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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 13, October 11, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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NDFB: Claiming
Murders, Calling Truce
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
The vicious cycle continues in India's insurgency-ravaged
Northeast. Separatist rebels armed to the teeth indulge
in macabre killings, instilling terror and cornering authorities,
before accepting the Government's olive branch and the offer
to engage in 'peace talks'. The violent prelude to offers
of peace is essentially intended to extract their pound
of flesh at the negotiating table. This is what the outlawed
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
- which has engaged in an armed campaign for an independent
Bodo homeland in Assam since its formation on October 3,
1986 - did when it issued a statement on October 8, 2004,
declaring a unilateral ceasefire for six months with effect
from October 15, 2004.
The sequence
of events that preceded the NDFB's truce offer is interesting:
After the December 2003 Bhutanese military assault on the
bases of the NDFB and other Northeast Indian insurgent groups
inside the Himalayan kingdom, these tribal guerrillas were
lying low, most of them cooling their heels on the Meghalaya-Bangladesh
border. By August-September 2004, the NDFB started flexing
its muscles, and carried out a few isolated attacks in western
Assam, but still went largely unnoticed. They were, of course,
pushing ahead with a strategy that is common in the region's
theatre of insurgency, but one that has always succeeded
in making the Government sit up and take notice - stepping
up violence like never before.
On September 30, 2004, Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi
called a news conference in Guwahati, the State capital,
primarily to brief journalists on the forthcoming cross-country
ASEAN car rally that is to be flagged off from the city
in November. In reply to a question from a journalist, Gogoi
said his Government was ready for a ceasefire with the NDFB
and the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA),
provided the rebel groups come up with a positive response
by October 15, 2004. If anything, it was a usual 'our doors
are open for peace negotiations' kind of a statement from
a Government leader. The State and Central Government have
always taken this line, arguing that, while they were ready
for peace talks, it was not possible to let insurgents have
a field day, and was consequently necessary to continue
with counter-insurgency offensives.
On October 2, 2004, however, all hell broke loose. The NDFB
and the ULFA - the Assam Police say they acted in tandem
- carried out a string of bombings and shooting attacks
killing more than 40 people in a span of just about 72 hours.
The NDFB had its own reasons to do so, since October 3,
2004, was its 18th 'raising day', and this is traditionally
been an occasion for its cadres to prove their existence.
Thereafter, the NDFB issued a statement to the media, claiming
responsibility for some of the attacks, including the one
at Makrijhora, in the western district of Dhubri on the
Bangladesh border, in which NDFB cadres gunned down at least
15 innocent villagers in a local market area.
While owning responsibility for some of these cold-blooded
murders was the NDFB's way of making the point that it could
still kill, the group was simultaneously getting ready to
call a truce and talk peace with New Delhi. At its 18th
'raising day' function on October 3, 2004, NDFB president
Ranjan Daimari alias D.R. Nabla told his cadres that his
group was 'ready for talks' with the Indian Government and
asked them, as well as the Bodo people, to 'get ready' for
peace talks. The NDFB issued a statement to this effect
to the media the next day.
Then on October 8, true to the indications, the NDFB came
out with a statement signed by its president Nabla and 'Boroland
Army' chief 'Lt. Col' B. Susranggra: "In response to the
offer of the ceasefire by the Chief Minister, Tarun Gogoi,
the National Democratic Front of Boroland has declared ceasefire
with effect from the 15th October 2004 for a period of six
Months to create a congenial atmosphere and initiate talks
with the Government of India. Therefore all the Commanders
of the Boroland Army are asked immediately to suspend hostilities
against India."
The NDFB's position contrasts with that of the ULFA, which
had also claimed responsibility for some of the attacks
between October 2 and 5, 2004, but snubbed the Chief Minister
saying 'it (the attacks) is our answer to Gogoi's offer.'
The Bodo insurgent group's greater acquiescence can be understood
in view of the fact that most of its top leaders have either
been captured by the security forces or have surrendered
to the authorities. In fact, it is believed that a former
NDFB 'finance and home secretary' Nileshwar Basumatary,
who had surrendered to the Assam Police in August 2004,
may have played a role in bringing the group to the offer
of truce.
