SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 15, October 25, 2004

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal

ASSESSMENT

SRI LANKA

A Bloody and Uncertain Peace
Guest Writer: Ameen Izzadeen
Deputy Editor, The Sunday Times, Colombo

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) says that nothing but its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) should be discussed at the negotiating table. The Government insists that parallel talks on a final solution should also be discussed. The stalemate continues amidst a fragile ceasefire and a tottering economy, the revival of which largely depends on the resumption of the talks.

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A Violent 'Ceasefire' -- Amantha Perera

The situation is so desperate that even a minor LTTE compromise is hailed as a major breakthrough.

The talks between the United National Front government of Ranil Wickremesinghe and the LTTE broke down in April last year with the rebels accusing the then government of not honouring its pledges with regard to rehabilitation and reconstruction in the war-ravaged North and East. Many an attempt was made to kick-start or push-start the peace process, but the LTTE held on to its position. A breakthrough came when, in October 2003, the LTTE made its ISGA proposals known.

Though the proposals were too suicidal for the Government to adopt in toto, it agreed to discuss them. Both the government and the LTTE were set for talks, but then President Chandrika Kumaratunga struck. She took over three key portfolios, including Defence, setting off a political crisis which culminated in the dissolution of Parliament and a new coalition Government being elected to office.

Since then, much blood has flowed under the bridge and many an attempt has been washed away by political undercurrents - with a split in the LTTE further complicating the search for peace.

Six months after the election victory that failed to give the new United People's Freedom Alliance Government a clear parliamentary majority, the Government is faced with a situation where, on the one hand, it has to cope with a factional war, a fragile ceasefire and a faltering peace process and, on the other, has to grapple with a worsening economic crisis and plummeting public confidence.

With the world oil prices reaching 55 US dollars, the Government is wilting under public pressure created by the spiralling cost of living. It is the economic factor that is pushing the Government to brush aside threats from its coalition partner, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), and go for peace talks and celebrate this as a major breakthrough to win international aid. Whether the talks end in success or failure does not matter. What matters is the resumption of talks - a sort of publicity photo-op with the government and the LTTE delegations shaking hands. That, the Government believes, will pave the way for the international community to release at least a part of the aid it promised at the Tokyo conference in 2003.

This appears to be the strategy of the Government, which now enjoys a majority in Parliament after the Ceylon Workers Congress, a kingmaker party representing the estate population, aligned itself with the ruling coalition.

The President appears to be playing her cards close to the chest and placing her aces one by one on the table. She wants to tell her southern constituency that hers is not a policy of 'peace at any cost' while sending a message to the LTTE that she is willing to compromise.

Her first card was the formation of the National Council for Peace and Reconciliation (NCPR) - which was supposed to be an all-party body, but could not be called that because the main opposition - the United National Party (UNP), the Tamil National Alliance and the Buddhist monks' party the Jathika Hela Urumaya - boycotted the inauguration on October 4. The LTTE dismissed the NCPR as a time-buying gimmick or a delaying tactic.

However, the President was unfazed. She breathed an air of success or a sigh of relief because the hardline JVP made its presence felt in a big way in the new peace body.

The once-bitten-twice-shy UNP, which appeared to have adopted a policy of mistrust towards Kumaratunga after she went back on her promise and threw it out of office, however, pledged to support the Government's peace moves.

Addressing the inaugural session of the NCPR, the President had reiterated her Government's commitment to end the 20-year-old conflict by peaceful means and invited the LTTE to resume talks on establishing a federal state. She said her Government was ready to negotiate on the setting up of the ISGA - but there should be parallel talks on a final deal. "We require a commitment from the LTTE that the interim administration as well as the final solution would be based on the Oslo declaration, which stipulates that a federal solution should be sought within a united Sri Lanka," she said, giving an indication of the shape of her Government's counterproposals, about which very little is known.

Government spokesman Mangala Samaraweera would only say that the counterproposals are ready and waiting. But those in the know say the Government's counterproposals are nothing but a position paper that spells out what the LTTE wants and the Government's response to such demands.

