A Bloody and Uncertain
Peace
Guest Writer: Ameen Izzadeen
Deputy Editor, The Sunday Times, Colombo
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
says that nothing but its proposal for an Interim Self-Governing
Authority (ISGA)
should be discussed at the negotiating table. The Government
insists that parallel talks on a final solution should also
be discussed. The stalemate continues amidst a fragile ceasefire
and a tottering economy, the revival of which largely depends
on the resumption of the talks.
The situation
is so desperate that even a minor LTTE compromise is hailed
as a major breakthrough.
The talks between the United National Front government of
Ranil Wickremesinghe and the LTTE broke down in April last
year with the rebels accusing the then government of not
honouring its pledges with regard to rehabilitation and
reconstruction in the war-ravaged North and East. Many an
attempt was made to kick-start or push-start the peace process,
but the LTTE held on to its position. A breakthrough came
when, in October 2003, the LTTE made its ISGA proposals
known.
Though the proposals were too suicidal for the Government
to adopt in toto, it agreed to discuss them. Both
the government and the LTTE were set for talks, but then
President Chandrika Kumaratunga struck. She took over three
key portfolios, including Defence, setting off a political
crisis which culminated in the dissolution of Parliament
and a new coalition Government being elected to office.
Since then, much blood has flowed under the bridge and many
an attempt has been washed away by political undercurrents
- with a split in the LTTE further complicating the search
for peace.
Six months after the election victory that failed to give
the new United People's Freedom Alliance Government a clear
parliamentary majority, the Government is faced with a situation
where, on the one hand, it has to cope with a factional
war, a fragile ceasefire and a faltering peace process and,
on the other, has to grapple with a worsening economic crisis
and plummeting public confidence.
With the world oil prices reaching 55 US dollars, the Government
is wilting under public pressure created by the spiralling
cost of living. It is the economic factor that is pushing
the Government to brush aside threats from its coalition
partner, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), and go for
peace talks and celebrate this as a major breakthrough to
win international aid. Whether the talks end in success
or failure does not matter. What matters is the resumption
of talks - a sort of publicity photo-op with the government
and the LTTE delegations shaking hands. That, the Government
believes, will pave the way for the international community
to release at least a part of the aid it promised at the
Tokyo conference in 2003.
This appears to be the strategy of the Government, which
now enjoys a majority in Parliament after the Ceylon Workers
Congress, a kingmaker party representing the estate population,
aligned itself with the ruling coalition.
The President appears to be playing her cards close to the
chest and placing her aces one by one on the table. She
wants to tell her southern constituency that hers is not
a policy of 'peace at any cost' while sending a message
to the LTTE that she is willing to compromise.
Her first card was the formation of the National Council
for Peace and Reconciliation (NCPR) - which was supposed
to be an all-party body, but could not be called that because
the main opposition - the United National Party (UNP), the
Tamil National Alliance and the Buddhist monks' party the
Jathika Hela Urumaya - boycotted the inauguration on October
4. The LTTE dismissed the NCPR as a time-buying gimmick
or a delaying tactic.
However, the President was unfazed. She breathed an air
of success or a sigh of relief because the hardline JVP
made its presence felt in a big way in the new peace body.
The once-bitten-twice-shy UNP, which appeared to have adopted
a policy of mistrust towards Kumaratunga after she went
back on her promise and threw it out of office, however,
pledged to support the Government's peace moves.
Addressing the inaugural session of the NCPR, the President
had reiterated her Government's commitment to end the 20-year-old
conflict by peaceful means and invited the LTTE to resume
talks on establishing a federal state. She said her Government
was ready to negotiate on the setting up of the ISGA - but
there should be parallel talks on a final deal. "We require
a commitment from the LTTE that the interim administration
as well as the final solution would be based on the Oslo
declaration, which stipulates that a federal solution should
be sought within a united Sri Lanka," she said, giving an
indication of the shape of her Government's counterproposals,
about which very little is known.
Government spokesman Mangala Samaraweera would only say
that the counterproposals are ready and waiting. But those
in the know say the Government's counterproposals are nothing
but a position paper that spells out what the LTTE wants
and the Government's response to such demands.
With the LTTE insisting on its pound of flesh over its ISGA
proposal even after the President's NCPR speech, the Government
was disappointed, if not desperate. In the eyeball-to-eyeball
confrontation that ensued, the first to blink was the LTTE.
