Assam: Demographic
Jitters
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
According to the National Census of 2001, the Muslim population
in the Northeast Indian State of Assam is 30.9 per cent
out of a total of 26.6 million. Although the last Census
was conducted three years ago, it was only on September
6, 2004, that the office of the Registrar General of India,
which carries out census operations, released the statistical
break-up on religious lines. The latest figures demonstrate
that the proportionate growth of the Muslim population in
Assam, in comparison with other religious communities, is
second only to Jammu and Kashmir (67 per cent Muslims).
The 2001
Census put Assam's population at 26,655,528. Of this, 17,296,455
were recorded as Hindus and 8,240,611 Muslims. Among the
critical elements made public by the Census authorities
is the fact that six of Assam's 27 districts have a majority
Muslim population. The district of Barpeta tops the list
with 977,943 Muslims and 662,066 Hindus. The other five
districts where Muslims constitute a majority: Dhubri, Goalpara,
Nagaon, Karimganj and Hailakandi.
The issue of Muslim population growth in Assam has a disturbing
resonance. The State has long been in the grip of a murky
politics of citizenship over the issue of unabated illegal
migration from adjoining Bangladesh, with which it shares
a 262 kilometre long border. The particular significance
of the recently released Census data is the fact that the
rates of growth of Muslim populations are the highest precisely
in the districts that share a border with, or lie close
to the border with, Bangladesh - particularly Dhubri, Barpeta,
Karimganj and Hailakandi - giving credence to the widely
held belief that illegal migration from Bangladesh was the
source of these demographic trends. Such migration clearly
continues unhindered, despite the barbed-wire fence being
erected in stretches and the presence of the Border Security
Force (BSF) along the border.
A look at the census figures of 1971 and 1991 (there was
no census in Assam in 1981 due to unrest in the State) shows
that there has been a steady to rapid rise in the Muslim
population in districts proximate to the border, confirming
apprehensions of a continuing illegal influx. This, perhaps,
goes a long way to explain the rather high Muslim growth
rate in Assam, estimated at 77.42 per cent between 1971
and 1991.
In 1971, Muslims, for instance, comprised 64.46 per cent
of the population in Dhubri district. This rose to 70.45
per cent in 1991 - a total growth of 77.42 per cent between
1971 and 1991. By 2001 the proportion of Muslims had risen
further to 74.29 per cent of the population in Dhubri. By
2001, the Muslim population in Barpeta rose from 56.07 per
cent in 1991 to 59.3 per cent; in Goalpara, from 50.18 per
cent to 53.71 per cent, and Hailakandi from 54.79 per cent
57.6 per cent. Significantly, two new districts joined the
list of Muslim majority districts in Assam by 2001: Karimganj,
where the Muslim population rose from 49.17 per cent in
1991 to 52.3 per cent; and Nagaon, where the community's
population grew from 47.19 per cent in 1991 to 50.99 per
cent.
There is need to make a clear distinction, here, between
indigenous Assamese-speaking Muslims and Bangladeshi migrants
before analyzing the demographic and security implications
of such population growth. Aside from Guwahati, Assam's
capital (that is part of the Kamrup Metro district), the
heartland of the indigenous Assamese Muslims - whose origins
can be traced to the forays of the pre-Mughals in the 13th
century - is located around the tea growing eastern districts
of Jorhat, Golaghat, Sivasagar and Dibrugarh. In Jorhat
district the Muslims comprised just 3.89 per cent of the
total population in 1971, rising to 4.32 per cent in 1991.
The growth rate was 48.04 per cent between 1971 and 1991.
In Sivasagar, Muslims accounted for 6.65 per cent of the
population in 1971, climbing to 7.63 per cent in 1991; in
Dibrugarh from 3.66 per cent of the total population in
1971 to 4.49 per cent in 1991; and in Golaghat, Muslims
comprised 5.17 per cent of the population in 1971, rising
to 7.11 per cent in 1991. It is useful to note, in this
context, that the growth rate of the Hindu population in
Jorhat, Sivasagar, Dibrugarh and Golaghat was between 32
and 49 per cent over the 1971-1991 period, closely comparable
to the rates of growth for the indigenous Muslim populations.
