on the
issue. "Bangladesh is not against fencing. But, it wants
that it should be erected 150 yards away from the border,"
BDR Director General Chowdhury was quoted as saying.
Dhaka's attempts at deflecting attention from concerns among
major western powers about Bangladesh turning into the latest
hub of terror, both Islamist and other, have failed on more
occasions than one. Recent developments have only further
exposed the goings-on in that country. Even during the latest
round of the BSF-BDR talks in Dhaka, the Bangladesh side
sought to pin down the Indian officials by furnishing a
list of 39 camps of anti-Bangladesh insurgent groups allegedly
operating from India. The Indian side had flatly rejected
these suggestions. Dhaka's claim can be dismissed rather
easily because, after the recent arms seizure in Chittagong,
security analysts in Bangladesh, including several former
Bangladesh Army generals, have openly stated that the weapons
seized could not have been used by local militants who were
not sufficiently trained to use such sophisticated military
hardware. Bangladesh can hardly be serious in trying to
suggest that militants capable of using only homemade weapons
are operating from India!
During the talks, India had once again made a case for joint
patrolling of the border by the border guards of the two
countries, a proposal Dhaka has rejected. On the face of
it, the joint patrolling proposal makes excellent sense.
An estimated 6,000 people from Bangladesh cross over into
India every day in search of work, many of them with the
intention of settling permanently in the country. The border
areas are also notorious for human trafficking in women
and children, trans-border terrorism, and smuggling. India
has repeatedly provided lists of terrorist camps in Bangladesh;
Bangladesh has now reacted by giving its own list of alleged
terrorist camps in India. Both countries have, individually,
an insufficient force to effectively patrol the border,
and joint patrolling would help end abuses on both side.
This was conceded during the March 2002 meeting between
the Directors General of the BSF and the BDR, when India
had submitted the joint patrolling proposal in a list of
six 'confidence building measures', and the then DG BDR
had said that the proposals could secure some dividends,
and had directed them to his Government for clearance. The
issue came up again during the BSF-BDR meeting in March
2003, following which it was agreed that joint patrolling
would be implemented from July 1, 2003. However, instead
of responding to the BSF's draft on modalities for joint
patrolling, Bangladesh rejected the proposal on August 1,
2003, with Foreign Minister Morshed Khan stating that the
proposal was 'not feasible'. Indian Foreign Secretary, Shashank,
also raised the issue during his visit to Bangladesh on
March 10, 2004. This time the proposal was shot down by
Bangladesh Home Minister Altaf Hossain Chowdhury on the
grounds that, since India had made specific allegations
about the existence of terrorist camps in his country's
territory, there was 'no need for joint patrol.'
The BSF-BDR talks are intended as an exercise at smoothening
out existing irritants and ensuring the security of both
nations, rather than sessions aimed at leveling charges
and counter-charges. A higher degree of transparency on
Dhaka's part will be necessary before this annual exercise
can serve its intended purpose. Absence of such transparency
within the structure of bilateral relations, future options
can only include international scrutiny and investigations
into developments such as the latest arms haul and Bangladesh's
support to terrorist and extremist groups - options that
Premier Khaleda Zia would certainly prefer to exclude.
The Politics of
a Retreat
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant
Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution
Ever since President Musharraf announced a turn-around on
his country's support to the Taliban
and Al
Qaeda on September 19, 2001, Pakistan has been
treading a thin line between placating the domestic Islamist
extremist constituency and maintaining the alliance with
the United States. Since the volte face, Pakistan
has arrested more than 500 Al Qaeda/Taliban operatives,
handing a majority of them over to US custody. Last week,
however, saw the military regime adopt a strategy of amnesty,
not an uncommon approach across many theatres of anti-state
violence in South Asia.
Five tribesmen accused of sheltering Al Qaeda terrorists
surrendered to the Pakistan army at a Jirga (tribal
council) on April 24, 2004. The five men, led by Nek Mohammed,
from the Zalikhel tribe turned themselves in before the
Jirga and reportedly pledged loyalty to Pakistan
in return for clemency. "We give amnesty to these people
in return for their pledge of brotherhood and loyalty,"
said Peshawar Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Safdar Hussain after
the wanted men joined him in the ceremony that occurred
at a Madrassa at Shakai, South Waziristan, in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region.