With the LTTE insisting on its pound of flesh over its ISGA proposal even after the President's NCPR speech, the Government was disappointed, if not desperate. In the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation that ensued, the first to blink was the LTTE. The Government was jubilant when LTTE 'spokesman', Daya Master, told Associated Press that the LTTE was willing to discuss the Government's counter proposals. The Colombo-based media ran banner headlines, describing the LTTE's softening of its stance as a major breakthrough. In Government quarters this was welcomed as a dramatic breakthrough. But the jubilation was short-lived when the LTTE's 'political wing' leader S. P. Thamilselvan, who is visiting European nations on a study tour of forms of federalism, made a hurried call to protest the remarks Daya Master had made and resumed the eyeball game. This time the LTTE wants the Government to blink.

Although, the LTTE has gone back to its nothing-but-ISGA position, the Daya Master-slip-of-the-tongue remark gave an indication that the rebel leadership was ready to hear any Government response or proposal when ISGA was being discussed. This was exactly what Norway's special peace envoy, Erik Solheim, has conveyed to the Government. Solheim said the LTTE's demand for ISGA was not a "take it or leave it position." It is, however, a demand it insists should be discussed.

One UPFA source said: "Agreeing to talk on the ISGA does not mean the Government accepts the proposal in toto. It only means the Government will give ear to what the LTTE has to say on the proposals and give its own position. What is good and acceptable will be given. That again would have to be within the parameters spelt out by President Kumaratunga."

It is against this backdrop that the Government is now planning to come out with another strategy, brushing aside fears that the ISGA would lead to a separate state and threats by the JVP to the President that it would leave the Government if the talks are based only on ISGA. President Kumaratunga is expected to consult the NCPR this week and outline an elaborate policy framework to take the peace process forward. She is likely to spell out her formula in an address to the nation either before she leaves for India early next month or after her return.

Adding strength to her position is the international support for the peace process and the world community's pressure on the LTTE. During meetings with officials of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the International Commission of Jurists, the touring Thamilselvan delegation was pushed to the ropes and forced to defend the LTTE when these groups urged the LTTE to stop political killings and child recruitment.

But the LTTE has mastered the art of weathering international criticism. It has proved it is a 'good boy' because it has not resumed the war. It has also mastered the art of violating the ceasefire agreement and still claiming that it is committed to the truce. In effect, it is holding the Government to ransom and incrementally obtaining what it wants. The UPFA Government, which accused the previous UNF regime of conceding too much to the LTTE, is now forced to follow its predecessor's policies. The so-called prisoner swap which took place in Trincomalee last week was a case in point. The two homeguards who were arrested and detained by the LTTE were released only after the Government acceded to the LTTE's demands and released ten Tiger cadres from a Government jail. The de jure position is that the detainees have been released on bail - the Government court acted in the case of the LTTE detainees and the LTTE court in the case of the homeguards.

A flip side of this episode brings forth a silver lining to the dark cloud, demonstrating that both the Government and the LTTE can do business together.

But what is complicating the issue is the challenge from the 'Colonel' Karuna group, which has struck an alliance with the Eelam National Democratic Liberal Front, a group, which was once said to have been backed by the Indian intelligence. The challenge to the LTTE also came from T. Anandasangaree, the sidelined vice president of the Tamil United Liberation Front. Anandasanagaree, in an open letter to Prabhakaran, urged the Tiger leader to stop the fratricidal war and to be pragmatic with regard to his ISGA proposals.

The Karuna group, which in a recent statement announced its entry into mainstream politics, called on the Tamil people to unite to defeat Prabhakaran's dictatorship and terrorism. It may be the case of one tiger accusing the other tiger of cannibalism, while both are cannibals. In any case, the situation in the East, especially in the Batticaloa and Ampara districts, has been worsening. With neither faction of the LTTE yet able to hold sway, the tit-for-tat political killings continue. The LTTE is perturbed that the Karuna group is emerging as a strong force with substantial public support in the East. Irked by this reality, the Tiger leadership has asked the Tamil National Alliance Members of Parliament in the two districts to intensify their campaign aimed at drawing the people away from the Karuna faction. The LTTE knows that its bargaining power will be weakened if it loses control of the East.

INDIA

The Northeast: Islamist Shadow
Bibhu Prasad Routray,
Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati

The real identity of the terrorist group behind the twin blasts in Nagaland on October 2, 2004, in which 27 persons were killed, will probably never be known. Each day unfolds different and confusing leads indicting different outfits. To begin with, one of the factions of the National Socialist Council for Nagaland (NSCN) was suspected. That possibility was quickly discounted after both condemned the blasts and one faction, the Isak-Muivah group (NSCN-IM), even announced a hefty reward for any information regarding the killers. After that it was the turn of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). Soon after a non-descript Islamist outfit claimed responsibility for the attack. Police sources now suggest that even the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) or the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) could be involved in the attack. Most recently, the National Socialist Council for Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K) pointed to 'Al-Qaeda footprints' in the attack. Some pointers also indicate possible involvement of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), with Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee indicating an ISI role in the incident, though the ever-cautious Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, decided to play it safe, declaring, on October 7, "We are neither giving the ISI a clean chit nor accusing them."