Evidently, the Muslim growth rate in areas dominated by
indigenous Assamese-speaking Muslims, located far from the
Bangladesh border, have been registering marginal increases,
as compared to areas located close to the border.
With these startling facts being brought to light, influential
groups, such as the All Assam Students' Union (AASU ) -
which had led the six-year-long anti-foreigner (that is,
anti-Bangladeshi) uprising in the State between 1979 and
1985 - have once again upped the ante, reiterating fears
that the illegal aliens will eventually overwhelm the indigenous
population. They have also stepped up demands for effective
action against this unremitting population offensive, including
the updating of the National Register of Citizens (NRC),
with 1971 as the cut-off year.
The population explosion in Bangladesh, with 2.8 million
added every year in one of the poorest and most densely
populated countries in the world, creates the push factors
for this silent demographic invasion. These are, however,
compounded by an expansionist political ideology, implicitly
or explicitly supported in the corridors of power in Bangladesh:
the idea of Lebensraum ('living space'), which has
been variously projected by the country's leadership for
a long time, though the use of the expression itself is
relatively recent. In the early nineties, Sadeq Khan, a
former diplomat, stated:
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All
projections, however, clearly indicate that by the
next decade, that is to say by the first decade of
the 21st century, Bangladesh will face a serious crisis
of lebensraum… A natural overflow of population
pressure is very much on the cards and will not be
restrainable by barbed wire or border patrol measures.
The natural trend of population overflow from Bangladesh
is towards the sparsely populated lands in the South
East, in the Arakan side and of the North East in
the Seven Sisters side of the Indian sub-continent…
|
The idea
had found repeated articulation even before the creation
of Bangladesh, and enumerated, among its supporters, Shiekh
Mujibur Rahman, the country's first Prime Minister.
The AASU and other organizations behind the anti-foreigner
movement in the State had, at the height of their agitation
in the mid-Nineteen Eighties, estimated the number of illegal
migrants in Assam to be as high as 4.5 to 5 million, or
31 to 34 per cent of the total population of the State in
1971. As recently as on July 14, 2004, India's Minister
of State for Home, Sriprakash Jaiswal, had told the Rajya
Sabha (Upper House of Parliament) that there were 5 million
illegal Bangladeshis in Assam. Groups such as the AASU reacted,
saying that their fears and estimates had been officially
confirmed. Later, on July 23 another Minister of State for
Home, Manik Rao Gavit clarified in Parliament that his colleague's
statement was not based on any comprehensive study, but
"on hearsay." But such glaring contradictions simply demonstrated
the oft-leveled charge that political parties, in fact,
lack the will to tackle the issue for fear of losing a massive
'vote bank'. With the census figures indirectly confirming
the alarming picture of mass illegal migrations from Bangladesh,
sparks are expected to fly in Assam.
Ironically, however, after the AASU leaders transformed
themselves into politicians, forming the Asom Gana Parishad
(AGP) in the winter of 1985 to contest the State Legislative
Assembly polls and to capture power in Assam with the key
promise of ridding the State of the illegal Bangladeshi
migrants, the party, did little to identify and deport the
aliens when it was in Government. In a span of nearly ten
years, spread over two terms, the AGP Government in Assam
deported fewer than 1,500 illegal migrants, blaming the
poor progress in the exercise of detection and expulsion
on loopholes in the controversial Illegal Migrants (Determination
by Tribunals) Act, 1983 (IMDT).
The IMDT Act operates only in Assam, while the Foreigners
Act, 1946, applies to the rest of the country. Under the
IMDT Act, the onus of proving the citizenship of an accused
'illegal alien' lies on the accuser, whereas in the Foreigners
Act, the onus lies with the accused. Given the infirmities
of the Act and the absence of political will, progress has
been extremely slow. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs
admits that the functioning of the IMDT Act has been "unsatisfactory",
and in a presentation in mid-1999, in connection with a
court case, disclosed that action under the Act had been
taken as follows:
-
Total
enquiries (against suspected illegal migrants) initiated:
3,02,554;
-
Enquiries
referred to the Screening Committee: 2,96,564;
-
Enquiry
reports referred to the IMDT Tribunals: 31,264;
-
Persons
declared as illegal migrants by the IMDT Tribunals:
9,625;
-
Number
of illegal migrants expelled: 1,461.
