SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 18, November 15, 2004

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal

ASSESSMENT

PAKISTAN

Power Play in South Waziristan
Guest Writer: Mohammad Shehzad
Islamabad-based freelance journalist and writer

The biggest quandary at present in Pakistan is not Musharraf's uniform but the ongoing military operation in South Waziristan against al-Qaeda suspects and their supporters.

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Nobody knows what is actually going on in South Waziristan - journalists' entry into the region is banned. On October 15, a fact-finding group of seven Parliamentarians from the Muttehida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA, an alliance of six pro-Taliban religious parties) was stopped from entering the tribal region at Jandola (near Tank, about 290 kilometres from Peshawar) citing a law that bans political activities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA]. The only source of information is Director General Inter Services Public Relations [ISPR] Major General Shaukat Sultan, whose information is contested by the opposition and the media in public, and by the diplomatic community in private.

The first military operation in FATA was launched on October 2, 2003, at Angor Ada. The first operation in Wana was launched on January 8, 2004; the second on February 24, 2004; the third between March 18-30, 2004; that was followed by a series of operations from June 11 to the present date. According to the official sources, the October 2 operation, in which eight suspects were killed and 18 were captured alive, was the most successful.

'But the military never presented the 'foreign' militants before us!' complains Rahimullah Yusufzai, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) analyst on Afghan affairs.

The jihadists, independent journalists, and opposition Parliamentarians have been challenging the military's viewpoint - i.e., that the operations had been initiated to flush out foreign terrorists hiding in the tribal areas - asserting that there were no foreign terrorists in South Waziristan, and if there are any, the Government should present them before the public.

Yusufzai asserts, "The military might have arrested or killed the foreign terrorists, but it is hesitant to present them before the media. In fact, it arranged our meeting with a 14-year old Tajik terrorist. The military is afraid to make such things public because in that case the US could mount pressure on Pakistan. The US is against the military's talking to the militants. It wants the military to use force'.

"It is an outrageous lie if someone claims that there are no foreign terrorists in South Waziristan," Sultan counters, "It is absolutely true that the foreign militants have been arrested and we have not presented them before the public in the larger national interest."

The military has been fighting the 'invisible' enemies in South Waziristan for more than a year without much success. Often times, it gives an impression that it has failed. Some analysts believe that a section of the Army is pro-militant, but both Sultan and Yusufzai dismiss such notions. Yusufzai argues: "If you are thinking why Abdullah Mehsud has not been arrested, then the answer is, he is familiar with the terrain. He has local support. He comes from the same tribe. He can flee to North Waziristan or Afghanistan. I am dead sure that there is no support to him from any section of the military. Mehsud has killed the Chinese. It is a very serious thing. No Pakistani Government can afford to annoy China. So, rule it out that military could support him. Mehsud enjoys a lot of support from his own people that has really made the task difficult for the military."

Sultan concedes several hitches in the operations. "The militants are mixed up with the civilians. The military cannot target them in such a situation. Certain people, to further their vested interests, portray the killings of the militants as the killings of civilians. They glorify militants as 'heroes.'"

The Government is upset with publications such as Nawa-i-Waqt, Ummat, Jasarat, Friday Special, Takbeer, Nida-i-Millat, Islam, which portray the militants as heroes. These publications act as 'unofficial' mouthpieces of the jihadists, and see the hand of India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), Mosaad and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) behind the events in South Waziristan.

Takbeer [Nov 3] has written that the US, India and Israel are the real masterminds of the incidents in South Waziristan, and that they want the tribal people to rise up against the Army. India, the article claimed, is supplying weapons to the tribal people and the US is very cleverly dividing the two united groups of mujahideen, i.e., the Pakistani Army and the civilian mujahideen [tribal people].

Friday Special [Oct 7, Zafar Mehmood Sheikh] views the lifting of the economic blockade on South Waziristan as a humiliating defeat for the Army. "The relief has been announced to silence the voices of such people who had been protesting the military crackdown in Wana. In fact, the killing in Wana was masterminded by Musharraf on the orders of Bush. The latter wanted it for his election campaign and Musharraf wanted it to protect his uniform." "The Army is repeating 1971 in Wana. God forbid, Wana may not prove to be another Bangladesh. Bangla Bandu was first declared as traitor and this time the tribes of Wazirstan have been declared terrorists… Wana will prove to be the last nail in the country's coffin if better sense did not prevail on Musharraf. He should stop arranging official visits to Wana and allow independent journalists access to the area. Only then the people of Pakistan will know about the atrocities of Pak army in South Waziristan."