Evidently, the investigation has a long way to go before its throws up any credible conclusion. What is, however, clear is that the blasts demonstrated the involvement of a force commanding superior firepower and tactical knowledge of explosives, which is why the first suspect was the ULFA, in spite of the group's somewhat unconvincing denials. The use of RDX, which the outfit has started using of late, and the subsequent arrest of two ULFA militants living in Dimapur, including a bomb expert, does little to quell suspicions. In its recent attacks, the most gruesome being the series of explosions in August in various districts of Assam, the outfit has put the plastic explosives to effective use, discarding the traditionally crude Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and the less expensive gelatine sticks.

As things stand today, however, there could be more than the ULFA's involvement in this episode. On October 15, a non-descript Islamist outfit, the Al Jehad-e-Islam, claimed responsibility for the explosions in Dimapur. In an e-mail sent to a Guwahati-based vernacular newspaper, Janasadharan, Mohammad Salim Khan, 'North East Chief' of the group, claimed responsibility for the twin blasts. Nothing was known about this group before it made its claim. It is not clear, moreover, why the organisation (if it exists at all) chose a Guwahati based vernacular paper to claim responsibility.

The Nagaland police chief has already discounted the possibility of the involvement of this particular group on the grounds that there is no intelligence on its activities. Such an assessment, however, runs the danger of ignoring a potentially significant transformation in the patterns of terrorism in the region, and the possible escalation of the role of external powers. As has been repeatedly emphasised, the ULFA's capitulation to the ISI's diktats has been complete. The Pakistan's intelligence agency, through its operatives in Bangladesh and in coordination with Bangladesh's Directorate General of Field Intelligence (DGFI), now directs most of the ULFA's activities and has an overwhelming influence on its postures and functions. According to a statement by the Director General of Police, Tripura, on October 15, a meeting of some six or seven militant organisations in Dhaka preceded the strikes in Assam and Nagaland. Apart from the ULFA, other Indian insurgent groups based in Tripura, Manipur and Meghalaya, including the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) of North Bengal, took part in the meeting, which was held at the behest of the ISI and other anti-India forces.

ULFA's decision to join the Muttahida Jehad Council (United Jehad Council), an umbrella Islamic organisation of various groups engaged in militant operations in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), had come to the notice of security agencies in September, following seizures made from the hideouts of a slain ULFA militant, Lachit Rabha. Grenades recovered from the militant killed in an encounter at Jerdoba in East Garo Hill district in Meghalaya were found to be strikingly similar to those used during the attack on the Indian Parliament and by the Pakistan Army, indicating ULFA's growing proximity with the agency that sponsors terrorism in J&K.

The shadow of this subversive alliance appears to be strengthening over Nagaland. The State has been complaining of Bangladeshi migrants flooding areas like Niuland and Dimapur for some time. About a month ago, the Naga Students Federation (NSF) launched an 'oust-Bangladeshis' campaign targeting the migrants, after two migrants had allegedly raped a minor girl. However, the impact of the presence of such migrants on the overall security situation in the State is largely neglected in the public and policy discourse. Very little has been said or is known about possible linkages between migrants with a track record of criminal activities and the ISI, the DGFI and fundamentalist Bangladeshi organisations.

Little is known, moreover, of the vast and isolated areas the Bangladeshi migrants have now come to occupy in Nagaland, and the linkages they may have developed with local and regional militant groups or the support structure they provide to activities of covert agencies like the ISI. It is now probable that ISI cells have been created and are lying low among the estimated 200,000 illegal Bangladeshi migrants who currently reside in Nagaland, lying low till their masters across the border ask them to execute specific operations. Army intelligence sources now suggest, "Bangladeshis trained in ISI camps are moving deep into Kohima, Peren and Wokha, besides Dimapur." Their sufficiently long stay in the area allows them the advantage of disappearing into the burgeoning migrant population without a trace after such incidents. Such cells within the larger migrant population can also play host to militants who cross over to execute terrorist strikes. As one intelligence official overseeing the investigations in Dimapur disclosed, "We had positive information about a group of 20 fundamentalist organisation-trained Bangladeshi jihadis sneaking into Nagaland through the Karimganj border. They had an agenda of carrying out large-scale violence in the Northeast, but nobody probably realised that it would be such a devastating attack in Dimapur."