In November
1998, the then Governor of Assam, Lt. Gen. (Retd) S.K.Sinha
presented a 42-page official report to the President of
India on 'Illegal Migration into Assam,' noting:
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As a result of population movement from Bangladesh,
the spectre looms large of the indigenous people of
Assam being reduced to a minority in their home state…
This silent and invidious demographic invasion of
Assam may result in the loss of the geo-strategically
vital districts of Lower Assam [on the border with
Bangladesh]. The influx of these illegal migrants
is turning these districts into a Muslim majority
region. It will then only be a matter of time when
a demand for their merger with Bangladesh may be made…
|
If current
trends of inflow of population continue unchecked, the security
implications, not only for Assam, but for the entire Northeast
region, could be disastrous.
Rhetoric and Denial
Saji Cherian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
The foreign relations ensemble in South Asia has, for long,
been dominated by the India-Pakistan scenario. Of late,
however, a slanging match between India and Bangladesh over
the terrorist infrastructure in the latter has cornered
significant media space. Much of this was, again, in evidence
during the Fifth Home Secretary-level biennial talks held
in Dhaka on September 16-17, 2004.
The Indian delegation, led by Home Secretary Dhirendra Singh,
presented a detailed list and some specific information
relating to some 195 camps of Indian insurgents that it
claimed were in Bangladesh, to Bangladeshi delegates. Unsurprisingly,
Dhaka denied knowledge of any such camp but said it would
'look further into the matter'. In a tit-for-tat ploy, Dhaka
sought 'immediate Indian action' against anti-Bangladesh
elements currently alleged to be on Indian soil. In reply,
India stressed the need for an extradition treaty to facilitate
the return of any such anti-Bangladeshi elements.
At the end of the talks, Bangladesh and India agreed to
co-ordinate patrols in their own territories. Bangladesh
also declared its readiness to sign an agreement to enhance
co-operation in security issues, if required, and also agreed
to consider India's proposal for an extradition treaty.
Bangladesh has agreed to respond to this proposal at a meeting
between the two countries likely to be held in January or
early February 2004. India, on its part, proposed a three-point
package proposal for Dhaka to notify India on the 1974 Land
Boundary Agreement and agreed to work towards a more concrete
solution to the problem after receiving Dhaka's response
to the package.
India shares a 4,095-kilometer border with Bangladesh, its
longest land boundary with any of its neighbours. The States
of Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Assam in India's Northeast
account for 1,879 kilometers, and the eastern state of West
Bengal has a border running 2,216 kilometers along Bangladesh.
An area of 6.5 kilometers of this extended frontier is yet
to be demarcated and two Joint Boundary Working Groups have
been set up to complete the boundary demarcation. The Indian
paramilitary Border Security Force (BSF) faces a surfeit
of problems managing this boundary, including illegal migration
from Bangladesh, trans-border movement of armed cadres belonging
to a number of insurgent groups from India's northeastern
states and West Bengal, as also widespread smuggling activities.
The existing and emerging threats along this border are
also conditioned, to a large extent, by the largely inhospitable
terrain.
Dhaka's claims that no terrorist group has camps on Bangladeshi
soil, and that the country does not encourage any anti-India
activity from within its territory, ring increasingly hollow,
with frequent reports in the Bangladeshi media of the consolidation
of terrorist groups in that country. Recently, the Dhaka-based
newspaper, Prothom Alo, published a five-part article
on the Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-BD),
a designated terrorist outfit in the United States, running
camps in different parts of the country to train terrorist
groups from India and Myanmar. Two Islamist organisations,
including the Islami Oikyo Jote, a member of the ruling
coalition, subsequently staged rallies near the Chittagong
office of the Daily on August 18, 2004, protesting against
what they claimed were defamatory reports (under the headline
'Militant Activities in Greater Chittagong') against unregistered
seminaries. Scrutinizing the lengthening shadow of Islamist
terror in Bangladesh, Prothom Alo reported that HuJI
has established an active network through madrassas
(seminaries) and local NGOs to carry out its activities.