The Government was jubilant when LTTE 'spokesman', Daya
Master, told Associated Press that the LTTE was willing
to discuss the Government's counter proposals. The Colombo-based
media ran banner headlines, describing the LTTE's softening
of its stance as a major breakthrough. In Government quarters
this was welcomed as a dramatic breakthrough. But the jubilation
was short-lived when the LTTE's 'political wing' leader
S. P. Thamilselvan, who is visiting European nations on
a study tour of forms of federalism, made a hurried call
to protest the remarks Daya Master had made and resumed
the eyeball game. This time the LTTE wants the Government
to blink.
Although, the LTTE has gone back to its nothing-but-ISGA
position, the Daya Master-slip-of-the-tongue remark gave
an indication that the rebel leadership was ready to hear
any Government response or proposal when ISGA was being
discussed. This was exactly what Norway's special peace
envoy, Erik Solheim, has conveyed to the Government. Solheim
said the LTTE's demand for ISGA was not a "take it or leave
it position." It is, however, a demand it insists should
be discussed.
One UPFA source said: "Agreeing to talk on the ISGA does
not mean the Government accepts the proposal in toto.
It only means the Government will give ear to what the LTTE
has to say on the proposals and give its own position. What
is good and acceptable will be given. That again would have
to be within the parameters spelt out by President Kumaratunga."
It is against this backdrop that the Government is now planning
to come out with another strategy, brushing aside fears
that the ISGA would lead to a separate state and threats
by the JVP to the President that it would leave the Government
if the talks are based only on ISGA. President Kumaratunga
is expected to consult the NCPR this week and outline an
elaborate policy framework to take the peace process forward.
She is likely to spell out her formula in an address to
the nation either before she leaves for India early next
month or after her return.
Adding strength to her position is the international support
for the peace process and the world community's pressure
on the LTTE. During meetings with officials of Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch and the International Commission of Jurists,
the touring Thamilselvan delegation was pushed to the ropes
and forced to defend the LTTE when these groups urged the
LTTE to stop
political killings and child recruitment.
But the LTTE has mastered the art of weathering international
criticism. It has proved it is a 'good boy' because it has
not resumed the war. It has also mastered the art of violating
the ceasefire agreement and still claiming that it is committed
to the truce. In effect, it is holding the Government to
ransom and incrementally obtaining what it wants. The UPFA
Government, which accused the previous UNF regime of conceding
too much to the LTTE, is now forced to follow its predecessor's
policies. The so-called prisoner swap which took place in
Trincomalee last week was a case in point. The two homeguards
who were arrested and detained by the LTTE were released
only after the Government acceded to the LTTE's demands
and released ten Tiger cadres from a Government jail. The
de jure position is that the detainees have been released
on bail - the Government court acted in the case of the
LTTE detainees and the LTTE court in the case of the homeguards.
A flip side of this episode brings forth a silver lining
to the dark cloud, demonstrating that both the Government
and the LTTE can do business together.
But what is complicating the issue is the challenge from
the 'Colonel' Karuna group, which has struck an alliance
with the Eelam National Democratic Liberal Front, a group,
which was once said to have been backed by the Indian intelligence.
The challenge to the LTTE also came from T. Anandasangaree,
the sidelined vice president of the Tamil United Liberation
Front. Anandasanagaree, in an open letter to Prabhakaran,
urged the Tiger leader to stop the fratricidal war and to
be pragmatic with regard to his ISGA proposals.
The Karuna group, which in a recent statement announced
its entry into mainstream politics, called on the Tamil
people to unite to defeat Prabhakaran's dictatorship and
terrorism. It may be the case of one tiger accusing the
other tiger of cannibalism, while both are cannibals. In
any case, the situation in the East, especially in the Batticaloa
and Ampara districts, has been worsening. With neither faction
of the LTTE yet able to hold sway, the tit-for-tat political
killings continue. The LTTE is perturbed that the Karuna
group is emerging as a strong force with substantial public
support in the East. Irked by this reality, the Tiger leadership
has asked the Tamil National Alliance Members of Parliament
in the two districts to intensify their campaign aimed at
drawing the people away from the Karuna faction. The LTTE
knows that its bargaining power will be weakened if it loses
control of the East.