The enormous quantities of finances required to execute an attack of this nature and magnitude also points a finger to active external involvement. According to preliminary investigations, between about 4 and 5 kilograms of RDX was used in the twin explosions, and the cost of the entire operation would run into millions of rupees. None of the militant groups in the Northeast, with the possible exception of the ULFA, possesses such financial capacities, and even the ULFA would be averse to investing so much into a single strike unless the costs are underwritten by its supporters in the Pakistan-Bangladesh Intelligence community.

For strange reasons, however, the dangers of Islamic militancy do not figure among the priorities of the State Governments in the region, despite the occasional voicing of misgivings regarding illegal migration from Bangladesh. In April 2000, the then Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) Government had tabled a white paper detailing ISI activities in Assam. However, since the election of the Congress regime in May 2001, the issue has receded - or has been pushed - into the background. The State's Minister of Home Affairs, Rockybul Hussain, on August 9 this year announced in the State Assembly that his Government had 'no evidence of ISI activity' in the State. So great has been the political nonchalance, that the Chief Minister himself threatened to 'speak to' the State Police intelligence chief, who had claimed to have substantial evidence of the ISI's role in funding militant organisations like the ULFA, after the series of attacks in August 2004.

Guided by the wisdom of its political masters, the Assam's State police department has also begun to underplay potential of Islamist militancy in the State and the role of the ISI-DGFI combine. A senior intelligence officer boasted in an informal conversation that he could 'finish Islamic militancy in the State just by persuasion'. There are, however, strong indications that such recourse to 'persuasion' has already floundered. In many of Assam's districts, including Karimganj, Cachar, Hailakandi, Nagaon and Dhubri, where the migrants from Bangladesh are in numerical majority, Islamist mobilisation and activity has seen an upsurge. The growth has followed a relatively subtle path, not accompanied by the expected mushrooming of the madrassas. In its latest manifestation, amidst intelligence inputs that the ISI was planning to use the MULTA (Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam) to carry out subversive activities in the Cachar district of Assam, CRPF personnel recovered 50 foreign-made detonators from Baghehor village in Cachar district on September 2, 2004, and arrested one person in this connection. Reports also suggested that, as the ULFA lacked an organisational structure in districts like Cachar, it is effectively using MULTA cadres.

The problem that confronts the region is not just about occasional 'security lapses' or even a sudden spurt of violence. Indeed, violence has never ceased to torment the region over the past decades. The real problem is located in a curious lack of vision and ability to locate this violence in a wider strategic perspective that accommodates all its driving factors - including the intervention of foreign elements. Unless the Governments in the region and New Delhi take a hard look at broader designs of destabilisation, incidents like the one in Dimapur can only recur with increasing frequency.

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
October 18-24, 2004

	Civilian	Security Force Personnel	Terrorist	Total
BANGLADESH	0	0	10	10
INDIA
Jammu & Kashmir	6	1	9	16
Left-wing extremism	1	0	1	2
Manipur	0	0	1	1
Nagaland	0	0	1	1
Tripura	6	0	0	6
Total (INDIA)	13	1	12	26
NEPAL	2	2	0	4
PAKISTAN	12	6	15	33
SRI LANKA	2	0	1	3

Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.

BANGLADESH

Islamist extremists behind attack on British envoy in Sylhet, claims Scotland Yard: The British investigative agency, Scotland Yard, suspects the involvement of Islamist extremist groups in the May 21, 2004, grenade attack on the British High Commissioner, Anwar Choudhury, at Hazrat Shahjalal Shrine in Sylhet, in which the envoy was injured and three others were killed. In a report submitted to the Bangladesh Crime Investigation Department on October 18, the Scotland Yard said the grenade used in the attack was of the same model as those used in the attack on the Opposition Awami League rally in Dhaka on August 21, 2004. The Hindu, October 20, 2004

INDIA

National Conference senior leadership escapes IED blast in Jammu and Kashmir: National Conference (NC) president, Omar Abdullah, the former Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah, and a number of other senior leaders of the party had a narrow escape when an Improvised Explosive Device (IED), planted by unidentified terrorists, exploded injuring seven people in Anantnag town of south Kashmir on October 24. The NC top leadership was going to attend the Rasm-e-Chaharum of the former Minister, Safdar Ali Beg, who had been killed by unidentified terrorists in Sarnal locality of Anantnag earlier this week. The IED, apparently planted in a sand stack at the entrance of the graveyard at Sarnal, exploded at 1140 hours (IST), seconds after Omar Abdullah alighted from his car and was heading for Safdar Ali Beg's tomb. Daily Excelsior, The Hindu, October 25, 2004.