Disagreeing patiently with such views, Sultan claims, "There is no ban on journalists' entry in South Waziristan." However, he insists that journalists should not "expect that ISPR would provide you vehicles or helicopters for your travel."

There is, nevertheless, a growing perception that the military operations are creating a sense of hatred among the tribal people against the Armed Forces. On Saturday night (November 13), at an Iftaar dinner in Rawalpindi, a local MMA leader Hanif Abbasi, told this writer, "The Pak Army is committing state terrorism in South Waziristan, exactly the way the Indian Army is doing the same in Kashmir. It is targeting innocent civilians."

Yusufzai echoes the growing concern: "The military operations have displaced thousands of people in South Waziristan. But the Army does not want it to be reported. The Pushtuns are severely independent people. They never forgive their enemies. The coming generations of the tribal people will be full of hate against the Army and they will take revenge."

Prof. Ishtiaq, a professor of Islamic Studies, adds: "The military can never win this battle. It might be able to contain them [the tribal people] temporarily but it will lose ultimately. The tribals never forgive and they never forget. The present generation of the tribal people has grown up during the Afghan jihad. They can forget their religious duties but they can never forget their enemies. Sometimes, injustice committed against the great grandfather is avenged by the great grandson!" Ishtiaq also sees a conspiracy in the Wana Operations: "The Pak Army has been pitched against the tribal people under a plot. The West knows that the tribal people are highly motivated and ideological. They have the capability to defend the country. They are the right-hand of the Army. The West wants to cut off this right hand."

Lashing out at the Government, Mohammad Usman Qazi, a civil society activist adds: "All the terrorists and criminals have been arrested from Rawalpindi, Lahore, and Karachi. None of them was arrested from South Waziristan. Could the military launch air attacks on these cities? Could the military stop their water and food supplies? The military has done so in South Waziristan because it treats it as an 'occupied area'. South Waziristan is part of Afghanistan. The military crackdown is sharpening the sense of alienation of the tribal people. The blood of the Pushtun has always been very cheap in Pakistan."

Contesting such feelings strongly, General Sultan asserts, "The operation has been deeply appreciated by the local people. They want to get rid of the terrorists. There is no sense of hatred against the Army among the local people."

A diplomat in Islamabad endorses Sultan's views, "The Government has found that some recently arrested terrorists in Karachi had links with what's going on in South Waziristan. The domestic violence in Pakistan has strong links with international terrorism masterminded by the al-Qaeda. The US is very happy with Pakistan's performance on terrorism and fully supports Musharraf in this effort." This diplomat also remarked that there was little chance of a repeat of 1971 in the present circumstances. "There is no evidence of a 1971-like situation in Pakistan. The terrorism has not spread out of South Waziristan-not even to other agencies of the tribal areas. It is limited to South Waziristan.'

There is, nevertheless, a unanimous view among civil society activists and organisations, that only a political solution, rather than present efforts at military domination, can help resolve the situation in South Waziristan. Yusufzai argues that "There is no military solution to any political dispute. The Army committed atrocities against Balochistan for more than 30 years, but the same problems are re-emerging in the province. As long as the US forces will remain present in Afghanistan and the country will face political instability, the situation in South Waziristan is not going to change. The military launches fresh offensive in South Waziristan under the US pressure. Whenever, Karazai would make some noise, Armitage or Khalilzad will twist Pakistan's Army and the result is another military operation." He adds that, "Jirga is the only solution to this dispute. Recently, the military has forged another agreement... that the tribal people will not be asked to present the foreign militants before the authorities. They will only ensure that the militants do not create any law and order situation for Pakistan. This could have been accepted in the Shakai agreement. But God knows what happened that the Corps Commander Peshawar, Lieutenant General Safdar, announced that Nek Mohammad would present the militants before the authorities. Nek Mohamamd denied this and he was killed".

