SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 22, December 13, 2004

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal

ASSESSMENT

INDIA

Naga Peace Overtures
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

The meeting of the leaders of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak- Muivah (NSCN-IM) with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at New Delhi on December 7, 2004, and their subsequent 'homecoming' in Nagaland after a self-imposed exile of 37 years, are, at a psychological level, significant movements in the ponderous pace of the Naga peace process - which commenced with a declaration of ceasefire by the rebel group and the Government of India seven years ago. NSCN-IM leaders Isak Chisi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah had earlier visited Delhi to meet the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in January 2003, and it is a measure of the elephantine gait of the negotiations that nothing much has changed since. Each such 'round' of high-level meetings is, nevertheless, greeted with great enthusiasm by the media and by those involved in the 'peace process'.

This time round, though the first encounter between Prime Minister Singh and the Naga leaders was more about atmospherics than 'substantive' discussions, there is reason to believe that the process may, in fact, soon be pushed forward. For one thing, Muivah and Swu are not in India just for this meeting, but as part of an extended programme of 'three or four months' that takes them back to Nagaland for Christmas and New Year, and then returns them to New Delhi for a 'substantive' phase of negotiations. At the end of this extended programme, there would be some erosion of the credibility of the 'peace process', were it not to yield any visible results. However, it remains altogether unlikely that the current round of talks would abruptly 'resolve' the 'Naga problem' that has plagued India for 53 years.

In his meeting with Swu and Muivah, on December 7, the Prime Minister promised a "mutually acceptable and honourable solution that can ensure that the Naga people live a life of peace with dignity and self-respect." This is, of course, unimpeachable, but it remains far from clear whether the situation in Nagaland and the NSCN-IM's vision and agenda will lend themselves to any easy resolution. Nor, indeed, has the mistrust between the negotiating parties been entirely purged. In fact, the Naga leaders were originally scheduled to arrive in Delhi in late November, but the visit was aborted with allegations by the NSCN-IM that Central intelligence agencies and the Nagaland Government were supporting and arming a 'rival' Naga group, the Naga National Council (NNC) in a gambit to 'divide the Naga people'. Another suspicion was that the Government of India (GoI) was engaged in secret negotiations with the NSCN's rival Khaplang faction (NSCN-K) as well, a charge the Government denied. Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil also reportedly advised Chief Minister Rio to 'rein in' his minister who was accused of providing support to the NNC. On the other hand, the Government has repeatedly accused the NSCN-IM of violating the 'ground rules' of the ceasefire, particularly for the movement of armed rebel cadres outside their designated camps and for administering an extensive regime of extortion.

These, however, are just pinpricks in the expansive minefield of talks. The real obstacles relate to the 'sovereignty' issue and, most crucially, the demand for a 'greater Nagalim', comprehending 'all Naga areas'. The 'sovereignty' demand has gradually, though only implicitly - in their public statements the NSCN-IM leaders remain committed to an independent Nagaland, separate from India - been transformed into a claim for 'greater autonomy'. On the Nagalim issue, however, the rebels have remained clear and unrelenting: they are not demanding a 'greater' or a 'lesser' Nagaland; they are only demanding that all Naga 'homelands' be brought under one political unit. The problem, however, is that these claimed areas are spread over the geographical territories of the Indian States of Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland, as well as in parts of western Myanmar. While the Myanmarese territories cannot be part of any 'settlement' between the Indian Government and the rebels, there are compelling Constitutional constraints on the transfer of the territories of any Indian State without the consent of the States so affected. Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur have all fairly clearly rejected the inclusion of any of their territories in the "so-called Nagalim". In an additional obstruction, Prime Minister Singh's United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government is committed to a Common Minimum Programme (CMP) that has specifically rejected the redrawing of boundaries in the Northeast. The rebels are, moreover, claiming wide areas where the Naga presence is, at best, nominal. In Assam, for instance, the districts of Cachar, the North Cachar and Karbi Anglong, have been proclaimed as parts of the projected Nagalim. But the population of Nagas (according to the 1991 Census) was just about 5 per cent in the North Cachar Hills, as little as 0.37 per cent in Karbi Anglong and 0 per cent in Cachar. In recent years, there have been deliberate and concentrated efforts by various Naga organizations to alter the demographics of many of these areas, with efforts to settle a Naga population along the border areas inside Assam, with places like Mariani in Jorhat and Merapani in Golaghat district acquiring significant Naga settlements. There have also been efforts to 'cleanse' Naga dominated areas in Manipur of non-Naga concentrations. The Kuki Movement for Human Rights (KMHR), for instance, has alleged that the NSCN-IM militants had, on November 23, served a 'quit notice' to Kuki villagers in Tamenglong district of Manipur, demanding that the Kukis vacate these areas before Christmas. In Arunachal Pradesh, the NSCN-IM has been involved in concerted proselytizing activities among the tribals in the Tirap and Changlang districts in an attempt to project them as a part and parcel of the anticipated 'Nagaland for Christ'.