The Northeast:
Islamist Shadow
Bibhu Prasad Routray,
Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati
The real identity of the terrorist group behind the twin
blasts in Nagaland on October 2, 2004, in which 27 persons
were killed, will probably never be known. Each day unfolds
different and confusing leads indicting different outfits.
To begin with, one of the factions of the National Socialist
Council for Nagaland (NSCN) was suspected. That possibility
was quickly discounted after both condemned the blasts and
one faction, the Isak-Muivah group (NSCN-IM),
even announced a hefty reward for any information regarding
the killers. After that it was the turn of the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA).
Soon after a non-descript Islamist outfit claimed responsibility
for the attack. Police sources now suggest that even the
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB)
or the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD)
could be involved in the attack. Most recently, the National
Socialist Council for Nagaland - Khaplang (NSCN-K)
pointed to 'Al-Qaeda
footprints' in the attack. Some pointers also indicate possible
involvement of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI),
with Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee indicating an ISI
role in the incident, though the ever-cautious Home Minister,
Shivraj Patil, decided to play it safe, declaring, on October
7, "We are neither giving the ISI a clean chit nor accusing
them."
Evidently, the investigation has a long way to go before
its throws up any credible conclusion. What is, however,
clear is that the blasts demonstrated the involvement of
a force commanding superior firepower and tactical knowledge
of explosives, which is why the first suspect was the ULFA,
in spite of the group's somewhat unconvincing denials. The
use of RDX, which the outfit has started using of late,
and the subsequent arrest of two ULFA militants living in
Dimapur, including a bomb expert, does little to quell suspicions.
In its recent attacks, the most gruesome being the series
of explosions in August in various districts of Assam, the
outfit has put the plastic explosives to effective use,
discarding the traditionally crude Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) and the less expensive gelatine sticks.
As things stand today, however, there could be more than
the ULFA's involvement in this episode. On October 15, a
non-descript Islamist outfit, the Al Jehad-e-Islam, claimed
responsibility for the explosions in Dimapur. In an e-mail
sent to a Guwahati-based vernacular newspaper, Janasadharan,
Mohammad Salim Khan, 'North East Chief' of the group, claimed
responsibility for the twin blasts. Nothing was known about
this group before it made its claim. It is not clear, moreover,
why the organisation (if it exists at all) chose a Guwahati
based vernacular paper to claim responsibility.
The Nagaland police chief has already discounted the possibility
of the involvement of this particular group on the grounds
that there is no intelligence on its activities. Such an
assessment, however, runs the danger of ignoring a potentially
significant transformation in the patterns of terrorism
in the region, and the possible escalation of the role of
external powers. As has been repeatedly emphasised, the
ULFA's capitulation to the ISI's diktats has been complete.
The Pakistan's intelligence agency, through its operatives
in Bangladesh and in coordination with Bangladesh's Directorate
General of Field Intelligence (DGFI), now directs most of
the ULFA's activities and has an overwhelming influence
on its postures and functions. According to a statement
by the Director General of Police, Tripura, on October 15,
a meeting of some six or seven militant organisations in
Dhaka preceded the strikes in Assam and Nagaland. Apart
from the ULFA, other Indian insurgent groups based in Tripura,
Manipur and Meghalaya, including the Kamtapur Liberation
Organisation (KLO)
of North Bengal, took part in the meeting, which was held
at the behest of the ISI and other anti-India forces.
ULFA's decision to join the Muttahida Jehad Council (United
Jehad Council), an umbrella Islamic organisation of various
groups engaged in militant operations in Jammu & Kashmir
(J&K), had come to the notice of security agencies in September,
following seizures made from the hideouts of a slain ULFA
militant, Lachit Rabha. Grenades recovered from the militant
killed in an encounter at Jerdoba in East Garo Hill district
in Meghalaya were found to be strikingly similar to those
used during the attack on the Indian Parliament and by the
Pakistan Army, indicating ULFA's growing proximity with
the agency that sponsors terrorism in J&K.
