SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 51, July 5, 2004

 

NEPAL

Tentative Political Coherence and Insurgent Consolidation
P.G. Rajamohan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

There is qualified good news from Nepal, with the major democratic parties breaking through the political logjam that has persisted for nearly 20 months. Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's new Government has successfully convinced its allies, the Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) and the Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP) to participate in his Cabinet. On June 30, the Government finally announced its 43-point Common Minimum Programme (CMP), which constitutes the basis for the allies' cohabitation. The four constituent parties, including Deuba's Nepali Congress - Democratic (NC-D), were part of the 'anti-regression' movement directed against King Gyanendra's 'activism' and, in joining the newly formed 'all-party' Government, have declared that the 'regression' had ended. However, Prime Minister Deuba's chief political rival, Girija Prasad Koirala's Nepali Congress (NC), which decided to remain outside the Government, criticized the present arrangement as a 'continuation of regression'.

With Deuba's return to power, the country has, in one sense, come full circle. Deuba's elected Government had been dismissed by King Gyanendra in October 2002 on charges of 'incompetence' for its failure to resolve the crisis caused by the Maoist insurgency, and to hold fresh elections. It was succeeded by the Lokendra Bahadur Chand and the Surya Bahadur Thapa regimes nominated by the King under the disputed Article 127 of the 1990 Nepal Constitution, but the crisis has, if anything, escalated, and the very possibility of holding elections in the country today is minimal. The restoration of a Government under Deuba, though this action is also under the authority of the controversial Article 127, is significant not only in the sense that it appears to right a past wrong, but also in the fact of the present Government's coalition character and the presence of two major parties of the dissolved Parliament of 200 - the CPN-UML and the NC-D.

As with past regimes, the 'All-Party' Government has emphasized the seriousness of the Maoist insurgency and the need to resolve it. The CMP, consequently, states that, "peace talks will be prioritized with maximum flexibility for a dignified political solution that is acceptable to all in national politics on the basis of national consensus for restoration of sustainable peace in the country." Immediately after his appointment, Prime Minister Deuba made a public statement inviting the Maoists to come forward for holding 'honest talks', adding that his twin objectives were to restore peace through dialogue with 'maximum flexibility' and to hold election.

Significantly, when Deuba came to power for the first time in 2001, he brought the Maoists to the negotiating table with enormous expectations for a peaceful resolution of the insurgency. However, the talks broke down in November 2001 after the Maoists stuck to their demand for elections to a Constituent Assembly, which the Government rejected. The Government has now pronounced its willingness to form the Constituent Assembly on the basis of 'national consensus'. A second round of peace talks in 2003 began with high hopes but ended in escalated violence. Deuba has confidently claimed that he can get the Maoists back to the negotiating table.

The inclusion in the Government of the CPN-UML, which has elements of ideological compatibility with the Maoists, is also a positive development. The Secretary of the CPN-UML, Madhav Kumar Nepal, has reiterated that elections are not possible without solving the Maoist problem and has stressed a solution through peaceful means. Madhav Kumar Nepal held a clandestine meeting at Lucknow in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh on November 20, 2003, with the Maoists' 'supreme leader', Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, immediately after the collapse of the second round of peace talks. The CPN-UML has said that it is prepared to meet the Maoists demands for holding a roundtable conference, for the formation of an interim government and for the election of a Constituent Assembly to draft a new Constitution. The spokesperson of CPN-UML and its Central Committee member, Pradip Nepal, has asked for the declaration of a unilateral ceasefire to create a conducive climate for peace talks.

While the formation of the Deuba Government is a major and positive development in the country's unruly democratic politics, it is not clear that it will immediately advance the movement to resolve the crisis of the Maoist insurgency. The Maoists' first reactions to the Deuba Government have, at best, been mixed. Baburam Bhattarai, the 'second-in-command' in the Maoist hierarchy, had stated, "The main thing is that the dialogue should not be held just for the sake of holding it - it should be aimed at progressive restructuring of state power. We are not willing to hold dialogue just for the sake of it. However, if there is a credible effort for negotiation for achieving progressive restructuring of state power, we are always ready." Prachanda, who initially dismissed Deuba's appointment as a continuation of the 'imperialist regime', later demanded United Nations mediation in the peace process. Deuba has not ruled out this alternative, asserting that, "All options that can lead to a concrete solution are welcome".