Many analysts have, moreover, noted that the Naga identity is synthetic, and of relatively recent origin. The NSCN-IM is dominated by the Tangkhul tribe - largely concentrated in the hill districts of Manipur - to which Muivah belongs, and, in lesser measure, by the Semas, represented by the nominal head of the NSCN-IM, Isak Chisi Swu. Other tribes have often chafed under this domination, and many of the fratricidal clashes between various Naga factions - particularly the NSCN-K and, more recently, the NNC - are manifestations of divided tribal loyalties. Two influential tribal organizations, the Ao Senden and the Sumi Hoho (the apex bodies of the Ao and Sumi tribes), have, further, decided to boycott the reception organized for Muivah and Swu at Dimapur on December 14. Indeed, among the imperatives that impel the NSCN-IM's demand for an 'integrated Nagalim' is the fact that leaders like Muivah and 'Home Minister' Rh. Raising would have very little tribal following in a 'Nagalim' that excluded the hill districts of Manipur. Any meddling with State territories in the Northeast, however, would be highly disruptive, as was clearly demonstrated by the violent reaction in Manipur after the ill-advised extension of ceasefire 'without territorial limits' in June 2001 - which had been interpreted as a covert recognition of the 'Greater Nagalim' idea. Several militant non-Naga tribal groups - including, most recently, the Kuki National Army, have threatened a 'bloodbath' in the event of any territorial reorganization that affects their respective 'traditional' lands.

Each of these streams of opposition have long and complex histories that would obstruct any easy settlement between the Centre and the NSCN-IM, and many more political entities - including the elected Governments of the affected States of the Northeast, the most consistently ignored parties in the 'search for peace' in Nagaland - would have to be taken into confidence before any sustainable advances can be made.

Nevertheless, advances are, in fact, now a distinct possibility. During their current tour of Nagaland, the rebel leaders would be interacting with a wide spectrum of the local leadership - including the Naga Hoho, the traditional umbrella organization uniting over 30 Naga tribes - to gauge 'popular sentiment'. They would certainly hear many and impassioned pleas for peace, and at least some complaints against the misconduct and extortion by NSCN-IM cadres. Muivah and Swu have been deprived of such direct feedback for nearly the entire period of their almost four-decade exile, though they had made a clandestine visit to Dimapur in May 1999 - crossing over from Thailand. During that visit, they had consulted with their cadres in an effort to hammer out a 'solution' short of the 'independence formula', but failed to arrive at a consensus. While the NSCN-IM is anything but a democratic entity, its leadership is not, and cannot be, entirely indifferent to the transformed mood of the people in Nagaland who are exhausted by the unending and fratricidal violence, and their own exclusion from the opportunities of development and the fruits of modernity. Significantly, moreover, both Muivah and Swu are now feeling the burden of age, and there are many who believe that they would be eager to arrive at an early settlement, fearing a dissipation of the movement in the event of their demise.