The shadow of this subversive alliance appears to be strengthening
over Nagaland. The State has been complaining of Bangladeshi
migrants flooding areas like Niuland and Dimapur for some
time. About a month ago, the Naga Students Federation (NSF)
launched an 'oust-Bangladeshis' campaign targeting the migrants,
after two migrants had allegedly raped a minor girl. However,
the impact of the presence of such migrants on the overall
security situation in the State is largely neglected in
the public and policy discourse. Very little has been said
or is known about possible linkages between migrants with
a track record of criminal activities and the ISI, the DGFI
and fundamentalist Bangladeshi organisations.
Little is known, moreover, of the vast and isolated areas
the Bangladeshi migrants have now come to occupy in Nagaland,
and the linkages they may have developed with local and
regional militant groups or the support structure they provide
to activities of covert agencies like the ISI. It is now
probable that ISI cells have been created and are lying
low among the estimated 200,000 illegal Bangladeshi migrants
who currently reside in Nagaland, lying low till their masters
across the border ask them to execute specific operations.
Army intelligence sources now suggest, "Bangladeshis trained
in ISI camps are moving deep into Kohima, Peren and Wokha,
besides Dimapur." Their sufficiently long stay in the area
allows them the advantage of disappearing into the burgeoning
migrant population without a trace after such incidents.
Such cells within the larger migrant population can also
play host to militants who cross over to execute terrorist
strikes. As one intelligence official overseeing the investigations
in Dimapur disclosed, "We had positive information about
a group of 20 fundamentalist organisation-trained Bangladeshi
jihadis sneaking into Nagaland through the Karimganj
border. They had an agenda of carrying out large-scale violence
in the Northeast, but nobody probably realised that it would
be such a devastating attack in Dimapur."
The enormous quantities of finances required to execute
an attack of this nature and magnitude also points a finger
to active external involvement. According to preliminary
investigations, between about 4 and 5 kilograms of RDX was
used in the twin explosions, and the cost of the entire
operation would run into millions of rupees. None of the
militant groups in the Northeast, with the possible exception
of the ULFA, possesses such financial capacities, and even
the ULFA would be averse to investing so much into a single
strike unless the costs are underwritten by its supporters
in the Pakistan-Bangladesh Intelligence community.
For strange reasons, however, the dangers of Islamic militancy
do not figure among the priorities of the State Governments
in the region, despite the occasional voicing of misgivings
regarding illegal migration from Bangladesh. In April 2000,
the then Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) Government had tabled
a white paper detailing ISI activities in Assam. However,
since the election of the Congress regime in May 2001, the
issue has receded - or has been pushed - into the background.
The State's Minister of Home Affairs, Rockybul Hussain,
on August 9 this year announced in the State Assembly that
his Government had 'no evidence of ISI activity' in the
State. So great has been the political nonchalance, that
the Chief Minister himself threatened to 'speak to' the
State Police intelligence chief, who had claimed to have
substantial evidence of the ISI's role in funding militant
organisations like the ULFA, after the series of attacks
in August 2004.
Guided by the wisdom of its political masters, the Assam's
State police department has also begun to underplay potential
of Islamist militancy in the State and the role of the ISI-DGFI
combine. A senior intelligence officer boasted in an informal
conversation that he could 'finish Islamic militancy in
the State just by persuasion'. There are, however, strong
indications that such recourse to 'persuasion' has already
floundered. In many of Assam's districts, including Karimganj,
Cachar, Hailakandi, Nagaon and Dhubri, where the migrants
from Bangladesh are in numerical majority, Islamist mobilisation
and activity has seen an upsurge. The growth has followed
a relatively subtle path, not accompanied by the expected
mushrooming of the madrassas. In its latest manifestation,
amidst intelligence inputs that the ISI was planning to
use the MULTA
(Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam) to carry out
subversive activities in the Cachar district of Assam, CRPF
personnel recovered 50 foreign-made detonators from Baghehor
village in Cachar district on September 2, 2004, and arrested
one person in this connection. Reports also suggested that,
as the ULFA lacked an organisational structure in districts
like Cachar, it is effectively using MULTA cadres.
The problem that confronts the region is not just about
occasional 'security lapses' or even a sudden spurt of violence.
Indeed, violence has never ceased to torment the region
over the past decades. The real problem is located in a
curious lack of vision and ability to locate this violence
in a wider strategic perspective that accommodates all its
driving factors - including the intervention of foreign
elements. Unless the Governments in the region and New Delhi
take a hard look at broader designs of destabilisation,
incidents like the one in Dimapur can only recur with increasing
frequency.