The military regime has reportedly agreed to halt its operations
against Nek Mohammed's tribal combatants, set free most
of the 163 suspected Al Qaeda supporters who were captured
during the March 2004 operations, and provide a grant of
Rupees 90.1 million for development in Waziristan. In return,
Nek Mohammed and his clique promised to refrain from attacks
on Pakistani forces and the U.S. troops in adjacent Afghanistan.
Among others, the unwritten agreement also specifies that:
local tribesmen will not provide protection to 'foreign
terrorists' (Arabs, Chechens and Uzbeks among others) in
the FATA; the tribesmen will surrender their heavy arms
to local authorities; tribesmen are to ensure registration
of all foreigners who would then be given amnesty and residence
by the state.
As a result, the tribal combatants, designated as 'most
wanted' only a month ago, were seen embracing the military
regime's representatives after a deal reportedly brokered
by leaders of the Islamist grouping, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
(MMA). Startled by the bonhomie expressed at the surrender
ceremony, a Western diplomat in Islamabad said, "How can
you go and fight these people last month and embrace them
this month?"
The 30-something Nek Mohammed, who was a 'commander' at
the Bagram airbase in Afghanistan during the Taliban rule,
and his tribal combatants had, in March, led a fierce resistance
to an army-led offensive on their hideouts in the remote
South Waziristan area, where senior Al Qaeda leaders are
thought to have taken refuge. At least 145 people, including
46 troops, were killed during these operations. Some Western
diplomats have claimed that Nek not only harboured, but
also supplied arms and men to Central Asian Al Qaeda-linked
terrorists for cross-border attacks on aid workers, troops
and Government targets in Afghanistan over the past 12 to
18 months. "He is, indirectly or directly, responsible for
the deaths of up to 400 people in Afghanistan," an unnamed
Western diplomat based in Pakistan told AFP.
Since the March operations, the state had been threatening
military action against the tribal fighters and had also
postponed deadlines for threatened military action on two
occasions. That Nek Mohammed, reportedly a popular figure
in South Waziristan, was a crucial actor is evident from
the fact that a wide spectrum of powers within the Pakistani
state was involved in the negotiations. According to Pakistani
analyst Nasim Zehra, tribal elders, two elected parliamentarians,
the Frontier Constabulary, Army regulars, Special Forces,
the Governor, tribal agents, FATA officials and the President
were variously involved at different stages.
After the March debacle, the military regime has been attempting
to isolate the five 'most wanted' in order to neutralize
the estimated 400-odd foreign fighters believed to be holed
up in the region. The objective is to either neutralize
them within Pakistani territory or flush them out into Afghanistan,
where the US troops are stationed, but this has evidently
not worked. While a fair amount of ambivalence still dominates
the military regime's end game, the state has evidently
conceded its limited coercive power in the FATA.
The military regime is currently caught in the dilemma of
protecting the surviving remnants of its own creation, the
Taliban, and the need to project the image of a responsible
state internationally. The 'do more' exhortations from Washington
only add to the complexity by creating a necessity of having
to deny a 'retreat' on the state's part in the FATA deal.
The continued reversal of the long pursued 'strategic depth
theory' is, however, becoming increasingly awkward. While
the March 2004 operations in FATA led to heavy casualties
for the Pakistani troops and failed to neutralize the Al
Qaeda in the region, the aftermath brings to light the perils
of the apparent demobilization of the jehadis through
conciliatory deals. However, while officially indicating
that "There has been reconciliation… achieved through mutual
consultation and negotiation", the military regime has had
to reiterate at the highest levels, as in the past, that
there is no dilution in Pakistan's commitment to eliminate
terrorism from its soil.
Though the Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives would try and
secure themselves from any future offensive in the region,
the demonstration effect of a 'reconciliation' is expected
to be high in the immediate future. "The world knows who
has really surrendered," Nek Mohammed is reported to have
declared at the ceremony before thousands of tribesmen.
While enforcing specificities of any unwritten agreement
is troublesome, the chances of the tribesmen abiding by
such a deal are very low in a region historically known
to defy the writ of the state. More significantly, the real
character of relations between the Pakistan Army and the
'rebellious' tribesmen remains murky. It is useful to recall
Nek Mohammed's observation at the 'reconciliation' ceremony:
"We are loyal to Pakistan and are ready to fight in Kashmir
or anywhere else if asked by the Government. It's a propaganda
that we were terrorists."