That the NDFB has been preparing to join the peace process
has been evident in its statements over the past two years.
In fact, several of its top leaders had apparently fallen
into the security net while they were on the way for meetings
to discuss just this - the modalities of opening negotiations
with New Delhi. Another significant development that indicates
that the group was almost in a hurry to begin peace talks
was the setting up of the All Bodo Peace Forum (ABPF) on
July 5, 2004. On October 10, 2004, within less than 48 hours
of the NDFB truce offer becoming public, members of the
ABPF addressed a news conference at Guwahati and offered
their services as facilitators to get the NDFB and the Government
to sit at face-to-face in talks. ABPF members also met Chief
Minister Gogoi on September 10, 2004, to make a direct offer
of mediation. Forum leaders claimed Gogoi had asked them
to go ahead. These developments cannot be ignored if the
broad picture of the region's murky insurgent politics is
to be understood.
Now that the NDFB has responded favourably to the truce
call, the Assam Government appears to be somewhat in a fix.
First, Chief Minister Gogoi responded, saying his Government
would comment soon. Then, he said no written communication
had yet been received from the NDFB and that they would
wait for one. A senior Home department official was quoted
as saying it was up to the Centre to hold talks with the
NDFB and that the State Government could act only as a facilitator.
Finally, news came that the Assam Government has formally
informed the Centre about the NDFB's offer for a ceasefire
through the media. It was not surprising, therefore, to
find the NDFB subsequently stating that it could be 'forced
to reconsider' its truce offer if the Government did not
respond favourably by October 15, 2004. The NDFB perhaps
realized that the Assam Government had not held any specific
discussions with New Delhi before the Chief Minister made
his off the cuff offer of truce.
Clearly, neither the Centre nor the Assam Government, as
also other State governments in the Northeast, have any
clear policy on dealing with the insurgencies in the region.
It is true that New Delhi is currently engaged in formal
and informal dialogues with several Northeast Indian rebel
groups, but it has no set road map on how to proceed when
a new insurgent group offers a truce or proclaims a readiness
to enter into negotiations. There is, nevertheless, a quality
of desperation in all this, and, in all probability, the
next course of action will be an offer of 'safe passage'
to the NDFB leadership to allow its representatives to emerge
from hiding and contact the authorities. From this point
onwards, steps would be taken to formalize a ceasefire before
talks could begin. The road is slippery, and the chances
of bungling by the Government, extremely high.
'Peace' by Assassination
Guest Writer: Amantha Perera
Editor - News Features, The Sunday Leader, Colombo
The Eastern coastal town of Batticaloa has become the main
battle field between forces loyal to Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and those who still continue
to support renegade 'commander' Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan
alias 'Colonel' Karuna.
Karuna,
who declared independence from the LTTE central command,
fled his stronghold and defected to Government-controlled
areas on April 9,2004, when Prabhakaran ordered an all out
attack to quash the rebellion. Ever since the defection,
intermittent skirmishes and killings have occurred in Batticaloa,
the northern Jaffna Peninsula and the capital Colombo.
Most recently, on October 5, 2004, two Muslims were killed
in Welikanda, East of Batticaloa. The Sri Lankan Army said
that the murders were carried out by members of the LTTE
pistol gang. The following day a Tamil, Dharmalingam Sathyalingam,
was gunned down in the same area. Some reports indicated
that he was a supporter of the LTTE and was killed by Karuna
loyalists.
Karuna supporters scored their biggest military success
on September 7, when they attacked a LTTE guard post at
Pulmalai, east of Batticaloa. Following the attack, the
entire security setup in the East was changed by the Tigers.
The Eastern military command was put under Banu, who also
heads the Tiger artillery units. He replaced Ramesh.
Banu inducted elite cadres from the northern command, drawn
from the Jeyanthan and the Charles Anthony Brigades, into
the east. On September 22, Vinayagamoorthi Sivasudari alias
Reggie, Karuna's brother, was killed by LTTE cadres during
an ambush near Karadiyanaru, east of Batticaloa. Reggie's
death was a major blow to the rebel faction. He was the
man designated by Karuna to lead troops on the ground and
was the second-in-command of the outfit.
