SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 3, August 2, 2004

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal

ASSESSMENT

NEPAL

Maoist Affiliates Sever Ties
Guest Writer: Keshab Poudel
Managing Editor, Spotlight Weekly Magazine, Kathmandu

Two sister organizations of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) - the Kirant Workers Party (KWP) and Madhesi National Liberation Front (MNLF) - announced their decision to terminate their association with the Maoists and steer an independent course, on July 27, 2004. After this split, the ongoing Maoist insurgency is believed to have entered into a new phase. This is the first major dissension within the Maoist fold since they launched the People's War in 1996. In a press release issued separately last week, the MNLF and KWP accused the CPN-M leadership of not fulfilling their commitment to increase the number of representatives of oppressed people, including Madhesiyas (people living in the plains region, also called the Terai) and indigenous people, at its top policy-making level.

When the KWP and the MNLF were with the CPN-Maoist, one senior leader from each of these groups was appointed as a member of the Central Committee of the CPN-M, and a number of other leaders were accommodated at different levels of the organizational structure. A press statement released by the 'Founding Chairman' of the MNLF, Jaya Krishna Goit, on July 27, asserted that the Front had split and that a new Janatantrik Terai Liberation Front had been floated in its stead. Goit blamed the Maoist leadership for discrimination against its Madhesi cadres. The statement accused the current establishment at Kathmandu as well as the Maoists of discrimination against the people of Terai (Madhes) region and alleged that, just as the Government recruits the Hill people in the bureaucracy that runs the Terai, the Maoists also appoint only Hill people at the decision-making levels. The statement emphasized the need to set up a federal state structure, with rights of 'self-determination' for the Terai people.

Likewise, the Kirant Workers Party (KWP) - another sister organization of the Maoists - has also decided to break ties, blaming 'lack of coordination'. A press release issued on July 27, 2004, - the same day the MNLF announced its decision - in the eastern town of Dharan, the KWP has stated that this decision was reached at an emergency meeting of the KWP held at an undisclosed location. The meeting also formed a new central coordination committee, which includes the regional members of the Maoists' Mechi-Koshi bureau. This is the third time that the KWP has broken its alliance with the Maoists. It is useful to note that the former 'General Secretary' of the KWP, Gopal Khambu, is a central committee member in the Maoist organizational structure. Some senior leaders of the KWP, including Khambu, were reportedly absent from the July 27 meeting.

Minor incidents of discontent among Maoist leaders at local levels have often been reported in the local newspapers in the past, but these had no impact on the Maoists' operational and institutional capacities. Last month, newspapers had reported the killing of half a dozen Maoists in far-western region after an internal dispute broke out among them. Following the amnesty offered by the previous Government, over 800 Maoist cadres deserted the insurgent group and surrendered before the security forces. The Ministry of Home has disclosed that more than 500 such former cadres were currently living in Government run rehabilitation centers.

The impact of these developments on the Maoists' operational and organizational capacities, however, is expected to be negligible. The breaking away of the two factions from the Maoist Front, and desertion of some cadres, will not significantly affect the strength of the Maoist organization, with its nationwide network and ideologically indoctrinated workers. Strategic analysts, however, do believe that the split may have a long-term impact on the Maoist organization. "The Maoists' strength relies on the strength of their own cadres. It is too premature to predict the possible future scenario," said a senior police officer working with a counter-insurgency team.

Other political analysts also hold the view that the MNLF and KWP played a crucial role in expanding the Maoist influence in the Terai and eastern parts of the country. However, since the Maoists now established their own organizational networks in these regions, the split will have minimal impact in the short-term.

Meanwhile, the Government claims that it has also blunted the Maoists' military capabilities. "Over the past few months, the Royal Nepalese Army has weakened the Maoists' military strength," claims Satchit Sumsher Rana, former chief of the Royal Nepalese Army. "The Maoists are not in a position right now to launch major attacks against the security forces," Rana stated in an interview on the Government-owned Nepal Television.

Nevertheless, the Maoists continue to demonstrate their strength and capability. They blew up a landmine in the heart of Nepalgunj city, 450 miles west of the capital, on July 27, injuring 22 civilians. The land mine was targeted at a police vehicle. Further, in a village about four miles south of Nepalgunj, the Maoists killed three people accusing them of being 'fake Maoists'. Similarly, one person was killed in each of two villages in Bara and Siraha - two eastern Terai districts. Despite the split, evidently, the Maoists continue to hold and demonstrate their influence in the Terai. Moreover, The Maoists also declared a three day bandh (shut down or general strike) in the Dhading, Nuwakot and Rasuwa districts on July 28, 29 and 30. The bandh crippled life across the districts and obstructed the movement of vehicles on the Prithvi highway, which links Kathmandu with the rest of the country.

With the split in the CPN-M, the prospects of the peace process could also suffer further. The split has come at a time when the Government and leaders of major political parties are reviving efforts to restore negotiations with the Maoists. The split in the Maoist Front could mean that the Government may now have to deal separately with multiple forces pulling in different directions. Although the CPN-M is still by far the most powerful organization, the Government cannot ignore the two other groups in case peace negotiations commence.