Usman Qazi also argues for a political solution: "The military is not trained to resolve conflicts… We need civilian leadership, not military dictators to resolve conflicts like 1971 or South Waziristan. And the military should not forget that the tribals are not timid like unarmed Bengalis. They are armed to teeth and nails (sic). Fighting them is not an easy task. They have already killed more than 200 soldiers and they are quite capable to further resistance." Diplomatic observers add that the Pakistan Army is not trained to fight the insurgency, but to fight a conventional war, and that too, only with India. This, however, leads them to underline the need to enhance the capacities of the Army.

General Sultan insists that events in South Waziristan need to be seen in the context of global injustice. "As long as the issues like Kashmir and Palestine will not be resolved, global peace is impossible. Global injustice is the root-cause of terrorism that is badly affecting Pakistan."

Clearly, before any solution can be arrived at in South Waziristan - and such a solution would need to be political - two of Pakistan's major problems would need to be addressed: the first is that the military dictatorship refuses to accept its mistakes or to learn from them. It continues to regard the Army as the panacea for all problems. The second is that the military regime is under US control. The latter wants the Army to solve the problem only through the exercise of force, rather than through efforts of conflict resolution. In combination, this can only mean that the prospects of peace in the country remain bleak.

INDIA

SRI LANKA

Tilting the Balance?
Saji Cherian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

India has often fumbled in achieving the right recipe of adroitness and tact to maintain a 'friendly' neighbourhood. Part of the problem lies in inept handling and inconsistent policies, over the years, towards issues that have plagued its relatively smaller neighbours. This scenario, however, appears to be evolving somewhat, particularly with respect to India's relations with its southern neighbour, Sri Lanka.

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The Sri Lankan President, Chandrika Kumaratunga, was on a state visit in New Delhi from November 3 to 7, to strengthen Indo-Sri Lankan relations. There was satisfaction on the dynamism and energy of bilateral economic ties as a result of the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA) of March 2000, which had resulted in bilateral trade between the two countries exceeding US$ 1.5 billion in 2003-04. However, though greater economic cooperation was one of the major items on the agenda of discussions, it was the announcement that a bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and a Memorandum Of Understanding on the Rehabilitation of the Airfield in Palaly, Jaffna would be signed between the two Governments on mutually convenient dates, that provoked controversy.

Over the decades of civil conflict between the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), India had put the island on its negative list with respect to military supplies. However, as a result of the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE in February 2002, Sri Lanka was taken off this list in January 2003. Since then, the idea of a defence cooperation agreement has been in the air, and was first discussed in October 2003, when Ranil Wickremesinghe was the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka and the National Democratic Alliance was in power in New Delhi. Again, on June 19, 2004, the visiting Sri Lankan delegation, led by Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse, and Indian officials agreed to expedite the proposed defence cooperation agreement.

Although specific contours of the new 'defence cooperation' have not been disclosed, the general drift was manifested in the October 19, 2004, Press Release of the Sri Lankan Defense ministry, published after a meeting between a five-member Indian delegation, led by Ranjith Issar, Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, and Cyril Herath, Lankan Secretary of Defence in Colombo. The Press Release mentioned "bilateral defence cooperation in the field of Military Training, Exchange of military Intelligence and information, Maritime surveillance to prevent illegal activities affecting both countries, official visits and bilateral meeting at different levels participation in training programmes, joint military exercises, etc were discussed among other matters." There can be little ambiguity over the potential target of this cooperation.

Over the years, India's policies towards Sri Lanka has fluctuated from the pro-active 'hands-on' approach of the late 1980s, when the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was dispatched to island nation, to a distant 'hands-off' orientation after the IPKF withdrew with substantial losses in March 1990.Despite the IPKF's withdrawal, however, cooperation with the Lankan security forces was maintained in view of the perception of the threat that the LTTE posed to India, especially after the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on May 21, 1991, by a LTTE suicide cadre. Since then, India has provided Colombo vital intelligence on the movement of LTTE ships and vessels transporting arms and ammunition, as well as occasionally more forceful interventions, such as the sinking of the M.V. Ahat, a part of the LTTE's shipping fleet, which was intercepted by Indian naval authorities off the Tamil Nadu coast in January 1993. The ship was blown up on the orders of one of the LTTE's leaders, Sathasivam Krishnakumar, alias Kittu, who was on board the vessel, after its interception by Indian Navy vessels.