Hammering out an 'honourable' agreement, however, remains a challenge, though not one that is insurmountable. Much of what the NSCN-IM demands by way of 'greater autonomy' already exists within, or can be created by minor amendments to, the Indian Constitution. As regards 'Greater Nagalim' the Centre can be expected to offer a process, rather than a solution, one that would involve the gradual enlargement of dialogue and conciliation between all concerned parties and States; one that would certainly be protracted but which could, eventually, yield an outcome untainted by the bloodshed and exclusionary hatred that has long afflicted the conflicting contentions of tribal groups in India's Northeast. If the Indian state is to engage in negotiations based on questionable principles with armed insurgent groups, this is, perhaps, the best that can be hoped for.

INDIA

ULFA: Playing Hard to Get
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati

The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) chief's rejection of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's offer of peace talks on December 9 has been interpreted as a great setback to the possibility of durable peace in Assam. It took less than two days for Paresh Baruah to decline the offer. The objections put forward by him in his rebuff to the Prime Minister were:

Absence of the signature of the Prime Minister on the formal letter.

The 'precondition' that ULFA should 'abjure violence' before the peace talks could begin.

No mention of the principal demand of the outfit, i.e. sovereignty of Assam in the letter.

Paresh Baruah, in an e-mailed response, said, "Had the Prime Minister been sincere, he would have signed the letter himself and not by his internal security advisor." This distilled the essence of the theatre of the absurd that has been enacted in Guwahati, Delhi and Dhaka over the past month, after Assamese litterateur Indira Goswami submitted a one and half page appeal for negotiations with the ULFA to the Prime Minister on November 18. On December 7, the Prime Minister's office had sent a letter to the 'negotiator', Goswami, inviting the rebel group for talks.

Paresh Baruah, in turn, had assured Goswami that he would discuss the PM's letter with his 'general council', an expression which carries little meaning today in view of the arrest and elimination of most of its members. The 'general council' boasted a strength of over 220 when it last met in Nagaon in 1995. It consists of ULFA's 'central committee' members, the political wing, armed wing, the mandals and the anchalik parishad leaders, at present estimated at not more than 70, and most of these members (referred to as senior hardcore cadres in local Press parlance) are either on 'field duty' or are cooling their heels in various camps and safe houses spread across the region. A 'council meeting', consequently, could only be conducted by way of a series of phone calls by the 'commander-in-chief' from his base in Dhaka.

The 'general council' in the present case appears, however, to have assumed a different character altogether. According to vernacular newspapers, the 'commander-in-chief' consulted a number of people in Guwahati over the phone, including, according to the Dainik Janambhumi, "one time comrades, sympathetic political leaders, journalists, non-political NGO activists and intellectuals". It is at the end of this process of consultation that the emphatic rejection of the offer of talks emerged, with the proviso that negotiations could be considered if the Government conceded ULFA's demand to put the 'sovereignty issue' on the agenda for discussions.

This outcome is unsurprising. Excerpts from an earlier statement by the 'sincere' ULFA 'C-n-C', in which he rejected the Mizo National Front (MNF) model of peace talks (which brought peace to Mizoram in 1986, after nearly two decades of insurgency) on August 13, 2004, are instructive. Baruah stated: "We will not move an inch from our earlier stand. We have come too far and sacrificed too many of our boys to turn back on our dream of sovereign Assam." He added further, "The Mizos are no better as they continue to be subjugated by the great Indian machinery. The offer of talks is so hollow, we can see through it. We do not want to fall for that trap."

Nevertheless, it is still unclear why the ULFA Chief chose to endorse Goswami's initiatives. In the past, several organisations including the All Assam Students' Union (AASU), the Assam Sahitya Sabha, the Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuba Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP), and several individuals of repute like singer Bhupen Hazarika and film maker Janhu Baruah have attempted to mediate between the Government and the insurgent leadership. ULFA has cold-shouldered all such efforts and, on occasions, accused some of the would-be mediators of being 'Indian agents'. In September 2004, the Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuba Chhatra Parishad (AJYCP), from which most of the initial batch of ULFA leaders was drawn, initiated a two-day conclave (Jatiya Mahasabha) in Guwahati, which overwhelmingly decided in favour of dialogue in which the Government was expected to take the initiative. The 'mahasabha' called for a unilateral ceasefire by the Government, and asked the ULFA to give up violence. Subsequently, the AASU also urged the Government to declare an 'experimental' 100-hour ceasefire with the outfit. ULFA had remained altogether unresponsive to each of these initiatives. It was possibly Goswami's willingness to pursue talks with the 'sovereignty' issue on the agenda that made her more acceptable. On October 23, Goswami had said, "ULFA has been fighting for 25 years on the issue of sovereignty. We just cannot ignore it. We have to listen to this aspect at the negotiating table and find out why they are fighting."