The prospects for such negotiations, however, are receding after the initial euphoria following the appointment of a new Government in the war-ravaged Himalayan Kingdom on June 2, 2004. The Sher Bahadur Deuba Government had promised to end the conflict through talks. Unfortunately, subsequent developments have failed to follow a positive direction, and the Maoists have, in fact, stepped up their violent activities across the country. In a statement released on July 20, 2004, moreover, Maoist 'Chairman' Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda explicitly ruled out the possibility of an immediate ceasefire, criticizing the Government for stating that it cannot negotiate beyond the country's current Constitution.

Prime Minister Deuba has also recently rejected the option of declaring a unilateral ceasefire "I don't want another peace process which would be aborted in months," he said. During his earlier tenure in 2001 his Government had declared a unilateral ceasefire - which was immediately welcomed and followed, but eventually breached, by the Maoists.

Leaders of the Alliance that constitutes the Deuba Government, however, continue to pressure the Prime Minister to take 'bold initiatives' to bring the Maoists to the negotiating table. "The Government must declare unilateral cease-fire," demanded Madhav Kumar Nepal, General Secretary of Communist Party of Nepal - United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), "The Government needs to initiate the efforts."

Leaders of other major parties have echoed similar views. "You cannot judge the Maoist leaders on the basis of their press statements. They will sit on the negotiating table in case we provide credible security to them," said former Prime Minister and Nepali Congress leader, Girija Prasad Koirala, who recently declared that he would work to bring the Maoists into the national mainstream; "If we guarantee their safety, the Maoists will come to the negotiating table."

Other leaders also remain strongly optimistic about such an eventuality. "The efforts made by us to restore peace are going on. There will be a major breakthrough in this regard soon," declared Deputy Prime Minister Bharat Mohan Adhikari. Civil society representatives and human rights activists continue to press the Government and the Maoists to immediately announce a ceasefire and re-engage in a peace process. "If the Government and Maoists both exhibit due seriousness, fruitful talks are likely," says Padma Ratna Tuladhar, a former facilitator of the talks between the state and the rebels.

Meanwhile, even as efforts to hold peace talks intensify, the Maoists have stepped up violence. Three trucks of food grains belonging to the World Food Program were looted in Achham district, 450 miles west of capital on July 3. On July 5, twelve police personnel and a civilian died in a roadside ambush by the Maoists on a police vehicle in Parsa district which borders India. A clash between the Maoists and the security forces in Kache area of Salyan District - 350 miles west of the capital - resulted in the death of 11 security personnel and 11 Maoists on July 6.

At this stage, bringing the Maoists to the negotiating table appears to be a far from easy task.

INDIA

Nagaland: A Frozen 'Peace'
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, ICM Database & Documentation Centre, Guwahati

In what is now becoming a routine exercise at this time of the year, the Union Government, on July 30, 2004, extended the cease-fire in Nagaland with the insurgent National Socialist Council of Nagaland - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) for another year. A decision to extend the truce, in place since August 1997, was reportedly arrived at after the Union Government interlocutor, K. Padmanabhaiah, held talks with the NSCN-IM leaders Isak Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah at Chiang Mai in northern Thailand.

Earlier, Isak Swu, had said: "A ceasefire is only important if it facilitates the peace process. If it is necessary for the progress of the peace process, we will extend it. But if that is not the prospect we are looking at, then we will not extend it. It will depend on our assessment of the attitude of the new dispensation in Delhi." Muivah, confirming his colleague's position, had added, "If one is not prepared to work for an honourable solution, what is the use of having a ceasefire? If after seven years the ceasefire ends, it will be sad. But we are not responsible if that happens."

While the cease-fire extension was on expected lines, some apprehensions had been expressed before the deal had been inked, and the NSCN-IM leadership had asked its cadres to go under-ground, with Muivah declaring, "Don't expect me to be a sitting duck when the enemy creates a situation." These apprehensions had significantly been fuelled by the NSCN-IM's reservations regarding the coalition United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government's Common Minimum Programme (CMP). The CMP stated, "There shall not be any erosion of the current territorial status of the northeastern States," which the insurgent group construed as a rejection of its demand for a 'Greater Nagaland', integrating all Naga-dominated areas in India's Northeast. The rebel group is reported to have subsequently decided to ignore the contents of the CMP on the grounds that, 'that was an internal matter of the Government.'

Since November 1999, Padmanabhaiah, a former Union Home Secretary, has been the Union Government's interlocutor, and has held several rounds of talks with the Naga group in Amsterdam, Bangkok, Japan, and Kuala Lumpur. That the 'Greater Nagaland' concept would be discussed in Kohima, Chiang Mai, Bangkok, Amsterdam, et al, was clear when National Security Advisor J.N. Dixit stated in Bangkok that, "Taking into account the totality of the territorial limits of the existing States, that is a matter to be discussed and that's what we are doing."