Karuna later admitted that his brother had been killed by
the LTTE using intelligence provided by a mole. Reggie had
infiltrated into Tiger held areas along with about 25 others,
according to Sri Lankan Army sources in Batticaloa. The
group had then split into smaller units and Reggie's group
was to coordinate the movements. His whereabouts had been
indicated to the LTTE by a cadre identified by the sources
as Pushpan.
The Reggie killing, nevertheless, intensified attacks by
the Karuna group. On October 2, LTTE camps in Panchchankerni,
north of Batticaloa, came under mortar fire. The LTTE camps
lie just within areas under the organisation's control.
Later in the week, the Tigers said that five cadres - Mayuran,
Annandaraj, Sri Kumar, Kandavel and Selva had died during
these clashes. A civilian, Karthigesu Kanathipullai also
died due to injuries received during the attacks.
Suspected Karuna supporters had also unsuccessfully tried
to carry out an attack on a bus carrying LTTE cadres using
a claymore mine on September 21.
On the other hand, Karuna lost at least four senior cadres,
including Castro and Ruban, during the first week of October.
Despite military intelligence confirming that there have
been attacks, very little independent verification was available,
since these were taking place in LTTE held areas. The Tigers
have also adopted a strategy of not revealing too much detail
on such attacks and, in fact, Tiger sources in the East
denied that any attacks were taking place. "Nothing is happening
here, they are all bluffs," a top Tiger source told this
writer last week, referring to reports of the confrontations.
Despite the denial, troops loyal to Karuna are believed
to be using hideouts in Thoppigala, north East of Batticaloa,
and in the Aralaganwilla-Maha Oya area, east of Batticaloa,
and infiltrating into Tiger held areas using jungle paths.
When he broke away from the LTTE, at least 400 to 500 cadres
still remained loyal to Karuna. During the rebellion another
1,500 child soldiers and 500 adults left the organisation.
Karuna was commander of a force of around 7,000 in the East.
Of these, at least 2,000 immediately signalled allegiance
to Prabhakaran when the revolt commenced.
Cadres from elite brigades of the LTTE have been stationed
in the areas used by Karuna supporters, to prevent such
infiltrations and act as a bulwark.
Tigers have also limited movement of their senior cadres
and leadership in public, and ordinary cadres have also
been instructed to appear as inconspicuous as possible when
crossing over to Government-held areas, where they are likely
to be targeted by assassins loyal to Karuna.
Military sources in Batticaloa also say that intelligence
wing operatives and pistol gang members of the LTTE have
taken over from political wing cadres. The Tiger political
office in Government-controlled Batticaloa has remained
inactive since Ramalingam Padmaseelan alias 'Lt. Col.' Senathiraja,
the last political head, died due to gun shot injuries on
July 13. The office had been opened after the February 2002
ceasefire agreement between the Tigers and the Colombo government.
The Tiger pistol gangs have been responsible for murders
outside Batticaloa as well, according to security forces
and rival parties.
"The killing of EPDP (Eelam People's Democratic Party) members
is being undertaken by the LTTE in a cold and calculated
manner. One therefore begins to wonder whether the Royal
Norwegian Government and the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
(SLMM) are turning a blind eye to the terrorism of the LTTE
in order to win kudos as 'Peacemakers'," the leader of the
EPDP, Douglas Devananda, wrote to Norwegian Ambassador in
Colombo, Hans Brattskar, while requesting the Norwegians
to take action.
A few days before the letter was sent out, Somasundaram
Varnakulasingham, an EPDP member and a former chairman of
the Manipay Local Government in northern Jaffna, was shot
and killed in Colombo on September 23. The EPDP accused
the LTTE of carrying out the attack. According to the party,
more than 150 party members and supporters have been gunned
down since the ceasefire went into effect.
EPDP members have been specifically and intensely targeted
following Devananda's announcement that he was in touch
with Karuna and assisting him to form a political party.
Devananda himself survived an assassination attempt by a
Tiger suicide cadre on July 7, 2004. Since the Karuna split,
at least eight senior EPDP members have been killed.