The fact that the defence equation was moving forward was reiterated by the November 1, 2004, visit of India's Chief of Army Staff, N.C. Vij to Sri Lanka - the first by an Indian Army Chief since the de-induction of the IPKF. After a visit to the forward line at Omanthai in Vavuniya district, Vij had said that, although there was a truce in fighting, the Sri Lankan soldiers needed to be vigilant. Commenting on the proposed Defence Agreement he said it was "of immense importance. It would mutually help procurement of arms, and training. Although the ceasefire is in force, recruitment and boosting the moral of soldiers should continue."

Earlier, in September this year, the Indian Navy Chief, Admiral Arun Prakash had also visited Sri Lanka to discuss, among other things, the threat that the LTTE's naval wing, the Sea Tigers, posed to 'both countries'. The emergence of the Sea Tigers and its growing dominance along Sri Lanka's northern shoreline, with an increasing frequency of skirmishes with Indian fishermen, has been a cause of concern to India. Unconfirmed reports have also indicated that the LTTE may be supplying arms to the Naxalite (Left Wing extremist) groups in the southern parts of the country, off the coastline between the Machilipatnam and Guntur districts in Andhra Pradesh. Restoring security in its Southern waters is consequently of prime importance to the Indian Navy, especially since the success of the Sethusamudram Canal Project in the Palk Bay area hinges on the Indian Navy dealing with the Sri Lankan Navy, rather than a 'third Navy'. [The Sethusamudram project will link the Palk Bay and Gulf of Mannar in the South Coast by creating a shipping canal through the Rameswaram Island]

Equally worrisome is the growing LTTE clout near the Trincomalee Harbour, where the Sri Lanka Navy's Northern Headquarters is located. The Sri Lankan Government, on August 9, 2004, officially complained to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) that 13 camps of the LTTE, located along the southern mouth of the harbour, had been newly setup, violating the bilateral ceasefire agreement between Colombo and the Tigers. An oil tank complex run by Indian Oil Corporation is located near the harbour, giving an Indian tinge to these anxieties.

The economic content packaged along with the Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) adds a crucial dimension to the current bilateral engagement. India has offered a US$ 100 million credit line for the development of Rural Infrastructure projects in Sri Lanka. India is the second highest tourism generating country in Sri Lanka and the number of Sri Lankan Airline flights into various cities in India now stands at 77 per week - the highest number of flights to India by any airline. India has also offered a grant of US$ 7.5 million to build a state-of-the-art Cancer Hospital in Sri Lanka. A second hospital project funded by the Indian Government is located at Dickoya near Kandy, with an investment of Rupees 200 million. In addition, Indian public sector undertakings such as RITES (Rail India Technical and Economic Services Ltd), National Thermal Power Corporation and Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., have set up projects in Sri Lanka. Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) recently paid the final amount of $45 million for a $75-million deal with the Sri Lankan Government to retail fuel in the island country. Lanka-IOC Pvt. Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of IOC, has taken over a large number of petrol bunks. India is also extending a $100-million credit line for goods and services over a period of 20 years, with a moratorium of five years. This includes a wheat loan of $31 million. In a minor reverse flow, a few Lankan companies, mainly in the confectionary business, would soon be setting up shop in Chennai.

The proposed DCA has naturally roused some anxieties among the LTTE and its sympathisers, and protests against the Agreement have been articulated on both sides of the border. Reacting to the latest developments, LTTE's chief peace negotiator, Anton Balasingham, declared: "Tamil people view that such an agreement is irrelevant during the time of a peace process, suspended though, but altogether not given up and therefore would tilt the military equilibrium, the underlying principle of the ceasefire agreement." P. Sithamparanathan of Sri Lanka's Tamil National Alliance (TNA) stated further, on November 10, that the proposed military pact between India and Sri Lanka might tempt the latter to restart the war against the Tamil Tiger guerrillas, and that Tamils fear "preparations are underway for another war in the island". On the Indian side, Vaiko, the pro-LTTE leader of the MDMK (Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) in the Southern state of Tamil Nadu, met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to express his disapproval.