However, with the exception of the political manoeuvre of the then Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia, who in the early-1990s effected a vertical split in ULFA after failing to progress beyond the preliminary rounds of peace talks with a group of ULFA militants, which included its chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa, no effort of consequence has succeeded in drawing the ULFA to the negotiating table. Paresh Baruah has remained the most significant and inflexible opponent to a peace process, though there is now a substantial section of ULFA cadres and leaders who would prefer to pick up the negotiation offer. These leaders and cadres, however, have little power within the current structure of the organisation, with Baruah commanding the loyalty and obedience of its armed cadres. As General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the 4 Corps stationed in Assam, Lieutenant General Anup Singh Jamwal, stated on December 10, 2004, "The military wing of the outfit is controlling everything and therefore, it is important to involve Paresh Baruah in the negotiation process."

Despite the current and apparent impasse, this is an option that is not excluded at present. On December 11, 2004, Indira Goswami submitted a second letter urging the Prime Minister to write a personal request to the ULFA Chief to rethink on the negotiation issue. However, there is need for both scepticism and caution in appeasing a terrorist group that has not balked from the repeated use of extreme violence against innocents. Indeed, even as Goswami was approaching the Government with her original proposals - clearly authorised by Baruah - the ULFA had triggered a series of explosions in different parts of the State on November 25. Again, on December 9, an intercept of messages from the ULFA 'chief' to his cadres revealed the group's plans to carry out a series of attacks on vital installations and prominent personalities, including Congress party leaders and 'Hindi-speaking people' in the State. Another report indicated that 400 ULFA cadres have entered the upper Assam districts from Myanmar to carry out serious acts of sabotage. A December 12 report further detailed the group's extortion activities in Assam under its new 'finance secretary' Nipesh Bhagat. Seventy-five businessmen in the State have already been asked to pay Rupees 200,000 each through handwritten extortion notes.

Among the recurrent principles that emerge from the various theatres of insurgency across India is the fact that terrorist groups seldom negotiate unless they have been pushed to the wall - and even in these circumstances, they often engage in negotiations as a tactic to buy time to regroup. After ULFA lost its safe haven in Bhutan following the military action there in December 2003, there were some claims - as there had been on many occasions in the past - that ULFA's 'back had been broken'. With some pressure now mounting in Myanmar as well, where the group has a substantial proportion of its armed cadres, there is reason to believe that many among the rebels will find the offer of a negotiated settlement tempting.

But the ULFA is clearly far from finished, and will retain its capacity to create significant nuisance as long as it retains its bases in Bangladesh, and continues to enjoy the support of the Government and intelligence apparatus there. There is also extraordinary financial incentive to keep the operation going, both in terms of direct infusions from Pakistani and Bangladeshi intelligence, as well as from extortion and the many lucrative businesses the ULFA leadership has set up over time. Indian policy-makers have long been married to the idea of 'bringing back the boys' by the simple expedient of buying off the insurgent leadership and cadres - and this was the essence of the hugely celebrated 'Mizoram model'. Evidently, their offers are still to match the expectations of the ULFA leadership.

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
December 6-12, 2004

	Civilian	Security Force Personnel	Terrorist	Total
INDIA
Assam	0	0	1	1
Jammu & Kashmir	2	6	8	16
Left Wing Extremism	2	2	0	4
Manipur	1	1	8	10
Mizoram	0	1	3	4
Tripura	2	0	0	2
Total (INDIA)	7	10	20	37
NEPAL	10	6	60	76
PAKISTAN	11	0	0	11
SRI LANKA	2	0	0	2

Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.