On September 27, 2004, Valli Sundaram (61), a senior member
of the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF)
was shot and killed in Jaffna. The EPRLF blamed the killing
on the Tigers.
The Tigers have also been blamed for carrying out attacks
on Karuna supporters and military intelligence operatives.
On July 18, suspected LTTE cadres raided a safe-house used
by Karuna supporters in Kottawa, a suburb just south of
Colombo, and killed seven persons who had come to Colombo
to help form a political party. The designated secretary
of the party, Kanapathipillai Mahendran alias Satchi Master,
had been shot and killed inside the Batticaloa jail by Mahendran
Pulidaran, a Tiger inmate, 48 hours before the Kottawa attack.
The LTTE, for its part, has denied any association with
the murders and other attacks. It has insisted that it was
up to the Government to ensure security in areas outside
Tiger control.
"There is no need for the Liberation Tigers to eliminate
anybody. It is true that political assassinations are taking
place. But we are also aware of the background of those
killings. Fall guys are selected by some elements who are
very much interested in promoting war and disrupting the
peace process. The killings have all the hallmarks of the
LTTE and the guys selected for it definitely happen to be
vocal opponents of the LTTE, but these are machinations
of serious political hierarchies to attain a position of
making the Liberation Tigers defensive on their political
stand, whether nationally or internationally," LTTE political
wing head S.P. Tamilselvan told this writer during an interview
last month.
The spate of killings during the first week of October has,
however, prompted both Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga
and the Norwegian Government to appeal to the Tigers to
stop the killings. "(Foreign Minister Vidar) Helgessen stated
that Norway condemns the political killings taking place
in Sri Lanka - and appealed to the delegation that the LTTE
does everything possible to stop such killings," the Norwegian
mission in Colombo said in a statement on October 5. Helgessen
conveyed the message when he met a high-powered LTTE delegation
touring Europe. The day before, Kumaratunga had issued a
statement saying that the Government could no longer ignore
the killings.
Norwegian Special Peace envoy Erik Solheim is expected in
Colombo later in the month in yet another effort to revive
the peace talks, which have been stalled since April 2003.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
October
4-10, 2004
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
18
|
0
|
2
|
20
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
6
|
9
|
27
|
42
|
Manipur
|
4
|
2
|
9
|
15
|
Nagaland
|
2
|
0
|
1
|
3
|
Tripura
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
30
|
12
|
39
|
81
|
NEPAL
|
4
|
7
|
2
|
13
|
PAKISTAN
|
48
|
4
|
5
|
57
|
SRI LANKA
|
2
|
0
|
2
|
4
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
Four
soldiers
and
civilian
killed
during
suicide
attack
on
Army
convoy
in
Jammu
and
Kashmir:
In
a
suicide
attack
on
an
Army
convoy
on
October
9,
2004,
near
Singhpura
on
the
Srinagar-Baramulla
highway,
at
least
four
soldiers
and
a
civilian
were
killed,
while
35
persons
sustained
injuries.
An
unidentified
terrorist
reportedly
blew
up
a
car
near
Hartrath
Bridge
when
an
Army
convoy
of
civil
buses
was
en
route
to
Uri
from
the
capital
Srinagar.
Meanwhile,
Abu
Junaid,
identifying
himself
as
a
spokesperson
of
the
Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JeM),
told
some
local
news
agencies
over
telephone
that
his
outfit
had
caused
the
blast.
Daily
Excelsior,
October
10,
2004.
National
Democratic
Front
of
Bodoland
declares
unilateral
cease-fire
in
Assam:
The
National
Democratic
Front
of
Bodoland
(NDFB)
announced,
on
October
8,
2004,
a
unilateral
cease-fire
to
create
a
congenial
atmosphere
for
talks
with
the
Government
of
India.
In
a
joint
statement
released
to
the
media
through
e-mail,
NDFB
'chairman'
D.R.
Nabla
and
'chief
of
army
staff'
B.