The Union Government has long fulfilled two of the NSCN-IM's conditionalities - talks at the highest level (including Prime Ministerial) and outside India, in neutral countries - but there have been no reciprocal concessions. There is, moreover, little evidence of any dilution of the NSCN-IM's intransigence on the 'Greater Nagaland' issue and its separatist agenda.

While not much headway has been made in the negotiations since the last cease-fire extension, it is now certain that the insurgency in Nagaland sustains an entirely new genre of politics in the State. While the fundamental responsibilities of governance are increasingly neglected, Nagaland's Finance Minister K. Therie has come up with a disingenuous solution to stop extortion in the insurgency-wrecked State: he proposes that the Government should fund the Naga insurgent groups in order to 'exterminate the scourge of extortion', arguing that this was 'the only way' to end extortion and intimidation among the general population. Therie suggested that a 'neutral agency' handle the funding of the insurgent groups during the ongoing peace talks. Underscoring his commitment to an 'honourable solution' to the Naga imbroglio, Therie warned that the insurgent groups' existing extortion machinery was adversely affecting the prices of essential and all other goods and services, and was destroying the economy and prospects of development in the State.

Within this context, the cease-fire and negotiations have been transformed by the NSCN-IM into a new battleground. The negotiating ensemble has primarily involved recurrent extended cease-fires which, while they may have resulted in the relative cessation of violence, appear to be acquiring the character of ends in themselves. The 'high price of peace' in Nagaland has been consolidated through the continuance of a parallel power structure with an elaborate paraphernalia of armed NSCN-IM cadres imposing 'taxes', operating an 'alternative justice system', and maintaining an extended underground economy and indeed, all the trappings of a 'state within a state'.

Beyond the cessation of hostilities between the insurgents and security forces, consequently, the ceasefire and peace process have little to demonstrate as benefits for the people, or measurable advances in the quality of governance. While internecine clashes (with the rival Khaplang group - the NSCN-K) continue, the people are forced to meet exorbitant extortion demands by the insurgent groups. Insurgent cadres, in violation of the terms of the Ceasefire Agreement, routinely move out of their designated camps to indulge in abductions, killing, intimidation and extortion. Muivah acknowledges this 'problem', arguing, "How can we confine ourselves (to the camps) when Khaplang's cadres and the NNC are freely moving around with weapons? Can we leave the field open to the enemy alone, either militarily or politically?"

The NSCN-IM has used the seven years of the ceasefire to widen its support base both within Nagaland and in the neighbouring States, including the hill areas of Manipur. A comparison of the group's support base in the pre-August 1997 period and the present demonstrates a continuous consolidation of the group over widening areas. Organisations within the State claiming to represent the opinions of an ambiguous 'Naga civil society', have now openly arrayed themselves behind the NSCN-IM. In a recent press release, organisations including the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (NPMHR), Naga Students' Federation (NSF) and Naga Mothers' Association (NMA) have openly proclaimed their support for the insurgent group, declaring their pride in associating with the outfit. The Naga Hoho (apex tribal council), which had consistently refused to be branded as a pro-NSCN-IM grouping till a few years ago, now openly canvasses support for the group, not only in Nagaland, but also in Manipur and Assam. In addition, with an overtly friendly Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN) Government in Kohima and the former Congress Chief Minister and bete noire, S.C. Jamir cooling his heels as Governor of distant Goa, the NSCN-IM's capacity to dictate terms can only grow.

Without any movement beyond an exclusive focus on competitive bargaining, the peace process remains trapped in a quagmire. Both parties will have to explore new and more efficient alternatives if they are to engineer a move forward and escape what has become an established and unproductive orthodoxy.

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
July 26-August 1, 2004

	Civilian	Security Force Personnel	Terrorist	Total
BANGLADESH	3	0	1	4
INDIA
Assam	1	0	0	1
Jammu & Kashmir	16	13	19	48
Left-wing Extremism	2	0	0	2
Manipur	0	5	0	5
Nagaland	0	0	1	1
Tripura	6	0	6	12
Total (INDIA)	25	18	26	69
NEPAL	12	6	11	29
PAKISTAN	2	9	7	18
SRI LANKA	1	0	0	1

Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.

INDIA

Cease-fire with NSCN-IM in Nagaland extended for another year: The Union Government on July 30, 2004, extended by another year the cease-fire with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) following talks with the outfit's leadership in Chiang Mai, Thailand. The decision reportedly came at the end of two days of talks between NSCN-IM Chairman Isaac Chisi Swu and Secretary-General Thuingaleng Muivah and Union Government interlocutor K. Padmanabhaiah. The Hindu, July 31, 2004.

Five police personnel and two terrorists killed during suicide attack in Jammu and Kashmir: Five Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel and two terrorists were killed on July 28, 2004, after an overnight gun-battle inside the para-military force camp on the banks of Dal Lake in the capital, Srinagar. Five CRPF personnel died when a two-member suicide squad of the Al Mansooran outfit barged into the camp, housed in Hotel Livard on July 27-night, Inspector General of Police K. Rajendra Kumar told Press Trust of India. Security forces engaged the terrorists holed up in the

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Weekly Assessments & Briefings Volume 3, No. 3, August 2, 2004

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 3, August 2, 2004