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
April 26-May
2, 2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
3
|
0
|
3
|
6
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
5
|
0
|
3
|
8
|
Bihar
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Delhi
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
7
|
4
|
10
|
21
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
4
|
4
|
3
|
11
|
Manipur
|
2
|
1
|
1
|
4
|
Tripura
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
18
|
9
|
23
|
50
|
NEPAL
|
2
|
0
|
10
|
12
|
PAKISTAN
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
SRI LANKA
|
0
|
0
|
7
|
7
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Dhaka
rejects
Indian
proposal
for
joint
patrol
of
common
land
border:
Bangladesh
has
rejected
India's
offer
of
joint
patrolling
of
the
over
4,000
kilometer-long-land
border
during
the
biennial
conference
of
the
Border
Security
Force
(BSF)
and
Bangladesh
Rifles
(BDR)
held
in
Dhaka
between
April
29-May
3,
2004.
While
BSF
Director
General
Ajai
Raj
Sharma
led
India's
15-member
delegation
at
the
talks,
a
19-member
team
of
the
host
country
was
headed
by
BDR
Director
General
Muhammad
Jahanghir
Alam
Chowdhury.
During
the
talks,
the
Indian
side
also
reportedly
reiterated
its
intention
to
go
ahead
with
the
plan
of
constructing
barbed
fences
along
the
border,
a
move
that
has
been
opposed
by
the
BDR.
The
BSF
delegation
also
renewed
claims
that
terrorists'
active
in
India's
Northeast
maintained
camps
within
Bangladesh.
Sentinel
Assam,
May
1,
2004;
Independent
Bangladesh,
April
30,
2004.
1200
left-wing
extremists
'surrender'
to
Islamic
organisation:
At
Least
1,200
activists
of
the
outlawed
left-wing
Purbo
Banglar
Communist
Party
(PBCP)
in
the
Raninagar
and
Atrai
areas
of
Naogaon
district
reportedly
'surrendered'
along
with
an
unspecified
quantity
of
arms
to
Jagrato
Muslim
Janata
Bangladesh
(JMB)
on
April
25,
2004.
JMB,
an
Islamic
organisation,
had
asked
for
the
'surrender'
with
a
threat
of
setting
ablaze
houses
of
all
suspected
extremists.
Police
official
Fazlur
Rahman
was
quoted
as
saying
that
the
JMB
has
no
legal
authority
to
conduct
any
such
surrender
and
that
the
law
will
take
its
own
course
against
the
terrorists.
Independent
Bangladesh,
April
27,
2004.
INDIA
USA
adds
People's
War
Group
and
Maoist
Communist
Centre
to
its
global
terror
list:
The
United
States
has
added
the
left-wing
extremist
(also
called
Naxalite)
People's
War
Group
(PWG)
and
Maoist
Communist
Centre
(MCC)
in
its
Terrorist
Exclusion
List,
according
to
the
annual
report
-
Patterns
of
Global
Terrorism,
2003
-
released
by
the
US
State
Department
on
April
29,
2004.
Welcoming
the
inclusion
of
the
PWG
on
the
US
terror
list,
Andhra
Pradesh
Home
Minister
T.
Devender
Goud
said
on
April
30
that,
"We
have
been
maintaining
right
from
the
beginning
that
the
Naxals
have
been
indulging
in
violence
and
destruction.
The
inclusion
of
the
PWG
in
the
terror
list
only
vindicates
our
stand."
The
Director
General
of
Police
S.R.
Sukumara,
however,
said
"I
don't
see
how
this
development
is
going
to
change
anything.
I
am
not
even
sure
of
the
implications."
Deccan,
April
30,
2004.
NEPAL
US
State
Department
adds
Maoist
Insurgents
to
Terrorist
Exclusion
List:
The
US
State
Department
on
April
29,
2004,
added
the
Communist
Party
of
Nepal
(Maoist)
to
its
Terrorist
Exclusion
List
aiming
to
restrict
the
Maoist
insurgents'
entry
and
movement
in
the
USA.
According
to
a
statement,
this
designation
will
facilitate
U.S.
fulfillment
of
its
obligations
under
United
Nations
Security
Council
Resolution
1373
to
prevent
the
movement
of
terrorists
or
terrorist
groups
by
effective
border
controls.