The Maoists' sincerity in engaging in a 'peace process' must, however, remain deeply suspect. Not only have they already abandoned negotiation on two occasions, launching ferocious attacks on the security forces, Government installations and the civilian population, but the exploitation of negotiations as a tactic for consolidation is both an integral part of their ideological perspective, and a demonstrable element in their past practice. Given the success of this strategy, and the current and expanding sweep of their influence, there can be little reason to believe that the Maoists would bring anything less than maximalist demands to the negotiating table

The trajectory of the Maoist rampage since the beginning of the movement in 1996 is interesting. In the first five years, they were able to establish their strongholds in three districts of the Midwestern Region, Rolpa, Rukum and Jajarkot, at which stage the Maoists declared a cease fire in July 2001 and entered into negotiations with the Government. This 'peace process' ended with the attack on the military camp at Dang, and a phase of widening and escalated violence, with the Army engaging against the Maoists for the first time. When the Maoists returned to the negotiating table in January 2003, the entirety of the Far Western, Midwestern and Western Region had virtually passed out of Government control, and at least 68 of the country's 75 districts were severely affected by the insurgency. After talks 'broke down' on August 27, 2003, the insurgency entered its bloodiest phase, with the Government presence progressively reduced to the urban centers and district headquarters virtually across the country, and no single district - including the capital, Kathmandu - entirely outside the ambit of Maoist violence.

Over the past ten months of violence, the Maoists have engaged in a systematic and strategically coherent campaign to break down the country's administrative structure. Mayors, Village Development Committee (VDC) Chairmen and members, and Government employees have been targeted for intimidation and selective elimination. The insurgents have killed the Mayors of Birgunj, Butwal and Pokhra, and have forced the nominated members of a majority of VDCs and ward offices to resign from their posts. Reports indicate that the insurgents have destroyed more than 40 per cent of the total administrative infrastructure, especially in the rural areas. Virtually all rural police stations have been abandoned, and a majority of these have been torched by the Maoists.

In the absence of the Governmental apparatus, the Maoists have established their own 'People's Governments' and 'People's Courts' at the village, district and regional level. Reports indicate that at least 21 district level 'people's governments' and nine 'autonomous regional people's governments' have been established.

The Maoists are now levying 'taxes' based on personal income in the regions of their domination. So far, only teachers had been subjected to this rule, paying a month's salary in every four months, but now all salaried individuals will have to pay an annual 'tax' amounting to 13 days of their salary. Farmers are also required to pay tax according to the size of their landholdings. The insurgents have also ordered non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and community-based organisations to pay tax to the respective 'district people's government', and to secure written permission to operate their projects in such areas.

Clearly, the Maoists are gradually transforming their insurgency into a self-reliant political movement with the establishment of enduring structures of administration. Militarily, the Maoists have graduated from crude home made weapons and arms snatched from the police and security forces, to a far more sophisticated arsenal, including a limited supply of AK-series rifles, and have acquired significant skill in the manufacture and use of a range of explosive devices and other small arms to sustain the war. The Maoists have also secured access to a high-tech communications network that comprehends wireless systems, cell phones and the Internet, to coordinate their activities in and around the country.

Since the collapse of the cease-fire on August 27, 2003, the escalated violence has killed an estimated 3,217 people including, 394 civilians, 529 security force personnel and 2,294 Maoists. While the disproportionate fatalities inflicted on the 'Maoists' may suggest increasing pressure on the insurgents, this is far from the case, and most of these fatalities have been peripheral cadres and sympathizers, with little of the core of the armed strength affected. The total fatalities in the eight-year-long insurgency have now exceeded 10,000, with the injured and mutilated numbering more than 50,000. There have been an estimated 250 bomb blast incidents across the country since August 27, 2003, with many of these located in markets and on public transport. At the same time, the insurgents have combined a programme of mass intimidation with indoctrination camps, where abducted civilians are forced to attend undergo training and 'corrective learning', and these have particularly targeted students, teachers and poor labourers from the Western, the mid-Western and the Eastern regions as a part of their 'People's War' strategy. Since September 2003 and till June 2004, more than 16,000 civilians, mainly teachers and students, have been abducted and put through such camps in various parts of the country. Further, the Maoists students organization, the All Nepal National Independent Students Union - Revolutionary (ANNISU-R) has organized a series of strikes in educational institutions and is also involved in the process of creating a combat force on its own, with a targeted membership of over 4,00,000.