The possible 'tilt' in the military balance between the SLA and the LTTE acquires particular significance against the backdrop of the stalled peace process, with both contesting parties refusing to dilute their stated positions. The eventual test of the trajectory of Indo-Sri Lankan relations may, indeed, arise if the Island nation is plunged once more into the vortex of civil war.

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
November 8-14, 2004

	Civilian	Security Force Personnel	Terrorist	Total
BANGLADESH	0	0	1	1
INDIA
Assam	1	0	2	3
Jammu & Kashmir	2	4	7	13
Left-wing extremism	0	0	4	4
Manipur	3	2	1	6
Meghalaya	0	0	1	1
Tripura	2	0	0	2
Total (INDIA)	8	6	15	29
NEPAL	8	2	14	24
PAKISTAN	1	6	52	59

Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.

INDIA

Assam Government's emissary meets NDFB 'Chairman' in Bangladesh: On November 13, media reports quoting official sources in Guwahati reported that the emissary deputed by the Assam government met the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), 'chairman' D.R. Nabla alias Ranjan Daimari in Bangladesh on an unspecified day and held discussions with him regarding a list of names of NDFB cadres who would be assigned with the task of formulating the ground rules of ceasefire. Sentinel Assam, November 13, 2004

Prime Minister announces troop reduction in Jammu and Kashmir: Ahead of his maiden visit to Jammu and Kashmir on November 17, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh on November 11 announced reduction of troops deployed in the State this winter in view of "improvement" in the situation there, but made it clear that the decision would be kept under "constant review". The decision was taken at a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) which, earlier in the day, reviewed the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, in general, and the North-East, in particular. The Prime Minister however added that "if the levels of infiltration and terrorist violence increase, more troops as necessary will be redeployed". The Hindu, Daily Excelsior, November 12, 2004

NEPAL

Country will experience authoritarian rule soon, says Government spokesperson Mohammad Mohsin: During a meeting at Singha Durbar on November 10, Government spokesperson and Minister for Information and Communications Dr. Mohammad Mohsin said "the country will probably experience an authoritarian Government very soon, if Maoists do not come to the negotiation table…The alternative to this Government will be one you people can't bear with". The minister pointed out that a dictatorial system was required to bring peace and maintain law and order in the country, so that the sovereignty of the people could be handed back to them as soon as possible. Nepal News, November 11, 2004

PAKISTAN

40 militants killed in South Waziristan: Atleast 40 suspected militants have been killed by Pakistani troops hunting Al Qaeda fighters in a rugged region bordering Afghanistan this week, South Waziristan field commander Major General Niaz Khattak said on November 13. Several militant hideouts had also been destroyed in the ongoing offensive, with an extra 7,000 troops, backed by helicopter gunships, pouring into the tribal region of South Waziristan on November 12, Khattak said, giving a detailed briefing in village Nano, the native village of Al Qaeda terrorist Abdullah Mahsud. Niaz Khattak said. "My reckoning is that the number of foreign militants in the area should not be more than 100". The News, November 14, 2004

Five wanted militants reach accord with Government in South Waziristan: Five most wanted tribal militants on November 11 signed an agreement with the government, pledging to live peacefully and not to harbour foreign militants in South Waziristan. Yargulkhel, Kurmezkhel and Malikkhel, three sub-clans of the main Ahmadzai Wazir tribe, signed the agreement with the authorities in Wana on behalf of the five militants, including Haji Mohammad Omar who had been declared successor to the slain militant 'commander', Nek Mohammad. The four other militants are Maulana Abdul Aziz, Haji Sharif, Maulvi Abbas and Mohammad Javed. "The tribes have deposited Rupees10 million as guarantee for each of the five militants," said Brigadier Mehmood Shah, the security chief (FATA), in Peshawar. Dawn, Daily Times, November 12, 2004

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Weekly Assessments & Briefings Volume 3, No. 18, November 15, 2004

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 18, November 15, 2004