The
State
Department
in
its
Patterns
of
Global
Terrorism,
2003,
report
also
warned
that
Nepal
has
become
a
convenient
"logistic
and
transit
point"
for
some
outside
militants
and
international
terrorists
due
to
its
limited
government
finances,
weak
border
controls
and
poor
security
infrastructure.
The
report
further
said
that
Nepal
also
has
many
relatively
"soft
targets"
that
make
it
a
"potentially
attractive
site"
for
terrorist
operations.
Nepal
News,
May
2,
2004;
April
30,
2004.
Maoists
free
41
police
personnel
in
Sankhuwasabha
district:
The
Maoist
insurgents
on
April
29,
2004,
released
41
police
personnel
captured
during
an
attack
at
Pashupatinagar
in
the
Ilam
district
on
April
9.
The
hostages
were
freed
at
Nundhaki
in
the
Sankhuwasabha
district
amidst
representatives
of
the
International
Committee
of
Red
Cross,
human
rights
activists
and
media
personnel.
A
Maoist
statement
claimed
that
the
abductees
were
treated
in
accordance
with
the
Geneva
Convention.
The
Himalayan
Times,
April
30,
2004.
PAKISTAN
Terrorists
responsible
for
March
2004
attacks
came
from
Pakistan,
says
President
Karimov:
Uzbekistan
President
Islam
Karimov
said
in
Tashkent
on
April
29,
2004,
that
terrorists
responsible
for
the
coordinated
series
of
attacks
during
March
2004
that
killed
at
least
47
people
were
based
in
Pakistan
along
that
country's
border
with
Afghanistan.
"The
main
base
where
the
terrorists
found
refuge
is
South
Waziristan,"
Karimov
told
a
press
conference
during
a
parliamentary
session.
Suspects
detained
after
a
series
of
suicide
bombings,
explosions
and
assaults
in
the
capital
Tashkent
and
the
central
region
of
Bukhara
had
confessed
that
they
had
been
in
South
Waziristan
and
that
they
had
links
to
people
operating
there,
said
the
President.
Daily
Times,
April
30,
2004.
Jihad
to
continue
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir,
says
Lashkar-e-Toiba
chief:
Hafiz
Mohammad
Saeed,
leader
of
Jamaat-ud-Dawa
(the
renamed
Lashkar-e-Toiba
[LeT]),
on
April
29,
2004,
criticized
President
Pervez
Musharraf's
"policy
of
friendship"
with
India
and
indicated
that
Jihad
in
the
Indian
State
of
Jammu
and
Kashmir
would
not
be
stopped.
"Jihad
will
never
be
stopped
in
the
held
territory.
On
this
issue,
there
is
complete
unity
and
solidarity
in
the
ranks
of
the
Mujahideen,"
he
said
at
a
public
meeting
in
Muzaffarabad,
Pakistan
occupied
Kashmir
(PoK).
Among
others
who
spoke
at
the
gathering
were
Muslim
Conference
president
Sardar
Attique
Ahmed,
People's
Party
information
secretary
Khawaja
Farooq
Ahmed
and
former
Jamaat-e-Islami
chief
Abdur
Rashid
Turabi.
Dawn,
April
30,
2004.
SRI
LANKA
Seven
cadres
shot
dead
by
Karuna
faction,
alleges
LTTE:
The
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam
(LTTE)
has
alleged
that
seven
of
its
cadres
were
killed
on
April
25,
2004,
in
Batticaloa
district
by
cadres
loyal
to
the
renegade
faction
headed
by
Vinayagamoorthy
Muralitharan
alias
'Colonel'
Karuna'.
According
to
the
LTTE,
its
cadres
were
shot
dead
inside
an
area
under
their
control,
four
kilometers
northwest
of
Batticaloa
town.
The
LTTE
has
told
the
Sri
Lanka
Monitoring
Mission
(SLMM)
that
cadres
loyal
to
Karuna
entered
from
an
Army
checkpoint
in
Vavunithivu,
about
one
kilometer
from
the
scene
of
the
incident.
"The
LTTE's
political
wing
leader,
S.P.
Tamilchelvan,
informed
us
that
seven
LTTE
members
were
killed
by
cadres
loyal
to
Karuna
last
night.
Our
monitors
have
started
an
inquiry.
We
do
not
have
an
independent
confirmation,''
said
SLMM
spokesperson
Agnes
Bragadottir.
The
Hindu,
April
26,
2004.
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