Clearly, the Maoists cannot be expected to easily give away at the negotiating table what they have won in the war. There is, moreover, persistent confusion among the constitutional forces, including the King and the political parties, on how to deal with the insurgency, and the rhetoric of a 'negotiated solution' continues to militate against the realities of the sustained Maoist expansion. While the installation of an 'All Party' coalition at Kathmandu is, consequently, good news at the political level, there is clearly a very long struggle ahead before a working democracy can be restored in the insurgency wracked country. It is only after the country's constitutional leadership manages to raise itself out of its petty rivalries and personal animosities, and recovers the will and determination to confront the more intractable tasks of governance, that the possibility of the restoration of a democratic order can be conceptualized.

 

INDIA	PAKISTAN

The Chasm between Rhetoric and Reality
Guest Writer: G. Parthasarathy
Columnist and former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokhar was in New Delhi for the "Composite Dialogue Process" between India and Pakistan during the weekend commencing June 26. The last round of talks between the Foreign Secretaries, in 1998, had been anything but cordial. When India's then Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath referred to the growing terrorist violence in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) by the Pakistani jihadi group the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), his Pakistani counterpart Shamshad Ahmad claimed that he was not even aware of the existence of such an organization in his country. This assertion came despite the fact that the then Governor of Punjab, Shahid Hamid, and the then Information Minister, Mushahid Hussain, had paid a highly publicized visit to the Headquarters of the LeT at Muridhke near Lahore. Much water has since flowed through the Ganga and the Indus. The LeT has proclaimed its intention to plant the green flag of Islam in Washington, Tel Aviv and Delhi. Its cadres have been apprehended while preparing for acts of terrorism in places as far away as Washington and Sydney. It has made no secret of its support for the Taliban and Al Qaeda and was belatedly declared a terrorist organization by the Americans, British and others.

General Musharraf reacted predictably to western actions declaring Pakistani jihadi groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and the LeT as terrorist organizations. He pretended to act against these groups, but allowed them to function under new names. He, however, acted firmly against elements in groups like the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), who were involved in plots against him personally, or joined the Al Qaeda in its moves to unseat the royalty in Saudi Arabia. The LeT functions under its new name - Jamaat ud Dawa - in Pakistan. Its cadres now carry arms more discreetly than in the past. And its communications networks actively give instructions to hundreds of its operatives, who have been infiltrated across the Line of Control (LOC) in J&K. More importantly, the LeT has evidently been assisted and tasked by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) to carry out terrorist strikes all across India, targeting both strategic installations like the Bombay Stock Exchange and political leaders who are accused of abetting communal violence. The political objective of such moves is clear. By targeting political leaders, the LeT is aiming to incite communal violence and create a deep communal divide within India. This is similar to earlier ISI attempts to create a Hindu-Sikh divide in Punjab by targeting innocent Hindus in the state. The indictment of cadres of the LeT in last year's bomb blasts in Mumbai and the recent gunning down of its cadres in Gujarat has confirmed the role the Lashkar intends to undertake across India.

What makes the Lashkar different from other ISI backed terrorist groups operating in India? While other groups have confined their activities to wresting the Kashmir valley from India and occasionally pretending to be champions of Muslims in India, the LeT avers that its objective is the liberation of Muslims in India by the destabilization and unraveling of the Indian Union. Hence its determination to establish its presence all across India, from Kashmir to Kerala.

On June 29, the day after the talks between the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan ended, Kashmir's Police Chief Gopal Sharma made some very interesting disclosures. Sharma indicated that his force had broken up a complex LeT network in the State. Two of its top leaders, both Pakistani nationals, had been gunned down. Twenty of its cadres had been arrested. Sharma also disclosed that the group was planning to eliminate politically high profile persons and some police officers. They were even planning to destroy economic centres like the Bombay Stock Exchange and concentrate their activities in Mumbai, Delhi, Pune and Srinagar. He added that the group was acting under the directions of the LeT leadership based in Pakistan and that it had amongst others, killed Moulvi Mushtaq Ahmed, the uncle of prominent All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq. It was also revealed that the LeT group was in close touch with its associates and Indian contacts, who were killed recently by the Gujarat Police. The LeT makes no secret that its cadres do indeed operate not only across the LOC but also elsewhere within India. A large number of LeT leaders and cadres, who are Pakistani nationals, have been killed in recent years in anti-terrorist operations within J&K.