Peace deal finalised between Mizoram government and the BNLF: Following the eleventh round of peace talks held last week, the Government of Mizoram has reportedly finalised a peace deal with the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF). A senior government official was quoted having said "The peace formula covers repatriation of the refugees as well as proper rehabilitation of both refugees and BNLF cadres." A formal peace agreement to this effect would be signed by both the parties once the Union Government sanctions the funds required to implement the peace package. North East Tribune, October 24, 2004.

United Liberation Front of Asom ready for unconditional talks: The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) has reportedly said it is ready for unconditional talks with the Union Government. The offer of talks has come through Assamese writer and Jnanpith award winner Indira Goswami, who has offered to mediate between the Centre and the terrorist outfit. NDTV, October 24, 2004

Former National Conference minister Safdar Ali Beg shot dead in Jammu and Kashmir: Senior National Conference (NC) leader and former minister, Safdar Ali Beg, was shot dead by unidentified terrorists at a shop, yards away from his residence in Sarnal locality of Anantnag town on October 21. Two terrorists shot at the politician minutes after he had come out of the local mosque after performing his afternoon prayers. Beg's personal security officer was also critically injured in the attack. Safdar Beg had been Minister of State for Revenue in Dr. Farooq Abdullah's National Conference Government. Daily Excelsior, October 22, 2004

Union Government asks Assam Chief Minister to hold talks with NDFB: On October 21, the Union Government asked the Assam Government to go ahead with its plans to hold talks with the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and said it would participate in due course. The response came after the Assam Chief Minister, Tarun Gogoi, met the Union Home Minister, Shivraj Patil, in New Delhi and informed him of the NDFB's offer of talks. The NDFB made a unilateral announcement of ceasefire on October 15. The Hindu, Sentinel Assam, October 22, 2004

PAKISTAN

Military operation launched in South Waziristan to capture Abdullah Mahsud: Hundreds of troops backed by helicopter gunships launched an operation on October 20 in Spinkai Raghzai area in South Waziristan to capture Abdullah Mahsud, a former Guantanamo Bay prisoner and the alleged mastermind behind the kidnapping of Chinese engineers. Lt. Gen. Safdar Hussain, the Peshawar corps commander, stated that the area under attack since October 20 night was Abdullah's political and military base. Daily Times, October 21, 2004

171 soldiers killed in Wana operation, says Corps Commander Lt. Gen. Safdar Hussain: On October 19, Corps Commander Peshawar Lt. Gen. Safdar Hussain stated that the Pakistan Army and the Frontier Corps have lost 171 troops during the military operations in South Waziristan, while 246 terrorists, including more than 100 foreign terrorists, were also killed. At his maiden press conference, Lt. Gen. Safdar Hussain said 579 militants were arrested in 35 military operations launched to-date. He ruled out the presence of Osama bin Laden or any other senior Al Qaeda figure in South Waziristan. However he felt that there were credible reports about the presence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader Tahir Yuldash in the area. www.dawn.com, Daily Times, October 20, 2004

Terrorist outfits barred from collecting donations during Holy Month: The Federal Government has directed the Provincial Governments to take special measures for curbing the collection of Zakat, Fitrana and other kind of donations by any proscribed or Jihadi outfit during the Holy month of Ramazan. The report said that special instructions were issued to the provinces not to allow Millat-e-Islamia Pakistan (erstwhile Sipah-e-Sahaba), Islami Tehrik Pakistan (erstwhile Tehreek-e-Jaferia), Khuddamul Islam (erstwhile Jaish-e-Mohammad), Jamaat-ul-Fuqra and others banned outfits to collect donations during Ramazan and on the occasion of Eid-ul-Fitr. The News , October 19, 2004

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Weekly Assessments & Briefings Volume 3, No. 15, October 25, 2004

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 15, October 25, 2004