Susranbggra,
said
"in
response
to
the
offer
for
ceasefire
by
Chief
Minister
Tarun
Gogoi,
the
NDFB
has
declared
a
ceasefire
with
effect
from
October
15
for
a
period
of
six
months.
Therefore,
all
the
commanders
of
Bodoland
Army
are
asked
to
immediately
suspend
hostilities
against
India."
Gogoi
had
earlier
said
that
the
State
Government
will
initiate
a
unilateral
cease-fire
if
the
terrorist
outfits
respond
positively
by
October
15.
Assam
Tribune,
October
9,
2004.
271
persons
killed
by
terrorists
between
March
2003
and
August
2004
in
Tripura:
The
Tripura
Chief
Minister
Manik
Sarkar
stated
in
the
State
Legislative
Assembly
on
October
4,
2004,
that
a
total
of
271
people
have
been
killed
by
terrorists
between
March
2003
and
August
2004.
Also,
between
January
2003
and
September
2004
as
many
as
393
terrorists
have
surrendered
in
the
State
and
Rupees
24,633,059
has
been
sanctioned
for
their
rehabilitation.
He
further
said
that
the
All
Tripura
Tigers
Force
(ATTF)
is
the
strongest
outfit,
with
a
cadre-strength
of
about
450,
while
the
Biswamohan
Debbarma
group
of
the
National
Liberation
Front
of
Tripura
(NLFT)
is
second,
with
about
370
cadres.
The
operations
by
the
Tripura
Police
during
the
period
from
September
1,
1999,
to
August
31,
2004,
have
led
to
the
arrest
of
593
terrorists
while,
during
the
same
period,
the
police
killed
at
least
171
terrorists,
the
Chief
Minister
added.
Tripura
Info,
October
5,
2004.
NDFB
kills
16
civilians
in
Assam:
Suspected
terrorists
of
the
National
Democratic
Front
of
Bodoland
(NDFB)
reportedly
shot
dead
at
least
ten
civilians
and
wounded
seven
others
in
the
Jalabila
village
of
Dhubri
district
in
Assam
on
October
5,
2004.
A
day
earlier,
six
civilians
were
shot
dead
and
seven
others
sustained
injuries
NDFB
cadres
opened
indiscriminate
fire
at
Gelapukhuri
village
in
Biswanath
Chariali.
Sentinel
Assam,
October
6,
2004.
PAKISTAN
41
people
killed
during
bomb
blast
in
Multan:
At
least
41
people
were
killed
and
more
than
100
injured
in
a
bomb
blast
in
the
city
of
Multan
on
October
7,
2004.
The
attack
occurred
at
about
4.40AM
(PST)
when
hundreds
of
people
had
gathered
to
mark
the
first
anniversary
of
the
killing
of
Sunni
leader
and
Sipah-e-Sahaba
(SSP)
chief,
Maulana
Azim
Tariq,
outside
Islamabad.
"It
seems
to
be
an
act
of
sectarian
terrorism,
but
we
are
still
investigating,"
Multan's
deputy
police
chief,
Arshad
Hameed,
told
the
Associated
Press.
While
no
one
has
claimed
responsibility
for
the
attacks,
police
suspect
the
involvement
of
outlawed
Shia
groups.
The
attack
comes
almost
a
week
after
a
suicide
attacker
detonated
a
bomb
inside
a
crowded
Shia
mosque
in
the
eastern
city
of
Sialkot,
killing
31
people
and
injuring
more
than
50.
Dawn,
October
8,
2004.
SRI
LANKA
1,424
children
recruited
by
LTTE
during
truce
period,
says
SLMM
spokesperson:
The
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam
(LTTE)
have
recruited
1,424
children,
out
of
which
45
have
been
abducted,
during
the
last
28-month
truce
period
ending
August
31,
while
359
adults
were
abducted
during
the
same
period,
a
spokesperson
of
the
Sri
Lanka
Monitoring
Mission
(SLMM)
said
on
October
9,
2004.
The
SLMM's
latest
statistics
reveal
that,
from
February
2002
to
end-August
2004,
1,760
complaints
were
recorded
in
all
districts
of
the
North
and
East.
Daily
News,
October
10,
2004.
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The South
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