The areas, where the newspaper sent reporters to investigate
the camps, are Bandarban, Naikhangchari, Ukhia, Dailpara,
Chandgaon and Khatunganj, among others, in Cox's Bazaar
and Chittagong district of southeastern Bangladesh. The
'central command headquarters' of the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA),
the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)
and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB),
insurgent groups active in India's Northeast, are also allegedly
based in these areas.
Adding to New Delhi's woes was the BSF Director General
Ajai Raj Sharma's statement on September 13 that there were
"firm reports" that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) had set up new training centres for terrorists in
Bangladesh. "The terrorist groups operating in Jammu and
Kashmir are also being trained there… It [ISI] is now fully
concentrating in Bangladesh," Sharma told a news conference
in Jammu.
Meanwhile, the World Bank Country Director, Christine I.
Wallich, reportedly left Bangladesh after receiving a death
threat on September 7, 2004, an official with the multilateral
lending agency said on September 10. A letter was sent to
her residence in the Gulshan area of the capital Dhaka,
marking her as the next target for bomb attacks. Wallich,
an American citizen, is the first foreigner known to have
received a death threat since the August 21 grenade attack
on an Awami League rally in Dhaka in which at least 20 people
died. She is reported to have subsequently returned to Dhaka
after the Government assured her of adequate security.
While New Delhi has, in the past, taken a firm line about
the Khaleda Zia Government's involvement in promoting separatist
violence in India's northeast, the past month has been dominated
by the exchange of a fair quantum of shrill rhetoric. At
the centre of this tirade was the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh,
M. Morshed Khan, who, on September 7, speaking at the inaugural
session of an 'India-Bangladesh Dialogue of Young Journalists'
organised by Bangladesh Enterprise Institute (BEI), alleged
that Delhi was restricting imports of Bangladeshi goods
into India to keep the balance of trade in its favour, despite
repeated calls for an 'equitable bilateral trade'. "Dhaka
too is capable of taking similar restrictive steps against
Indian goods to arrive at a 'win-win' situation," Khan threatened.
At the same time, he said: ''I do not want any more misconceptions
like what has arisen from a neighbouring country conversing
with a particular party but not the nation as a whole.''
Khan was reportedly expressing his Government's annoyance
over the fact that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
only telephoned Awami League leader and former Prime Minister
Sheikh Hasina after she escaped an assassination attempt
on August 21. Further, on September 16, the Foreign Minister
claimed, "Bangladesh does not believe in retaliation against
anyone, if Bangladesh wanted, it could've done so, but that
does not improve relations." He said this when asked whether
Dhaka would slap para-tariff and non-tariff barriers on
Indian imports to narrow the trade gap between the countries.
On the other hand, India had not been passive in the runup
to the Secretary-level talks, and Delhi has expressed the
opinion that the plug could be pulled out on the TATA group's
proposed investment of $2 billion in Bangladesh in view
of the 'security situation' in that country.
Two aspects of the current reality stand out. While an increasing
proportion of the recent violence inspired and executed
by Islamist extremists extends the lengthening shadow of
terror in Bangladesh, the present regime in Dhaka has also
sought to amplify its anti-India posture. There is fair
indication that the regime finds such rhetoric a convenient
proxy for inaction in combating the growing Islamist terror
within the country. It is such inaction and indeed, the
shadow of Islamist terror, which prompted Cofer Black, US
State Department's Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism, to
say on September 13 in an interview to the Outlook
magazine that, "We are looking closely at Bangladesh".
There exists a certain spectrum of opinion within the Bangladeshi
establishment which believes that, given India's pre-occupation
with the détente with Pakistan, New Delhi will not be in
a position to take an effective stand on issues like Dhaka's
dalliance with the insurgencies in India's Northeast. Notwithstanding
the credibility of such a presumption, there is reason now
to believe that India may wish to make such options unaffordable
in the future.