Despite much talk of a fall in infiltration across the LOC in J&K, terrorists did strike on a number of occasions just before the composite dialogue with Pakistan commenced. These attacks included the killing of four Indian tourists on June 12, the brutal murder of an Indian railway Engineer and his brother on June 25, and the gunning down of 11 members of the Gujjar community, including women and children in the Jammu Region on June 26. They follow careful targeting across J&K of candidates and others taking an active part in the General Elections in April - May 2004. The ISI strategy in J&K is clear. They will use terrorist violence to disrupt political and economic life across the State. At the same time, they will target political activists who seek to distance themselves from Pakistan's ambitions, either by attacking them directly, or by killing their close relatives and associates. The assassinations of Abdul Ghani Lone and Moulvi Mushtaq Ahmed are a part of this strategy. It is significant that not a single leader of the APHC or the ruling People's Democratic Party in J&K has yet issued a single statement categorically condemning acts of terrorist violence and pointing out that Pakistani nationals involved in such activities have no business to enter the State. More importantly, a message has been sent across the Valley by the terrorists that they will not hesitate to target tourists and others who provide employment and earnings for the people of the State.

Gopal Sharma also made another interesting revelation. He indicated that the predominantly Pakistani LeT was now working in close coordination with the largest Kashmiri group operating in Jammu and Kashmir, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM). Both the Hizb and the LeT are associated with the ISI-sponsored United Jihad Council that operates out of Muzaffrabad. The ISI evidently realized that the Punjabi speaking cadres of the LeT were no longer welcome in the Kashmir valley. They are, therefore, endeavoring to ensure that they receive a measure of support by coordinating their activities with the cadres of the Hizb, who have widespread local contacts. The ISI establishment has also been concerned by the split in the Hurriyat. They are uncomfortable with exclusively supporting the faction led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani. Hence the frantic efforts of Foreign Secretary Riaz Khokhar to persuade separatist leaders and groups to close ranks during his meetings with them in New Delhi. The effort will be to coax the various factions of the Hurriyat to fall in line through a judicious mix of fear and incentives. Security agencies in India have estimated that there are around 2,500-3,500 armed terrorists operating in J&K. Roughly sixty percent of these terrorists are estimated to be Pakistani nationals. With hundreds of trained terrorists having moved to staging areas for infiltration across the LOC, it should be evident that Pakistan has no intention of ending its use of violence and terrorism as instruments of State Policy.

It is interesting that on the very day that that Foreign Secretary Khokhar was meeting the Prime Minister and other leaders in Delhi two important security related meetings took place in Islamabad and New Delhi. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his colleagues in the Cabinet Committee on Security received a detailed briefing on the security situation from the Army Chief, General Nirmal Vij, the same day. General Musharraf also addressed a meeting of his senior army colleagues, including the Pakistan Army's nine Corps Commanders on June 28. The main focus of this meeting was on the situation on Pakistan's western borders with Afghanistan, though the situation on the LOC and the internal situation, including the attacks on General Musharraf and the Karachi Corps Commander also figured in the discussions. General Musharraf now has his hands full, with his Army and Air Force attacking and laying siege on their own countrymen in North and South Waziristan, along the Pak-Afghan border. General Musharraf has little choice in this matter as George Bush desperately needs to "get" Osama bin Laden before the US Presidential elections. The meeting of the Corps Commanders took place just before a visit to Pakistan by the American CENTCOM Chief General John Abizaid. The United States obviously wants General Musharraf to devote full attention to the operations against the Al Qaeda and not fritter away his energies on tensions with India. General Musharraf has little choice but to fall in line, in much the same manner as General Zia was all milk and honey and even proposed a "No War Pact" with India, when the US commenced its jihad against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Hence the sweet talk and soft approach of Mr. Khokhar.

New Delhi obviously has to embark on a process that enhances cooperation, builds confidence and seeks to resolve differences with Pakistan. But it would do well to remember that even as it treaded softly on issues like Pakistan's membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and its readmission to the Commonwealth, the Musharraf dispensation spared no effort to fulfill its ambitions on the Kashmir issue at the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Foreign Minister's Conference in Istanbul. The vicious propaganda against India on the State run Pakistan television and radio continues. But far more dangerous than all this is the ISI supported effort by the LeT to exacerbate communal tensions and target political leaders and economic centres across India. Has any thought been given to how the costs for Pakistan can be raised, if it persists with these efforts?