INDIA

United Liberation Front of Asom rejects offer for negotiations: The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) on December 9, 2004, rejected the invitation from the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) for peace talks. In a statement e-mailed to the media in Guwahati, ULFA 'Commander-in-Chief' Paresh Baruah said, "The reply of the Prime Minister to Dr. Mamoni Raisom Goswami [noted Assamese writer Indira Goswami] will disappoint the peace loving people of Assam. It is not surprising that the Prime Minister's reply was sent by the security adviser to PMO which shows that the Prime Minister did not think it worth to give a personal reply to the sincere effort of Dr. Goswami." He claimed that the PMO's letter is contradictory and confusing. He pointed out that on one hand the letter said that the Prime Minister hasn't put any pre-condition for talks but, on the other, the letter made it clear that the Prime Minister is ready to talk only with the groups prepared to abjure violence, which itself is a pre-condition. Assam Tribune, December 10, 2004.

NSCN-IM leaders meet Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in New Delhi: Leaders of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), Chairman Isak Chisi Swu and General Secretary Thuingaleng Muivah met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil in New Delhi on December 7, 2004. "Our government will make sincere effort to find an honourable way out," Dr. Singh told the visiting NSCN-IM leaders. During their 30-minute meeting with Singh, the Naga leaders reportedly emphasised that "a solution cannot be found in violence and blood." Subsequently, at a meeting with Shivraj Patil, the leaders expressed confidence in the Indian leadership and said "the whole world is seeking peace. So we also want peaceful solution." Tribune India, December 8, 2004.

Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 repealed by Lower House of Parliament: On December 6, 2004, the Lower House of Indian Parliament (Lok Sabha) passed a bill to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (POTA) and approved the new law - Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act (UAPA) to tackle terrorism. Both the bills, passed by the House by a voice vote, replace earlier ordinances. The Hindu, December 7, 2004.

PAKISTAN

11 persons killed in Quetta bomb blast: Eleven persons, including two army personnel, were reportedly killed and 26 others sustained injuries when a bomb attached to a bicycle exploded at Quetta in the Baluchistan province on December 10, 2004. At least a dozen vehicles, including a military truck, were destroyed and several shops damaged in the blast which occurred at Mezeen Chowk. Meanwhile, a person identifying himself as 'Azad Baloch' (Free Baloch) informed journalists at Quetta Press Club that the Baloch Liberation Army was responsible for the blast. However, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Pervez Bhatti, said law-enforcement agencies were investigating the blast from different angles. Dawn, December 11, 2004.

Terrorists reduced to 100 in South Waziristan, says Maj. Gen. Niaz Khattak: Briefing the Peshawar-based media at the Durrani Fort on December 9, 2004, about the Army's achievements, Maj. Gen. Niaz Khattak stated that persistent military operations against foreign terrorists and their local harbourers have reduced the strength of these elements to 100 in South Waziristan. He added there were approximately 600 foreign terrorists at the time the Army launched operations against the Al Qaeda and their local tribal sympathisers. "Their strength has reduced to 100 plus now, who too lost support of the local population," he told newsmen. Regarding Army's losses, Khattak stated that the Pakistan Army and the paramilitary Frontier Corps had thus far lost 200 personnel in Waziristan. More than 246 terrorists, including at least 100 foreigners, were also killed, while 579 were arrested in 35 military exercises. Dawn, December 10, 2004.

Bilateralism has last chance on Kashmir issue, says President Musharraf: On December 6, 2004, at a breakfast meeting with editors of leading British dailies in London, President Pervez Musharraf stated that bilateralism had a last chance for finding a peaceful solution to the Kashmir issue. "I am giving bilateralism a final chance. Let it not fail," the President said. Gen. Musharraf added that when he talked of bilateralism to address this issue he, in fact, was showing flexibility. He, however, made it clear that Pakistan had not changed its stance on Kashmir

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Weekly Assessments & Briefings Volume 3, No. 22, December 13, 2004

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 22, December 13, 2004